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   ABSTRACT 
 
The field of academic theology is presently maintaining the following about the 
critical thought of the Scottish thinker John Baillie (1886-1960): (1) Baillie’s so-called 
"mediating theology" does not have a concept to contribute to contemporary Christian 
thought; (2) Baillie's concept of "mediated immediacy" is important primarily for 
Baillie's thought in his Our Knowledge of God (1939); (3) mediated immediacy’s logic 
about knowledge of God is severely convoluted. Received positions which support the 
field's marginalization of mediated immediacy's contemporary relevance in particular, 
they come with a concession: (4) the field's confusion about mediated immediacy's 
meaning—this, as evidenced in over 75 years' worth of competing interpretations about 
mediated immediacy’s logic, in particular. 
This thesis centers primarily on Baillie's concept of mediated immediacy, taking 
as its primary aim the resolution of research issues (1-4). In doing so, it demonstrates that 
previous research has underestimated: the staying power of Baillie's mediating theology 
in general, mediated immediacy’s importance for Baillie’s mediating theology in 
particular, and mediated immediacy’s potential as a contribution to contemporary 
Christian thought. Along the way, it resolves several research issues which have been 
occasioned by perennial confusion about the logic of mediated immediacy's normative 
epistemology and descriptive epistemology in particular. Research contributions about 
the logic of mediated immediacy's epistemology per se, these derive from three 
additional research contributions: a diachronic trace of the development of Baillie's 
mediating theology (Baillie research has sought a comprehensive and cogent ordering of 
Baillie's non-systematically articulated critical thought; this thesis provides it, by 
identifying Baillie's espistemic and apologetic preoccupations across his critical thought's 
roughly 35-year development); a modeling of mediated immediacy's logic (previously 
absent in a research corpus whose literature ahs been replete with confusion), that logic's 
expression in what is found to be, contrary to the thrust of previous research, a concept of 
mediated immediacy that serves at least four functions for Baillie's mediating theology; 
and, a comprehensive and rigorous critical evaluation of mediated immediacy’s 
 iv 
epistemology (also previously absent in Baillie research literature), a multi-disciplinary 
evaluation of it's logic (from contemporary philosophical-epistemological, empirical-
psychological and theological-epistemological perspectives), included. An evaluation 
warranted by the multi-disciplinary scope of Baillie's mediating theology, as well as by 
Baillie's employment of his rather versatile concept of mediated immediacy, this 
evaluation considers mediated immediacy's now robustly evaluated logic's consequences 
for core aspects of Baillie's mediating theology, including Baillie’s ideas of knowledge of 
God, divine action, divine revelation and religious experience.  
The definitive work on John Baillie's concept of mediated immediacy, this thesis 
is essential for those with an interest in John Baillie's critical thought. Amongst other 
things, the thesis challenges positions widely held by John Baillie research. For example, 
it demonstrates that a nascent form of mediated immediacy existed in Baillie's thought 
before the concept's first explicit mention in the mediating theologian's 1939 publication 
Our Knowledge of God. Here is a novel interpretation in the research. Furthermore, 
whereas previous research has rightly observed that Baillie’s critical thought gravitates 
toward the problems of revelation and knowledge of God in general, this thesis 
demonstrates that Baillie’s mediating theology focuses on one problem in particular—
across the roughly 35-year span of its development: the problem of the epistemological 
relationship between direct knowledge and indirect knowledge for knowledge of God. In 
addition, this thesis demonstrates that Baillie’s latter mediating theology (post-1939) 
provides a stronger doctrine of the Holy Spirit than that found in Baillie's earlier critical 
thought.  
This thesis may also be of value to persons with broader interests, including the 
epistemic interplay between aspects of philosophy of religion, philosophical theology, 
and empirically-based interpretations of the phenomena of religious experience. 
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“The specific proposals and methodological 
moves made by John [Baillie]… cannot 
usefully be repeated in a quite different 
context decades later. Is it then possible to 
distill an essence from [his] work, from 
whose elements new theological 
programmes can somehow be cloned, as in 
the dinosaurs in Jurrasic Park? Clearly not? 
Dinosaurs will only flourish in an 
appropriately contemporary environment, as 
will theologians.”1 
 
INTRODUCTION: JOHN BAILLIE’S MEDIATING THEOOGY: 
DINOSAURIAN?  
When the Scottish philosophical theologian John Baillie (1886-1960) died, he was 
widely regarded as “one of the most highly respected theologians in Christendom.”2 
Baillie’s distinguished academic career, which had included several posts in American, 
Canadian and Scottish academic institutions, including Chair of Divinity, Edinburgh 
University (1934-1956), testifies to such acclaim. Indeed, “Many of the most famous 
chairs in the English speaking world from the nineteen-forties onward” studied under 
John (and Donald) Baillie, notes Cheyne.3 Baillie’s writing was also widely received in 
academic circles during Baillie’s day. Fey, for example, observes that for “many 
competent researchers the best book on Christian apologetics published in [Baillie’s] time 
was Our Knowledge of God (1939)”.4 After Our Knowledge of God’s success, Baillie 
was promoted to several distinguished church-related and administrative positions.5 Here, 
too, Baillie distinguished himself. Indeed, Mackay6 regards John Baillie as “the leading 
                                                           
1George M. Newlands, John and Donald Baillie: Transatlantic Theology, Vol. 10, Religions and 
Discourse, James Francis (Ed.) (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2002), p. 316. 
2 Harold E. Fey (ed.), Obituary for John Baillie, "The Christian Century”, Oct. 12, 1960, p. 1172. 
3 Alec Cheyne, “The Baillie Brothers: A Biographical Introduction”, p. 21.  In Christ, Church and Society: 
Essays on John Baillie and Donald Baillie, ed. David A.S. Fergusson (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1993). 
4 Fey, ibid. 
5 For example: Moderator of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland (1943-4); Principal of New 
College Edinburgh and Dean of the Faculty of Divinity (1950-6); Co-President of the World Council of 
Churches (1954-60); Chaplain to the King in Scotland (1947-52); Chaplain to the Queen in Scotland (1952-
6); Extra Chaplain to the Queen in Scotland (1956-60). 
6 John A. Mackay, "John Baillie, A Lyrical Appraisal", Scottish Journal of Theology, Vol. 9, 1956, pp. 225-
235. 
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mediational theologian of [his] time” and “probably the most outstanding Scottish 
theologian in the mid-century [20th] century years”.7  In light of Baillie’s personal impact, 
Mackay’s estimation is not without warrant. 
That was yesterday, however; and as Newlands suggests in the opening passage, 
the field of academic theology is hardly persuaded that John Baillie’s thought has 
anything to offer the field today. Can it be rightly said that Baillie’s thought is dead, 
however? Is it entirely devoid of a concept or doctrine of value to contemporary Christian 
thought? This introductory chapter examines research which gets at these and related 
questions. It begins with a review, methodical ordering, and critical analysis of over fifty-
plus years of scholarly criticism aimed at Baillie’s so-called "mediating theology”. It then 
addresses research debate about one of that mediating theology’s concepts, Baillie’s 
concept of mediated immediacy. In light thereof, I argue that contemporary Christian 
thought’s consensus position, John Baillie’s critical content is without contemporary 
theological relevance, is suspect. The chief ground for my claim is that the field has 
failed to evidence an understanding of Baillie's concept of mediated immediacy. A 
concept repeatedly identified by research as important for Baillie’s mediating theology, it 
is one presently in need of “serious theological attention”,8 as Fergusson has maintained. 
The chapter finishes with an overview of how this thesis gives mediating immediacy such 
attention.  
 
1.1. BAILLIE’S MEDIATING THEOLOGY: HISTORIANS’ EVALUATION OF 
ITS ENDURING VALUE 
Research on theological-doctrinal history (e.g., modern Christian thought; history 
of Christian thought; ideas of revelation) in general, coupled with scholarly evaluations 
of Baillie’s mediating theology in particular, evidence that academic theology does not 
regard Baillie’s critical content as being of substantial value for contemporary Christian 
thought.  
                                                           
7 Ibid. Quotes from p. 228. 
8 David A.S. Fergusson, John and Donald Baillie: Selected Writings (Edinburgh:  Saint Andrews Press, 
1997), p. 3. 
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We begin with a consideration of general surveys of contemporary Christian 
thought, taking firstly Ford’s The Modern Theologians.9  An influential and 
comprehensive British exposition of key developments in modern Christian thought, it 
remarks of Baillie’s “mediating theology” merely that it was “moving away from the 
Kantian outlook which shaped [Baillie] as a younger theologian” around 1937.10  
Cunliffe-Jones’s British publication, A History of Christian Doctrine, likewise fails to 
find staying power in the critical content of Baillie’s mediating theology: all that one is 
told, is that it advanced “the normal, orthodox assertion” that knowledge of God “is not 
the result of an inference of any kind”.11 Transatlantic American evaluations of the so-
called “transatlantic” theologian's”12 critical thought also marginalize the present value of 
Baillie’s mediating theology. Consider, for example, Grenz and Olson’s 20th Century 
Theology: God and the World in a Transitional Age.13  An historical survey centered 
upon the development of two doctrines which are emphasized in Baillie’s critical 
thought, the doctrines of God and knowledge of God, this work accordingly recognizes 
Baillie’s The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought: here is a “very positive survey and 
evaluation” of twentieth century ideas of non-propositional revelation.14  Praising thus 
Baillie’s astute acumen and judicious evaluation of other theologians’ ideas of revelation, 
the work is silent on Baillie's own idea of revelation. The same goes for Olson’s quite 
recent (2013) The Journey of Modern Theology: from Reconstruction to 
Deconstruction.15  Initially “a revision” of the Grenz et al. work, it eventually expanded 
to an impressive 700+ page work. Yet for all of Olson’s revision, he does not revise his 
position on Baillie’s critical thought: it is without a contribution to contemporary 
Christian thought. Similarly, Musser and Price note merely in their American publication 
                                                           
9 David F. Ford, ed., The Modern Theologians: An Introduction to Christian theology in the Twentieth 
Century, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997). 
10  Peter Sedgwick, "Theology and Society", pp. 287-288.  In Ford, Modern Theologians.     
11 John Baillie’s Our Knowledge of God, p.  143, as cited in Hubert Cunliffe-Jones, ed., A History of 
Christian Doctrine (paperback edition) (Edinburgh:  T & T Clark, 1997), p. 468. 
12 Newlands, Transatlantic Theology. 
13 Stanley J. Grenz & Roger E. Olson, 20th Century Theology: God and the World in a Transitional Age 
(Downers Grove, IL:  InterVarsity Press, 1992). 
14 Ibid., note #15, p. 325.  
15 Roger E. Olson, The Journey of Modern Theology: From Reconstruction to  Deconstruction. Downers 
Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2013. 
 4 
A New Handbook of Christian Theologians16that Baillie helped persuade T.F. Torrance to 
take a position at Auburn Seminary.17 This, however, is more than one will find in 
Livingston’s 2006 Modern Christian Thought: The Twentieth Century. This American 
publication “covers the twentieth century and includes chapters on the important 
movements, theologians and writers of the century, including developments in the last 
years of the century.”18 A review of its 544 pages will disclose that it never even 
mentions John Baillie’s name. Kapic and McCormack’s more recent (2012) American 
publication, Mapping Modern Theology: A Thematic and Historical Introduction, follows 
suit: it notes, for example, the contributions of Barth, the brothers Niebuhr, and Baillie’s 
student T.F. Torrance, though says nothing about John Baillie’s modern theology. 
Of course it is not as if historians of Christian thought have found nothing of 
value in Baillie’s critical thought. Writing from Oxford University, Trevor Williams, for 
example, maintains that John Baillie (like Donald Baillie) “helped secure a middle 
ground for those open to Barthian influence but less inclined to abandon all the insights 
of the immanentist tradition”.19 A presumed accolade for Baillie’s talent for mediating 
between theological extremes, it echoes Macquarrie's quite similar estimation of Baillie’s 
theology, articulated some 15 years earlier: Baillie's theology, forged at a time which “so 
stressed God’s transcendence that any sense of his presence in the world was almost 
lost”, stands out as a “notable exception”: its doctrine of God mediates between two 
“unfortunate” Protestant-theological “extremes” characteristic of Baillie’s day—viz., the 
nineteenth-century’s overemphasis on God’s immanent presence and the early twentieth-
century’s overemphasis on God’s transcendence.20 That said, neither Williams nor 
Macquarrie maintain that Baillie’s thought per se is of value to modern Christian thought. 
The same goes for the rather important The Oxford Companion to Christian Thought :21 
                                                           
16 Donald W. Musser & Joseph L. Price, ed., A New Handbook of Christian Theologians (Nashville, TN: 
Abingdon Press, 1996). 
17 Ibid., p. 461. 
18 James C. Livingston, and Francis Schüssler Fiorenza. Modern Christian thought: The Twentieth Century,  
Vol. 2 (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2006), Preface. 
19  Trevor Williams, "Protestant Theology: Britain", p. 484.  In Alister E. McGrath, ed., Modern Christian 
Thought (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1993). 
20  John Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, revised edition (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1977), p. 
203; note #18, ibid.  
21 Adrian Hastings and Alistair Mason and Hugh Pyper, eds.  The Oxford Companion to Christian Thought. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
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although it rightly provides entries for several of Baillie’s contemporaries, it neither 
provides and entry for Baillie, let alone an argument for the contemporary relevance of 
Baillie’s critical thought.  
Baillie’s theological corpus indicates that his was a career-long preoccupation 
with both the problems of revelation and knowledge of God.22 Consequently, one would 
expect Baillie’s thought to surface in the more specialized surveys that are concerned 
with the idea of revelation.  One does. For example, Macdonald makes mention of 
Baillie’s idea of revelation in his work Ideas of Revelation.23 Therein, Macdonald claims 
that Baillie's idea of revelation “sharpened the divorce” between revelation and Biblical 
inspiration during the early twentieth century.24  Nevertheless, Macdonald certainly does 
not take this as a gain for Christian thought; his own idea of revelation argues against the 
wisdom of such a divorce. Moreover, when Macdonald does make but passing reference 
to Baillie's idea of revelation, that reference is occasioned by, and incidental to, 
MacDonald's exposition of what he reckons to be more important twentieth century ideas 
of revelation, those of Barth and Brunner.25  Instructive also is Avery Dulles’s creative 
and instructive Models of Revelation.26 Something of a minor classic in theological 
typology, when this veritable tour de force of models of revelation turns to Baillie’s idea 
of revelation, it notes merely that Baillie’s survey of the idea of revelation demonstrates 
“'a remarkable breadth of agreement [among twentieth century theologians] that ‘God 
reveals himself in action’”.27 By Dulles’s estimation, then, Baillie was a capable historian 
of other theologians’ ideas of revelation, albeit a theologian whose own idea of revelation 
is without value for contemporary Christian thought.  
We find, then, a tendency amongst both historians of Christian thought in general, 
and historians concerned with the idea’s of knowledge of God and revelation, to dismiss 
                                                           
22 Professor Macquarrie remarks in his Twentieth Century Religious Thought (p. 340): "In particular, the 
problem of revelation and of our knowledge of God continually exercised [Baillie’s] mind…” Similarly, 
Professor Newlands identifies ground for knowledge of a personal God as a central concern in Baillie’s 
critical thought.  See George M. Newlands, “The Sense of the Presence of God”, p. 155. In Fergusson, 
Christ, Church and Society (pp.155-169)  
23 H.D. McDonald, Ideas of Revelation: An Historical Study: 1860-1960 (London: George Allen & Unwin 
Ltd., 1963). 
24 Ibid., p. 173. 
25 See pp. 162-168 passim for other remarks.   
26 Avery Dulles, Models of Revelation (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan Ltd., 1992). 
27 Baillie, The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought (pp. 49-50), cited in Dulles, p. 53. 
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the contemporary relevance or staying power of Baillie’s mediating theology. This 
marginalization is not without warrant; it is amply backed by the leading Baillie 
scholarship’s present estimation of the virtues of Baillie’s mediating theology.   
 
1.2. BAILLIE’S MEDIATING THEOLOGY: BAILLIE RESEARCHERS' 
EVALUATION OF ITS ENDURING VALUE 
A review of over 50 years of scholarly criticism of Baillie's critical thought 
discloses a theme that continues to pervade the literature: John Baillie's critical thought 
is, as the opening quote has been found to suggest, dinosaurian: dead and unable to 
survive a now more demanding intellectual terrain, contemporary Christian thought.  
The publication dates of the histories of Christian thought thus considered span 
roughly the past two decades. Concurrently, the past two decades have witnessed 
resurgence in research on John Baillie's life and thought. Research that has hailed 
typically from Scottish Universities,28 it has afforded generally positive appraisals of its 
native son’s mediating theology, as one would expect. Newlands, for example, has of late 
emphasized the positive impact of Baillie's mediating theology on transatlantic 
theological developments29: Baillie, one is told, was a mediating theologian with an 
uncanny talent for relating Christian thought to secular thought (and vice versa)—a 
superb “bridge builder” whose theological prowess is “needed by every theological age, 
our age included.”30  
                                                           
28 E.g., George M. Newlands, John and Donald Baillie: Transatlantic Theology, Vol. 10, Religions and 
Discourse, James Francis (Ed.) (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2002); David A.S. Fergusson, John and Donald 
Baillie: Selected Writings (Edinburgh: Saint Andrews Press, 1997); David A.S Fergusson, ed., Christ, 
Church and Society: Essays on John Baillie and Donald Baillie (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1993). Professor 
Fergusson’s works were published while he was at Aberdeen. In Fergusson’s Christ, Church and Society, 
all of the essays focused primarily on John Baillie’s life and thought issue from thinkers each of whom has 
been affiliated with, or is affiliated with, Scottish universities. This includes: Alec C. Cheyne, Professor of 
Ecclesiastical History in Edinburgh (1964-86); David A.S. Fergusson, then Professor of Systematic 
Theology in the University of Aberdeen (1990-99), now at New College, Edinburgh; Duncan B. Forrester, 
then Professor of Christian Ethics and Practical Theology, University of Edinburgh; now Professor 
Emeritus; George S. Hendry, former parish minister in Bridge of Allan (1930-49), and Charles Hodge 
Professor of Systematic Theology at Princeton Theological Seminary (1949-73); John C. Lusk, a minister 
in the Church of Scotland; George Newlands, then Professor of Divinity in the University of Glasgow; T.F. 
Torrance, Professor of Christian Dogmatics in the University of Edinburgh (1952-79); and James A. 
Whyte, Professor of Practical Theology and Christian Ethics in the University of St. Andrews (1958-87). 
As indicated in the preface of Fergusson, Christ, Church and Society, 1993. 
29 As amply demonstrated in George M. Newlands, John and Donald Baillie: Transatlantic Theology, Vol. 
10. In Religions and Discourse, ed. James Francis. Oxford: Peter Lang, 2002. 
30 Newlands, Transatlantic Theology, p. 297.  
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And yet it is not without irony that research from Scottish academic quarters 
collectively provide plausibly the most compelling argument for the inability of Baillie’s 
critical thought to thrive beyond its “theological age, our age included”; for we find 
Scottish theologian’s overall evaluations of Baillie’s mediating theology tending to 
marginalize the staying power of Baillie’s critical thought. Specifically, while these 
global evaluations typically do commend Baillie for his theological method, powers of 
observation and writing style, they are yet routinely tight-lipped about the enduring value 
of Baillie's theological content per se.  Here, it will prove helpful to divulge the pattern to 
which overall evaluations of Baillie's life and thought have tended to conform for over 50 
years. The pattern of evaluation tends to emphasize the following virtues.   
 
The Often-Identified Virtues of Baillie's Mediating Theology (“V”)   
 
(V1) Its harmonious marriage of critical theology and the Christian faith;  
(V2) Its astute observation and judicious evaluation of other thinker’s thoughts;  
(V3) Its style;   
(V4) Its mediating theological method;  
 
Combinations of (V1-4) also come with  
 
(V5) The absence of an argument that Baillie's mediating theology produced a doctrine or 
concept of value to contemporary Christian thought.   
  
We begin with John Mackay’s “John Baillie, A Lyrical Tribute and Appraisal”.31 
In this memoriam, Mackay identifies Baillie as the “leading mediational theologian of 
[his] time” and proceeds to what, in written form, constitutes the next section of 
Mackay’s essay, “The Theologian”. Here, Mackay identifies the mediational theologian's 
virtues: "Few writers can match him [Baillie] in doing critical justice to the thought of 
others. His capacity to relate theological ideas to realities of the secular order is 
                                                           
31 John A. Mackay, "John Baillie, A Lyrical Tribute and Appraisal", Scottish Journal of Theology, Vol. 9, 
1956, pp. 225-35. 
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particularly impressive."32 This gives way to Mackay's global assessment of Baillie's life 
and thought. Did Baillie’s meditational theology provide a particularly impressive 
theological concept? Apparently it did not; for what ensues is an emphasis on the stylistic 
and formal qualities of Baillie’s critical thought: “To a greater extent than any 
professional theologian of our time John Baillie’s work combined the finest scholarship 
with a deep devotional spirit…”33 
Although Mackay’s academic-theological career was distinguished primarily on 
transatlantic shores,34 Mackay, Baillie’s fellow Scot, Invernessian and lifelong friend, 
advances an evaluation of Baillie’s thought, in The Scottish Journal of Theology, the 
contours of which will be repeatedly emphasized by Scottish university-affiliated 
theologians’ estimations of Baillie's theological virtues.  As such, it repays study. 
 
Mackay’s Assessment of Baillie’s Mediational Theology’s Merits (“M”) 
 
(M1)  Its marriage of a “deeply devotional spirit” with “finest scholarship”; [Cf. V1, V3]  
(M2)  Its judicious treatment of (“critical justice to”) other thinkers’ thoughts; [Cf. V2] 
(M3)  Its “particularly impressive” relating of “theological ideas” to “the secular order”.   
           (Cf. V4)   These (M1-M3) contributed to John Baillie's being  
(M4) “[T]he leading mediational theologian of his time”.  (Cf. V4) 
 
Mackay’s assessment of Baillie’s theological merits is also   
  
(M5) Without an argument that Baillie's mediating theology produced a doctrine or 
concept of value to contemporary Christian thought.35 (Cf. V5) 
 
Implicit, then, in Mackay's evaluation is that Baillie's mediating theology is dead (M5). 
                                                           
32 Ibid., pp. 229-30. 
33 Ibid., p. 227. 
34 President and Professor of Ecumenics, Princeton Theological Seminary, 1936-1959.  
35 Of course, one would hardly expect an argument from Mackey in a memoriam! Still, the occasion would 
have easily afforded Mackay the opportunity to make at least the claim that Baillie’s thought produced a 
particularly fruitful concept or doctrine for contemporary Christian thought.    
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Fergusson provides a more recent, and substantially more penetrating, analysis of 
Baillie's critical thought in his important “John Baillie: Orthodox Liberal”.36  The present 
concern is with its conclusions. To put them in context, Fergusson, having thus laid bare 
the contours of the development of Baillie’s critical thought, restates the main point 
developed in his essay: Baillie’s childhood rearing in orthodox Calvinism, and 
subsequently increased theologically openness to modernity's theological criticism, 
shaped Baillie’s theological method—one carried out in a typically “orthodox-liberal” 
manner.  The “theological virtues” of Baillie's mediating theology are subsequently 
identified:     
Fergusson’s Assessment of Baillie’s Theological Virtues (“F) 
 
(F1) Baillie’s “orthodox-liberal” theology is a “. . . creative blend of Christian piety and 
intellectual honesty…”  
(F2) Baillie’s “strategy of mediation was not an easy and comfortable compromise 
between opposites.” 
(F3) Baillie’s apologetic style “was unfailingly irenic, [though] he never sought a false 
peace with rival opinions.”  
(F4) Baillie’s theology is always “illuminating and instructive” on the issue of “the way 
in which Christian witness to the uniqueness of the person and work of Christ can be set 
alongside the disclosure and activity of God amongst other religions and traditions...”   
(F5) Baillie’s theology has a “harmony and style”. “A spirituality pervades Baillie’s 
philosophical, dogmatic, apologetic, and devotional writings and this is reflected in his 
calm and elegant prose style.”  
 
Here, then, are the mediating theologian’s “highest achievements”.37  What is one to 
make of them? For one, it is readily apparent that Fergusson’s evaluation of Baillie’s 
mediating theology is not unlike Mackay’s evaluation (M):    
 
                                                           
36 David A. Fergusson, “John Baillie: Orthodox Liberal”. In Fergusson, ed., Christ, Church and Society, pp. 
123-153. 
37 “Orthodox Liberal”, p. 152. 
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Mackay and Fergusson’s Assessments of the Virtues of Baillie’s Mediating Theology: 
Points of Agreement (“MF”)  
 
(MF1) Its positive spiritual quality (Cf. F1, F5 and M1 as:   V1);    
(MF2) Its judicious assessment of other thinker’s thoughts (Cf. F1 - F3 and M2 as:  V2)  
(MF3)  Its stylistic quality.  Fergusson lays more emphasis on the stylistic elements of 
Baillie’s critical thought. (Cf. F3, V2) 
(MF4) Its method’s ability to relate Christian thought to non-Christian thought. “(Cf. M3 
and F4 as:   V4 ).  
 
Likewise, Fergusson's identification of Baillie’s "highest achievements”:           
 
(MF5) Is without an argument that Baillie’s mediating theology produced a doctrine or 
concept of value for contemporary Christian thought. (Cf. M1–M4; cf. F1-F5 as:   V5)  
 
Of the above conclusions, (F4) and (F5) require further consideration, as they could 
suggest that Fergusson finds life in Baillie's critical thought—a promising doctrine or 
concept for contemporary Christian thought. For example, (F4) does suggest that 
Baillie’s thought provides a promising idea of revelation—one perhaps able to reconcile 
the Christian idea of knowledge of God in Jesus Christ with other religions’ ideas of 
divine action, in particular. Fergusson's criticism of Baillie's thought, indicated elsewhere 
in the essay, appear to nullify, however, the possibility that Baillie’s idea of revelation is 
promising in those respects:          
    
 
There still remains an unresolved tension in Baillie’s 
theology which suggests a failure to think through a 
theological epistemology consistent with the position he 
holds.  Is our knowledge of God derived primarily from the 
revelation attested to in Scripture and proclaimed by the 
Church or is it derived primarily from the moral sense 
which is common to all religions and traditions? If both are 
related to [sic] admitted as sources of theological 
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knowledge, how are they to be related and integrated?  
Although we can discern hints of a possible reconciliation 
in his last work, these questions are not dealt with at any 
point in Baillie’s corpus, and this may be the outstanding 
weakness in his theology.38             
 
 
 
If, then, Fergusson is correct—Baillie’s idea of revelation fails to integrate special 
revelation (Christian knowledge of God) with general revelation (a moral sense of God 
indigenous to persons of all religions and traditions)—I should think Baillie’s mediating 
theology rather ill equipped to be (F4) "illuminating and instructive" on “the way in 
which Christian witness to the uniqueness of the person and work of Christ can be set 
alongside the disclosure and activity of God amongst other religions and traditions...” 
This is because a cogent elucidation of revelation’s integration across religions would 
demand at least the following: (1) a lucid (and persuasive) description of how knowledge 
of God is mediated across religious traditions; (2) a conceptually clear demarcation of 
specifically Christian revelatory content from non-Christian revelatory content—i.e., an 
elucidation of what is qualitatively distinct in God’s revelation in and to each religion. 
This (1-2), however, is exactly what Baillie’s idea of revelation fails to provide, 
according to Fergusson. For one, Baillie’s idea of revelation fails to identify the primary 
locus for the mediation of a specifically Christian revelation: “Is our knowledge of God 
derived primarily from the revelation attested to in Scripture and proclaimed by the 
Church or is it derived primarily from the moral sense which is common to all religions 
and traditions?”39 Not only does Baillie’s elucidation of divine revelation suffer from 
apparent internal logical difficulties when it describes Christian knowledge of God per 
se; it fails to differentiate a specifically Christian locus of revelation from that for 
knowledge of God in general: Baillie’s is a problematic elucidation of how a universal 
moral sense mediates a general knowledge of God, Fergusson maintains. If, then, 
Baillie’s idea of revelation is illuminating and instructive on Christian revelation's 
relationship to a universal revelation, such a theological virtue would appear to as an 
                                                           
38 Ibid., p. 146.  
39 Ibid., p. 146. 
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object lesson of sorts—a testimony, for example, to the pitfalls of a Christian theology 
inclined to couch religious belief in a universal moral sense of God’s presence.40  Indeed, 
at least one point41 in Baillie’s theological development, Baillie himself does appear 
inclined to reject the possibility of (1-2)—that is, the conceptual integration of multiple 
religious experiences with multiple revelations which might afford positively 
enlightening instruction on the issue of revelation. Perhaps this is what Fergusson has in 
mind, when he admits that Baillie's illuminating and instructive epistemology fails to 
resolve certain revelation-related "questions [that] are not dealt with at any point in 
Baillie’s corpus” to Fergusson's own satisfaction? Regardless, there is scant evidence to 
suggest that Fergusson thinks Baillie's idea of revelation a positive gain for Christian 
thought. Consequently, this global evaluation of Baillie’s critical thought tacitly asserts 
the popular position (V5):  Baillie’s mediating theology is dead: it without a doctrine or 
concept of positive value for contemporary Christian thought.  
Newlands, writing in Fergusson's excellent collection of essays, also weighs in on 
Baillie's mediating-theological virtues. His first assessment of John's (and Donald's) 
theological legacy (“N1”) arrives in the context of an elucidation and appraisal of 
Baillie’s most mature thought, Baillie’s posthumously published Gifford Lectures, The 
Sense of the Presence of God (1962). Newlands states:        
 
 
I refer to the eirenic quality which characterises much of 
the Baillie brothers’ work, and which enabled them to draw 
inspiration from many sources, from the theological right 
and from the theological left, from different philosophical 
traditions and devotional traditions, from different 
cultures… [T]hey displayed a rare and remarkable freedom 
to choose and to communicate with different perspectives.  
This is not the least of the legacies of John Baillie…42   
 
 
                                                           
40 See ibid., p. 135.  
41 "To stop short anywhere within the religious experience of our race [when distinguishing Christian 
revelation from non-Christian revelation] is to express a purely arbitrary preference and to draw a line for 
ourselves where no line exists.” See IOR, p. 62. 
42 Newlands, "The Sense of the Presence of God", p. 165. 
 13 
Elsewhere in the essay, Newlands augments his estimation of John's legacy with the 
remark that Baillie was “one of the most perceptive and judicious of twentieth century 
theologians”43.   
Taken as a whole, then, Newlands’s evaluation can be summarized as follows. 
 
Newlands's First Assessment of the Chief Merits of Baillie's Mediating Theology (“N1”) 
 
(N1) Its astute observation and judicious evaluation of other perspectives (Cf. V2) 
(N2) Its stylistic quality—its irenic style, in particular (Cf. V3)  
(N3) Its mediating theological method draws from and effectively dialogues with 
different positions (Cf. V4) 
 
In addition, Newlands’s appraisal of Baillie’s legacy is one 
  
(N4) Without an argument that Baillie's mediating theology produced a concept of 
enduring value for contemporary Christian thought. (Cf. V5)  
 
We observe, then, that overall evaluation N1 conforms to overall evaluation V, the 
exception being that it does not advance the merits indicated in proposition (V1): 
Baillie’s harmonious infusion of devotional and critical thought. 
Newlands’s superb John and Donald Baillie: Transatlantic Theology44 provides 
the definitive research on John Baillie's life and thought to-date. Authoritative work that 
                                                           
43 Ibid., p. 155. 
44 George M. Newlands, John and Donald Baillie: Transatlantic Theology, Vol. 10, in Religions and 
Discourse, James Francis, ed. Oxford: Peter Lang, 2002. A work whose aim is to elucidate language and 
culture’s collective effect on western Christian theology both immediately before and after World War II, it 
effectively realizes its aim as within the broader context of an elucidation and analysis of major historical, 
sociological and cultural developments of the first half of the twentieth century. This gives way to a 
diachronic and conceptual elucidation of the social context in which John and Donald Baillie developed 
their own, particular “transatlantic” theologies. Here, the “Baillie Papers”—an expansive number of papers 
(diaries, letters, and papers penned by the Baillie’s) hitherto unavailable to mainline research—prove rather 
insightful for understanding the historical development of the Baillie brothers' theologies. For example, 
these papers provide substantial insight into the Baillies’ transatlantic activities, their well-document 
collective influence on the theology of their day, included. John, for instance, is found to have been 
instrumental in the shaping of the American, Scottish and ecumenical theological scene from roughly 1930-
1960.  The "Baillie Papers" also provide Newlands insight into the theoretical construction of a new critical 
liberal theology. 
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it is, it effectively evidences the tendency of Baillie scholarship to marginalize the 
contemporary theological relevance of Baillie’s mediating theological content per se. 
This marginalization is evidenced in Newlands's overall evaluation of John Baillie’s 
mediating theology, located in Chapter 8: “Faith, Theology, and Culture—An 
Assessment”. Here, the major research findings are consolidated and ordered in six 
subsections. Given the work’s importance, I shall explicate at length its research findings 
and accompanying conclusions.        
  
(Introduction)  The “book does not have a conclusion”—that is, an all-encompassing 
conclusion about the Baillies’ thought. Yet conclusions are drawn: "Theology needs its 
prophetic protesting figures like Kierkegaard and Barth.  But it also needs people like the 
Baillie’s, to discern connections, to build bridges between different styles of theology, 
between theology and culture . . ." A six-fold organizational scheme for elucidating how 
the Baillie’s can “help us in the task of relating theology to church and society, faith to 
culture in the present” ensues.  
 
(1) “Developing Engagement with the Baillie's”.  This review of “the most significant 
findings” from essays in Fergusson’s Christ, Church and Society introduces a point of 
disagreement in the literature: Fergusson maintains that Baillie’s latter critical thought 
was more creative than his early thought; Newlands thinks “Baillie’s theology is creative 
in different ways at different times.”  
 
(2) “Christian Faith and Culture”.  “In assessing further here . . . the impact of the 
Baillie’s life and work, we shall seek to bear in mind the changing cultures in which they 
were working.”  Cultural changes shaped and facilitated Baillie’s theological impact on 
American and Scottish culture: “John had real influence, though it should not be 
overestimated, on Presbyterian thought between about 1930 and 1960.”  That influence 
faded in the late 1950’s, in lieu of cultural and intellectual changes.  Accordingly, John’s 
Gifford Lectures (1962) spoke only “to John’s established readers.  Others were now into 
new territory in philosophy and theology—notably linguistic philosophy and Barth 
respectively—and last year's fashion seems the most dated of all.” 
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(3) “The American Dimension”.  Baillie’s Scottish evangelical-theological heritage was 
well received by the early, twentieth century American theological scene. One reason 
for its reception was its ability to combine strengths from evangelical liberalism with 
lessons learned from the Barthian school. This helped Baillie and others (Reinhold 
Niebuhr, Van Dusen, and Sloan Coffin) construct an independent theological position 
which would play a central role in world ecumenical movements from 1930 to 1950.       
 
Newlands subsequently identifies the strengths of Baillie’s critical thought:  
 
(4) “Text in Context”.  Baillie’s exposure to transatlantic culture broadened Baillie’s 
theological perspective. This broadening, in turn, helped facilitate the development of 
strengths in Baillie’s mediating theology ("N2"):    
 
(N2:1) Balance.  “John was not inclined to jump into espousing a particular 
viewpoint without qualification...  But he was always concerned to see particular 
movements in their particular context, to be appreciated and learned from but not 
to be followed slavishly.  He succeeded in creating a balance which was a 
considerable strength.”   
(N2:2) Method.  Baillie’s theological method is “one particular model which was 
particularly effective in producing constructive theology while maintaining a 
critical dialogue between theology and culture at the same time.”   
 
In which direction did Baillie’s balanced theological method lean?  Was it preoccupied 
with the systematic articulation of timeless theological truths; or was it primarily 
concerned to respond theologically to intellectual currents prominent during Baillie’s 
day?  “John Baillie’s work does not read like a timeless Summa.  Indeed it could not, 
because it quite deliberately addresses current intellectual issues with a sympathetic 
sensitivity to their own agenda.”   
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(N2:3) Particularity.  In keeping with its “sympathetic sensitivity” toward 
intellectual currents, Baillie’s critical thought’s “effectiveness depends on its 
particularity.”    
 
“Yet its methodology, of careful dissection of all the relevant concepts, has a 
classic quality which makes it a model of its own kind.”   
 
What, then, is the present-day value of Baillie’s mediating theology? They are its:     
 
(N2:4) Methodological value.  Baillie’s liberal Christian method demonstrates 
potential as an intercultural hermeneutic, despite its claims to experiences which 
transcend nature.   
(N2:5) Epistemological potential.  Baillie’s idea of immediacy may have 
potential for Reformed epistemological debate over the issue of non-inferential 
modes of knowing.  
 
(5) “Personal Impact”.  One of Baillie’s former students (David H. C. Read) speaks to 
Baillie’s pedagogical prowess in America.  Baillie was well respected, and thought ‘very 
human and very funny’.  Baillie was able to relax in America—generally not the case 
when he lived in Scotland.  The section closes with remarks about Donald.     
 
(6) “Beyond the Frontiers of Liberal Theology”.  The critical theological legacy of John 
and Donald’s thought is now cast into bold relief: John and Donald’s thought are 
“dinosaurs”: well adapted to their (intellectual-cultural) milieu, it died with changes in 
(intellectual-cultural) climate.  Newlands then entertains the possibility of resurrecting 
the Baillies' thought:     
 
 
Is it then possible to distill an essence of their work, from 
whose elements new theological programmes can somehow 
be cloned . . .?  Clearly not . . .  [However] we can still 
consider the possible legacy of the Baillie’s for theology.   
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What, then, is the “possible legacy of the Baillie’s” thought? Newlands's global 
evaluation of that legacy centers primarily on their mediating theological method: 
 
Newlands’s Estimation of the Possible Legacy of the Baillie’s (“N2”) 
 
(N2:6:1) John (and Donald) provides an example of an “evangelical liberal approach to 
theology [which] sought to combine critical openness to modern scholarship at all levels 
with commitment to Christian faith.”  
(N2:6:2) John shows us that “the basic problem with liberal theology was its illusion to 
finality.” 
(N2:6:3) John (and Donald) demonstrates that “an evangelical liberal theology would 
also have to learn from the catholic dimensions of Christianity . . .” 
(N2:6:4) John (and Donald) makes it clear that “above all, a new critical liberal theology 
has to be confident in developing its own response to the divine transcendence.” 
(N2:6:5) The Baillie's also teach us that “a theology of transformative Christian practice 
will shed new light on the mystery of faith, changing the contours of the landscape to 
produce surprise and devotion.” 
(N2:6:6) The Baillies’ liberal evangelical theological method demonstrate “that such an 
enterprise is part of a well-established tradition whose theological credentials are at least 
as solid as any other candidates in the theological tradition, and whose potential for 
deployment in a theology of the future is still immense.”45 
 
Here, then, is an overall evaluation from the definitive work on Baillie’s life and thought.   
 
We observe that Newlands's second overall evaluation of Baillie's thought (hence, 
"N2") is a substantially more nuanced account than the earlier and necessarily briefer N1: 
Baillie’s strengths and potential legacy are indicated across six subsections (N2:1-N2:6).  
We also find that N2’s conclusions (sections four and six) are consistent with N1—i.e.,  
                                                           
45 Transatlantic Theology, Chap. 8, pp. 297–319, passim.  
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consistent with MF—i.e., consistent with M and F—i.e., consistent with V. That N2 does 
largely reiterate those emphases of V is apparent when we recall V, which has been found 
to be identical with M, and square it with N2’s salient findings.   
 
Baillie’s Theological Virtues: From Mackay (1956) to Newlands (2002):  
Points of Agreement (“VN2”) 
 
(V1) Its harmonious marriage of critical theology and the Christian faith (Cf. N2:6:1) 
(V2) Its astute elucidation and judicious evaluation of thinkers’ thoughts (Cf. N2:1) 
(V3) Its style (downplayed in this work's overall evaluation)  
(V4) Its mediating theological method (Cf. N2:1-4; N2: 6 passim) 
 
This combination (V1-4) comes  
 
(V5) Without an argument that Baillie's mediating theology produced a concept of 
enduring value for contemporary Christian thought 
 
It should be noted that Newlands, writing nearly fifty years after Mackay, does deviate 
from position (V). For one, there is no explicit contention in N2 for Baillie’s excellent 
style of writing (cf. N).  Secondly, N2 suggests that Baillie’s mediating theological 
legacy could provide a paradigm or template for the construction of a new critical liberal 
“theology of the future”. This is a new spin in the literature, to my knowledge. It is an 
estimation of the enduring value of Baillie’s method to which I shall return in the final 
chapter of the thesis.  Thirdly, (N2: 5) does suggest that Baillie’s mediating-theological 
content—which is to say, neither merely his literary style nor his mediating theological 
method—holds promise for contemporary Christian thought. Specifically, it is suggested 
that Baillie’s idea of immediacy holds potential for reformed epistemological debate over 
the issue of non-inferential modes of knowing. It is a suggestion interesting even more, as 
Baillie's concept of mediated immediacy presupposes the idea of immediate knowledge 
of God suggested to be of possible contemporary-theological value.  
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Does Baillie’s own idea of immediacy hold promise as a contribution to 
contemporary Christian thought? Although Newlands does not argue that it does, when 
his historical-epistemological observation suggests such promise, it does so with recourse 
to Power’s thought46 as ground. There is, however, nothing in Power’s not-so-novel 
observation47 that Baillie’s idea of immediacy anticipates the reformed epistemological 
emphasis on non-inferential or immediate knowledge of God, those of Alston and 
Plantinga included, to suggest that Power is persuaded that Baillie’s own idea of 
immediacy could survive, let alone impact, those epistemological advances that have 
ensued since Baillie’s death. Surely, Newlands is aware of this. Consequently, we must 
conclude that N2 advances proposition (V5)—this rather in keeping with his position that 
Baillie’s critical content is, by contemporary apologetic standards, dinosaurian.  
The relatively recent research on John Baillie has provided us considerable insight 
into Baillie’s life and thought. I am hardly taking odds with the explicit propositions 
advanced in its overall evaluations of Baillie’s critical thought. For instance, it appears 
incontrovertible that Baillie’s corpus is replete with astute observations. In addition, it 
seems reasonable to think that the mediating theologian was a generally a faithful 
observer and even-handed critic of other thinkers’ thought, if it is assuredly the case that 
not all research specialists (for instance, experts on the thought of Barth, James, Kant, 
Schleiermacher) would agree with all of Baillie’s appraisals of multifarious thinkers’ 
thoughts.48 Axiomatic also, I think, is that Baillie's legacy includes his production of 
powerful devotional material. Perhaps T.F. Torrance puts it best, when he praises 
Baillie’s elegant fusion of critical thought with devotional-oriented material:      
 
 
                                                           
46 Power (1994), as Newlands notes, has examined mediated immediacy's possible impact on reformed 
epistemology. Power does not contend that the concept holds promise for contemporary Christian thought, 
its idea of immediacy, included. See William L. Power, "Our Knowledge of God", Perspectives in 
Religious Studies, 21, 1994, pp. 231-43. 
47Hoitenga similarly observes in his earlier work that “Baillie is a good example of the typically Reformed 
effort to avoid natural theology in the interest of defending the priority of a non-inferential way of knowing 
from our experience of the world.” Dewey J. Hoitenga, Jr., Faith and Reason from Plato to Platinga: An 
Introduction to Reformed Epistemology. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1991, p. 157. 
48 For example, not only was Baillie unfamilar with Barth’s final and uncomplete thought in Chuch 
Dogmatics, according to Fergusson: “It is not clear that Baillie had read much beyond Church Dogmatics 
I/3.” “Orthodox Liberal”, note 70, p. 151. 
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In no theologian of our time has the contemplation of God 
been so wedded to a beauty of form deriving from rational 
worship.  It flowed over into his appreciation of all lovely 
creatures and of the works of God’s children, whether in 
music or drawing or porcelain or verse; but is most 
manifest in the form of his thoughts and the corresponding 
form of his writing.  We have rarely known such 
theological prose as flowed from the pen of John Baillie—
even his writing was a worshipping and honouring of God 
in the beauty of holiness.49 
 
 
 
Surely, a work like Baillie's A Diary of Private Prayer50 readily attests to Baillie’s 
eloquence as a writer of devotional material. Likewise, the chapters of Baillie’s own life 
exemplified a harmonious, if not always easily reconcilable, marriage between an 
academic theologian’s critical contemplation of Christian doxa and a Christian believer’s 
devout walk of Christian praxis.51  
Still, if both historians of Christian thought and the leading Baillie research are 
correct, Baillie failed, for all his acumen, to pen a theological concept of enduring value 
for Christian thought.52 This present marginalization of the enduring value of Baillie’s 
critical thought, includes, we have found, no shortage of scholars on each side of the 
                                                           
49 Thomas F. Torrance, “John Baillie at Prayer.” In Fergusson, Christ Church and Society (pp. 253-261), p. 
257. 
50 John Baillie, A Diary of Private Prayer. London: Oxford University Press, 1936. 
51  See Thomas F. Torrance, "A living Sacrifice: In Memoriam, John Baillie, 1886-1960”, Religion in Life, 
Vol. 30, No. 3 (summer, 1961), pp. 329-333.  
52 In this context, we could find attidional support in the thought of the late A.C. Cheyne. The former 
Professor of Ecclesiastical History (1964-1986) and Principal at New College, Edinburgh (where he taught 
from 1958-1986) indicates in Chapter 10 (“John and Donald Baillie: A Biographical Intruduction”) of his 
Studies in Scottish Church History: “In what follows an attempt will be made to assess the Baillies’ 
theological achievement…” (p. 201). Having lucidly dealt with the Baillies’ spiritual and intellectual 
inheritance, Cheyne identifies “their distinctive contribution” in a section by the same name. A review of 
the three areas in which the Baillies made contributions distinct (“Apologetic Concern”, “Sensitivity in the 
treatment of doubt and unbelief”, “Resistance to the Barthian onslaught”) will also indicate an asssesment 
absent of the claim that John Baillie’s thought has a concept of value for contemporary Christian thought. 
Noteworthy also, is that Cheyne’s identification of Baillie’s “theological achievements” does not conform 
to the commonplace pattern for evaluations of Baillie’s theology. See A.C. Cheyne, Studies in Scottish 
Church History, pp. 199-236 (esp., pp. 218 ff). Edinburgh:  T&T Clark, 1999. In addtion, I find it 
interesting that when Cheyne introduces this essay in Fergusson’s earlier Christ, Church and Society 
(1993), Cheyne uses the phrase “the significance of the Baillie’s theology” and not the more decisive “the 
Baillie’s theological achievement” when discussing his evluatory aim for the latter work. Had Cheyne 
become more certain that these were ultimately John Baillie’s distinct contributions to Christian thought?  
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Atlantic. Consider, for example, “John Baillie: A Mediating Theologian”,53written by the 
American Power: a work published by the Union Theological Seminary at which Baillie 
once taught; a work poised to identify the virtues of Baillie’s mediating theology; a work 
with no shortage of space (20+ pages) to do so; it is a work without an argument that the 
transatlantic “mediating theologian” produced a concept of value for contemporary 
Christian thought. This reticence applies to Power’s appraisal of Baillie’s concept of 
mediated immediacy, which is discussed in that article. In due course, this thesis will 
challenge the tacit and widespread claims that neither the mediating theologian’s concept 
of mediated immediacy (hereafter, MI) in particular, nor his mediating theology in 
general, afford contemporary Christian thought a promising concept.  
 
1.3. THE MYSTERY OF MI’S MEANING 
It is not for 75 years of ignorance of MI that academic theology's has rejected MI 
as a promising concept for Christian thought. McEnhill and Newlands, for example, 
rightly observe in their Fifty Key Christian Thinkers54 that MI is “the idea with which he 
[Baillie] is most associated”.55 Rather, that marginalization would appear to be 
underwritten primarily by scholarly criticism of MI's epistemology, the overwhelming 
tendency here being to assert that MI's meaning and logic are convoluted (see below).  
Although MI’s meaning is itself presently a major research issue, we can get some 
sense of what Baillie means by knowledge of God as MI. Baillie states that  
 
 
This is what I have tried to express in the conception of a 
mediated immediacy.  In Christ we know God not by 
argument but by personal acquaintance.  In Christ God 
comes to us directly.56 
 
 
 
Elsewhere in Our Knowledge of God, Baillie elaborates on how such direct or  
                                                           
53 William L. Power. "John Baillie: A Mediating Theologian", Union Theological Seminary Quarterly 
Review, 25, 1968, pp. 47-68. 
54 Fifty Key Christian Thinkers, P. McEnhill and G. M. Newlands (eds), London: Routledge, 2004. 
55 “John and Donald Baillie”, pp. 48-58, in ibid., p. 51. 
56 OKG, pp. 196-197. 
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immediate Christian knowledge of God is, paradoxically, mediated knowledge:  
 
 
[N]o one of the four subjects of our knowledge—ourselves, 
our fellows, the corporeal world, and God—is ever 
presented to us except in conjunction with all three of the 
others . . . .  
The service of others, the fellowship with others, and the 
historical tradition in which I stand are all media that leads 
me to the Mediator, and the Mediator leads me to God. 
. . . . Clearly, then, the immediacy of God’s presence to our 
soul is a mediated immediacy.57  
 
 
1.3.1. MI: Separates Faith from Knowledge? No Personal Encounter With Christ? 
Despite Baillie's straightforward description of the contours of MI's logic, MI's 
meaning persists as a matter of scholarly debate. The present division is readily 
evidenced in manifold competing interpretations about MI’s logic and its epistemic 
status. There is, for example, the issue of MI’s understanding of the epistemological 
relationship between faith and knowledge. Does MI’s logic separate faith from 
knowledge or does it contend for an organic epistemological connection between faith 
and knowledge? D.W. Torrance insists that “immediated immediacy” (sic) evidences 
Baillie's  “liberal” “separation of faith and knowledge” and also evidences that Baillie 
never “theologically . . . really understood the real significance of faith as knowledge, or 
personal encounter with God in Jesus Christ”.58 The neo-orthodox theologian is hardly 
alone in his contention that MI separates faith from knowledge; there is a long history of 
similar claims in the literature. The Christian evangelical thinker Carl Henry, for 
example, expresses epistemic disdain for Baillie’s idea of immediacy in his God, 
Revelation and Authority,59 his position being that Baillie’s idea of immediacy 
marginalizes the cognitive content of revelation to the extent that it endorses logical 
agnosticism: 
 
                                                           
57  Ibid., pp. 178-181 passim. 
58 David W. Torrance, a review of Fergusson's Christ Church and Society, in "The Evangelical Quarterly”, 
Vol. 68, No. 1, January, 1996, p. 87.  
59 Carl Henry, God, Revelation and Authority, Waco, TX: Word Book Publishers, 1979. 
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What Barth and those he influences [Baillie] fail to 
emphasize . . . is that God’s ways include the gift of our 
mental equipment that divine revelation addresses.  The 
theology of revelation includes epistemic access to 
objective reality wherein the Logos in self-disclosure and 
self-interpretation manifests a Truth to be acknowledged 
and a Word to be heard.60   
 
 
 
Indeed, such a denial of  “epistemic access” to “objective reality” is, for want of 
emphasis on the propositional content of revelation, Baillie’s "denial that revelation is a 
mental act” altogether.61  
One can go back further still, to find D.C. Macintosh maintaining, not unlike 
Torrance and Henry, that a logically self-contradictory MI breaks the epistemological 
connection between faith and reason. Writing in 1940, the empirical theologian maintains 
with Torrance and Henry that the logic of Baillie’s idea of immediacy compromises the 
logic of Baillie’s related doctrines. Specifically, Macintsoh claims that MI’s logic: (1) 
undermines Baillie’s analogia entis—the ontological connection between God and 
unregenerate human minds which makes knowledge of God possible—a shortcoming 
which, in turn, compromises Baillie's doctrine of the knowledge; (2) evidences that “in 
Baillie’s case, it is the voice which is the voice of an epistemological monist, while the 
hands seem to be those of the dualist;” (3) demonstrates that Baillie's thought in Our 
Knowledge of God (3) is “unduly dogmatic; because at the bottom of his mind Baillie is 
still essentially dualistic and logically agnostic”. 62  
 Macintosh’s ground for claims (1-3) presupposes the validity of his criticism of 
MI's normative epistemology,63 MI's reliance on an analogy between knowledge of 
human minds and knowledge of God, in particular. Macintosh's chief contention is MI's 
description of how God and the human mind are analogous is self-contradictory. As 
                                                           
60 Ibid: Chap. II, Vol. III, p. 171.  
61 Henry cites Baillie for support: ‘God does not give us information by communication.  He gives us 
Himself in communion.  It is not information about God that is revealed but . . . God Himself.  John Baillie, 
Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought, p. 29. Cited in God, Revelation and Authority, p. 465. 
62 D.C. Macintosh, The Problem of Religious Knowledge (New York: Harper and Brothers Publications, 
1940), p. 183ff. 
63 Details provided in Chapter 6. 
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support, Macintosh maintains that discursive (mediated) knowledge about the corporeal 
world is logically irreconcilable with non-propositional (immediate) knowledge of God 
and other minds: such supposedly "immediate" knowledge logically entails discursive 
(mediated) knowledge about the object claimed to be known immediately—namely, 
knowledge that it is God (or a human mind) who is being (supposedly) immediately 
known. In short, if discursive knowledge in one's brain about or of an object (God or a 
human mind) negates the logical possibility of proposition-free knowledge of that 
object—i.e., immediate knowledge of that object.  
While this may be so, it is worthwhile to note that Macintosh also backs his 
various claims with his self-admitted confusion about MI’s meaning: does MI’s logic 
describe a “confrontation of the soul with the divine reality . . . a strong feeling of the 
reality of an unperceived presence, or on the other hand, a perceptual intuition, verifying 
and making objective our knowledge of the reality of the divine.”64 To claim that one 
knows MI’s logic to be self-contradictory, however, is to assert tacitly that one knows 
what that logic entails—i.e., that one knows what Baillie means by knowledge of God as 
MI. This tacit assertion applies by logical extension to the claim that MI’s logic 
undermines the credibility of epistemologically related concepts. While Macintosh may 
possess knowledge of what MI means, he assuredly fails demonstrate it. Rather, he 
concedes confusion about a most fundamental aspect of MI’s description of knowledge of 
God—its mode for the apprehension of knowledge of God (Is it a feeling or an 
intuition?). Secondly, he admits confusion about MI’s logic concerning the verification of 
knowledge of God.  In short, Macintosh’s warrant appears to be this: if he is confused 
about a concept’s logic, that concept must be illogical. 
T.F. Torrance offers a more recent, and apparently different, take on the issue of 
the separation of faith and knowledge by Baillie’s epistemology of immediacy.  For one, 
he maintains that Baillie’s idea of immediacy does presuppose knowledge of an 
objectively existing God. Secondly, he maintains that Baillie's idea of immediacy (also 
unlike Schleiermacher’s anschauung) does not reduce knowledge of God to “subjective 
states” “explained from the human end.”  Thirdly, Torrance interprets Baillie’s thought 
on the immediacy of knowledge of God as contending for propositional content-carrying 
                                                           
64 The Problem of Religious Knowledge, p. 182. 
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knowledge. This comes out in Torrance's somewhat different criticism of the idea of 
immediacy presupposed by MI:    
 
 
I cannot agree with John Baillie’s position that the 
‘propositional’ element is derivative, and comes only in a 
second-order reflection upon faith for it arises out of the 
immediate conceptual content [emphasis mine] of our 
intuitive knowledge of God.65 
 
 
Thus, while these Torrance’s agree that Baillie's idea of immediacy is a problematic 
description of faith's assent to Christian belief, T.F. Torrance does not appear inclined to 
read Baillie as a logical agnostic who separates faith from knowledge.  The same applies 
to Klinefelter, who apparently finds no problems at all with Baillie’s logic of MI. Indeed, 
according to Klinefelter, the immediacy of knowledge of God supposed by MI’s logic 
does articulate rather cogently Christian faith's very nature:  
 
 
John Baillie saw more clearly than many of his Neo-
orthodox contemporaries the nature of and need for a 
careful and complete reassessment of the epistemological 
credentials of religious assertions in the light of our 
radically changing theological, philosophical, and cultural 
situation.  If he has fallen short, it is not for lack of 
understanding the peculiar logic of faith, but for the 
apparent lack of any twentieth century logic adequate to 
understand the connections between religious and non-
religious cognitive claims, or between faith and secular 
culture generally.  Only in the very recent past has the work 
of men like Dunne, Köestler, Lonergan, Merleau-Ponty, 
Ricouer, Polanyi, and Torrance begun to be appreciated as 
a full-blown attempt to explicate that experience of 
cognitive insight into the nature of the reality that Baillie 
tried to articulate in more traditional theological language 
throughout his long and distinguished career [emphases 
mine].66  
 
                                                           
65 Thomas F. Torrance, Theological Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969, note #4, pp. 30-31. 
66 Klinefelter, “Our Knowledge of God”, p. 426.  
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1.3.2. MI’s Logic: Reduces to a Saramental or Historical Model? Coherent? 
Klinefelter's optimism about MI's logic constitutes something of a rarity in the 
research literature. It also instances a commonplace type of conjecture: Klinefelter 
maintains that Baillie’s logic cogently articulates the epistemological connection between 
cognition (mediated knowledge) and “insight” (immediate knowledge) whilst 
simultaneously asserting that no logic exists for describing the immediate knowledge that 
is epistemically necessary for that connection.  This raises the question: with what 
particular logic does Klinefelter know that MI's idea of immediacy describes the 
"particular logic" of faith?67 Surely, Klinefelter undermines his claim MI cogently 
describes the logic of faith, when he concedes that that very logic is unknowable. This 
seeming double talk say nothing of the viability of Klinefelter's epistemologically related 
claim: "There are doubtless many serious difficulties with Baillie’s controversial account 
of the relations of Christian and non-Christian religion . . .”68 Klinefelter's seeming 
ignorance notwithstanding, Klinefelter yet knows how MI's logic must be interpreted—in 
order to be known: the logic of Baillie’s “controversial epistemological model” of MI 
must be understood as one which “explicates the notion of a mediated immediacy on an 
historical rather than a moral or sacramental model.”69   
In “Mediated Immediacy: A Search for Some Models”,70 J. Brenton Stearns 
makes claims contrary to those of Klinefelter on the issue of the interpretation of MI's 
logic. For example, MI’s logic should not be interpreted as an essentially historical model 
of revelation; rather, its logic reduces to that of a sacramental model of knowledge of 
God.  Stearns also rejects Klinefelter's optimism about MI's logical coherence—that is, 
with regard to Baillie's particular concept of MI. Indeed, Stearns identifies several models 
of mediated immediacy, ordering them under three headings: the “other minds model,” 
                                                           
67 In light of Klinefelter's ambiguity, I must presume that Klinefelter is maintaining that MI's logic is: (1) a 
very good description of Christian faith, as a mode of knowing God (i.e., a good descriptive epistemology); 
(2) a poor elucidation of how Christian faith is epistemologically integrated with the non-Christian 
knowledge of God maintained by Baillie's doctrine of revelation: it’s logic is not cogent concerning how 
knowledge of God is mediated by the experiences of persons devoid of discursive knowledge about (i.e., 
immediate knowledge of) Jesus Christ.   
68 “Our Knowledge of God”, pp. 425-426.  
69 Ibid., p. 409. 
70 J. Brenton Stearns,  "Mediated Immediacy:  A Search for Some Models",  International Journal for the 
Philosophy of Religion, 3, 1972, pp. 195-211. 
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the “language model,” and Stearns’s own model. The distinguishing feature of the "other 
minds model", the type to which Stearns assigns Baillie’s concept of MI, is its position 
that knowledge of God is partially analogous to knowledge of human “minds”. This so-
called "other minds" model of mediated immediacy suffers shortcomings in general, 
maintains Stearns. For one, (1) “there may yet be inferences that are very fast, habitual, 
or tacit”, leading one to think falsely that one has immediate knowledge of human minds. 
Secondly, (2) “as Tennant tells us, we cannot move from psychological immediacy to 
epistemological ground for our beliefs without argument.” Thirdly, (3) it lacks “the 
epistemological credentials that make a belief rational . . ..” Baillie's particular model of 
MI, furthermore, (4) “hints” of a reduction to a Lutheran modification of the doctrine of 
transubstantiation. On grounds (1-4), Stearns rejects Baillie's model of MI as a promising 
model for Christian thought. 
More promising for Stearns is the second model of mediated immediacy, the 
“language model”.  A model espoused by the “intellectual father of [John E.] Smith, 
Baillie, and Hocking—Josiah Royce,” its most distinguishing feature is that it “tells us . . 
. that the process of interpreting a manuscript gives us a clue as to how mediating signs 
can reveal and give us immediate contact with meaning.”  In this regard, Royce's model 
is, according to Stearns, particularly instructive; for it alone provides the “key insight” for 
modeling the logic of knowledge of God as a mediated immediacy. What is this key 
insight? It is that knowledge of God is a mediated by a “triadic” relationship between 
God, the believer, and the coporeal world. Stearns elaborates:         
 
 
The relation between the believer and God is to be 
constructed, like the relation between the reader and what 
he reads, as triadic.  Imagine the worshiper, God, and 
religiously significant finite events as represented by three 
points on a triangle.  The route from the worshipper to God 
is then both immediate (taking the short route along one 
side of a triangle) and mediated by the religiously 
significant finite events (taking the long route via the third 
point of the triangle. Mediated immediacy presents a 
problem only to the person who thinks all relations are 
dyadic.    
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Royce’s "great insight", then, is that knowledge of God is mediated by an essentially 
triangular (triadic) relationship—that is, not mediated "through" the corporeal world to 
humans (dyadic). A logically consistent model of mediated immediacy must emulate 
Royce's model in this regard; only then can the “harsh paradox of ‘mediated immediacy’” 
be “softened”.  
Stearns then turns to his allegedly superior model of mediated immediacy. A 
model which breaks from Royce's model—Royce's model, like all "language models", 
suffers the general criticism (1-3) advanced against the “other mind’s” models—its 
strength is its resolution of the paradoxical logic of knowledge of God as mediated 
immediacy:        
 
 
My models will have the feature, I might be so bold as to 
say advantage, of not being linked to an idealistic or 
dualistic psychology or to a theory of language that holds 
meaning to be a mental event . . .  
. . . . My model of mediated immediacy has the advantage 
of not being specifically Christian.  It is tied to no particular 
metaphysics and to no particular interpretation of 
revelation.  It finds its roots in human worship—wherever 
man recognizes, commits himself to, or hopes for the 
kingdom of God.71 
 
 
Unfortunately, Stearns does not even attempt to resolve the paradox of the logic of 
mediated immediacy. Indeed, to one's knowledge, Stearns makes no mention of mediated 
immediacy in any of his subsequent research publications.  
Klinefelter, then, contends that MI's logic of immediacy should be understood as 
espousing a logic that conforms to an essentially historical model of revelation; Stearns 
maintains, however, that Baillie’s particular logic of MI “hints” of a reduction to a 
Lutheran sacramental model.72  This interpretation, coupled with Stearns's optimism 
                                                           
71 Stearns’s argument is on pp. 195-211, passim. 
72 In the article’s conclusion, Stearns reduces Baillie’s concept to a Lutheran sacramental model. He 
maintains that MI’s logic is underwritten by that entailed in a sacramental idea of knowledge of God; that 
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about his allegedly superior model of mediated immediacy, constitutes the primary 
ground for Stearns's rejection of Baillie's concept of MI as a contribution to contemporary 
Christian thought. Klinefelter, however, is relatively optimistic about MI's contemporary 
promise, were MI's logic elucidated according to a historical model of revelation. What is 
common to each researcher's perspective? The validity of their (conflicting) 
interpretations of MI's logic and (conflicting) estimations of MI’s potential for Christian 
thought is suspect.  
 
1.3.3. MI: A Dyadic or Triadic Mediation of Knowledge of God? A Metaphysic? 
MI's description of the mediation of knowledge of God has occasioned additional 
competing interpretations about MI in the research literature. For example, there is the 
current issue of whether MI's logic contends for a dyadic or triadic conceptualization of 
the mediation of knowledge of God.    
Stearns, as noted, criticizes MI's description of the mediation of knowledge of 
God as being dyadically mediated—as coming “through” our knowledge of “other 
minds”. Power, however, offers a plausibly competing interpretation in his “Religious 
Faith and Pragmatic Semiotics,”73 a paper in which Power develops his own idea of 
knowledge of God. Power announces in the paper's introduction that the mediation of 
knowledge of God must be conceived as a triadic relationship.  
 
 
Mine is a plea for a kind of rationally constructed Pierceian 
semiotics in order to understand religious faith, which 
indeed has a triadic structure [emphasis mine] consisting of 
cultural, existential, and ontological dimensions.  The [1] 
cultural dimension involves the signs or representamens of 
religious communities, the [2] existential dimension 
involves the faith interpretants, and the [3] ontological 
dimension involves the realities and values which are taken 
to be the object or objects of religious faith.74      
                                                                                                                                                                               
this model is perennially open to debate; and that Baillie’s idea of MI is unlikely as such to advance our 
understanding of the logic of knowledge of God as a MI. Stearns refers to Plantinga’s remarks in his God 
and Other Minds (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1967), p. 271. "Mediated Immediacy: A 
Search for Some Models", p. 202.  
73 "Religious Faith and Pragmatic Semiotics", a presentation for Highlands Institute for American Religious 
and Philosophical Thought, Highlands, NC, 23-27 June 2000. 
74 "Religious Faith and Pragmatic Semiotics”, p. 2. 
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Elsewhere in the article, Power maintains that each node of the above threefold structure 
mediates, interestingly, an immediate knowledge.  “Our experiences of things divine like 
our experiences non-divine are by-products of immediate or direct elements as well as 
mediate and direct elements..."75 As such, Power appears to be advancing a variant of 
what Stearns calls the “language model” of MI.76  
What evidence is there that Power interprets Baillie’s concept of MI as advocating 
a triadic mediation of knowledge of God?  For one, Power acknowledges that Baillie's 
thought has influenced his own.  Secondly, he explicitly uses the language of mediation 
and immediacy to advance his model of mediated immediacy. Thirdly, he maintains 
elsewhere77 that Baillie's model of MI is of historical value for contemporary Christian 
thought. Fourthly, nothing in the article suggests a dyadic interpretation of Baillie's 
model. Fifthly, Power's concept of mediated immediacy describes the mediation of 
knowledge of God as a triadic relationship—as does Baillie's model of mediated 
immediacy (discussed later in the thesis).  
 There is evidence that counts against Power's possible interpretation of MI's 
conceptualization of the mediation of knowledge of God as triadic, however. For one, 
Power’s concept of mediated immediacy differs substantially from Baillie’s concept of 
mediated immediacy. There is, notably, the explanatory scope of their models: Power 
aims to provide an all-encompassing model of reality (divine and non-divine). The scope 
of Baillie’s logic of MI is also broad in that it seeks to describe how knowledge of God is 
mediated by knowledge about and of oneself, others and the world. Accordingly, MI’s 
logic is couched, as we shall come to find, in Baillie’s epistemology of reality as a 
multileveled, valuation field. Here too is a scope ambitious. However, Baillie's concept of 
MI hardly attempts to describe all of reality (the divine and non-divine, in Power’s 
language).  Furthermore, MI's logic neither attempts to justify nor to authenticate 
                                                           
75 Ibid., p. 11. 
76 “To take seriously these non-cultural givens [i.e., the triadic context that mediates knowledge of God], 
which evoke or elicit our non-semiotic responses [i.e., our immediate knowledge], is to take seriously 
Pierce’s category of ‘secondness’. . .” Ibid., p. 12. 
77 William Power, "Our knowledge of God”, Perspectives in Religious Studies, Vol. 21, number 1, spring, 
1994, pp. 231-243. 
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religious faith (see Chapter 2), whereas Power's logic of mediated immediacy undergirds 
a metaphysical system which Power is disposed to think can justification religious faith:  
 
 
In my judgment . . . the partial knowledge of faith which 
religions have or for which they strive, needs further 
justification or validation within the context of some 
philosophical or metaphysical theory.78   
 
 
There is evidence, then, for possibly conflicting interpretations about MI's 
description of the mediation of knowledge of God, although it is not conclusive.    
 
1.4. MI’S IMPORTANCE FOR BAILLIE’S MEDIATING THEOLOGY 
I have just noted McEnhill and Newlands’s remark that MI is important for 
Baillie’s mediating theology, as expressed in Our Knowledge of God (1939). Likewise, 
Brown has maintained that MI is “an important feature”79 for that publication’s 
articulation of his doctrine of the knowledge of God. That MI is important for Baillie’s 
epistemology in Our Knowledge of God is evident. Not so apparent is the viability of 
Klinefelter’s suggestion that the importance of MI’s epistemology exceeds its impact on 
Our Knowledge of God: for Klinefelter does maintain that “mediated immediacy is the 
cornerstone of Baillie's epistemology of religion and … crucial for his doctrine of 
revelation".80 Has the John Baillie research underestimated MI’s importance for Baillie’s 
critical thought as a whole? The correct answer to this question presupposes, amongst 
other things, an understanding of what Baillie means by MI. We have found scant 
evidence to persuade that the field presently understands what MI means—as evidenced 
in conflicting interpretations about MI’s logic and instances of conceded confusion about 
that logic. Here, then, is a research issue: MI’s meaning. Although the possibility that 
MI’s meaning has been misunderstood allows for the possibility that MI’s importance for 
Baillie’s mediating theology has been underestimated, we have already found direct 
                                                           
78 Ibid., p. 13. 
79 James Brown, “John Baillie” (pp. 17-29), p. 23. In Theologians of our Time, A.W. Hastings and E. 
Hastings, eds., Edinburgh, T&T Clark, 1966. 
80 "Our Knowledge of God”, p. 409.  
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evidence for the plausibility of such an underestimation: Baillie’s mediating theology 
evidences at least a 35-year preoccupation with ideas of revelation and knowledge of 
God; and MI is widely considered to be central to Baillie’s ideas of revelation and 
knowledge. The conceptual integration of MI's logic with that of doctrines perennially 
featured in Baillie’s mediating theology—this suggests the possibility that MI’s 
importance has been underestimated. Accordingly, Fergusson and Newlands have each 
observed that MI’s presence in Our Knowledge of God (1939) anticipates Baillie’s 
thought in major works, such as The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought (1956) and 
The Sense of the Presence of God (1962). This suggests that MI’s importance for 
Baillie’s thought extends beyond Our Knowledge of God and, as such, that prior research 
has underestimated MI's importance for Baillie’s critical thought. 
 
1.5. MI AND CONTEMPORARY CHRISTIAN THOUGHT 
Is there adequate ground for thinking that MI holds promise for contemporary 
Christian thought? Seventy-five years of overwhelmingly negative criticism of MI would 
suggest that there is not.  
Perhaps Baillie’s “controversial epistemological model”81 of MI does suffer many 
of the logical difficulties maintained by its critics. Nevertheless, that remains to be seen, 
as the backing for each line of that criticism is presently dubious—at best. For one, a 
review of the literature makes plain that each claimant invariably fails to substantiate 
such criticism with an understanding of the epistemological inner-workings of MI's logic. 
Of course, MI's critics could substantiate their claims via appeal to an authoritative 
elucidation of MI’s logic. No such elucidation the inner-workings of MI’s logic presently 
exists in the literature, however. Moreover, when researchers decree with certainty that 
MI's logic is flawed, they often overtly concede uncertainty about what MI means. 
However, it does not follow, as a matter of logical necessity, that a concept’s logic must 
be incoherent, because one cannot understand what that logic means. Then again, there 
are those many competing interpretations about MI’s logic: these do not persuade that the 
field as a whole is certain about what Baillie means by knowledge of God as MI. These 
                                                           
81 Klinefelter, “Our Knowledge of God”, p. 409. 
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collective deficiencies hardly amount to a coercive argument for MI’s logical 
incoherence.   
Such less-than-persuasive support applies, by extension, to critics' claims for and 
against MI's negative impact on related doctrines. For instance, we have seen it being 
asserted that MI’s illogic compromises both Baillie’s idea of revelation and his 
Christology. That may be so; still, the verdict is presently out on the credibility of these 
claims, and their class (e.g., MI’s illogic undermines Baillie’s Christology): the field has 
not evidenced an understanding of the logic entailed in MI’s meaning.  The same goes for 
claims to MI’s alleged ambiguity: it is not enough to assert that MI’s logic is problematic. 
The field of academic theology, then, is presently beset with substantial 
uncertainty about the validity of researchers’ appraisals of MI’s epistemic logic, be those 
appraisals philosophical and/or theological in origin; be those appraisals for or against 
MI’s capacity to elucidate the logic of Christian faith. This present uncertainty about the 
status of MI’s logic presents the possibility that MI, better understood, could be a 
contribution to contemporary Christian thought.  
But here again, we find ourselves peering into a research consensus momentous 
and asking, “Is their evidence to suggest that the importance of Baillie’s critical thought’s 
is being unduly marginalized at present”—this time, not with regard to MI’s importance 
for Baillie’s mediating theology per se, but with regard to MI’s potential for 
contemporary Christian thought. Is Baillie’s idea of MI dinosaurian? Can it be 
resurrected—and survive? On appeal to authority, there is ground to think so. Fergusson, 
for one, maintains that MI is possibly Baillie’s “most original contribution” to the 
doctrine of knowledge of God.82 Indeed, it is perhaps ironic that Fergusson should 
suggest, if not overtly maintain, that a concept directly integrated with Baillie’s idea of 
revelation could hold contemporary promise. However, Fergusson’s criticism of Baillie’s 
idea of revelation notwithstanding, this at is exactly how I interpret him, when he 
maintains that “Baillie's renowned concept of 'mediated immediacy . . . has important 
theological implications".83  
                                                           
82 Fergusson, Selected Writings, p. 3. 
83 “Orthodox Liberal”, p. 141. 
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What might these implications be? At least one of them, as I see it, is suggested 
by Newlands. Observing that debates in epistemology (e.g., realism verses anti-realism) 
and semantics are much more sophisticated than were they during Baillie’s day, 
Newlands continues on to say that 
 
 
There has been… the rise of the phenomenon of post-
modernism in its numerous expressions, and a reaction 
against the “foundationalist” views of reality common in 
philosophy of the early part of this century. No doubt 
Baillie would have been a keen observer [also] of these 
debates and would have drawn the implications for his 
theology.84  
 
 
If Newlands is correct, then it is likely that the mediating theologian would consider 
postmodernism’s implications for his epistemology (i.e., MI), and his epistemology’s 
(i.e., MI’s) implications for postmodernism, were he here today. Following Newlands’s 
lead, I shall, in due course, square MI’s epistemology with the postmodern ethos and 
draw implications for Baillie’s thought, its contemporary relevance, included.   
 
1.6. CONCLUSION 
I conclude that academic theology can not be certain at present that Baillie's 
mediating theology is without a promising concept for contemporary Christian thought—
this as evidenced by the 75-year legacy that is the scholarly criticism of MI: namely, the 
failure of this corpus to demonstrate an understanding of MI's logic and meaning.   
Fergusson maintains that “Baillie’s concept of 'mediated immediacy' remains 
worthy of serious theological attention".85  We have found at least three major research 
issues in need of such attention: MI’s meaning, its importance for Baillie’s mediating 
theology, and its promise as a contribution to contemporary Christian thought.  We have 
also discovered a host of minor research issues—a matter of several competing 
interpretations in need of resolution—and that the resolution of all issues, both major and 
                                                           
84 “The Sense of the Presence of God”, p. 161. 
85 Fergusson, Selected Writings, pp. 3-4. 
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minor, beckons a fundamental understanding of MI’s logic. John Baillie research must 
give these research issues serious attention. To fail to do so is, for one, to fail to advance 
its own understanding of possibly Baillie’s most original contribution to the doctrine of 
knowledge of God per se, MI. To fail to advance our understanding of MI is to hinder 
unduly the research momentum, research progress, and refined understanding occasioned 
by the relatively recent resurgence in research on Baillie’s life and thought—and this, 
plausibly, with pointedly negative consequences indeed: the concept in need of 
illumination is, as Newlands observes, that concept for which the illustrious mediating 
theologian is most notorious. To foreclose on such research investigation is lastly, to 
perpetuate unduly the field’s present perplexity about MI’s implications for Baillie’s 
critical thought as a whole—namely, its importance for Baillie’s mediating-theological 
corpus (perhaps also, its capacity to order much of Baillie’s seemingly non-systematically 
elucidated corpus); and to perpetuate uncertainty about MI’s implications for John 
Baillie’s legacy—namely, his mediating theology’s capacity to contribute a concept to a 
contemporary Christian thought in dialogue with a contemporary culture. 
 
1.7. THESIS OBJECTIVES, METHOD AND GENERAL CONCLUSIONS  
My thesis, then, is an examination of John Baillie’s concept of MI.  The definitive 
body of research on MI to-date, it takes as its primary objectives the resolution of three 
major research issues:  (1) MI’s meaning; (2) MI’s importance for Baillie’s mediating 
theology; (3) MI’s importance for contemporary Christian thought.    
The thesis examines the three major research issues within three corresponding 
divisions. What ensues is a chapter-by-chapter summary of its basic method and general 
conclusions. The present introductory chapter has found that contemporary Christian 
thought is tacitly maintaining that John Baillie’s mediating theology is without a 
promising concept or doctrine—this as evidenced in works which evaluate: (a) 
contributions from contemporary Christian theologies in general (surveys of Christian 
thought); (b) ideas emphasized in Baillie’s mediating theology (revelation, knowledge of 
God) that are conceptually intertwined with MI’s logic (surveys of the idea of revelation); 
(c) the legacy of Baillie’s mediating theology (Baillie researchers’ overall evaluations of 
Baillie’s thought). I have argued that the credibility of (a-c) is presently suspect, on the 
 36 
ground that there presently exists much debate about what Baillie means by MI, as 
evidenced in competing interpretations about MI’s logic, each of whose validity is 
uncertain at present.  Chapter 2 resolves the issue of MI’s meaning, by providing the 
elucidation of MI’s logic that has been perennially in need since 1939. Drawing primarily 
from Baillie’s thought on MI in Our Knowledge of God, I elucidate the structure of MI’s 
logic, identify four ways that MI functions in Baillie’s thought, and contend that MI's 
meaning varies, depending on how Baillie’s apologetic employs MI in service to his 
mediating theology. The richer and requisite understanding of MI's meaning now in-
hand—prior research has tended to interpret MI’s meaning in light of only two oft 
functions—the thesis turns to the second division (Chapters 3-5) to engage the second 
research issue: MI’s importance for Baillie’s mediating theology. This move serves two 
major purposes: (1) It helps the reader to understand fuller MI’s meaning: guided by the 
now-clarified conceptual understanding of MI's meaning, including its multi-
functionality, the reader is able to locate MI and to witness its evolution within the 
dynamic apologetic context of Baillie’s development as a mediating theologian. This 
move also (2) helps the reader appreciate the concept’s importance for Baillie’s 
mediating theology as a whole. Specifically, this division diachronically traces Baillie’s 
theological development from 1925 to 1960. An investigation of Baillie's major86 and 
minor, it lays emphasis on the explication of primary sources which (a) speak directly to 
doctrines emphasized in Baillie's mediating theology throughout Baillie's academic 
career—Baillie's ideas of religious experience, revelation, knowledge of God and God—
and (b) speak directly to MI's development, its ideas of mediation and immediacy, in 
particular. The explication and examination of this conceptual and historical interplay—
this play between Baillie's mediating theology and MI—is carried out within the context 
of Baillie’s Christian apologetics, in particular. Chapter 3 focuses on MI’s development 
in Baillie’s early childhood and formal education—experiences which would influence 
Baillie’s apologetic strategy and, in time, his development of MI. Chapter 4 examines the 
apologetic moves in Baillie’s “early mediating theology” (1925-1939: pre-Our 
                                                           
86In particular: The Roots of Religion in the Human Soul  (1926), The Interpretation of Religion:  An 
Introductory Study of Theological Principles (1928),  The Place of Jesus Christ in Modern Christianity 
(1929),  Our Knowledge of God (1939), The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought (1956), The Sense of The 
Presence of God (1962), A Reasoned Faith (1963). 
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Knowledge of God); Chapter 5, the apologetic moves in Baillie's “latter mediating 
theology” (1939-1962: post-Our Knowledge of God).87  
The third division (Chapters 6-9) resolves each of the major research issues: MI’s 
meaning, importance for Baillie’s mediating theology, and promise for contemporary 
Christian thought. The thesis, which has now equipped the reader with both a requisite 
static-conceptual (first division) and requisite historical-dynamic (second division) 
understanding of MI’s meaning, turns to Chapter 6 and resolves several sub-issues 
concerning the meaning of MI’s descriptive epistemology. Is MI a metaphysical structure 
or argument for knowledge of God?  Does the logic of MI essentially reduce to an 
historical or sacramental model of knowledge of God? Does MI’s logic describe the 
mediation of knowledge of God as being a dyadic or a triadic relationship? Does MI’s 
logic separate faith from knowledge, or does it contend for an organic epistemological 
connection between faith and knowledge?  Does the model’s idea of immediacy fail to 
express a “theological understanding” of Christian knowledge of God, or does it convey 
the very “logic of faith” itself?  Does MI’s idea of immediacy demonstrate that Baillie’s 
thought advocates logical agnosticism? Does MI depersonalize Christian faith in Jesus 
Christ? Can MI’s logic be modeled?  In Chapter 6, I systematically evaluate these 
manifold competing interpretations that have both evidenced and perpetuated the field’s 
confusion about MI’s meaning, and draw conclusions on each research issue. Chapter 7 
briefly recounts the diachronic trace’s findings. Drawing from them, I weigh in on the 
second, major research issue, MI’s importance for Baillie’s thought: I argue that MI is the 
most important concept for Baillie's mediating theology.  It is a conclusion which 
challenges the consensus view in the research—one which has tended to limit MI’s 
importance to Baillie’s Our Knowledge of God (1939), save some residual effects for 
works such as his Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought (1956) and The Sense of the 
Presence of God (1962). Chapter 8 centers on the third, major research issue, MI’s 
promise for contemporary Christian thought.  My method, in brief, is to evaluate MI’s 
promise by subjecting it not only to the criticism of opponents whose tendency has been 
to dismiss, often dogmatically, two of the concept’s function dogmatically on theological 
grounds; but by also subjecting each of its four functions to more contemporary criticism, 
                                                           
87 The rationale for this scheme is addressed in the division’s beginning chapter, Chapter 3. 
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including that from theological and epistemological and cognitive-psychological quarters. 
In keeping with the thrust of the criticism of MI, a substantially more sophisticated 
corpus of criticism is brought to bear on the logic of MI’s idea of immediacy, in 
particular. In light of the evaluation, I concede that much of the (now-substantiated) 
criticism of MI has been legitimate. However, as against the thrust of Baillie research, I 
argue that one of MI’s functions—one that has been overlooked in the literature—is a 
promising contribution to contemporary Christian thought. As support for my argument, 
and in keeping with MI’s various loci of inspiration—MI, true to the mediating 
theologian’s form, draws strength from theological, philosophical, and empirical-
psychological intellectual currents, I take an inter-disciplinary and somewhat 
unconventional approach as support my argument for MI’s present promise. This 
includes appeal to the concept’s correspondence with Christian theological-
epistemological and empirical cognitive-psychological interpretations of religious 
experience, as well as appeal to the concept’s utility value for the Christian tradition in its 
dialogue with postmodernity. Chapter 9 summarizes the research findings and 
contributions, finishing with suggestions for future lines of research on MI.88 
 
1.8. LIMITATIONS  
The scope of John Baillie’s mediating theology. Baillie’s efforts as a mediating 
theologian included his service to the Christian faith as a writer of both devotional works 
and critical works. This thesis is primarily concerned with Baillie’s critical works.   
 
Major source emphasis.  Baillie wrote several books and articles. This thesis focuses 
primarily on works that are essential for understanding Baillie’s thought on the problems 
of knowledge of God and revelation. Of Baillie’s major works, his The Interpretation of 
Religion (1929), Our Knowledge of God (1939), and The Sense of the Presence of God 
(1962) are: (1) regularly consulted in expositions and critiques of Baillie’s thought on the 
problems of knowledge of God and revelation; (2) widely considered to be Baillie’s three 
most substantive and scholarly works; (3) essential for understanding the arc of Baillie’s 
mediating theology’s development: they chronicle Baillie’s earliest, middle and final 
                                                           
88 See Appendix B, which provides a detailed schematic of the thesis’ architecture. 
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thought. Baillie’s The Roots of Religion in the Human Soul (1926) and The Idea of 
Revelation in Recent Thought (1956) are less beefy, though essential for understanding 
Baillie’s thought on the ideas of revelation and knowledge of God. 
 
Doctrines and ideas examined. Baillie wrote on several Christian doctrines. This thesis 
focuses primarily on Baillie’s thought on revelation, knowledge of God and religious 
experience. This thesis aims to trace and order the development of Baillie’s non-
systematic mediating theology; research indicates that Baillie was preoccupied with the 
doctrines of knowledge and God and revelation throughout his academic career.  Insofar 
as a sustained focus on doctrines prevalent throughout a thinker’s career holds promise 
for meeting the above objectives, the method is warranted.  The thesis also aims to assess 
MI’s importance for Baillie’s mediating theology, as well as to understand MI’s meaning. 
Research indicates that MI is central to Baillie’s doctrine of the knowledge and his idea 
of revelation. It also suggests that MI is important for Baillie’s idea of religious 
experience. Consequently, this thesis’s examination of Baillie’s mediating theology is 
one whose primary focus is on the above doctrines and ideas, their impact on MI’s 
meaning and development (and vice versa), included. 
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DIVISION I: MI'S MEANING 
2. MI’S FOUR FUNCTIONS 
There is presently much confusion about MI's meaning, as evidenced in the 
previous chapter's review of the literature. This chapter provides the elucidation of MI's 
"controversial logic" that is necessary to resolve the many conflicting interpretations 
about MI’s meaning.  
In order to understand MI's meaning, it is necessary to understand two contexts in 
which MI functions: its conceptual context, including its relationships to Baillie’s ideas 
of divine action, revelation, knowledge of God and religious experience; and its 
chronological context, Baillie’s use of MI in the historical context of his apologetic, his 
ongoing debates with various intellectual currents in particular. This chapter centers on 
MI’s conceptual context. It begins by orienting the reader with Baillie’s mediating 
theology in general. It then narrows the focus, expositing Baillie’s thought on the 
objectives of Christian apologetics, language's epistemic limitations and the nature of 
Divine-human encounter. That more general conceptual context having been provided, it 
hones in on the issue of MI’s meaning. Drawing from a close reading of Our Knowledge 
of God (1939), the chapter elucidates MI’s logic, giving particular attention to Baillie’s 
thought on divine action, revelation, knowledge of God, and religious experience. In so 
doing, it relates MI’s logic to core epistemic positions maintained by Baillie throughout 
his career as a mediating theologian. Major epistemology-oriented works include 
Baillie’s early publications, The Interpretation of Religion (1926) and The Roots of 
Religion in the Human Soul (1928), and his latter publications, The Idea of Revelation in 
Recent Thought (1956) and The Sense of the Presence of God (1962). In addition to 
providing the reader a conceptual context for understanding MI, this chapter’s elucidation 
of MI’s logic provides the provisional understanding of MI’s meaning that is necessary 
for the subsequent division’s consideration of MI’s development in Baillie’s mediating 
theology.  
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My conclusion for this chapter is that MI serves four major functions in Baillie’s 
mediating theology. A more precise interpretation of MI's meaning than found in the 
previous research, whose tendency has been to identify only two of MI's functions, my 
modeling of MI’s logic in this chapter provides much of the conceptual groundwork 
required for the resolution of the two other research problems that are presently plaguing 
the research: MI's importance for Baillie's mediating theology (division two) and MI's 
value for contemporary Christian thought (division three).  
 
2.1. JOHN BAILLIE: A MEDIATING THEOLOGIAN  
The phrase "mediating theology" derives from a group of 19th century theologians 
concerned to reconcile the Christian faith with modern scientific consciousness in 
particular. Today, the phrase is typically used in a more general sense: to designate 
Christian theologies whose aim is to reconcile religious beliefs with secular intellectual 
currents, in general.89  
It is this more general that Baillie's theology has been identified as a mediating 
theology. We have already found Mackay (1956), Power (1968) and Newlands (2002) 
identifying Baillie as a “mediating theologian” who attempted to reconcile the Christian 
faith with non-Christian intellectual currents; Macquarrie, for example, has also alluded 
to Baillie’s mediating theology, when he notes that one aspect of Baillie’s “post-liberal” 
theology constitutes “an attempt to combine the best insight of both liberal and dialectical 
theology”.90 Fergusson, whose preference is for "orthodox-liberal", has more recently 
underscored that breadth of the scope of Baillie’s “mediating theology’: here one finds an 
attempt “to reconcile the methods of philosophy and theology, liberalism and orthodoxy, 
Christianity and contemporary culture, and hope for this world with faith in the life to 
come.”91 It is Klinefelter, however, who perhaps provides the fullest insight into the 
mediating theologian’s great breadth of scope and many attempted theological-
conceptual reconciliations:  
 
                                                           
89 See Claude Welch, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1972), Vol. I, 1799-1870, esp. Chapter 12: "Mediation, Speculation and Criticism”, pp. 269-291. 
90 Twentieth Century Religious Thought, p. 349. 
91 David A.S. Fergusson, "John Baillie: Orthodox Liberal". In Christ, Church and Society: Essays on John 
Baillie and Donald Baillie, ed. David A.S. Fergusson (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1993), p. 152.    
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John Baillie both temperamentally and professionally 
served as a mediator and interpreter among competing 
Continental, British, and American theologies; between 
naturalism and supernaturalism; reason and revelation; 
science and history; empiricism and rationalism; theology 
and philosophy; morality and religion; orthodoxy and 
liberalism; liberalism and neo-orthodoxy; neo-orthodoxy 
and Post-Barthian liberalism; and finally, between the 
several Christian and non-Christian communions.92 
 
 
Baillie, to my knowledge, overtly labeled himself neither a "mediating theologian" nor 
his theology a "mediating theology". Nonetheless, Baillie was surely a mediating 
theologian who attempted to reconcile Christian faith with culture in general: save his 
own professed “desire to combine liberalism with a recast orthodoxy”,93 and that he 
sought reconciliation between the aforementioned theological positions and those 
intellectual currents indicated by Klinefelter; as Baillie's own theological corpus makes 
plain, Baillie was a theologian who routinely engaged several academic fields and 
disciplines, including (for instance) philosophy, philosophical theology, philosophy of 
religion, theoretical and empirical psychology and theoretical physics. Baillie’s many 
wanderings into these fields and disciplines have immediate implications for our 
understanding of MI. We shall also find in time that they also carry implications for our 
(multi-disciplinary) evaluation of MI. 
 
2.2. CHRISTIAN THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE: ITS METHOD AND AIMS 
Baillie’s major publications span roughly thirty-five years. They begin with The 
Roots of Religion in the Human Soul (1926) and conclude with his 1960 Gifford 
Lectures, completed right before his death, posthumously published as The Sense of the 
Presence of God (1962). These, Baillie’s first and last major works, disclose Baillie's 
enduring fundamental epistemic commitments, including his thought on the aims of 
Christian apologetics. As such, they are essential for understanding possibly Baillie’s 
                                                           
92 Donald S. Klinefelter, "The Theology of John Baillie”, p. 434. 
93 John Baillie, "The Idea of Orthodoxy”, cited in Fergusson, "Orthodox Liberal", n #18, p. 131. 
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most important epistemological and apologetic construct, MI This conceptual interplay 
between Baillie’s basic epistemology, his thought on Christian apologetics, and MI come 
to the fore, when we consider the contours of Baillie’s mediating-theological method, 
Baillie’s thought on the limits of religious language, and Baillie’s thought on the 
epistemological relationship between realties and truths, in particular.  
Baillie's second major publication is The Interpretation of Religion.94 Essentially 
an amplification of his more concise The Roots of Religion, which had been published 
three years earlier, it is plausibly Baillie's most substantive and scholarly work.95 Therein, 
we gain insight into Baillie’s early theological method and attempt to reconcile the 
Christian faith with a host of intellectual currents, including several theologies, 
philosophies and psychologies. Baillie’s method of choice is the “science of religion—the 
science, that is, which selects religion as its special object of study.”96  Such "theological 
science" is a “science of spirit” (Geisteswissenschaften) not unlike Socrates’ own 
investigation of the “human things” (ta anthrōpina) or “things of the soul” (tēs 
psychēs),97 in that it examines human consciousness. It differs markedly from Socrates' 
investigation of the human soul, however, in that its method interrogates the specifically 
religious consciousness98 with the view to elucidate "what religion really is".99  
 
2.3. LANGUAGE ABOUT KNOWLEDGE OF GOD: ITS AIMS AND LIMITS 
Baillie's mediating theology (hereafter, MT) maintains, throughout its 
development, 100 that the following epistemological and ontological claims are true: (1) 
all persons appear to have some knowledge of God; (2) such universal knowledge of God 
                                                           
94 The Interpretation of Religion:  An Introductory Study of Theological Principles (Edinburgh: T & T 
Clark, 1929). 
95 “Orthodox Liberal”, pp. 127-128. 
96 IOR, p. 3. 
97 IOR, p. 4. 
98 "The real object of theological study is not ultimate reality in all its aspects, but only those aspects of 
ultimate reality which are approached by us through the religious consciousness . . ." IOR, p. 30. 
99 "We . . . define the business of theological science as the interrogation of the religious consciousness 
with a view to discovering what religion really is.” [Baillie's emphasis] IOR, p. 14.  
100 In division two it will become apparent that the early mediating theologian's  (1926-38) theological-
scientific method, apologetic strategy and core theological positions all anticipate the latter theologian's (c. 
1939) position that knowledge of God is a MI. We shall also find that the theological-scientific method 
employed by Baillie in his early mediating theology is consistent with theological positions for which he 
later contended. 
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is always a divinely-initiated, continuous self-disclosure of God; (3) knowledge of God, 
be it a universal knowledge of God, or a specifically Christian knowledge of God, is 
always an immediate or direct knowledge of God; (4) knowledge of God is always 
mediated by the individual's unique, concrete circumstances; (5) knowledge of God is 
always a knowledge of Personality by personalities. These core claims have several 
implications for the aims and limitations of language about God. For example, when 
Baillie’s early theology attempts to “exhibit” aspects of God’s “relationship to the soul” 
through an interrogation of religious consciousness, it presupposes that no language can 
demonstrate God's existence, including propositions derived from religious 
consciousness, moral consciousness, empirical arguments, rationalist arguments or, even, 
divine revelation. That said, language can at least say something about humans' beliefs 
about the God-human relationship itself: as Baillie’s own method presupposes, language 
can, for instance, "exhibit" the belief content of humanity’s religious consciousness of 
humanity. Such limitations on language reflect Baillie’s position that knowledge of God 
is an immediate knowledge.   
What specifically, then, should Christian theological language aim to exhibit? 
Theological science indicates that most humans appear to believe (explicitly or tacitly) 
that they have an immediate knowledge of God (i.e., revelation), and that such immediate 
knowledge is evidenced in, though not logically demonstrated by, their religious and 
moral consciousness of supreme Value. Baillie finds evidence for this in both the moral 
commitments of theists and intellectual atheists. When theological science interrogates 
the religious consciousness of the theist, it finds that knowledge of God is widely 
believed to be a self-authenticating, direct or immediate knowledge (non-logically 
demonstrable knowledge) of God's Self-disclosure in and to huamns moral 
consciousness—one which occasions faith or trust in God (i.e., religious consciousness), 
Supreme Value. When theological science interrogates the moral consciousness of those 
who has not placed their faith in God (i.e., does not have religious consciousness), such 
as the intellectual agnostic or atheist, it finds that moral consciousness’ knowledge of 
moral value (a good) also presupposes knowledge of a source of supreme value (Good), 
whose truth value can neither be appprehended nor totalized nor validated by language’s 
logic. In short, the intellectual atheist and agnsotic’s positions are, like the theist’s, never 
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established by logical certainty, but grounded rather in a non-discursive or immediate 
knowledge (i.e., is a knowledge by faith). Part of the Christian apologist’s task is to bring 
that to light, when battling with language.   
In keeping with his position that language can never totalize the ground for our 
moral and religious convictions, Baillie places limitations on the logic of theological 
science’s own language, including its capacity to capture fully the content exhibited by its 
interrogation of religious consciousness:   
 
 
 
But while it is thus completely wrong in principle to expect 
from the study of theology that it should either bring faith 
originally to birth in our souls or to give it a securer 
grounding in them than it has in the souls of other men, yet 
on the other hand there is undoubtedly a real service which 
theology is able to render towards the establishment of faith 
in the world.  For though it cannot provide religion with 
any new assurance of truth, it can at least disclose the 
nature of the assurance which it already possesses.  If it 
cannot prove the truth of religion, it can at least exhibit the 
truth of it.101  
 
 
When considered, then, from an appologetic perspective, Baillie’s early mediating 
theology clearly conceives of theological language as being primarily evocative in 
function: when the Christian apologist uses theological language to contend for the 
Christian faith, theological language can evoke reflection upon an already-present 
immediate knowledge of God made present in and to both humans' religious and moral 
consciousness. When considered from a theological-epistemological perspective, 
theological language can, at best, only mediate immediate knowledge of God.102 
                                                           
101 IOR, p. 24. Baillie’s italicized emphasis. 
102 Although I can not establish it here, Baillie’s position is that theological language's mediation of 
immediate knowledge of God extends to theological language about God’s “continual invasion” and 
progressive Self-disclosure in and to persons’moral and religious consciousnessses, “in, with and under” 
concrete events that constitute their personal hsitories and which invariably mediate knowledge of God. 
This includes God’s disclosure “in, with and under” the concrete events that constituted the life of Jesus, as 
well as the life-events of the witnesses of persons who consututed the early Chrsitian church.  Considered 
from a more mentalistic and cognitive psychological perspective, such a progressive and more profound  
awarenes of God, through God’s self-disclosure in Christ, includes humans' movement from immediate 
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In the subsequently published Our Knowledge of God  (1939), Baillie jettisons the 
theological-scientific method described by Fergusson as being quasi-
phenomenological.103 However, he continues to maintain that Christian-apologetic aim is 
primarily evocative in function: it aims to evoke or bring forward humans’ late belief in 
Supreme Value. Accordingly, Baillie’s epistemology still maintains belief that 
theological language can mediate an immediate knowledge of God—can facilitate, as 
Baillie puts it in Tillichian language, one’s being in a "revelatory situation". What makes 
for a particularlly likely revelatory situation?  Baillie’s epitemology continues to 
emphasize that situations characterized by personalities in personal relations are 
particularlly ripe for the mediation of immediate knowledge of God, as god is a personal 
agent: such situations of felowshipping are often charatrized by humans’ engagement 
with each others’ moral consciousness. A fellowshiping with one’s fellowship that is 
characterized by actions and language reflective of the virtue of agapē (i.e, koinonia) is 
particularly promising for mediating immediate knowledge of, and a deeping faith in, 
God. A trans-personal contextuality and agapē-oriented relational quality increasingly 
emphasized by Baillie’s latter epistemology-oriented works’ articulation of the mediation 
of immediate knowledge of God, it is a node in Baillie’s idea of revelation (knowledge of 
others) to which he a conceptually ties an also increasing feature in Baillie’s latter 
epistmological works: the proclamation of the Gospel language for the mediation of 
immediate knowledge of God's being in Jesus Christ.104 Here, Gospel language, is potent 
theological language for the Christian apologist who would speak the truth in love. 
We see, then, a mediating theologian armed with a more overtly critical-realist 
theological epistemology, albeit one whose epistmology continues to rely heavily  on a 
distinction made in Baillie’s early mediating theology: second-order reflection about 
knowledge of God (e.g., theological language, apologetics; Gospel proclamation) can 
refer to first-order, immediate knowledge of God. In both Our Knowledge of God and the 
                                                                                                                                                                               
knowledge or faith in God in general (general revelation) to the specifically Christian human's immediate 
knowledge or faith in God's being in Jesus Christ (special revelation). One might rightly say that, for 
Baillie’s epistmeology, theological language can, does and must make way for the coming of the Lord—
must, that is, evoke faith in the Mediator, by enaging religious consciousness (i.e., moral consciousness) 
with the logic of a well-reasoned faith. 
103 Fergusson, "Orthodox Liberal", p. 128. 
104 In keeping with Baillie’s exposure to Barth’s thought in the 1930’s. Disccused in chapter 5. 
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Sense of the Presence of God,105 Baillie distinguishes first-order “knowledge of” 
"realities" from second-order “knowledge about” "truths"—this while mataining that, 
while distinct, truths about God (and about other realities) and immediate knowledge of 
God (and other realities) are yet epistemologically connected. A basic understanding of 
this constant feature of Baillie’s epistemology is necessary for understanding MI's 
meaning, logic and functions for Baillie's MT.  
 
(1) Language can say something about realities.  Second-order “truths” (i.e., discursive 
language) “about” primordial “realities”—the realities “God and the external world”—
can describe the realities about whom (or which) we have knowledge “of” (i.e., know 
immediately).  
 
(2) Language about God is epistemologically authoritative over language about other 
realities.  Knowledge of God, knowledge of others, and knowledge of our self are 
mediated-immediate knowledges.  Knowledge of God is always mediated by, and always 
occurs contemporaneously with, knowledge of other realities (the external world, 
ourselves, others). Knowledge of God, however, has "logical priority" over all other 
knowledges:  God is the ground of all being, the Reality most directly known, and the 
ground for all knowing, including our knowledge of other realities. Accordingly, 
analogies established between human knowledge of God and human knowledge of 
human minds should not proceed according to the veridicality of the latter. Summa 
summarum: inasmuch as language refers to God, it is, with regard to matters of Christian 
faith, normative over language about all other realities (e.g., human minds). Here is an 
affirmation of the authority of scripture over, for instance, psychology, in matters of 
faith.106  
 
(3) Language can neither totalize Reality nor realities. Baillie’s distinction 
between second-order theological truths about religious consciousness and religious 
                                                           
105 "We must say that our knowledge of the realities themselves—whether these be the external world or 
God—is primary and our knowledge of truths concerning them secondary." SPG, p. 113. 
106 All of this reflects Baillie's early MT’s interrogation of human consciousness—one that indicates the 
widely held belief that a universal knowledge of God is logically primary to our knowledge of other 
realities. 
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consciousness’ immediate knowledge of primordial Reality places limitations on 
language's capacity to describe realities. In short, second-order truths can never exhaust 
the realities to which they (somehow) refer: ultimately, each “reality” is immediately 
known—known, that is, in a non-propositional manner. Knowledge of the “Really Real”, 
God, is sui generis—knowledge made possible only by “faith” a “primary mode of 
awareness”.  Language about faith's immediate knowledge of God—be it second-order 
reflection about the exhibitions of a universal, immediate knowledge of God’s Presence 
in and to humans’ moral consciousness of value; or, rather, second-order reflection about 
the specifically Christian religious consciousness’ knowledge of God’s being in Jesus 
Christ—a religious consciousness which is itself conceived by Baillie (I shall argue) as 
being mediated by second-order discursive reasoning about an organically and 
epistemologically connected, latent knowledge of God available in and to humankinds' 
moral consciousness of value—no theologian's and/or apologist's language can ever 
totalize realties, be they personalities (God, self, others) or objects (the cosmos).  
Accordingly, though the Christian apologist's language about the Mediator who 
mediates Christian knowledge of God can be effective as means of mediating knowledge 
of God, no theological and/or apologetic content can ever exhaust the specific personality 
of Jesus Christ:            
 
The infinite riches of the divine Personality who is revealed 
to us in Christ cannot be exhaustively enclosed in any 
number of abstract nouns. In every such abstraction, in 
every such conceptualizing, we are also to some extent 
falsifying by regarding one aspect of the living whole in 
temporary isolation; and not all possible abstractions added 
together can make up the living whole itself.107   
 
 
 
                                                           
107 IRRT, p. 27.  
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2.4. THE LANGUAGE OF CHRISTIAN APOLOGETICS: ITS PURPOSE  
If, then, language about religion in general cannot demonstrate God’s existence, 
what is its value for the specifically Christian apologist? Its purpose, as already indicated 
at several turns, is an evocative one. 
Baillie's position is that a proper Christian apologetics uses language (doctrinal, or 
otherwise) to clarify humans’ already-present faith in God—that is, to drive persons to a 
deeper awareness of God’s presence in and to the soul, thereby facilitating the will’s 
resolve to follow God in faith.  Indeed, the Christian apologist uses language to “exhibit” 
to the individual the beliefs inherent in the individual’s own religious consciousness—to 
exhibit God’s dealings with the human soul. This strategy of facilitating a heightened 
awareness of religious consciousness’ latent beliefs about the I-Thou relation—beliefs 
informed by God’s self-disclosure to humans in their moral consciousness of value—
demands language which will help persons become self-consciously aware of their 
“repressed” awareness of God. Baillie is rather clear about this in Our Knowledge of 
God:     
 
 
For though we may not try to prove either to ourselves or to 
others that God exists, we may do something to persuade 
both others and ourselves that we already believe in Him 
[Baillie’s emphasis] . . .. Such is the only legitimate kind of 
theistic proof.  ‘The true business of philosophy, wrote 
Cook Wilson . . . seems to be to bring the belief to 
consciousness itself.’  It is to this end that the whole 
argument of this book has been directed . . .108 
 
 
Accordingly, Baillie’s own arguments in Our Knowledge of God take aim at intellectual 
atheists in particular: They engage thinkers whom, denying God’s existence with the “top 
of their heads,” do yet believe, Baillie insists, in God’s existence in “the bottom of their 
hearts.” (cf. the early mediating theologian's thought on universal knowledge of God).  
As partial support for Baillie's apologetic strategy, he contends that although atheists 
reject a moral Absolute, atheists yet typically contend for high moral ideals, often living 
                                                           
108 OKG, p. 240.  
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their own lives as if a moral Absolute exists. This inconsistency between the intellectual 
atheist’s theory and praxis does not demonstrate God’s existence; however, it does 
provide ground for a central claim advanced in Our Knowledge of God:  all humans, 
atheists included, operate as if having an immediate, though also mediated, knowledge of 
God.109   
Baillie’s idea of immediacy, then, is of critical importance to Baillie’s critical 
thought in at least two senses: for one, it informs Baillie's thought on the limitations and 
purpose of theological language. In addition, it informs Baillie’s perspective on Christian 
apologetic strategy: although discursive reasoning about theological propositions cannot, 
in and of itself, provide immediate knowledge of God; that immediate Christian 
knowledge of God is invariably mediated by discursive reasoning underscores the 
epistemic value in the proclamation of Christian doctrine, including the Gospel message. 
It is in this context that we must understand MI’s own meaning, functions and epistemic 
limitations.   
We are now in a position to unpack MI’s logic.110 
 
2.5. BAILLIE'S CORE THOUGHT ON MI  
A MT whose primary objective is to describe religious consciousness needs a 
concept to describe religious consciousness.  A MT which tries to correlate the 
phenomena of religious experience with a theology of revelation needs a concept for 
correlating the same.  A MT apologetic in orientation needs a concept to function within 
its apologetic framework and to help it realize its apologetic aims. A MT broad in 
scope—one which mediates amongst multiple philosophical and theological 
perspectives—needs a multi-functional concept with multi-disciplinary applicability. A 
MT preoccupied with ideas of revelation, knowledge of God and religious experience 
throughout its historical development needs a concept to integrate those ideas. A MT with 
an increasingly Christocentric emphasis needs a concept to integrate its Christology with 
                                                           
109 As examined in detail in the second division. 
110 I have had to take a somewhat abstract approach toward the topics of theological language and 
apologetics to help the reader begin to frame an understanding of MI.  As an aid to the reader who would 
benefit from a more conventional and concrete approach, I have recast the material in terms of the Christian 
apologist’s task and use of language (see Appendix).    
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its epistemology. MI serves Baillie’s MT in all of the above-indicated capacities, as 
evidenced in the concept's four functions.  
An understanding of MI should ultimately derive from Baillie’s own thought on 
MI. The mediating theologian first identifies the concept (explicitly) in plausibly his most 
important Christian apologetic work, Our Knowledge of God (1939).  A section dedicated 
to the concept (“Mediated Immediacy”) provides some initial insight into MI’s 
importance for both Baillie’s Christology and his doctrine of the knowledge of God:    
 
 
This is what I have tried to express in the conception of a 
mediated immediacy.  In Christ we know God not by 
argument but by personal acquaintance.  In Christ God 
comes to us directly.111 
 
 
Although the above passage spells out some of Baillie's objectives for MI, it is not self-
evident what Baillie means by the concept, as he offers no formal definition of it. To 
compound matters, Baillie uses MI to speak to a host of related ideas. In order to 
appreciate MI's richness of complexity and functional versatility for Baillie's thought, it is 
necessary to quote Baillie at length—and this all the more so, as Baillie’s synopsis will 
form the basis for my own interpretation of MI’s meaning:   
 
 
Though we are more directly and intimately confronted 
with the presence of God than with any other presence, it 
does not follow that He is ever present to us apart from all 
other experiences  . . . 
. . . [N]o one of the four subjects of our knowledge—
ourselves, our fellows, the corporeal world, and God—is 
ever presented to us except in conjunction with all three of 
the others . . . .  
. . .We do not know God through the world, but we know 
him with the world; and in knowing Him with the world, 
we know him as its ground.  Nature is not an argument for 
God, but it is a sacrament of Him. Just as in the sacrament 
                                                           
111 OKG, pp. 196-197. 
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of Holy Communion the Real Presence of Christ is given 
(if the Lutheran phrase may here be used without prejudice) 
‘in, with and under‘ the bread and wine, so in a wider sense 
the whole corporeal world may become sacramental to us 
of the presence of the Triune God. 
. . . But it is equally certain that our knowledge of God is 
given “in, with, and under” our knowledge of one another.  
This means, first, that knowledge of God is withholden 
from those who keep themselves aloof from the service 
[Baillie’s italics] of their fellows . . . It means, second, that 
only when I am in fellowship [Baillie’s italics] with my 
fellow men does the knowledge of God come to me 
individually . . . It means, third, the necessity of history. . . 
The Christian knowledge of God is not given to any man 
save in conjunction with the telling of an ‘old, old, story’. 
Therefore, it means, lastly, the necessity of Christ, God 
incarnate in the flesh. . . The service of others, the 
fellowship with others, and the historical tradition in which 
I stand are all media that leads me to the Mediator, and the 
Mediator leads me to God. 
. . . . Clearly, then, the immediacy of God’s presence to our 
soul is a mediated immediacy [emphasis mine].112  
 
 
Baillie also has this to say about MI: 
 
The kind of directness for which we have contended in our 
knowledge of God is thus not at all interfered with, but 
rather is implemented, by the fact of Christ’s mediatorship.  
This is what I have tried to express in the conception of a 
mediated immediacy.  In Christ we know God not by 
argument but by personal acquaintance.  In Christ God 
comes to us directly [emphasis mine].113  
 
 
Lastly, Baillie remarks:   
 
We have to face the fact that we have to do here with an 
experience of an entirely unique kind, its uniqueness lying 
precisely in this conjunction of immediacy with mediacy—
that is, in the fact that God reveals Himself to me only 
                                                           
112  Ibid., pp. 178-181, passim. 
113 Ibid., pp. 196-197. 
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through others who went before, yet in so doing reveals 
himself to me now [emphasis mine].114  
 
 
In light of the above remarks, we are now in a position to summarize Baillie’s thought on 
MI:  
 
 
Knowledge of God always arrives indirectly—it is 
"mediated" by propositional knowledge about oneself, the 
world, and others—though also always directly—it is a 
first-order, non-inferential ("immediate") knowledge of 
God (not a second-order abstraction about God). A 
specifically Christian knowledge of God is a non-
propositional knowledge (immediate knowledge) of God’s 
being in Jesus Christ (the "Mediator"). This knowledge, 
like general knowledge of God, is mediated by knowledge 
about oneself, the world, and others. It is also mediated by 
knowledge of God, in the general sense. 
 
 
Given MI's already apparent versatility Baillie’s MT, it is not entirely surprising that over 
75 years of research has struggled to understand the meaning of MI’s logic.  That 
meaning becomes clear, however, when each of MI’s four functions are expounded in 
light of the above crystallization of Baillie's thought on MI, situated within the broader 
theological context provided earlier in this chapter.  
 
2.6. MI'S FIRST FUNCTION: A DESCRIPTION OF DIVINE ACTION 
MI serves four functions in Baillie's thought: (1) a description of the mediation of 
divine action, (2) a description of revelation, (3) a description of the epistemology of 
Christian religious experience and (4) a normative epistemology for knowledge of God. 
We begin with the first function. 
                                                           
114 Ibid., 185. Baillie’s thoughts on MI come from the section in Our Knowledge of God (Chapter IV, Sec. 
16) with the same name. This section, which lays out MI’s basic conceptual framework, is followed by the 
final chapter of the book—a chapter which is largely an in-depth discussion about MI’s ideas of  mediation 
and immediacy (e.g., our immediate knowledge of “the world of others”).   
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MI's first function is to describe divine action. In his The Idea of Revelation in 
Recent Thought (1956), Baillie indicates that divine action is a divinely initiated 
disclosure of God to human consciousness:     
 
 
God reveals himself in action—in the gracious activity by 
which He [God] invades the field of human experience and 
human history which is otherwise a vain show, empty and 
drained of meaning.115  
 
 
 
Mediated by human experience, divine action is a divinely initiated “continuous 
invasion” of human experience, according to Baillie.  Yet, it is with such action that God 
is, paradoxically, made directly present in and to the human soul. In Our Knowledge of 
God, for example, Baillie divulges: “The position I am maintaining is that there is no 
reality by which we are more directly confronted than we are by the Living God.”116  
God, the ground of all being (the possibility for all that is) and all knowledge (the 
possibility of all knowledge) is a distinct Knowledge who directly confronts humans and 
known immediately as Thou:      
      
 
[F]rom the beginning God meets us, not as one among the 
many objects of our knowledge, but as another Knower by 
whom both they and we ourselves are known.  He is not 
part of the world we know…rather is He another 
Knowledge of that world.  He confronts us not as an It nor 
as an inference from all possible Its, but, from the 
beginning as a Thou.  He is not something we find 
ourselves speaking about, but Some One we find speaking 
to us and whom we then, in our turn, find ourselves 
speaking to.117 
 
 
                                                           
115 IRRT, p. 50. 
116 OKG, p. 166. 
117 Ibid., p. 220. 
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Baillie's (Buberian-like) conception of God as a Thou reflects Baillie's enduring position 
that God is Personality. It also reflects Baillie's earlier theological position (Interpretation 
of Religion, 1928) that theological science's interrogation of religious consciousness aims 
to exhibit the I-Thou relationship via a faithful description and "exhibit[ion]" of religious 
consciousness’ belief content.   
In Our Knowledge of God, MI describes the divine action of God: God 
continuously invades humans' field of experience to directly confront human 
consciousness as a Knowledge immediately known. Maintaining “There is nothing in our 
experience, which may not be the medium of God’s self-revelation”,118 Baillie uses MI to 
describe how four objectively-existing media in particular (realities), as well as our 
thought about these four media (truths), do each mediate divine action.  Again:        
 
 
"No one of the four subjects of our knowledge—ourselves, 
our fellows, the corporeal world, and God—is ever 
presented to us except in conjunction with all three of the 
others."  
 
 
Accordingly, MI maintains that it is “in, with and under” these media that God divinely 
acts. Furthermore, MI maintains that divine action is mediated “in, with and under” our 
knowledge of and about these realities. This is in keeping with Baillie's distinction 
between “realities” and “truths”, as discussed earlier in the chapter.  In short, when 
Baillie maintains that divine action (and knowledge of Knowledge—i.e., revelation) 
comes “in, with and under” knowledge of these loci, he is maintaining that divine action 
(and revelation) comes “in, with and under” both our indirect (mediated) propositional 
knowledge “about” these realities through abstraction (knowledge about “truths”), and 
our direct (immediate) knowledge "of" these objects of our experience by personal 
acquaintance (knowledge “of” these objects as “realities”).     
MI, then, describes the mediation of divine action "in, with and under" our 
discursive knowledge about ("truths") and our non-propositional knowledge (immediate 
                                                           
118 Ibid., p. 222. 
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knowledge) of those realties—this with to describe the nature of the Divine-human 
interaction—an interaction between Personality and personalities.119   
 
2.7. MI'S SECOND FUNCTION: A DESCRIPTION OF REVELATION 
2.7.1. Baillie's Differentiation of Divine Action from Revelation 
MI’s second function aims to describe revelation, the epistemological ground for 
all knowledge of God, according to Baillie, throughout his thought.  
In Our Knowledge of God, Baillie maintains that revelation is always mediated by 
concrete historical situations; and in the case of MI, we have found Baillie's suggesting 
that some events are better able to mediate knowledge of God—namely those in which 
we are keenly aware of our self-knowledge, God-knowledge, other-knowledge and 
world-knowledge.  
Writing almost two decades latter, Baillie continues to emphasize the 
contextuality of the mediation of divine revelation, and to underscore that some concrete 
events are epistemologically necessary for the mediation of divine revelation. Of 
particular importance at present, is Baillie's thought on human co-action in the face of 
God's Self-disclosure via divine action.  
 
 
Revelation is always given [sic] us through events; yet not 
through all events, but only through such as appear to be 
God’s mighty works; and through no event in its bare 
character or occurrence, but only as men are enabled by the 
Spirit of God to apprehend and receive its revelatory 
power.120 
 
 
Clearly, Baillie emphasizes that the apprehension of divine action requires the help of the 
Spirit of God.  Divine action, however, does not insure that divine action becomes 
revelatory for humans; human co-action is epistemologically necessary for divine action 
                                                           
119 In the subsequent division we shall relate this function of mediate immediacy to Baillie's early 
thought—examine, for instance, MI's parallels with A.S Pringle-Pattison's position that reality is a multi-
leveled, gradated valuation field, the knowledge of which is mediated by multiple levels of experience and 
knowledge types.  
120 IRRT, p. 78. 
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to become revelatory for the individual, even when the Holy Spirit illuminates the human 
mind:     
  
We must therefore say that the receiving is as necessary to 
a completed act of revelation as the giving.  It is only so far 
as the action of God in history is understood as God means 
it to be understood that revelation has place at all. The 
illumination of the receiving mind is a necessary condition 
of divine self-disclosure.121  
 
 
 
We observe, then, that Baillie conceptually differentiates divine action and divine 
revelation: revelation, unlike divine action, always entails human co-action: God 
discloses God through God’s mighty acts in history; humans, by “illumination” from the 
Holy Spirit, apprehend events as revelatory and appropriate revelation. Put from a 
slightly different perspective, if the human correlate—faith’s response to divine action—
is absent, humans do not have immediate knowledge of God's self-disclosure “in, with 
and under” human experience.  Indeed, save God’s gracious invasion of human 
experience, including those events “in, with and under” which God illuminates the 
human, “receiving mind”, the Christian church itself, a body of believers, would fail to 
exist:      
 
 
 
The truths which Christians believe, the doctrines and 
dogmas which their Church teaches, are such as they could 
not be in possession of, if God had not first revealed 
Himself to his people—revealed His nature and mind and 
will and the purpose which, conformable to His will, He 
has in mind for their salvation.122 
 
 
Why does divine action not always guarantee revelation? Baillie’s theological 
anthropology, and theology of God, collectively assert that humans fail to discern 
                                                           
121 Ibid., p. 64. Cf. ibid., pp. 104-105. 
122 Ibid., p. 34.   
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historical events as mediating a divine action that conveys God’s “nature and mind and 
will and purpose”, because of the limitations of both human nature and God’s nature. 
Regarding the former, the human “receiving apparatus” suffers an imperfect 
“psychosomatic organization”123—hence the epistemological necessity of divine 
illumination for revelation. Concerning God’s nature, God’s omnipotence does not 
override the human mind and will. This too allows for the possibility of a failed 
apprehension of God’s self-disclosure “in, with, and under “human experience, including 
a failed appropriation of the salvation offered by Christ.124It also makes the Holy Spirit’s 
prompting of humans epistemologically necessary for humans' apprehension of certain 
historical events as mediators of the revelatory content, God.   
The diachronic trace provided in the next division will make it apparent that 
Baillie’s epistemological shift125 in Our Knowledge of God introduces neither an idea of 
revelation entirely foreign to Baillie’s early thought nor an idea of revelation that is 
entirely foreign to MI’s logic.126 Here, we observe that when Baillie finishes his writing 
career with The Sense of the Presence of God (1962), he continues to emphasize the 
following as epistemologically necessary for divine revelation: it is mediated by concrete 
historical events; its verification is ultimately contingent upon faith’s apprehension of 
Personality; it can not be logically reduced to any deliverance from discursive or 
                                                           
123 Ibid., p. 34. Cf. SPG, p.6 
124“Revelation and salvation cannot have place unless the divine intention to reveal and to save is met by a 
human acceptance of revelation and salvation which is none the less a free act for all that is divinely 
inspired. This initiative was always with God.  The first move was always His. But his second move 
depended, as constantly comes out in the narratives, upon the response men were enabled to make to the 
first. Ibid., p. 68.  
125 It is true that Baillie’s earlier, heavily Kantian-influenced thought, and quasi-phenomenological method 
of "theological science", do de-emphasize the objectivity of the realities supposed by MI to exist. It is also 
true that Baillie's early thought does not emphasizes a doctrine of revelation—i.e., the contextuality of 
revelation: Baillie's apologetic strategy typically involves the couching of whatever ground is to be found 
for a distinctively Christian religious experience in a primarily Kantian conception of our moral 
consciousness of value. Moreover, it is also the case that The Mediator essential to MI is conspicuously 
absent in epistemologically-oriented major works penned Baillie prior to Our Knowledge of God's 
publication. However, I am not inclined to follow Fergusson, who suggests, albeit carefully avoids, that 
Our Knowledge of God, and MI’s inclusion in it, signals Baillie’s epistemological break with his early 
thought on knowledge of God,  revelation and religious experience.  
126In Baillie’s thought, divine revelation is always mediated by realties and truths (discursive reasoning, be 
that Kantian practical or pure reasoning, for example) corresponding to them; revelation is always, 
paradoxically, an immediate knowledge; and immediate knowledge of God, be that revelation in a general 
sense (moral consciousness of value, or  "general revelation"), or a specifically Christian sense (knowledge 
of Jesus Christ), is always a revelation of Personality (or, Thou), as apprehended by a Holy Spirit-inspired 
faith.   
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inferential reasoning; it is qualitatively a non-inferential (immediate) knowledge of God; 
it requires an illumination of the mind and an apprehension of Divine disclosure by faith 
(assensus), be such knowledge of God a Christian knowledge of God or otherwise. 
Baillie adds:   
 
 
We speak here of faith itself (as distinguished from the 
many theological propositions which claim to ground 
themselves upon it) as being a single apprehension, a single 
disposition of the believing mind…Christian faith…is a 
single illumination, a single reception of and commitment 
to the light revealed…[I]t is always faith in the same 
reality; and its essence is trust in that reality—a trustful 
commitment leading to obedience to its claims. 
 …Our faith was born within us through our divining a 
profounder meaning in certain encountered events than is 
evident to our ordinary senses.”127 
 
   
Baillie maintains, then, that second-order doctrine (“truths”) can derive from reflective 
thinking about the first-order immediate knowledge of God (Reality) given in a 
revelatory event. MI second functions aims to describe faith's operations in humans’ 
immediate knowledge of (notitia), and commitment to (fiducia), the Personality known 
"in, with and under" an event that becomes revelatory, including the paramount Jesus 
Christ event.  
 
2.7.2.  MI's Description of Christian Revelation  
MI’s description of a specifically Christian idea of revelation reflects Baillie’s 
position that while any medium can mediate divine action, God’s self-disclosure as 
Personality is mediated most profoundly by personalities—namely, by Jesus Christ and 
by those who have faith in him. This mediation of Personality by personalities is a 
paradoxically immediate knowledge of Personality’s self-disclosure. The mediated-
immediate quality of knowledge of God's being in Jesus Christ comes out in Baillie's 
description of the historical event and “mediatorship” of “the Mediator”, Jesus Christ.  
                                                           
127 SPG, pp. 72-73. 
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The Christian knowledge of God is not given to any man 
save in conjunction with the telling of an ‘old, old, story’. 
Therefore, it means, lastly, the necessity of Christ, God 
incarnate in the flesh. . . The service of others, the 
fellowship with others, and the historical tradition in which 
I stand are all media that leads me to the Mediator, and the 
Mediator leads me to God. 
. . . . Clearly, then, the immediacy of God’s presence to our 
soul is a mediated immediacy.128 
….The kind of directness for which we have contended in 
our knowledge of God is thus not at all interfered with, but 
rather is implemented, by the fact of Christ’s mediatorship.  
This is what I have tried to express in the conception of a 
mediated immediacy.  In Christ we know God not by 
argument but by personal acquaintance.  In Christ God 
comes to us directly.129 
 
 
Here, Baillie emphasizes the necessity of mediated knowledge about divine action in 
Jesus Christ for Christian faith (i.e., Christian revelation). Specifically, the immediate 
knowledge of God’s being Christ, which can, in turn, give way to faith in Christ (i.e., to 
specifically Christian revelation), is one mediated by at least four types of "necessity": (1) 
the ontological necessity of Christ, God incarnate; (2) the epistemological necessity of 
discursive knowledge about Jesus Christ (an "old, old, story"); (3) the moral necessity of 
our relations with others (service and fellowship); (4) the historical necessity of one's 
historical tradition. These media, and our knowledge thereof, in turn, leads us to the 
Mediator, who comes to us "directly" and is known by "personal acquaintance" (i.e., 
immediately); and the Mediator, in turn, mediates the "immediacy of God's presence to 
the soul", bringing one a specifically Christian knowledge of God. 130      
 Christian revelation, then, is always knowledge mediated by discursive 
knowledge about "truths" pertaining to Jesus Christ, though also, and more profoundly,  
mediated by immediate knowledge of the "reality" of Jesus Christ. These epistemological 
                                                           
128 OKG, pp. 178-181, passim. 
129 Ibid., pp. 196-197. 
130 “For there is one God, and one mediator between God and men, the man Jesus Christ; who gave himself 
a ransom for all, to be testified in due time...” Ibid., p. 180. 
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necessities are both logically and theologically co-extensive with MI's more general 
epistemology of knowledge of God (i.e., revelation); revelation is always mediated by 
knowledge about the world (cf. historical tradition), knowledge of others (cf. fellowship 
and service to others), and knowledge of ourselves (cf. personal acquaintance with 
Christ).   
In light of Baillie’s position that God is a Knowledge; that divine disclosure 
always comes in, with and under historical (space-time) events; that faith (as a mode of 
apprehension) is, in part, a divining of an event’s being revelatory; that revelation, 
generally speaking, is always a mediated-immediate knowledge of God; that Christian 
faith is, in Baillie’s (hierarchical) form of religious pluralism (discussed below), supreme; 
we can here conclude of MI’s description of revelation that:  
 
 
MI’s logic of revelation describes the Mediator-Event as 
being God’s supreme self-disclosure to human kind: Jesus 
Christ, in whom “God comes to us directly”, albeit, in a 
mediated (veiled) form, is qualitatively speaking, 
Knowledge of God par excellence.  
 
 
 
 MI's description of the supremacy of Christian revelation anticipates Baillie's 
thought in The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought (1956). There, Baillie indicates that 
his own moral consciousness mediated to him knowledge of Jesus.  
 
The challenge [to obey God] was mediated to me by my 
Christian upbringing, and thus through the Christian 
Church; but its ultimate source was Jesus Christ. The voice 
I heard was indeed ‘the voice of conscience,’ but it was a 
conscience that had a long history behind it, going back to 
the evangelic story. 131   
 
 
In the subsequent division, we will find Baillie forthrightly describing his early childhood 
knowledge of God as being a MI, and equally contending that family and church relations 
were formative for his early faith in God.  
                                                           
131 IRRT, p. 147. 
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In The Sense of the Presence of God (1962), Baillie continues to use the language 
of mediation to reemphasize that divine revelation is most potent when mediated by 
personal relations.   
 
Where I find myself in most assured contact with reality is 
in the relation with God that is mediated to me through my 
relation with my fellows, and in the relation with my 
fellows that is mediated to me through my relation with 
God [emphasis mine].132  
 
 
In that same final work he also reasserts MI’s core position that knowledge of other 
personalities (relations) is essential for the mediation of a Christian knowledge of God.  
Baillie also emphasizes, as does he with MI, that relations between personalities best 
mediate revelation are relationships characterized by agapē:    
 
 
 
In Christian thought, the two great commandments, 
enjoining the love of God and the love of the neighbour, are 
related to one another in precisely this way. The way to 
God passes through my relation to my neighbour, and the 
way to my neighbour passes through my relationship to 
God.133  
 
 
Previous research has typically found MI to be important only for Baillie's Our 
Knowledge of God (1939). Here, however, we can already present evidence to the 
contrary: we have just found that, be it Baillie's description of Christian revelation in The 
Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought (1956) or The Sense of The Presence of God 
(1962)—each underscores the epistemological necessity of agapē-like relations with 
other minds for both the mediation of divine action and for immediate knowledge of the 
Mediator (i.e., Christian revelation), by personal acquaintance. But does MI contend for 
                                                           
132 SPG, p. 39.  
133 Ibid., p. 37. Baillie instances I John 4: 20 and Matt. 25: 40, 45 for support. The command to "love one's 
neighbour as thyself" is a divine command to treat persons as "subjects", not "objects". To objectify 
persons is to fail to act on "claims" made by God as mediated by one's neighbors.  Ibid., 36-37.   
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the same in Our Knowledge of God?  In the section titled “A Mediated Immediacy”, 
Baillie asserts:          
 
But it is equally certain that all our knowledge of God is 
given us ‘in, with and under’ our knowledge of each other. 
This means, first, that the knowledge of God is withholden 
from those who keep themselves aloof from the service of 
their fellows. It means that “he that loveth not knoweth not 
God”; whereas “If we love one another, God dwelleth in 
us”. And this is indeed a blessed provision by which God 
makes my knowledge of Himself pass through my brother’s 
need. It means, secondly, that only when I am in fellowship 
with my fellow men does the knowledge of God come to 
me individually.134 
 
 
Here we see Baillie emphasizing that Christian revelation is always mediated by 
knowledge of others, particularly as in the context of agapē relations; and that  revelation 
can be "withholden" from those not in such relations (i.e., divine action does not 
guaranteed revelation). When MI describes Christian revelation as being necessarily 
mediated by agapē, it presupposes that God’s presence is most directly apprehended 
when humans are engaged in relations characterized by the highest moral value known to 
humankind—agapē, for Baillie’s thought. When we have knowledge "of" others as 
personalities (realities) in the koinonia of agapē relations—this as opposed to having 
merely discursive, objectified knowledge "about" them ("truths")—God, Baillie suggests, 
dwells within us must fully.  
In passing, when Baillie maintains in his latter thought that the Mediator mediates 
the highest ethical value as yet disclosed to humankind’s moral consciousness—agapē—
the Baillie of (1939-1960) sounds quite a bit like the Baillie of The Interpretation of 
Religion (1926), who also emphasizes that the Mediator mediates the highest ethical 
value as yet disclosed to humankind—agapē:      
 
 
Jesus endeavours to lead his contemporaries to the higher 
thought of God always take the form of an argumentum a 
                                                           
134 OKG, p. 179. 
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fortiori, a ‘How much more...’ His major premise is the 
assumption that we must think of God in the light of what 
is best in our human experience, and as being yet better: 
His minor premise is that what is best in our human 
experience (our ‘highest social value,’ as our modern 
jargon would have it) is agapē.135  
 
 
2.7.3. MI: A Possible Description of Universal Revelation 
When MI describes divine revelation as mediated most profoundly by 
personalities engaged in relations realizing the as-yet, highest known moral value, agapē, 
the concept's function as a description of Christian revelation suggests that it is logically 
co-extensive with the early mediating theologian's early description of revelation—an 
idea of revelation which posits universal knowledge of God, as evidenced in, albeit not 
demonstrated by, humans' moral consciousness of value. Does MI’s function as a 
description of Christian revelation include its being a description of universal revelation? 
Is MI consistent with Baillie's early thought, despite Baillie's "epistemological shift" in 
Our Knowledge of God?  
One way to approach this question is to ask of Baillie’s critical thought: what 
knowledge does all of humankind have about God? Likewise, how do humans get this 
Knowledge? In his early MT, Baillie’s interrogation of religious consciousness leads him 
to conclude that religious consciousness is organically connected to our moral 
consciousness of value.  
 
 
It is not in our own specific animal nature that we find the 
footprints of Divinity, but only in our nature as moral 
personalities . . . [I]t is in our human values that we find 
God revealed . . . Not in the sound of thunder but in the 
voice of conscience do we hear Him speak most plainly.”136   
 
 
Baillie, then, clearly believes that God reveals God’s Self to our moral consciousness of 
value. And it is exactly here that Baillie’s early MT takes odds with Kant's theory of 
                                                           
135 IOR, p. 442. See ibid., pp. 440-42 for Baillie’s thought on agapē as the highest moral value. 
136 IOR, pp. 460-461. 
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religion. A cursory look at that argument evidences that Baillie would rather have Kant 
contend for an immediate knowledge of God (i.e., revelation) mediated by our moral 
consciousness of value.   
 
2.7.3.1 Some insight from Baillie's early criticism of Kant 
According to Baillie, the primary weakness of Kant’s theory of religion concerns 
Kant’s explication of “the exact nature of the transition from the moral to the religious 
outlook”. Kant's failure to elucidate the exact nature of this “determinative connection” 
“between the beliefs of religion and the utterances of the moral consciousness,” is 
particularly problematic:       
 
Especially there is the question whether it is possible to 
claim for that transition full logical cogency—whether, that 
is to say, the fundamental affirmations of faith can be 
exhibited as strict logical implicates of our recognition of 
the moral claim upon our wills. 
 
 
Kant's inadequate description of the epistemology involved in the transition from moral 
consciousness to religious faith has negative implications for Kant's theory of religion. 
For one, it threatens to undermine his doctrine of the summum bonum—the “central 
doctrine of all religion”. This is because, while right to maintain that humans’ have an 
immediate knowledge—an “immediate certain knowledge” of an ideal “I” that initiates 
the transition from moral to religious consciousness—Kant's thought casts serious doubt 
upon the knowability of a “real” “moral” universe, as it fails to elucidate the nature of the 
“determinative connection” that epistemologically conjoins moral and religious 
consciousness:           
 
 
Has Kant ever really offered any demonstration that our 
recognition of duty’s claim upon us carries with it the belief 
that the universe, as moral environment, must be no less 
ethically constituted than ourselves as moral agents? 
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Kant has not, maintains Baillie; and he argues that the corrective to Kant must conceive 
of immediate knowledge as a knowledge mediated by a certain context—namely, one 
that lays emphasis on God-knowledge:    
 
The judgment-form ‘I ought,’ though indeed it is the very 
root and type of immediate certain knowledge [emphasis 
mine], has nevertheless never appeared capable of standing 
by itself in isolation from some kind of context in the 
reality to which the ‘I’ in question belongs’. 137    
 
 
 
We find Baillie, then, asserting well before Our Knowledge of God's publication, that 
knowledge of God is an immediate and mediated knowledge: religious faith, he 
elaborates, is an “immediate certain knowledge” of the “I ought’s” epistemological 
correspondence to an objectively existing Reality. Such immediate knowledge is 
mediated by objective knowledge about reality: “immediate certain knowledge does stand 
in isolation”; it is known in a “context”.  What is the nature of that context which 
mediates immediate knowledge of reality? Baillie's interrogation of the religious 
consciousness of ordinary persons emphasizes the mediation of Reality by the “moral” 
context: it is widely believed that humans’ moral consciousness of value mediates 
immediate knowledge of Reality. Specifically, the religious consciousness of humankind 
testifies to the widely held belief that moral consciousness is governed by God whom, 
perceived as Supreme Value, is believed to correspond epistemologically to moral 
consciousness’ “immediate certain knowledge” of the “I ought”.  
 
Our race as a whole has found it impossible to maintain a 
religious outlook apart from belief in God.  Men have been 
unable to conceive of reality in any way ‘continuous with 
their moral consciousness,’ or to realize their own ethical 
                                                           
137 Quotes from IOR, pp. 272-276 passim. Baillie's criticism of Kant's thought in ROR and IOR focuses 
primarily on Baillie's interpretation of Kant's thought in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1781) and Kant's 
Critique of Practical Reason (1788). See IOR, pp. 259-76, for Baillie's most extensive treatment of Kant's 
thought—in Baillie's published works (Baillie aborted a doctoral thesis on Kant's thought, when he was a 
student at Edinburgh).  
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oneness with it, except by believing it to be under spiritual 
control.138  
 
 
Consequently, when Kant fails to elucidate the determinative epistemological connection 
between the moral consciousness out of which religious consciousness (i.e. religious 
faith) arises, he advances an interpretation of religious consciousness whose description 
flatly contradicts what the ordinary person believes: that an "I" beyond the "ought" 
epistemologically connects an organically related religious consciousness with our moral 
consciousness of value—namely, a Real Value with whom our highest immediately 
intuited values are believed to correspond: God.  
By Baillie’s estimation, then, the ordinary person rightly maintains, contra Kant, 
that religious consciousness: (1) entails knowledge of the really real; (2) is not grounded 
in indirect knowledge (practical reason); (3) possesses a determinative connection with 
moral consciousness in the form of an activity. This activity, simultaneously a mode of 
apprehending God and the self-authentication of knowledge of God, is precipitated by a 
direct knowledge of God: it is called “faith”, which “goes beyond” both the immediate 
knowledge of moral value provided by God in and to the moral consciousness and 
beyond any ground retroactively provided by inferential reasoning's truth's about (indirect 
knowledge) the Reality initially and immediately apprehended by revelation (i.e., faith). 
Indeed,      
 
 
 
Our fundamental moral values are given to us directly, and 
intuited by us directly [emphasis mine]; but for everything 
in religion that goes beyond this direct intuition of moral 
value, there is required the activity of faith.139    
 
 
 
The epistemological connection that is the transition from moral consciousness to 
religious consciousness, then, is an immediate knowledge of God (faith) that is mediated 
by the moral consciousness of value to which it is organically and epistemologically 
                                                           
138 IOR, p. 389. 
139 IOR, p. 246.   
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connected. Kant the man, by Baillie’s estimation, certainly recognized this;140however, 
Kant qua philosopher seems to "waver" on this issue, as evidenced in Kant's excessively 
“narrow and abstract” interpretation of humans' moral consciousness of value—one 
whose “legalism” and “formalism” reduce immediate knowledge of God to second-order 
(indirect) discursive knowledge about a logical implicate. Baillie protests this move,141 as 
it conflicts with the ordinary persons’ understanding of the same and with the “Pauline 
truth that those who live by the spirit are dead to the law.” Better to contend, Baillie 
argues, that moral consciousness possesses moral laws that include both commands and a 
prompting to seek out the “highest ideal”—a prompting, that is, which occasions faith's 
trust in the Reality widely believed to be Self-disclosed in humans’ moral consciousness.  
This, by Baillie’s estimation, better describes humankind’s testimony to God’s universal 
revelation of God.  
 
2.7.3.2 Some insight from Baillie's early criticism of Herrmann's Neo-Kantianism 
 Baillie's early MT also criticizes Wilhelm Herrmann’s (1846-1922) thought, 
contends for immediate knowledge of God, and provides additional evidence that Baillie 
uses MI to contend for universal revelation. 
 When Baillie, in his The Interpretation of Religion, criticizes Herrmann's neo-
Kantian thought, he focuses primarily on Herrmann’s theory of religion, as articulated in 
Herrmann's The Communion of the Christian with God.142 A marked improvement over 
Ritschl’s neo-Kantian theory,143 in Herrmann’s thought “the process by which Christian 
                                                           
140 “That the ideal is in some sense the real, that what ought to be will be or is-is not that the very meaning 
of faith?  Surely Kant makes the passage from morality to religion not when he deduces the existence of 
God from the belief in the objective vindication of goodness but much rather when he passes to the belief in 
the objective vindication of goodness from the attitude of mere unquestioning obedience.” IOR, p. 276. 
141 “Surely the real root of our difficulty with Kant lies not in the nature of the bond which he forges 
between faith and morality but rather in the kind of morality to which religion is thus attached and in terms 
of which it accordingly comes to be interpreted.  If morality means only keeping the commandments—
‘obedience to the categorical imperative’—we may feel that it provides too narrow a basis for Christian 
faith to rest upon.  But if (as a more adequate ethical theory would instruct us) morality be rather the quest 
of the highest and most inclusive ideal which it is possible for man to seek after, the case is very different.  
To envisage moral laws as divine commands is one thing; to envisage the goal of human endeavour as 
being in line with the eternal purpose of God is a very different thing.” IOR, p. 274. 
142 Wilhelm Herrmann, The Communion of the Christian with God, 3rd English ed., trans. J. Sandys 
Stanyon, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1913.  
143 Baillie's criticism of Ritschl's thought centers primarily on Ritschl's The Christian Doctrine of 
Justification and Reconciliation: The Positive Development of the Doctrine, Vol. 3, T. & T. Clark, 1900. 
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conviction develops in the soul has never been so faithfully set forth.  Nor has there been 
any more distinguished contribution made to theology in our time than that made by 
Herrmann....”144  Baillie also commends Herrmann's theory for its articulation of the 
mediation of God’s self-disclosure: Herrmann's idea of revelation allows, in theory, 
knowledge of God across religious traditions (i.e., an interrogation of religious 
consciousness across religious traditions); and, also unlike Ritschl’s theory of religion, 
does justice to the “recognisability of the common Christian experience shared alike by 
ourselves to-day and the New Testament writers long ago”.145 Herrmann's idea of 
revelation notwithstanding, his most distinguished theological contribution is his 
description of Christian religious experience (hereafter, CRE). It is also his thought's 
glaring deficiency. Specifically, its (1) unduly “narrow and exclusivistic” description of 
CRE denies the religious epistemology supposed by Herrmann's method—namely, that a 
correct description of religious experience, coupled with a theology of divine revelation, 
could illuminate religion’s essence.  Secondly, it (2) ambiguously describes the 
epistemological connection between moral consciousness and religious consciousness, as 
evidenced in Herrmann's ambiguous elucidation of: (a) the content of religious 
knowledge which mediates assent to Christian religious faith; (b) the epistemological 
connection between Christian religious faith and non-Christian religious faith.  These 
ambiguities (a-b), in turn, suffer from "one critical point that does not satisfy . . . that 
Christian faith in God ‘rests upon two object facts’—the historical fact of Jesus and the 
fact of our consciousness of duty’s claim.”146 Specifically, Herrmann’s epistemology of 
religious experience expresses uncertainty on how revelation mediates religious 
experience.  
 
 
‘We may have the revelation of the being of God quite 
apart from Jesus, but . . . Jesus makes some addition to that 
revelation, as, for example, the knowledge that God has a 
Son and constitutes one Being with Him . . . 
. . . . [But] we by no means wish to assert, even for a 
moment, that the savages of New Holland have no 
                                                           
144 IOR, p. 296. 
145 IOR, p. 56. 
146 IOR, p. 296. 
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knowledge of God, no pulsations of true religion, and 
therefore no communion with God.  But we do not know 
through what medium such knowledge and such 
communion reach them.  We cannot enter fully into the 
religious life even of a pious Israelite, for the facts which 
worked upon them as revelation have no longer force for us 
. . . ’ [emphasis mine].147 
 
 
 
Jesus, then, is said to mediate a revelation co-extensive with, though qualitatively distinct 
from, general revelation—this by making “some addition” to non-Christian knowledge of 
God.  This mysterious "addition" in knowledge which, via the Jesus-human encounter, 
mediates Christian faith, is said to be, in turn, mediated by another medium—an 
epistemological connection between Christian revelation and a more general revelation, 
about whose nature “we do not know”.  All of this is problematic for Baillie 
 When Baillie centers his argument on Herrmann’s description of the mediation of 
divine revelation, he attacks Herrmann's description of how a specifically Christian faith 
develops in the soul—namely, how “some addition” mediates Christian knowledge of 
God and prompts trust in Jesus Christ (i.e., CRE).148 Herrmann rightly maintains that 
Jesus' life is the historical fact upon which Christianity should focus—an advance on 
Ritschl’s “narrow Lutheran Christocentrism” 149 Herrmann also correctly recognize that 
faith in the Mediator is in some sense an immediate knowledge: ‘The faith which is 
religion is not assent to propositions but is, in words of Herrmann’s “nothing else than 
trust in persons and in the powers of personal life.”’150  
Still, language's limitations—that it can neither exhaust the historical fact of 
Jesus, nor the nature of divine-human encounter, nor the immediate certitude that 
Christian faith “undeniably contains”—do not warrant Herrmann’s epistemological 
                                                           
147 Herrmann, Communion with God, p. 62. Cited in IOR, p. 57.  
148 Herrmann's description provides fodder for Baillie's criticism: ‘If we now ask, “How is it possible that 
so mighty an utterance should be spoken to us in the fact that Jesus stands before us as an undeniable part 
of what is real to ourselves? or, “How can this fact become for us the intimation wherein God discloses 
Himself to us in His reality and Power?” these answers can be answered only by the fact itself, and by what 
it undeniably contains.’ Herrmann, Communion with God, pp. 83-84. Cited in  IOR, p. 295. 
149 Though Ritschl rightly affirms Herrmann’s own Lutheran position that Christ is the Mediator of 
knowledge of God—"that," in Baillie’s words, “the faith of Christians is altogether grounded in an 
experience mediated through Jesus Christ.” 
150 Herrmann, Communion with God, p. 228.  Cited in IOR, p. 378. 
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reduction of the organic epistemological connection between moral consciousness and 
religious consciousness to the "historical fact of Jesus". Moreover, such an 
epistemological maneuver would foreclose unduly on Herrmann's otherwise excellent 
description of CRE, as: (1) the description of the historical fact of Jesus—but one 
“antecedent of faith”—is not illuminating; (2) it is unclear how said "fact", the vaguely 
described impression that it makes on humans' moral consciousness included, mediates 
moral consciousness’ assent to a CRE—one with which it is, again, (somehow) 
epistemologically connected. Indeed, Herrmann's description of CRE (3) introduces 
grave doubt about how “such an impression made by Jesus upon us . . . gives us grounds 
for believing that a God is here acting upon us through the medium of his historical 
memory.”  
According to Baillie, then, Herrmann's description of the epistemology religious 
experience and revelation is essentially vacuous: Christian faith is (somehow) mediated 
by a divine encounter with a Mediator who (somehow) engages humans' moral 
consciousness of value with (some) "impression" to bring one, via cognitive insight, into 
a qualitatively more profound communion with the universally-known God. 
How might one better describe revelation, religious consciousness, moral 
consciousness and their epistemic relations? Baillie maintains that a description of 
Christian faith’s development in the soul should emphasis that assent to religious 
consciousness is mediated by discursive reasoning—that which Herrmann marginalizes, 
in his rather vague description of the mediation of religious experience: 
 
 
It is . . . a serious question whether Herrmann, by thus 
refusing that the final step leading to faith can be 
represented as an act of intelligent insight, has not in effect 
robbed faith altogether of that connection with the objective 
world which he had been at such points to give it.  He has 
broken the chain of reason at a critical point; and when we 
proceed beyond that point, are we not as surely loosed from 
our moorings in objectivity as if the chain had never been 
forged?151   
 
 
                                                           
151 IOR, p. 296. Baillie's italicized emphasis.   
 72 
Accordingly, the superior description of the "historical fact of Jesus" will elucidate how 
assent to Christian religious consciousness (i.e., Christian revelation) is mediated by an 
"act of intelligent insight"—itself an act mediated by one’s encounter with the 
"antecedent of faith" (Jesus) whose "impression", in and to moral consciousness, both 
mediates and prompts assent to Christian religious consciousness (i.e., fiducia).  Such an 
emphasis on the epistemological necessity of intelligent insight will go far toward 
improving upon Herrmann's description of CRE. Indeed, when Herrmann denies that 
Christian religious consciousness is mediated by an act of intelligent insight, he (4) 
“breaks the chain of reason” between Christian moral and religious consciousness as well 
as (5) fractures the epistemological connection between Christian religious consciousness 
and the other “antecedent of faith” —“the fact of our consciousness of duty’s claim”—
each of which mediates the assent from humankind’s moral consciousness of value to 
Christian religious consciousness.  Consequently, Herrmann's thought fails to explain 
lucidly how moral consciousness' epistemological connection to Christian religious 
consciousness occasions CRE (faith in Jesus Christ via divine revelation).  The absence 
of this epistemological linkage not only compromises the cogency Herrmann's 
description of CRE; it invariably (6) undermines Herrmann's would-be attempt at a 
theology of general revelation. The superior description of CRE, then, will overcome 
deficiencies (1-6). 
It is also clear that Baillie is, even with his early Kantian and neo-Kantian-
indebted thought, contending for the following epistemological positions: (a) knowledge 
of God is an immediate knowledge; (b) immediate knowledge of God is mediated by 
one's historical context (e.g., knowledge about the historical fact of Jesus Christ); (c) 
knowledge of God is always a matter of revelation; (d) Divine Love is the highest value 
known to moral consciousness; (e) a conceptually integrated moral consciousness and 
religious consciousness, be it construed either theologically (theology of revelation) or by 
its correlate empirical methodology (a quasi-phenomenology of religious experience)—
and that all of this mediates, or makes way for the coming of, faith in the Mediator—the 
one in whom God most supremely acts—the one in whom Divine Love and Goodness is 
most fully realized.  
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2.7.3.3 MI in Light of Baillie's early criticism of Kant and Herrmann 
Does MI, then, describe universal revelation?  Prior research has not maintained 
that it has; I have already presented evidence that it does. For one, there is Baillie’s just-
mentioned prescription (1-6) for a superior description of CRE (i.e., Christian revelation): 
it will emphasize that CRE is mediated by intelligent insight. MI's description of CRE 
straightforwardly emphasizes that and propositions (1-6), if not without its own logical 
difficulties. We have also found Baillie criticizing Herrmann's epistemology for 
espousing an unduly narrow conceptualization of the scope of divine action, revelation 
and religious experience—on, again, grounds (1-6). Given that MI's epistemology does 
endeavor to meet challenges (1-6), and that MI's logic does uphold the core of Baillie's 
early epistemology (a-e), it stands to reason that MI is also a response to Herrmann's 
allegedly deficient description of God's revelation of God's Presence in and to all 
persons—a mainstay position throughout Baillie's scholarly thought. Indeed, we have 
Baillie using the language of mediation and immediacy to contend that what is “written in 
the hearts” of humankind is something of the “nature, mind, will and purpose” of God is 
epistemologically connected to a specifically Christian revelation. To be sure, Baillie 
does not overtly indicate in The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought (1956) that 
humans’ moral consciousness recognize in Jesus God’s Supreme disclosure of Value; 
nevertheless, Baillie does lay it down that God manifests God in and to the moral 
consciousness of all humans—namely, such that humans know that: (1) they “owe” God;  
(2) an evil pervades humans' “inner” and “outer worlds”; (3) God is the One who delivers 
humans from exigency.152 How does God deliver humans from the throes to which moral 
consciousness universally testifies? Addressing the situation of human exigency, Baillie 
submits: “The fullness of revelation is only in Jesus Christ, and in Him all other 
revelation is comprehended and summed up.”153 Clearly, then, Baillie’s idea of special 
revelation presupposes an epistemological connection with moral consciousness; and 
moral consciousness, according to Baillie, mediates its assent to Christian faith:  having 
privy to God’s Self-disclosure in and to it, moral consciousness facilitates humans’ 
                                                           
152 IRRT, Ch. 3. 
153 Ibid., p. 80. Baillie’s italicized emphasis. 
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recognition in Jesus God’s supreme self-disclosure and deliverance from the evil that 
pervades humans’ inner and outer worlds. 
It is Baillie’s Our Knowledge of God, however, which provides the best evidence 
that MI's function as description of revelation extends beyond its description of 
specifically Christian revelation to an affirmation of Baillie's idea of general revelation. 
Therein, Baillie contends, as does he throughout his thought, that all humans have 
knowledge of God. In keeping with both his early and latter thought, Baillie specifically 
maintains that, firstly, all humans have a priori moral “conceptions” of God’s divine 
attributes. A priori knowledge that is no mere knowledge about “an impersonal realm of 
a priori moral essences”, it is rather a priori moral conception of God as Personality.  To 
this Baillie adds:      
 
 
 
What is true of personality is true of goodness… infinity, 
eternity, omniscience, and omnipotence. All these 
conceptions we do certainly possess, yet it is clear that we 
do not find them in ourselves or anywhere in the created 
world…It must be that we have some direct knowledge of 
Another who is Uncreated and in whom these qualities 
inhere.   Such qualities are known, not a posteriori but a 
priori; which is to say, being interpreted, that they are first 
seen not on earth but in heaven.  They are the names and 
attributes which we find in God (emphases mine).154   
 
 
 
Baillie's position in Our Knowledge of God, then, is that all humans have a "direct" 
(immediate) knowledge of God mediated by a priori knowledge (“conceptions”) about 
God’s attributes. This immediate knowledge, Baillie goes on to say, includes knowledge 
of God’s “perfections” and “ideals” as well as knowledge of the “ontological predicates” 
of God’s attributes, namely God's “immutability,” “omniscience”, and “omnipresence”. 
These essences are “first discovered by us in the divine Reality that confronts us . . .”155 
Is such universal knowledge of God, situated in moral consciousness, inborn-innate 
                                                           
154 OKG, pp. 251-252. 
155 Ibid., 258. “He who know the poverty of his personality knows it only because there has first been 
revealed to him the perfect personality of God.” Ibid. 
 75 
knowledge? Put slightly differently, is it a directly immediate knowledge of God—one 
that bypasses mediation by human sensory experience? Baillie makes it clear that 
universal knowledge of God is immediate knowledge mediated by human experience, 
albeit a knowledge whose ground ultimately does not reduce to (can be verified by) a 
posteriori truths: God ultimately verifies knowledge of God.   
We see, then, that when MI describes Christian revelation in Our Knowledge of 
God as mediated by the highest value known by moral consciousness, agapē, it describes 
revelation in a manner consistent with Baillie's interpretation of the content of humans' 
moral consciousness. One might rightly say that, in effect, to gaze upon the Mediator is to 
gaze upon the Supreme Value of whom the moral consciousness already has some 
knowledge by faith (notitia). Baillie's line of reasoning here corroborates his view that 
the apologist's language should be, as we have seen, primarily evocative, and never 
demonstrative, in methodological orientation: one need not prove what (Whom) is 
already known.156  
Furthermore, when MI describes a specifically Christian knowledge of God as 
mediated by our knowledge of personalities, it presupposes that moral consciousness is 
epistemologically necessary for human history’s mediation of knowledge of God's being 
in Jesus Christ. When speaking, for instance, of Christian revelation as MI, Baillie 
indicates that    
 
   
We have to face the fact that we have to do here with an 
experience [mediated immediacy] of an entirely unique 
kind, its uniqueness lying precisely in this conjunction of 
immediacy with mediacy—that is, in the fact that God 
reveals Himself to me only through others who went 
before, yet in so doing reveals himself to me now.157 
 
 
How can knowledge of God be mediated by mere historical knowledge or information 
about persons—indeed, by persons whom one has never encountered in a concrete 
                                                           
156 As Baillie maintains that Cook Wilson rightly perceives.  
157 OKG, p. 185.  
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historical situation?  MI's description of persons' mediation of knowledge of God across 
history presupposes that knowledge "about" a person’s thought (truths) can mediate 
knowledge "of" their personality (reality), and that knowledge of that personality can 
mediate knowledge "of" the Personality disclosed in and to that personality. As Baillie 
puts it: “When God speaks to us in the Epistle, it is at the same time St. Paul who speaks 
to us.  St. Paul’s thinking is not extinguished, but is rather at its best, when God is most 
plainly thinking in him [emphasis mine].”158  
Although the mediation of knowledge of Christ by other minds may prove 
problematic for MI’s logic,159 when MI describes Personality thinking in a personality, its 
epistemology does suppose that when the human qua personality encounters the Gospel 
message in a concrete situation, such a personality can have, by personal acquaintance, a 
knowledge of those other minds (e.g., Gospel writers) said to mediate divine action. Such 
mediation of divine action “in, with and under” the trans-historical fellowship of other 
minds, coupled with the "human correlate", faith (fiducia), helps to enable that Gospel 
message to become a Christian “revelatory situation”—i.e., enables, via mediated 
knowledge about the Gospel, immediate knowledge of God’s being in Christ, including 
faith’s response in the individual's hic et nunc.160 When MI’s epistemology describes 
such historical mediation of such a Christian revelatory situation, it emphasizes to things 
which are, on Baillie’s analysis, not emphasized by Herrmann’s epistemology: (1) not all 
mediation of Christian knowledge of God is limited to the Christian tradition’s 
interpretation of the historical fact of Jesus; (2) faith in Jesus is mediated by the moral 
consciousness in and to which God is self-disclosed.161  
We see, then, that MI’s second function is primarily a description of Christian 
revelation—that is, a description of faith's trust in the Mediator, the paramount and, 
paradoxically, Mediated (flesh)-Immediate (spirit) Knowledge of God. When MI’s 
description of the epistemology of divine revelation places the Mediator-Event at the 
                                                           
158 Ibid., p. 236.   
159 As examined in Chapter 8. 
160 “All the history that has Presence in it for me, all the history that has anything to say to me, all of the 
past through which I am addressed in the present, is centered in the story of the Cross,” OKG, p. 186. Cf. 
IRRT, pp. 104-08, where Baillie emphasizes the here-and nowness of revelation—an aspect of immediacy 
of knowledge of God which finds increasing emphasis in Baillie’s MT in OKG, and is central to MI’s 
epistemology. 
161 Please see next section’s reference to MI’s autobiographical basis for evidence for (1-2).  
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center of Christian faith, it describes how various knowledges (e.g., ourselves, others, the 
world) mediate knowledge of the Mediator who most profoundly points humanity toward 
God. It also presupposes that the Mediator is the personification of our highest ethical 
value—agapē. In doing so, MI describes Christian revelation as mediated by knowledge 
of God's action "in, with and under" a concrete history that mediates religious 
consciousness’ reflexive action upon, and linguistic interpretation of, moral 
consciousness’ latent belief that Personality is revealed (i.e., known immediately) in a 
Divine-human encounter, between Personality and personalities, in and to humans’ moral 
consciousness of value. This includes MI’s description of God’s action in the Mediator—
the paradigm event the knowledge about and of which is mediated by mediated-
immediate knowledge of other minds—supra-sensory personalities whom, like God, are 
not ontologically reducible to bodies. Such mediation is particularly adept at mediating 
knowledge of God when personalities engage fellow personalities in relations 
characterized by agapē.  
Although MI's description of revelation is primarily concerned with the 
epistemology of a specifically Christian knowledge of God, when it describes Christian 
revelation as immediate knowledge of the Mediator through personal acquaintance, its 
description conceives of faith in the Mediator as being a more particularized, and 
profoundly more illuminating, instanced knowledge of the God, the Self-disclosure of 
Whom is already known (notitia) universally via the medium of human moral 
consciousness. With regard to non-Christian religious consciousness (i.e., general 
revelation), MI's description of Christian revelation likewise conceives of Christian 
knowledge of God as being a more profound and instanced knowledge of Subject in 
Whom the religious consciousness of "ordinary persons" have put their trust (fiducia).  
The extent to which MI’s function as a description of revelation extends beyond a 
description of Christian revelation to a description of universal revelation requires an 
examination of MI’s function as within the more dynamic context of Baillie’s MT (next 
division). Nonetheless, MI is surely that concept with which Baillie would 
epistemologically forge a link between his idea of Christian revelation and his idea of 
general or universal revelation. As such, we already have evidence to suggest that prior 
research has underestimated MI’s importance for Baillie’s critical thought as a whole.  
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2.8. MI'S THIRD FUNCTION: A DESCRIPTIVE EPISTEMOLOGY OF 
CHRISTIAN RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 
We see that Baillie's MT maintains that God objectively exists; that God is in 
Jesus Christ; that faith in Jesus Christ is Christian saving faith; that faith in Jesus Christ 
places the Christian in a deeper fellowship with God than was previously the case—and 
that all of this knowledge of God is mediated by human experience, though God be 
immediately known. We have also seen that the veridicality of this mediated-immediate 
knowledge is ultimately established by God's self-authenticating revelation, which MI 
describes.  
Baillie was not inclined to proclaim these and other theological truths, when in 
apologetic mode, however. He certainly did not assert tout court that revelation provides 
the basis for our understanding of all of God’s action. Rather, when Baillie engaged the 
intellectual currents of his time, his tendency, in keeping with his mediating theological 
method, was to engage such currents on more neutral ground. For Baillie qua apologist, 
this often included his taking a more empirical approach toward the would-be 
reconciliation of an issue—this often with appeal to some aspect of shared experience—
to correlate that aspect with his theology, and then persuade that the theological 
explanation is the superior explanation. It is with this correlative approach in mind that 
we now turn to MI’s third function: Baillie's attempt to describe an empirically-based 
epistemology of religious experience in a way that correlates with his theology of divine 
revelation (i.e., MI’s description of revelation).  
Baillie's MT does also use MI to describe the cognitive-psychological phenomena 
involved in religious consciousness’ experience—a point routinely overlooked in the 
scholarly criticism of MI. Specifically, this third function of MI endeavors to describe 
what seems, to the subject, to be involved in what appears, to the subject, to be divine 
revelation in Christ.  In this respect, MI tries to describe what Proudfoot calls the 
“phenomenological immediacy” of CRE.162 I shall prefer the language of "descriptive 
epistemology" to refer to MI's function as a description of CRE.163   
                                                           
162 In his own analysis of religious experience, Wayne Proudfoot identifies two types of immediacy, when 
examining Schleiermacher’s concept of immediacy: the "phenomenological immediacy" of religious 
experience and the "theoretical immediacy” of religious experience.  Phenomenological immediacy refers 
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In Our Knowledge of God, Baillie uses MI to describe the perception and 
cognition involved in assent to belief in Jesus Christ, in particular. I have already covered 
much of that ground with my look at MI's description of revelation, and need not repeat 
that description here. The major difference to note here is that, whereas MI's function as a 
description of divine revelation theologically presupposes that faith, the mode of 
apprehending God, provides actual knowledge of God in Jesus Christ by personal 
acquaintance, MI’s function as a description of CRE describes the phenomena by which 
moral consciousness transitions into Christian religious consciousness, according to what 
seems to the subject to be saving faith in the Mediator.  A function of MI which mirrors 
the early mediating theologian's belief that theological science should interrogate and 
accurately describe religious consciousness, this function of MI, more particularly still, 
describes the cognition involved in moral consciousness' assent to belief in Jesus Christ, 
according to how God seems to be known in Jesus Christ.  
This is a novel interpretation of MI, to my knowledge. It is not without support: 
the primary basis for it is Baillie's own autobiography—itself the basis for much of 
Baillie’s epistemology in Our Knowledge of God. That autobiography is discussed in 
detail in the next chapter; here, I note only that when Baillie does argue for MI, his first 
move is to appeal to his own experience of God as support. An experience of God which 
Baillie will be found to describe as a "mediated immediacy", Baillie epistemologically 
ties his experience of God-as-MI to what seems to him to have been his childhood moral 
consciousness of value (using axiological-loaded words like “owed”, “ought”, 
“conscience”, the sweetness and “rebuke” of the message of Jesus; that Jesus was 
somehow the “authority” which “confronted” him). Moreover, we shall also find Baillie 
maintaining that knowledge of God-as-MI is an experience shared by all humans, in at 
                                                                                                                                                                               
to a description of “how an emotion or experience seems to the subjects as an account of what must be 
assumed in order to have such an experience.” Theoretical immediacy refers to how an emotion or 
experience is an account of what must be assumed in order to have such a religious experience. Wayne 
Proudfoot, Religious Experience. Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press, 1985, p. 19. Cf. ibid., p. 3. 
163 Proudfoot's language of "phenomenological immediacy" connotes two epistemological aspects that are 
inconsistent with MI and could perplex the reader: (1) that Baillie employed a strictly phenomenological 
method for studying religious experience; (2) that Baillie's was a phenomenalist account of CRE. 
Regarding the former, Fergusson has rightly noted that Baillie employed a quasi-phenomenological 
approach and that this approach pertains only to Baillie's thought prior to OKG. See Fergusson, “Orthodox 
Liberal”. 
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least one respect. 164 An epistemological and apologetic move co-extensive with Baillie's 
epistemology of universal revelation, it is also consistent with MI’s plausible attempt to 
integrate Baillie's descriptions of universal revelation and Christian revelation. 
There is additional evidence to indicate that Baillie employs MI as an empirically-
based description of the cognitive psychology involved in religious experience. For 
example, there is Baillie’s ground for the other-knowledge and world-knowledge that 
constitute two of MI’s four types of knowledge (along with self-knowledge and God-
knowledge): it does not derive primarily from a theology of revelation; rather, Baillie 
appeals to philosophical and psychological reflection as ground for how the mind seems 
to perceive the world and others.165 
In passing, inasmuch as the proper aim of Christian apologetics is to facilitate 
conscious reflection upon a latent knowledge of God thought available to all humans, 
MI’s hitherto neglected function as a description of religious experience may hold 
promise as a contemporary apologetic construct.   
 
                                                           
164 “Clearly, then the immediacy of God’s presence is a mediated immediacy. But I must now do what I can 
to solve the apparent self-contradictoriness of this phrase…. What I must do is ask myself how knowledge 
of God first came to me. And here I can only repeat what was said in the opening pages of this book: unless 
my analysis of my memory is altogether at fault, the knowledge of God that first came to me in the form of 
an awareness that I was ‘not my own’ but under authority, one who ‘owed’ something, one who ‘ought’ to 
be something which he was not. But whence did this awareness come to me?” Baillie then indicates that his 
parents’ language and behavior mediated to him his earliest awareness of God. The story of particular 
importance for the mediation of knowledge of God in this “spiritual climate” was the story of Jesus: “And I 
knew that was somehow the source of the authority with which I was confronted. I could not hear a Bible 
story read without being aware in it I was somehow being confronted with a solemn presence that had in it 
both a sweetness and rebuke. Nor do I remember a day when I did not already dimly known that this 
presence was God.” Baillie continues: “The story told me how God had spoken to Abraham and Moses and 
the prophets and Apostles, but what gave the story power over my imagination and conscience was the 
knowledge that ‘in, with and under’ this speaking to these others of long ago He was now also speaking to 
me.” He then explictly reties his personal experience of God to his idea of mediated immediacy: “And we 
have to face the fact that we have to do here with an experience of an entirely unique kind, its uniqueness 
lying precisely in this conjunction of immediacy with mediacy—that is, in the fact that God reveals 
Himself to me only through others who went before, yet in so doing reveals himself to me now.” This was 
Baillie’s experience, to best of his memory, of how God “used these media” to “reveal Himself to [Baillie’; 
“my” emphasized] soul.” By Baillie’s estimation, is he the only one to have experienced the immediacy of 
God in the present by the mediation of others from the past? “Mysterious though it be, it is a mystery with 
which all men have had acquaintance.” OKG, pp. 181-186, passim. 
165 See Ibid., section 17, pp. 201-218. 
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2.9. MI'S FOURTH FUNCTION: A NORMATIVE EPISTEMOLOGY OF 
KNOWLEDGE OF GOD  
We have found MI’s first three functions to be primarily descriptive—
descriptions of divine action, revelation, and CRE. MI also functions as a normative 
epistemology in Baillie’s MT. To say that MI’s fourth function is a "normative 
epistemology", as opposed to a "descriptive epistemology", is to move beyond a 
description of the processes involved in what seems to be knowledge of God (descriptive 
epistemology), to the position that it is reasonable to think that such description evidences 
actual knowledge of God.   
When Baillie uses MI in this capacity, he argues that knowledge of God is 
somewhat analogous to knowledge of human minds: each is a mediated immediacy. 
Specifically, each is a mediated knowledge of a mind, in that each comes “in, with and 
under” the corporeal world and our inferential knowledge “about” that world; each is, 
however, paradoxically an immediate knowledge of a mind ontologically irreducible to 
the corporeal matter each embodies: Mediating by second-order, discursive knowledge 
(“truths”) about corporeal realities, knowledge of human minds, like knowledge of God, 
is a non-discursive knowledge “of” "realities" (“minds” or “personalities”) whose 
existence is often thought to transcend the material order.  MI, when functioning in its 
somewhat limited capacity as a normative epistemology, is not a proof for God's 
existence, based on knowledge of human minds: knowledge of God is always a matter of 
revelation, according to Baillie, and never an inference. Accordingly, this function of MI 
does not suppose that analogies between knowledge of God and knowledge of other 
realities can be established from, in Baillie's words, “the human end”: God is the ground 
of all being and knowledge, according to Baillie; and all analogies, imperfect though they 
must be, must begin with God, who has logical priority over all realties and truths, and be 
evaluated to the extent that such realties correspond to God’s self-revelation.  
MI’s function as a normative epistemology does function as a safeguard of sorts 
for Baillie's Christian apologetic: it is a construct which Baillie wields as a defense 
against epistemologies which reject as meaningless knowledge of God, on the ground 
that such talk admits of knowledge of a supra-sensible mind. Specifically, Baillie 
employs MI to contend that, inasmuch as knowledge of persons (or minds) is admitted as 
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a truth statement in epistemological debate, knowledge of Personality (Mind) cannot be 
rejected on the ground that it too contends for knowledge of a supra-sensible reality. One 
might say that, in this regard, Baillie uses MI to argue for a position not unlike, for 
example, Plantinga and Alston’s position for the proper basicality of belief in God. 
 
2.10. CONCLUSION 
My conclusion for this chapter is that MI serves four functions for Baillie’s MT: 
(1) a description of divine action; (2) a description of divine revelation; (3) a descriptive 
epistemology of CRE; (4) a normative epistemology of knowledge of God. My 
interpretation is, to my knowledge, original: prior research has tended to identify merely 
two of MI’s functions, as evidenced in its collective criticism of MI.  
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DIVISION 2 : MI’S DEVELOPMENT IN BAILLIE’S MEDIATING THEOLOGY  
3. JOHN BAILLIE: A MEDIATING THEOLOGIAN IN-THE-MAKING  
This second division of the thesis, to which we now turn, provides the 
groundwork necessary for the resolution of the second major research issue presently 
facing John Baillie scholarship: MI’s importance for Baillie’s MT. It does so by 
elucidating and diachronically tracing the autobiographical and intellectual influences 
which shaped the development and focus of Baillie’s MT. Operating within this broader 
social-intellectual context, the division brings to the fore MI’s development in Baillie’s 
evolving MT.  It is found that MI’s importance for Baillie’s MT has been severely 
underestimated by previous research.  
 
3.1. AN INTRODUCTION TO BAILLIE’S MEDIATING THEOLOGY: ITS 
CHALLENGES AND HOW THEY WILL BE OVERCOME  
Any attempt to order, to understand and to evaluate Baillie’s MT must overcome 
a host of challenges. For one, unconventional lines of thinking would appear to run 
rampantly throughout it. J.K. Mozley touches on this issue, when, writing over half a 
century ago, he warns that  
 
Dr. Baillie is, indeed, a singularly independent thinker, and 
both those who read him now, and those who will be in the 
position someday to assess the value of his work as a 
Christian theologian, must not expect to follow his 
expositions as though he were taking them along familiar 
routes. 166 
 
 
To compound matters, Baillie’s unfamiliar expositions found him engaging several 
intellectual currents, as we have seen. Furthermore, Baillie’s wide-ranging theology is not 
systematically elucidated . Fergusson, for example, notes that Baillie’s was a non-
systematic theology, and thinks it better to label Baillie’s MT as a “reactive” 
                                                           
166  John Kenneth Mozley, Some Tendencies in British Theology  (London: S.P.C.K., 1951), p. 149. 
 84 
theology167—one, that is, whose doctrines were articulated in the context of Baillie’s 
mediation amongst a host of any number of intellectual currents. As Newlands puts it, 
“John Baillie’s work does not read like a timeless Summa. Indeed, it could not, because it 
quite deliberately addresses current intellectual issues with a sympathetic sensitivity to 
their own agenda.”168 Power, writing earlier still, likens Baillie’s non-systematically 
elucidated thought to a poet's musings.169 Furthermore, Baillie’s most creative, and 
perhaps most fruitful, thought appears to be disjointed at times.170 Indeed, it is on such 
occasions that one finds evidence for possibly the “outstanding weakness” of Baillie’s 
MT, its plausibly incoherent language about revelation.171  
There are, then, several challenges that accompany an attempt to understand 
Baillie’s MT and MI’s importance for it. These demand a research method that can, at 
minimum: (1) effectively order Baillie’s expansive MT; (2) astutely follow the logic of 
Baillie’s often unconventional arguments as such; (3) diachronically track and order 
Baillie’s dynamic, “reactive”, and, at times, dynamically changing, theological 
development; (4) judiciously evaluate any would-be potential value of that MT’s 
doctrines and concepts (i.e., MI172), by subjecting them to criticism from the very areas 
                                                           
167 Fergusson, “Orthodox Liberal”, p. 123. 
168 Transatlantic Theology, p. 310. 
169 “It may be safe to say that Baillie was not a systematic thinker, if by that one means a person who 
constructs an architeonic system in which all of the structure comes together in a well proportioned whole. 
Baillie wrote more like a poet, and his style was impressionistic.” William L. Power, The Knowledge of 
God, the Nature of God, and the Function of Theological Language in the Theology of John Baillie. Emory 
University Doctoral Dissertation, 1965, p. 158. 
170 Fergusson, for example, appears to find a positive correlation between the number of intellectual 
currents amongst which Baillie is mediating and the incomprehensibility of Baillie's latter thought (in 
particular). When, for example, Baillie expands his dialoguing partners in Our Knowledge of God (1939), 
so as now to engage Barth's thought with increased depth of expression, Baillie’s now “increasingly 
creative” theology becomes one increasingly plagued by “disjointed” arguments. Such disjointed logic is 
said to occur in Baillie’s thought on revelation and religious experience in aprticular—that is, as concerning 
doctrines of central importance to MI.  If so, here is a challenge for an understanding of the Our Knowledge 
of God that is of pivotal importance for MT’s development (and, presumably, a challenge for understanding 
the concept of MI featured in that work). See Fergusson, “Orthodox Liberal”, p 140. Here also is some 
rather delicious irony: if Fergusson’s analysis is correct, then Baillie's apologetic is often considered to be 
the most profound, when its arguments are the most disjointed: Our Knowledge of God, we have found, is 
widely considered to be Baillie’s most outstanding contribution to mid-twentieth Christian apologetics! 
171 “Orthodox Liberal”, p. 146. 
172 Division Three’s eventual evaluation of MI does exactly that, by following research method 
prescriptions (1-4).  Its evaluation of both MI’s logic and its possible contemporary-Christian-theological 
value, for instance, subjects MI to advances in Christian theology (as pertaining to immediate knowledge of 
God) and in the area of the philosophy of religion (especially as concerning the veridicality of immediate 
knowledge), including the phenomenology of religious experience (particularly as concerning the 
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and disciplines to which the mediating theologian often appealed  (e.g., philosophy, 
psychology) as support for the cogency of his theological content. Here is no small task 
Fortunately, research has suggested promising in-roads for meeting challenges (1-
4).  For example, even if Baillie’s MT is broad in scope, creative in articulation, reactive 
in method and occasionally disjoined in argumentation; Baillie’s theological corpus 
demonstrates a sustained focus on two problems in particular—throughout its 
development: the problems of knowledge of God and revelation.173 Consequently, 
Baillie’s MT does divulge a promising conceptual structure for the ordering and 
diachronic tracing of much of its development—one that focuses on Baillie’s thought on 
knowledge of God and revelation. That such a diachronic trace readily lends itself to the 
resolution of the major research issue at hand, MI’s importance for Baillie’s MT, adds to 
the method’s promise For how important is MI for Baillie’s thought on the problems of 
knowledge of God and revelation? To recall Klinefelter, MI is “the cornerstone of 
Baillie's epistemology of religion and … crucial for his doctrine of revelation".174 Our 
examination of MI in the previous chapter has already gone a long way toward 
corroborated the truth of that statement. Klinefelter and Macquarrie, then, suggest a 
promising means for meeting the present challenge—the systematic ordering and tracking 
of Baillie’s MT’s doctrinal-conceptual development over a roughly 35-year period: here 
is a means for the delimitation of an otherwise imposingly broad research scope, and a 
means for a sustained focus on MI’s particular historical and conceptual development—
essentials for the assessment of MI’s importance for Baillie’s MT as a whole.  
Turning now to the development of Baillie's thought, I will employ a method 
which, thus: (a) traces diachronically Baillie’s theological development on these 
problems (revelation, knowledge of God); (b) adds additional order to the trace, via the 
inclusion of two problems also featured (at various times) in Baillie’s philosophical-
theological development (his Christology; his idea of religious experience); (c) situates 
(both chronologically and logically) MI within the dynamic stream of that evolution; (d) 
elucidates its conceptual integration with, and implications for, the (now) four doctrines 
                                                                                                                                                                               
immediacy of CRE)—areas to which the mediating theologian appealed in support for MI’s value for the 
Christian thought of his own day.  
173 John Macquarrie, Twentieth Century Religious Thought, (London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1963), p. 340. 
174 Klinefelter, "Our Knowledge of God”, pp. 402-403.  
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which constitute the focus of his MT; and, subsequently, (e) assesses the concept’s 
importance for Baillie’s MT—all this with the aim to realize my research aims (2) and 
objectives (2).    
 What works are essential to understanding Baillie’s thought on the problems of 
knowledge of God and revelation in particular? Of Baillie’s major works, three—The 
Interpretation of Religion (1929), Our Knowledge of God (1939), and The Sense of the 
Presence of God (1962)—are regularly consulted in expositions and critiques of Baillie’s 
thought on the problems of knowledge of God and revelation.  The primary major 
sources examined in this division, they are, furthermore, widely considered Baillie’s three 
most substantial scholarly works. Important also for understanding the development of 
Baillie’s thought on knowledge of God and revelation are his less substantive The Roots 
of Religion in the Human Soul (1926) and The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought 
(1956). This division’s diachronic trace of Baillie’s MT’s development also consults 
these works in its exposition of Baillie’s thought on revelation, knowledge of God and 
MI, in particular.  
 My scheme for the division is to divide Baillie’s thought into two periods: 
Baillie’s “early” (1926-1938) and “latter” (1939-1960) MT. My rationale for this division 
also derives from both prior research observations and my present research objectives.  
For instance, while literature on Baillie’s intellectual development175 has not overtly 
divided Baillie’s thought into two distinct phases, it has suggested that were such a 
scheme employed in service to the ordering of Baillie’s thought, the demarcation would 
most appropriately occur with the publication of Our Knowledge of God (1939).  For one, 
Our Knowledge of God signals marked intellectual developments in Baillie’s MT, 
particularly with regard to Baillie’s thought on the problems of knowledge of God and 
revelation.176As my diachronic trace centers upon these problems, the division at this 
point is a natural one. Secondly, as my focus is on MI’s development and its relationship 
to Baillie’s MT, Our Knowledge of God is the most suitable choice: it is this work in 
which Baillie’s MT makes first explicit mention of MI. Thirdly, as Our Knowledge of 
God is, according to Fergusson, characterized by an epistemological shift in Baillie’s 
                                                           
175 E.g., Fergusson divides Baillie's thought into three time periods in “Orthodox Liberal”. 
176 As spelled out in this chapter's exposition of Knowledge of God. 
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thought—one now characterized by increased critical realism, a stronger doctrine of 
revelation, and an emphasis on the contextuality (mediation, I would say) of knowledge 
of God—this work is the natural choice. In addition, if possibly the “outstanding 
weakness” of Baillie’s MT is in fact its failed integration of general revelation and special 
revelation, then Our Knowledge of God is a good work for delineating Baillie’s latter 
thought and his early thought: MI is important, as Fergusson is rightly inclined to think, 
for Baillie’s attempted reconciliation of these types of revelation.177 This division’s 
method lends itself to the isolation an analysis of this possible difficulty and development 
in Baillie’s MT.  
This division, then, is whose scheme’s rationale derives from scholarly insight 
into the trajectory of Baillie’s MT. Its first chapter begins with an elucidation of Baillie’s 
reflection on his spiritual and intellectual development during his early childhood and his 
formal education. Here, we shall find evidence that Baillie was considering his concept of 
MI well before his first explicit mention of it in his 1939 publication Our Knowledge of 
God.  
 
3.2. BAILLIE’S EARLY CHILDHOOD (1886-91) 
John Baillie was born in the Scottish Highland town of Gairloch, a small fishing 
village on the West Coast of Rosshire.  His childhood dwelling was a Free Church 
Manse; his father, the Reverend John Baillie, the pastor of the local community. 
Although the Reverend Baillie died when John was five years old, it was not be before he 
made a lifelong impression on John. Recalling a father who was “a Calvinist divine of 
strong character and courtly bearing”,178 Baillie portrays his father as having been highly 
involved in his son’s theological development. For example, Baillie speaks of a recurring 
image which continues to haunt him, well after his father’s death: a rather young John is 
propped upon a father’s knee and undergoing an oral examination of sorts beside a fire. 
The question put to the boy is the first from the Westminster Shorter Catechism: “What is 
                                                           
177 A partial summary of MI from Fergusson: “All history has its centre and meaning in Christ, and Baillie 
appears to make the further claim that knowledge of God which is mediated here controls and shapes what 
we know of God elsewhere.” “Orthodox Liberal”, pp. 142-43 
178 From John Baillie’s biographical essay on his brother, Donald, in Donald M. Baillie, The Theology of 
The Sacraments (New York:  Scribners, 1957), p. 13. 
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the chief end of man?” Although Baillie assuredly, and uncharacteristically,179 failed to 
score a First on this exam, he recalls that this father-son encounter provided the young 
Baillie with some theological insight:            
 
My own infant capacity must have been weak indeed, for 
“chiefend” was to me a single word, and a word whose 
precise meaning was beyond my imagining.  But I did 
grasp, I think, even then, something of the general teaching 
that was meant to be conveyed, and I grew up 
understanding and believing that only in the everlasting 
enjoyment of God’s presence could my life ever reach its 
proper and divinely appointed fulfillment.180  
 
 
Baillie’s mother, Annie Macpherson, also played a prominent role in Baillie’s early 
exposure to Calvinist theology. Also well versed in the Westminster Standards, she was, 
by Baillie’s estimation, a quite competent Calvinistic apologist: when it came to the 
Standards, she was “well able to answer any objections that might be brought against 
them.”181  
Yet, it was not so much the daily round of doctrine, but rather the quality of 
parental relations, which impacted Baillie’s early understanding of Christianity. Baillie 
elaborates:   
 
 
As little can I reach a day when I was conscious of myself 
but not of God as I can reach a day when I was conscious 
of myself but not of other human beings. My earliest 
memories have a definitely religious atmosphere.  They 
contain as part of their substance a recognition, as vague 
and articulate as you will, yet quite unmistakable for 
anything else, of what I have now learned to call the divine 
as a factor in my life.  I cannot remember a time when I did 
not already feel, in some dim way, that I was ‘not my own’ 
to do with as I pleased, but was claimed by a higher power 
                                                           
179 Uncharacteristic for Baillie. For example, his undergraduate degree from the University of Edinburgh in 
1908 was a Distinguished First in Philosophy. Alec Cheyne, “The Baillie Brothers: A Biographical 
Introduction”, p. 3.  In David A.S Fergusson (Ed.), Christ Church and Society (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
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180 John Baillie, And the Life Everlasting (London: Scribners, 1934), p. 3. 
181 John Baillie, ‘Donald: A Brother’s Impression’, in D.M. Baillie, The Theology of the Sacraments and 
Other Papers (1957), pp. 13-14. Cited in A.C. Cheyne, Studies in Scottish Church History, p. 203. 
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not my own . . . For, as far back as I can remember 
anything, I was somehow aware that my parents lived 
under the same kind of authority as that which, through 
them, was communicated to me.  I can see that my parents 
too behaved as though they, even they, were not their own . 
. .182 
 
 
The Baillie parents’ pious Christian living, coupled with their doctrinal teaching, 
apparently made a lasting impression on John’s two younger brothers, as well. This is 
evidenced in their career trajectories: Donald, John’s younger brother of a year, would 
forge a distinguished career as an academic and a pastor.  The author of what many 
consider to be one of the most outstanding christological works of the twentieth-century, 
God Was in Christ,183 Donald was also a renowned pastor.  Peter, the youngest boy, 
would serve the Christian Faith as a medical missionary in India, before accidentally 
drowning to death in India at the age of 25 years. Each brother undoubtedly contributed 
to John’s early theological development and spiritual growth.       
When the Baillie boys ventured out of their childhood manse, they found 
themselves ensconced in a Gairloch community replete with intellectual and spiritual 
richness. Looking back on that Gairloch community, John remarks that   
 
 
I have never since those days had the good fortune to live 
in a community that was, generally speaking, so well-
informed in matters theological, so well acquainted with 
the contents of the Bible or so well able to explain and 
defend what it professed to believe.  Not many systems of 
thought have been devised which  (once certain initial 
premises are granted) hang together in so coherent a whole, 
or in which the vulnerable Achilles-heel is so hard to find. 
. . . . There was here [also] as deep and sincere a 
development of personal religion as could perhaps 
anywhere be pointed to in the Christian world.  The 
practice of prayer, private, domestic and public, was given 
a primary place in the daily and weekly round and was a 
deep reality for men’s thoughts.  There was a strong 
                                                           
182 OKG, p.5.  
183 Donald Baillie, God Was in Christ:  An Essay on Incarnation and Atonement (London: Faber, 1948). 
Donald was Chair of Systematic Theology at St. Mary's College, St. Andrews, from 1934-1954.      
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evangelical note, so that one’s mind was constantly being 
turned upon the necessity of regeneration, and yet any kind 
of sensational or over-emotional ‘evangelistic’ movement 
was looked at askance.184  
 
 
 
Speaking further of the Gairloch community which mediated to the young Baillie his 
early understanding of Christianity, Baillie emphasizes that his blossoming childhood 
awareness of God was mediated by communal contexts and personal relations which, not 
unlike his relationships with his parents and the Gairloch community at-large, were 
characterized by Christian fellowship. In particular, Baillie experienced God’s presence 
in his communal sharing of The Lord’s Supper.  
 
 
Nowhere else [emphasis mine], however imposing and 
fitting may have been the ritual, have I ever been so aware 
of the mysterium tremendum as in those rare celebrations of 
the Lord’s Supper.  Here, if ever, das Numinose, ‘the sense 
of the Holy,’ was found prevailing.185  
 
 
Six years after penning the above disclosure in his 1933 “Confessions of a Transplanted 
Scot” (hereafter, “Confessions”),  the mediating theologian maintains the following. 
 
 
. . .Just as in the sacrament of Holy Communion the Real 
Presence of Christ is given (if the Lutheran phrase may 
here be used without prejudice) ‘in, with and under‘ the 
bread and wine, so in a wider sense the whole corporeal 
world may become sacramental to us of the presence of the 
Triune God. 
. . . But it is equally certain that our knowledge of God is 
given “in, with, and under” our knowledge of one another.  
This means, first, that knowledge of God is withholden 
from those who keep themselves aloof from the service 
[Baillie’s emphasis] of their fellows . . . It means, second, 
                                                           
184 John Baillie, "Confessions of a Transplanted Scot”, Contemporary American Theology, second series, 
ed., by Vergilius Ferm (New York, 1933), pp. 33-34. 
185 Ibid., p. 34.  
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that only when I am in fellowship [Baillie’s emphasis] with 
my fellow men does the knowledge of God come to me 
individually . . . It means, third, the necessity of history. . . 
The Christian knowledge of God is not given to any man 
save in conjunction with the telling of an ‘old, old, story’. 
Therefore, it means, lastly, the necessity of Christ, God 
incarnate in the flesh . . . The service of others, the 
fellowship with others, and the historical tradition in which 
I stand are all media that leads me to the Mediator, and the 
Mediator leads me to God. 
. . . . Clearly, then, the immediacy of God’s presence to our 
soul is a mediated immediacy.186 
 
 
Theological prowess, balanced thinking, a personal form of religion, and pious Christian 
devotion—these, according to Baillie, were the hallmarks of the community at large and 
of the personal relations who mediated to Baillie’s earliest awareness of God’s presence. 
With time, Baillie’s own life and thought would be distinguished by its embodiment of 
these very hallmarks. Concerning the latter, this would include Baillie’s thought on MI—
a concept which, amongst other things, emphasizes the soul’s personal encounter with 
God “in, with and under” a sacramental universe.   
 
3.3. BAILLIE’S FORMAL EDUCATION (1891-1912) 
3.3.1. The Royal Academy of Inverness (1891-1904) 
When Baillie’s father died, Baillie’s mother moved the family to Inverness in 
1891. Resolved to provide John and Donald with an excellent education, she enrolled the 
boys in the historic Royal Academy of Inverness.187   
John indicates that his stay at the academy was both challenging and illuminating. 
For one, the Royal Academy afforded Baillie an intellectual climate whose humanism 
had been relatively foreign to him. Relating in “Confessions” that prior to the move, “all 
[his] early religious associations were with the more strictly Calvinistic type of Scottish 
                                                           
186  OKG, pp. 178-181, passim. 
187 John Baillie, Invitation to Pilgrimage (London, Pelican edition, 1960), p. 45. Original edition:  Oxford 
University Press, 1942.  
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Presbyterianism,”188 Baillie elsewhere discloses that the milieu was for him spiritually 
trying. 
 
 
I have often reflected that parents who dutifully bring up 
their children in a traditional orthodoxy which has never 
submitted itself to the challenge of the Renaissance and 
Aufklärung, and who then send them to a school whose 
whole ethos is of humanist inspiration, seldom realize the 
extent of the spiritual stress and strain to which they are 
thus subjecting them.189   
 
 
Baillie, by his account, appears to have adapted fairly well, however.  For one, he came 
to recognize “certain spiritual deficiencies in [his] inherited system”. What was the nature 
of those deficiencies? The deficiencies concerned Baillie’s previously orthodox Calvinist 
thought on the scope of the mediation of God’s Presence, in particular: for Baillie came 
to believe that God’s presence could also be sensed in, for instance, poetry. Introduced by 
his friends and masters to new “mentors”—the Victorians Thackery, Dickens, Tennyson, 
Arnold, Kingsley, Carlyle and Ruskin—Baillie divulges in his “Confessions” that he was 
now most thoroughly “deep in the poets.”190   
 Moreover, the young man at the Royal Academy was now deeply ensconced in 
Plato’s thought—a thought that was challenging, as Baillie puts it, his “virgin mind”.  
The challenge to his Calvinstic worldview, Baillie indicates, concerned what was for him 
an encounter with new regions of truth and experience:  
 
 
I can remember how deeply I was moved in these days by 
our reading of the Apology and the Phaedo in the Greek 
class . . . I, at least, coming to them from my particular 
background, could not read Plato and Carlyle and Matthew 
Arnold without being, even then, aware of a slowly 
emerging intellectual problem.  Here was a new world of 
                                                           
188 “Confessions”, p. 33. 
189 John Baillie, The Theology of the Sacraments, p.14. 
190 “Confessions”, p. 35. 
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thought opened to me, a very different world from the 
austere Highland Calvinism of my immediate surroundings 
. . . My difficulty was that through these new mentors I 
seemed to be becoming initiated into a certain region of 
truth and experience which could not easily be enclosed 
within the clearly defined frontiers of my traditional system 
[emphasis mine].191  
 
 
 
Baillie’s struggle with this “slowly emerging intellectual problem”—the reconciliation of 
newfound regions of truth and experience with his theological inheritance—would 
continue well beyond his stay at the Royal Academy. That will be discussed in the 
following section.  
We observe, then, a young Baillie who is beginning to struggle with the 
reconciliation of his is Christian experience of God’s Presence, as mediated by Christian 
doctrine, fellowship and sacrament, with a developing belief that God presence can be 
mediated by poetry and philosophy. We also observe a Baillie who, in the midst of 
Baillie’s struggles, is becoming somewhat renowned for his being one both an apologist 
(e.g., Baillie was president of the Academy’s debating society) and a scholar in-the-
making: Baillie, according to J.A. Mackay, was “the school’s most brilliant student”.192 
    
3.3.2. Edinburgh University (1904-08) 
In 1904 Baillie matriculated to Edinburgh University to study philosophy, his 
newly found love. A curriculum that would be “much influenced by each of the four 
highly gifted thinkers who were lecturing in philosophical subjects” (James Seth, Henry 
Barker, R.P. Hardie, and Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison) in particular, it was by all 
estimations devoured by a Baillie who had arrived at Edniburgh with, in Baillie’s words, 
a “religious problem”—one to such an extent that he had “descended into the valley of 
the shadow of the negative.”193  
                                                           
191 “Confessions”, p. 36. 
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The source of Baillie’s so-called religious problem was his seeming inability to 
reconcile competing intellectual currents with themselves, and either with his Christian 
faith: on one hand, there was absolute idealism, the versions of F.H. Bradley and Bernard 
Bosanquet, in particular; on the other, naturalism, whose mechanistic and materialistic 
reductionism was being largely substantiated by a Darwinian theory of evolution 
seemingly not short on explanatory power. In short, Baillie was persuaded that each 
philosophical position spoke a half-truth to the denial of the half-truth found in the other;   
and that neither half-truth seemed reconcilable with Baillie’s Christian theology of 
knowledge of God.   
It was at this time that Baillie became entrenched in Pringle-Pattison’s 
philosophy—a system which, in brief, maintains, with absolute idealism, that the 
Absolute is Mind, though rejects absolute idealism’s claim that, contrary to naturalism, 
empirical science cannot provide (scientific) truths; a system which, contrary to absolute 
idealism and naturalism, maintains that reality and religion are inherently personal. How 
is it able to do so? Pringle-Pattison’s philosophy maintains that reality is a multi-leveled, 
gradated valuation field, with multiple knowledge types that are mediated to persons on 
multiple levels of experience. For example, while empirical science is said to provide 
some knowledge about Reality, it does not provide an exhaustive account of persons’ 
knowledge, as the materialistic interpretation of religion maintains, as scientific 
knowledge is but one type of knowledge about reality.194 
Thirty years after his graduation from Edinburgh, Baillie writes in Our 
Knowledge of God that the work’s primary concern is with “our attempt to understand the 
relations of God to the soul”. He subsequently indicates that this task calls for him to 
mediate amongst competing postions: “My purpose has been the irenic one of 
endeavouring to distinguish the true insight within each alternative [position] from that 
blindness in it which renders it insensitive to the insight of the other.”195  
                                                           
194In Baillie’s first major work, Interpretation of Religion, Baillie indicates his agreement with Pringle-
Pattison: “In religion we are . . . much closer to our ultimate values and standards than we are in science.  
We are dealing here directly with the things we know matter most-with justice and honour, with character 
and the will to serve . . . . The certitude of science differs from the certitude of religion in that the former 
proceeds primarily from the intellect, whereas the latter proceeds from the personality as a whole.” IOR, 
pp. 375 -376. Baillie’s italicized emphasis. 
195 OKG, Preface. 
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Our consideration of Baillie’s development at Edinburgh discloses a young man 
who was even then very much a mediating theologian in the making. We find Baillie (1) 
already mediating between competing postions—between the supposed half-truths of 
idealism and naturalism and their implications for Christian faith; (2) preoccupied with 
the issue of God’s relation to the soul; (3) preoccupied with the perceived strengths and 
weaknesses of epistemologies; (4) entertaining a model of reality which emphasizes 
multiple knowledges;  (5) maitaining that multiple knowledges an organically related 
universe (6) attempting to wed conceptually insights from religion with insights from 
morality; (7) contending for Personality as the supreme Knowledge—a Knowledge 
whose Certitude is mediated by relationships between personalities.  All of these 
emphases resonate with Baillie’s thought and agenda in Our Knowledge of God , 
incuding his concept of MI. 
 In his “Theology and The University: John Baillie”,196 John McIntyre remarks 
that Baillie conceived of the university as a place “to explore the relationship of theology 
to other branches of learning.”197 Mcintyre goes on to contend that MI is a concept 
especially characteristic of Baillie’s conceptualization of that relationship, “for God is 
thought to be known in those fields in which other disciplines operate.”198 I would add 
that Baillie’s own personal experience as an undergraduate university also impacted the 
mediating theologian’s perspective on “theology’s compresence” in the university: we 
find a Baillie at Edinburgh who is stuggling intellectually to conceive of the mediation of 
knowledge of God’s presence across disciplines, and one whose religious problem is 
being somewhat quashed, as he is seemingly able to reconcile his characteristically 
critical pious Christian faith with, for instance, a philosophy—one whose peronal 
idealism conceives of the mediation of God’s presence on multiple levels of reality and 
across multiple disciplines (e.g., poetry, philosophy). 
.   
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3.3.3. New College (1908-12) 
Though Pringle-Pattison’s thought would assist Baillie with his “religious 
problem,” it would be four years of theological training in New College which would 
ultimately guide Baillie toward a more “positive outlook”. This is to say that Baillie’s 
more positive outlook was not vouchsafed entirely by his refined understanding of 
metaphysical systems; rather, it was through his exposure to a different set of thinkers, 
coupled with his increased interest in understanding religion’s essence, that Baillie was 
able to find the answer to his religious problem. Speaking of his education at New 
College, Baillie remarks:  
  
 
In my progress towards a more secure mental outlook than 
I enjoyed in my undergraduate years these general 
philosophical adventures were less important than certain 
other influences of a more purely theological kind under 
which I now came and which seemed to show me that what 
was necessary for the solution of my problem was rather a 
deeper insight into religion itself than the successful 
construction of a lay system of metaphysics.199  
 
 
Baillie’s progress toward a more secure mental outlook at New College was aided by four 
of its better known teachers at the time: Alexander Whyte (Principal), H.A.A. Kennedy 
(Professor of New Testament), H.R. Mackintosh (Professor of Systematic Theology) and 
Alexander Martin (Professor of Apologetics and Pastoral Theology).  Thinkers of a more 
liberal Christian theological persuasion—characteristic of much of the intellectual 
climate in Scottish Presbyterianism since at least 1860200—each was committed to three 
theological positions: “commitment to the use of historical and literary criticism in the 
study of the Bible; wariness of what seemed to be undue emphasis on credal and 
confessional statements; and respect for the methods of natural science.” Beliefs to which 
John (and Donald) would eventually give their cautious allegiance,201 they announce a 
shift in Baillie’s intellectual development, his appreciation for history’s importance for 
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understanding truths about Christianity, in particular. Specifically, this shift occasioned 
an increased appreciation for the historical study of the New Testament (in particular) 
and for history’s being a source for understanding religion in general. Baillie reflects on 
this turning point in his intellectual development when, discussing his student days at 
New College, he relates that  
 
 
More and more, indeed, as the years go by, have I found 
myself being instructed by history rather than by 
independent dialectical reflection.  More and more have I 
come to feel that, if I am to decide whether such and such a 
belief be a true and wise one, my first step must be clearly 
and deeply to understand its history—to know how it came 
into the world, from what quarters it has encountered 
opposition and what have been its fortunes in age-long 
debate.202  
   
 
Although the value of the examination of religion itself, as within the hsitorical context of 
its development, would prove an important insight for both Baillie’s theological 
trajectory, he would glean substantially more important theological insight from his stay 
in New College.     
 
The most important change of mind which came to me 
during these years in New College and in Germany was of 
another kind, and I think that what it amounted to was the 
gradual realization that religion is in possession of an 
insight into reality which is all its own and cannot be 
reached at all without its aid. This is the change of mind, of 
course, which in European thought is represented in 
different ways by the two great names of Kant and 
Schleiermacher, and it was in close connection with my 
study of the Critical Philosophy and of Der christliche 
Glaube that it was accomplished in my own case.203  
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“Religion is in possession of an insight into reality which is all its own and cannot be 
reached at all without its aid”—here is Baillie’s great insight in New College. An insight 
precipitated thus by Baillie’s reading of Kant and Schleiermacher, it was, however, 
Herrmann’s thought, to which Baillie was routinely exposed during a summer’s worth of 
attendance at Herrmann’s lectures in Marburg (the other summer was spent in Jena), that 
would exert the most influence on Baillie’s thought at this time—Herrmann’s take on the 
position that religion possesses an insight in reality all its own, in particular.  
We see, then, that Baillie’s education at New College was a formative time for 
Baillie’s intellectual development and his Anfechtungen’s abasement. Indee, when the 
now relatively self-assured Baillie graduated from New College, he left with seven 
axioms that would guide his subsequent theological investigation. These axioms, 
expounded in Baillie’s 1933 publication “Confessions of a Transplanted Scot”, merit 
extended quotation, as they both document Baillie’s theological state of mind at that time, 
and anticipate Baillie’s thought on MI in 1939.    
 
 
(1) That the truths for which religion stands are of such a 
kind as to be accessible and as evidence to those quite 
untrained in science and philosophy as to those who can 
boast the fullest scientific and philosophical training; 
(2) That, however, these truths can be brought home to us 
only through the discipline of religious experience itself 
and can consequently never be evident to anybody save in 
such measure as he is visited by such experience;  
(3) That the only means by which our hold on these truths 
can be made more secure is, not the pursuit of any 
independent scientific enquiry in which they can be 
buttressed from without, but by the progressive deepening 
of religious insight.  
(4) That accordingly the only competent criticism of 
religious convictions is one carried out, not in the light of 
knowledge obtained by some non-religious means, but in 
light of advancing religion itself—leading to the discovery 
that the convictions in question are not as religious as they 
ought to be;  
(5) That accordingly religious certitude, far from being a 
product of scientific metaphysics, or being in any way more 
fully enjoyed by scientific metaphysicians than by other 
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folk, must be, for any scientific metaphysician who 
possesses it, the main (though certainly not the only) fact 
on which his metaphysical system will be built; 
(6) That while religious faith may communicate something 
of its own certitude to a metaphysical system in the 
formation of which it has been allowed to play its proper 
part, yet no such system can ever hope to possess the same 
degree or kind of certitude as attaches to the fundamental 
religious insights themselves; 
(7) That, as regards natural science, the most we have a 
right to expect of it is that, as Kant has said, it should 
“leave room for faith,” not that it should in any way 
provide a positive foundation for faith. 
It will be realized at once that these are not really 
seven different axioms but are all deducible from a single 
principle—the principle already stated, that religious faith 
is not a dim fore-grasping of a reality which other and 
exacter processes of thought and research will afterward 
more clearly reveal and establish, but a way of knowledge 
which is at least equal to any other in point of reliability 
and which leads us into the presence of a Reality that is not 
discoverable by any other means. It was this principle and 
little, that I took from the Schleiermacher-Ritschl tradition 
in which Herrmann stood . . . 
. . . . Except in regard to the [tradition’s] one great un-
Greek insight [that the existence and knowledge of God 
must be justified on grounds unique to religious 
experience] . . . I still remain a Christian Platonist 
[emphasis mine].204      
  
 
 
3.4. BAILLIE’S ACADEMIC CAREER: MAJOR PUBLICATIONS (1912-60) 
When Baillie graduated from New College (1912), he assumed an assistantship in 
philosophy under Pringle-Pattison.  He also served as an assistant pastor in an Edinburgh 
church during this time.205  These assistantships would be short-lived, as Baillie would 
volunteer his services to the Y.M.C.A (1915-1919) during World War I.  This service 
would profoundly impact the orientation of Baillie’s theology, as well as bring him a 
wife—Jewel Baillie, descendent of the Elizabethan Bishop Jewel.  When the Y.M.C.A. 
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service was completed in 1919, the newlyweds moved to New York State. Here Baillie 
assumed teaching duties in systematic theology at Auburn Theological Seminary and 
held the Chair of Christian Theology (1919-1927). Baillie was subsequently appointed to 
Chair of Systematic Theology at Emmanuel College, Toronto (1927 to 1930). An 
appointment to the Roosevelt Chair of Systematic Theology (1930-1934) at Union 
Theological Seminary (New York), followed.  Baillie’s fifteen-year stay in America bore 
him his first four books: The Roots of Religion in the Human Soul (1926), The 
Interpretation of Religion (1929), The Place of Jesus Christ in Modern Christianity 
(1929), and And the Life Everlasting (1933).206  
The Baillie’s returned to Scotland in 1934, as John was invited to succeed 
Pringle-Pattison as the Chair of Divinity in the University of Edinburgh.  Baillie would 
hold this post until his retirement in 1956, save a temporary hiatus—a return to the 
Y.M.C.A. (1940) for service.  Baillie’s major publications in Scotland include his well-
known devotional works, A Diary of Private Prayer (1936); his most highly acclaimed 
apologetic work, Our Knowledge of God (1939); and his also important, Invitation to 
Pilgrimage (1942), The Belief in Progress (1950), and The Idea of Revelation in Recent 
Thought (1956).    
Three of Baillie’s works were published after his death in Edinburgh (1960): his 
undelivered, though officially accorded, Gifford Lectures (1960), published as The Sense 
of the Presence of God (1962), as well as his Christian Devotion (1962) and A Reasoned 
Faith (1963).207  
 
3.5. SUMMARY  
The spiritual climate of Baillie’s childhood was replete with Baillie’s 
indoctrination in theological training,  participation in a personal form of religion, and 
exposure to Christian communities whose personal relations were characterized by 
Christian piety. This upbringing, coupled with Baillie’s formal education and personal 
struggles, collectively laid the foundation for Baillie’s theological orientation, that of a 
mediating theologian. It also influenced Baillie’s doctrine. Looking back at his childhood, 
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recalls that his childhood experience of God was a MI. Accordingly, Baillie indicates that 
that he tended to have a “deep awareness” of God’s Presence , when God’s Presence was 
mediated to him by communities of persons qua personalities whose language and deeds 
reflected Personality—namely, communities characterized by agapē. Baillie, looking 
back at his formal education,  discloses a young man who, attempting to reconcile 
competing philosophical and theological positions, began to conceive of knowledge of 
God as an immediate knowledge of Personality—One whose Presence was mediated 
across multiple levels of reality and across multiple disciplines. Initially, God’s seeming 
Self-disclosure through media like poetry distressed Baillie’s “virgin mind” of Baillie; 
however, he was able to receive some existential relief from the thought of A.S. Pringle-
Pattison, who showed Baillie some ways to reconcile his orthodox Calvinist upbringing 
with his relatively liberal new-found epistemological inclinations.  Inclined, however, to 
think that knowledge of Personality could be established by any highest inference, it was 
rather Herrmann’s thought which resonated more with Baillie’s thought, particularly 
Herrmann’s position that religion is sui generis. This also helped Baillie to achieve a 
more secure mental outlook. Along the way, we have also found some evidence to 
suggest that Pringle-Pattison and Herrmann anticipated, if perhaps also directly 
influenced, Baillie’s conceptualization and development of MI.  
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But it is knowledge of ultimate reality that 
we most desire to have, and certitude in this 
region of our thinking that is most precious 
to us . . . As one looks back over the whole 
history of our race, one must realize that 
this was at all times and in all places the 
most deep-seated of human interests.208 
 
 
4. BAILLIE’S EARLY MEDIATING THEOLOGY (1926-38) 
This chapter initiates the turn toward our examination of Baillie’s MT proper. A 
diachronic trace that examines Baillie’s early MT (pre-1939) in particular, it focuses 
primarily on the structure and claims of Baillie’s apologetic, as levied against several 
theories of religion. Works consulted include those major and minor works widely 
regarded to be important for Baillie’s thought on knowledge of God, revelation and 
religious experience, in particular. The first half of a two-stage diachronic trace, this 
chapter provides evidence that, contrary to popular belief, the mediating theologian was 
employing a nascent concept of MI well before his Our Knowledge of God (1939).  
  
4.1. A MEDIATING THEOLOGY FOR THE ORDINARY PERSON 
John Baillie’s first two major publications are his The Roots of Religion in the 
Human Soul (1926) and his The Interpretation of Religion (1929).  The latter work was 
assimilated between the Autumn of 1922 and the Spring of 1925, and advances many of 
the aims and conclusions of the former.209 For instance, Baillie’s objective in each work 
is to “set forth a true theory of religion” based upon what his study of religion shows to 
be its “true and abiding and indispensable essence”. Baillie’s method for getting at 
religion’s essence requires his guiding of the student of religion “through the winding 
labyrinths both of historical opinion and of contemporary literature” on religion.  A 
journey that requires that Baillie “dig down afresh to [religion’s] deep foundations in 
                                                           
208 SPG, p. 20. 
209 IOR, Preface, viii. 
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human experience”,210it demands an interrogation of religious consciousness with a 
theological-scientific method (Chapter 2), in particular. Each work also limits the scope 
of its investigation primarily to classic European philosophical theology and philosophy 
of religion. Each early work also discloses a mediating theologian who is trying to 
reconcile a host of intellectual currents.   
Baillie’s mediation in these works occurs within the broader context of a seeming 
conflict between relatively sophisticated academic philosophies of religion and the lay 
form of religion espoused by the “ordinary man”. Religion has become of “practical 
irrelevance” of the ordinary person. Who is this person? For purposes of Baillie’s 
analyses and would-be reconciliation, this person is the World War I soldier, by and 
large. Such a one is typically unlearned in metaphysical speculation, romantic theology, 
mystical contemplation, and the various theories of religion to which these and other 
theories have given rise; and, also not unlike the ordinary person, the soldier tends to 
champion a religion whose basis, power and credulity are alien to much of the thought for 
which the more academic approaches to religion contend.  
Baillie knows these ordinary persons and their theory of religion. For one, he has 
knowledge of soldiers by personal acquaintance.211 Secondly, Baillie has privy to 
research knowledge about their beliefs, as contained in “a certain body of literature which 
has hardly . . . received quite the share of attention it deserves at the hands of the 
theologically minded.”  Baillie speaks of The Army and Religion,212 wherein he finds a 
‘surprising unity of testimony’ amongst British soldiers.   
 
 
These men as a whole believe that the Churches are out of 
touch with reality and out of touch with ordinary humanity.  
They think them irrelevant to the real business of their 
                                                           
210 Quotes from ROR, 39-48 passim.  See ibid., Ch. 1, for Baillie‘s thoughts on soldiers‘ testimonies and 
questionnaire data.  
211 Baillie served with the British armies in France from 1915-1919 through his participation in the 
Y.M.C.A.  Baillie’s also served the Y.M.C.A. from 1939-1940, once again providing religious and 
educational assistance to troops in France.  He contributed  to the Dunkirk evacuation.  
212A volume of British soldiers’ responses to questionnaires distributed by a committee under the 
convernship of David S. Cairns and Edward A Talbot. Baillie also references, e.g., W.P. Young, A Soldier 
to the Church; A. Herbert Gray, As Tommy Sees Us; Neville Talbot, Thoughts on Religion at the Front; 
Canon Macnutt (ed.), The Church in the Furnace, Donald Hankey,  A Student in Arms; Donald Hankey, 
The Church and the Man.  See ROR, p. 7. 
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lives, antiquated in their ideas and methods, and wanting in 
vitality and conviction.213  
 
 
On the basis of soldiers’ testimony, Baillie concludes that   
    
 
If we put all the evidence together, one major charge stands 
out in the very boldest relief, and that is that there is a lack 
of reality about the religion of the Christian Church, and a 
conspicuous unpreparedness to the real problems of human 
life.214   
 
 
French and American soldiers, who have answered similar questionnaires, are also 
inclined as a whole to think the Christian church out of touch with reality.  
What has occasioned soldiers’ disenchantment with the Christian Church? Baillie 
relates that the primary culprit is religious doctrine:  
 
 
There are many who have lost their way in its [religion’s] 
maze of doctrines and sects. That is the real root of our 
trouble and I believe there is only one way of meeting it—
we must find our way back to the fountainhead.  We must 
make re-discovery, and help others make re-discovery, of 
the true centre of gravity in this accumulated mass of 
tradition.215   
 
 
Competing religious traditions; divisions over doctrines within those traditions; 
conflicting truth claims over what constitutes orthodoxy—these confuse soldiers who, 
generally speaking, know religion to be simply a matter of “doing what’s right.”   
  In the following sections, we will examine the structure of Baillie’s lines of 
argument against five theories of religion, in particular: the romantic theory of religion, 
                                                           
213 The Army and Religion, p. 194.  Cited in Baillie, ibid., p. 12. 
214 Ibid., p. 12 . 
215 Ibid., p. 40. See ibid., Chapter I, 1-41 for Baillie’s thoughts on “The Present Situation in Religion”. 
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the rationalist theory of religion, theological intuitionism, Kant’s theory of religion, and 
neo-Kantian theories of religion. Theories of religion which are, to varying degrees, out 
of keeping with the ordinary person’s theory of religion, each theory conflicts with 
Baillie’s own theory of religion.  
We shall find that, although Baillie mediates amongst several theories of religion, 
all of the apologist’s arguments zero in on one epistemological problem in particular: the 
epistemological relationship between direct knowledge of, and indirect knowledge about, 
God.  Baillie’s position being that all of the above-mentioned theories advance a faulty 
conceptualization of this relationship, he maintains that it is better to conceive of religion 
as does the ordinary person: a matter of acting upon (i.e. “faith”) what one’s moral 
consciousness immediately intuits to be of highest value. 
 
4.2. A MEDIATING THEOLOGY ACROSS THEORIES OF RELIGION  
Although The Interpretation of Religion (hereafter, IOR)is largely an 
amplification of the more humble The Roots of Religion (hereafter, ROR), some brief 
examination of Baillie’s positions in the latter work is necessary. For one, the work 
provides a general framework of those issues substantially more developed in IOR. 
Secondly, as this is Baillie’s first major publication, its examination helps to establish, in 
keeping with the aims of my diachronic trace, the evolution and general trajectory of 
Baillie’s critical216 mediating theological corpus.  
 
4.2.1. Romanticism's Fallacy: An Indirectly-known God via Pre-reflection  
When, in ROR, Baillie argues against the romantic theory of religion, he takes aim 
at romantic theology. The essence of romantic theology, according to Baillie, is that it 
grounds religion in a knowledge believed to be “below the level of reflective thought”. 
 
 
Indeed . . . the essence of this [romantic] theology is 
capable of being stated without reference to feeling at all.  
What characterises the romanticist theologians is just the 
attempt to find the roots of religion somewhere in the mind 
below the level of reflective thought; and there is hardly any 
                                                           
216 Our concern is primarily with Baillie’s critical thought and not with his devotional works. 
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mental element or activity lying in this pre-rational region 
that has not, at some time or another during the last 
hundred years, been exploited in the interests of anti-
rationalism.217 
   
 
Baillie’s characterization of romantic theology as essentially “pre-rational” provides 
Baillie a helpful category with which he can argue against the romantic theory of religion 
as a whole. It is, on Baillie’s tongue, a reiteration of a word with which the reader is 
already familiar—immediacy. Indeed, Baillie identifies no less than three strains of  
“immediacy” that are problematic for the romantic theory of religion. These include 
knowledge of God as an “immediate feeling,” “immediate vision” and “immediate 
experience”.  Baillie argues that each of type of “immediacy” gives rise to a theory of 
religion which is a “disservice to religion”, as each type of immediacy rejects what is 
“obvious” to the ordinary person: knowledge of God is both a direct knowledge and a 
knowledge “mediated by the ideas present in our minds”.218   
 
4.2.1.1 “Immediate feeling” and Schleiermacher   
In ROR Baillie criticizes Schleiermacher’s romantic theory of religion, 
maintaining that it is “a disservice to religion”, in that it grounds religion in an 
“immediate feeling of dependence” upon God. The ordinary person, however, thinks such 
immediacy “the very hallmark of subjectivity”.  Accordingly, when Schleiermacher's 
thought advocates the “sheltering of [religion] from the criticism of reflection of 
intelligence”, it not only severs religion “from all claim to objective truth”; its idea of 
“immediate feeling” also, to its disfavor, reduces religion to a “sentimentality” that “lacks 
reality”. Thus unreal to the ordinary person, Schleiermacher's theory of religion is also 
unreal to the academician, as it does “give our thinking contemporaries good reason for 
ignoring it [religion] altogether.” When, for example, Schleiermacher’s idea of 
immediate feeling does “considerable violence to [the] psychological fact” that non-
religious feelings always entail humans’ being “cognitively aware of the stimuli” to 
                                                           
217 ROR, p. 81. Cf. IOR, p. 202.  Here Baillie indicates that “pre-reflective” thought is “pre-rational” and 
“pre-intellectual”.   
218 Ibid., p. 79. 
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which those feelings correspond epistemically, it invites academics learned in psychology 
to ignore religion’s claims. Better, maintains Baillie, to contend for the reality that 
humans are “cognitively aware” of a God “immediately” known.219 
Baillie supplements his somewhat empirical-psychological criticism of 
Schleiermacher’s idea of immediacy with a more philosophical line of criticism: 
knowledge of the mundane world, he argues, presupposes “consciousness of” and 
“consciousness about” the object claimed to be known.   
 
You can never have a feeling which is not a feeling of 
something.  Feeling, indeed, is nothing but our subjective 
response to external stimuli, and we must first be 
cognitively aware of the stimuli before we can be affected 
by them to pain or pleasure.220  
 
 
Here, then, Baillie contends for something like the epistemological necessity of 
“intentionality” for ordinary knowledge—that ordinary knowledge is always mediated by 
semiotic or thematic content (i.e., not immediate) as it presupposes, at minimum, 
consciousness of the object known. Baillie restates the argument in Interpretation of 
Religion, bringing his criticism of Schleiermacher's thought into sharper focus:     
 
                                                           
219 Baillie was aware that Schleiermacher's thought on feeling as the ground for religion evolved. Baillie's 
critique of Schleiermacher's thought in ROR and IOR reviews that thought's evolution across two editions 
of On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured despisers (1799, 1806; 1831 edition not addressed) and The 
Christian Faith (1821-2; revised edition 1830-1). In ROR and IOR Baillie takes aim at Schleiermacher's 
thought in The Christian Faith, the leading question for Baillie being if Schleiermacher was "right in 
concluding that [religion] could be nothing but 'pure and immediate feeling'?" IOR, p. 208. Baillie clarifies 
his interpretation of Schleiermacher's most mature idea of feeling, when he approvingly cites Ward's 
summary of the same: "For Schleiermacher's theory, obviously, everything turns on the doctrine that 
feeling is itself psychologically prior to the two other elements of mental life, knowledge and will. Feeling 
he believes to be, as such, "immediate"--that is to say, 'unmediated' by ideas of any kind; so that it is 
through feeling alone that we first become aware of our environment, knowledge and desire become alike 
both secondary and 'mediate' products of such awareness." James Ward, Psychological Principles, 
Cambridge University Press, 1918, p. 42 n., as cited in IOR, p. 208. Baillie's subsequent criticism of 
Schleiermacher (OKG, SPG) also focuses primarily on Schleiermacher's thought in The Christian Faith. 
220 ‘We have not first a change of feeling and then a change in our sensations, perceptions and ideas; but, 
these changing, change of feeling follows.’ James Ward, Psychological Principles, pp. 41-45, as cited in 
ROR, pp. 78-79.  Cf. IOR, p. 212. Baillie's criticisms anticipate the main lines of Proudfoot's arguments 
against Schleiermacher and James.  See Wayne Proudfoot,  Religious Experience (Berkeley, CA:  
University of California Press, 1985). 
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For Schleiermacher’s theory, obviously, everything turns 
on the doctrine that feeling is in itself psychologically prior 
to the two other elements of mental life, knowledge and 
will.  Feeling he believes to be, as such, ‘immediate’—that 
is to say unmediated by ideas of any kind [emphasis mine] 
. . .221 
 
 
In language which anticipates Baillie’s latter language of knowledge of God as a 
“mediated-immediacy”, Baillie relates that his major charge against Schleiermacher’s 
theory of religion is its problematic conceptualization of the epistemological relationship 
between “immediate” knowledge (knowledge “unmediated by ideas of any kind”) and 
mediated knowledge (knowledge mediated “by ideas”) for knowledge of God.  Baillie 
underscores that this is his major criticism of Schleiermacher’s epistemology, when in the 
same work he remarks:   
 
 
‘Intuition of the Universe’ (Anschauung des Universums); 
‘an awareness of the Infinite in the finite’ or of the 
influences upon us of finite things ‘not by themselves but 
as a part of the Whole, not as limited in opposition to other 
things but as an exhibition of the Infinite in our life’; ‘the 
immediate consciousness of the Deity as he is found in 
ourselves and in the world’;  ‘a feeling of absolute 
dependence, as being in relation with God’—these are 
some of the expressions which Schleiermacher uses to 
describe the essence of religion; and it must be said that 
there is not one of them that does not describe a definitely 
cognitive state [emphasis mine].222  
 
 
 
Schleiermacher’s romantic theory of religion, then, constitutes a disservice to religion: it 
grounds knowledge of God in a “pre-rational” “immediate feeling” that unduly 
marginalizes cognition: for knowledge of God, like ordinary knowledge about the world, 
is, according to Baillie, “obviously mediated by the ideas present in our minds.”  
                                                           
221 IOR, p. 208.   
222 IOR, pp. 211-212.   
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And if it be true of all feeling, it seems doubly true of 
religious feeling.  For it would seem that this kind of 
feeling is dependent, not on cognition merely (which might 
mean only sense perception), but on nothing less than 
reflective intelligence . . . Hardly any kind of feelings, 
therefore, are more obviously mediated by the ideas present 
in our minds than are our religious feelings [emphasis 
mine].223  
 
 
4.2.1.2 “Immediate experience” and James’s psychology of religion 
In ROR Baillie argues against the idea of immediacy advanced by the psychology 
of religion, as well.  His critique focuses on the idea of “immediate experience” espoused 
by William James in particular. Citing several claims from the “intellectual father” of the 
psychology of religion, including James’ claim that “all religious ideas, dogmas and 
creeds are thus intellectual constructions” ultimately reduce to a religious feeling,224 
Baillie maintains that James’s theory of religion is essentially a restatement of 
Schleiermacher’s225 and to be discounted, as such, on similar grounds. Indeed, even 
James’s “new-fangled conception of the subliminal or subconscious” (of which Baillie 
makes mention in IOR) does nothing to strengthen James’s position, as a subconscious,  
“immediate experience” of “The More” is merely “a slight modification” of 
Schleiermacher’s “doctrine of the consciousness of the Infinite that comes to us in our 
awareness of finite things.”226  
 
4.2.1.3 “Immediate vision” and “Extreme Mysticism” 
Baillie takes aim at a third type of immediacy—one that conceives of knowledge 
of God as an “immediate vision” —in ROR. This theory of religion insists that 
                                                           
223 ROR, pp. 79.  
224 Ibid., pp. 74.  
225"This view [Schleiermacher’s] of religion as consisting in pure feeling merits our greater attention 
because, since about the year 1890, it has been given a new lease on life by those American writers who 
have occupied themselves with what they have called the ‘Psychology of Religion.’  The majority of these 
writers follow Schleiermacher’s view almost to the letter . . ." Ibid., pp. 72-73. 
226 J. B. Pratt‘s “Religion of Feeling”, about which Baillie now makes mention in Interpretation of 
Religion, also constitutes a hindrance to the understanding of religion's essence, its being essentially a 
Schleiermacherean theory of religion:  Pratt states that religion ‘might be defined as belief in God based 
chiefly on an immediate experience whose dominant element is feeling’.  Ibid., Ch. 3, pp. 202-219, passim. 
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knowledge of God is “pre-rational” or “pre-reflective”, as do Schleiermacher's 
theological and James’s psychological theories. It markedly differs from these theories, 
however, when it maintains that religion's ground is an immediate knowledge of God 
mediated by a so-called “immediate vision” of God. 
 
There are some among us who, instead of using the 
language of feeling to explain religion, would use the 
language of perception.  Religion they would tell us is, in 
essence, neither thought nor feeling so much as immediate 
vision.  It is possible, they say, to attain to a direct 
perception of God’s presence, and that is surely all the 
foundation that religion needs [emphasis mine].227  
 
 
In ROR, Baillie contends that this theory misguidedly fails to “appeal . . . to the normal 
religion of Jesus and Paul, Augustine and Luther, but to the more emotional and ecstatic 
and . . . pathological piety represented by the extremer mystics”.  He also identifies it 
with “recent American writers”, though identifies only one British poet, Coventry 
Patmore, as espousing it.228   
In IOR, we get a fuller argument against this variant of the romantic theory. Here, 
Baillie re-identifies the theory with “extreme” mysticism (hereafter, “extreme 
mysticism”) and directs his criticism toward that which makes it “extreme”: its claim that 
humans have a “sixth-sense” for apprehending an “immediate vision” of God.  A claim 
evidenced in extreme mysticism’s use of the ordinary language of sensory perception to 
explicate the sixth-sense’s mediation of an immediate vision of God, it comes with 
language such as: the mystic’s being one who “finds“ God with “the eyes of the soul” and 
God’s being a Presence Whom one “hears speaking” and “feels”.229  Such “attempts to 
establish a religious sense or a direct and purely perceptual knowledge of the Divine” by 
analogy are, Baillie maintains, absurd—on empirical-psychological, philosophical and 
historical grounds alike.  For one, empirical psychology has not verified the existence of 
                                                           
227 Ibid., p. 81. 
228 Ibid., p. 81 ff. Baillie’s footnote indicates that he is drawing from Coventry Patmore, The Rod, The Root 
and The Flower, edition unidentified. 
229 Baillie points out that adherents to this position can be found in James’s chapter on “The Reality of the 
Unseen”.  See William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, “Lecture III”, in e.g., Mentor edition 
(New York: The New American Library, Inc., 1958), pp. 58-75. 
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some sixth sense.  Secondly, extreme mysticism’s language is “redundant”: when it 
speaks of knowledge of God in the language of physico-sensory “organs or vehicles by 
which our spirits apprehend the material world” it adds nothing to its contention that 
knowledge of God is mediated by an “immediate vision”.  Furthermore, and logically 
speaking, such tactile language is a “contradiction in terms, the things of the spirit being 
other than the things of sense and not to be apprehended by sensible means.” Extreme 
mysticism’s essentially empirical-reductionist explanation of the epistemological 
phenomena which give rise to religious faith is also quite damaging—one religious 
ground: it “run[s] seriously counter to the very fundamental principle that in religion ‘we 
walk by faith and not by sight’.”  To compound matters, when it emphasizes the mode of 
apprehension of knowledge of God as being a “sixth sense”, it “tends in a serious degree 
to obscure the moral nature of faith”, its being rather a crude form of “aesthetic 
pantheism”. 230   
When, then, extreme mysticism advances the belief that immediate knowledge of 
God is a pre-reflective sensory “perception” or “vision” of God, it is not only 
psychologically and philosophically extreme; it is also, from an historical perspective, 
extreme in that it breaks from the “authentic mystical theory of religion”  (hereafter, 
“authentic mysticism”).  History shows that authentic mysticism has never maintained 
that immediate knowledge of God is a pre-reflective, “immediate vision” provided by 
sensory perception231; rather, it has contended for a direct knowledge of God 
characterized by an immediate intuition of God—one mediated by thought.    
 
 
The central contention for which mysticism stands is 
certainly that of the direct and intimate nature of God’s 
presence to our souls [i.e. immediate knowledge], but it has 
                                                           
230 “It is well known that the neglect of the fundamental moral element in religion was the greatest of all the 
pitfalls that lay in wait for those schools of mysticism which stressed the immediate and quasi-perceptual 
character and quasi-perceptual character of the religious vision. Among them religion often seemed bound 
up not with social duty but rather with a sense of beauty. Defining religion as aesthesis, as being essentially 
a matter of religion, they naturally correlated it with the ‘aesthetic’ rather than the ethical.  Instead of 
recognising it as an outreaching of man’s ethical nature towards a Divine Goodness above and beyond him, 
they tended to regard it rather as a quasi-sensible contact with a Divine Substance. The result was a kind of 
aesthetic pantheism.”  IOR, pp. 224-225.  
231 In its most authentic manifestations—in Pythagoras, in Socrates and Plato, in Plotinus, in Erigena, in 
Bruno, in Spinoza—mysticism has much rather identified with intellectualism than with any sort of 
sentimentalism or romanticism. Ibid., p. 226. 
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also been of the very essence of its case that it is not to our 
senses that He is thus present but to our thoughts [i.e. is a 
mediated knowledge]. That in our thoughts we can get 
closer to God than we can get to the things of sense by 
seeing and touching and tasting them-on that assurance all 
Platonism and Neo-Platonism rests.  It is all summed up in 
Plato’s saying that God is indeed visible, but visible to the 
mind alone; and in the equivalent teaching of the latter 
Platonism that God can be seen indeed, but only ‘with the 
ideas of the mind' [underline emphases mine].232  
 
Baillie adds,   
There is undoubtedly a certain perceptive quality about the 
highest manifestations of religious insight.  We agree with 
the Platonists that ‘the soul has a certain perceptive power 
of its own’. 233  
 
 
What language, then, should be used to describe the mode for direct knowledge of God? 
Baillie contends that it is “preferable and less confusing . . . to cease altogether (at least in 
scientific discourse) to speak of a ‘religious sense”. Rather, one should speak of 
knowledge of God as being mediated by a non-sensory “perception” (synonymous with 
"intuition", according to Baillie).  For one, “perception” better communicates both the 
directness and the indirectness (mediated by the “thoughts” of “insight”) of knowledge of 
God. Secondly, “perception” militates against the confusion which arises when one 
speaks of knowledge of God as analogous to tactile knowledge (i.e., God’s being “seen,” 
“taste,” “heard”).234  
 
4.2.2. Rationalism's Fallacy: An Indirectly-known Really Real via Logical 
Abstraction 
In ROR Baillie also argues against the rationalist theory of religion.  Mediating 
theologian that he was, Baillie points out that this theory of religion, like the romantic 
theory of religion, is indeed “likely to contain some partial truth”, though, also like the 
                                                           
232 Ibid., p. 227.  Baillie here cites the Corpus Hermeticum as support. See ibid.  
233 Ibid., p. 229. 
234 Ibid., pp. 229-230.  
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romantic theory of religion, disposed to suffer from thought that is “seriously 
misleading”.  A theory of religion which too admits of several variations,  
 
 
Rationalism might be defined as the tendency to look upon 
science as the only source of reliable knowledge which is 
open to us; and the rationalist’s attitude to religion is 
simply to assume that if it is to have any light at all, it must 
get it from science . . . from physics, biology and 
psychology . . . [or] from that more speculative extension 
of scientific method which is called philosophy or 
metaphysics.235 
  
 
 
Baillie traces this theory’s origin back to Plato and Aristotle’s attempts to ground 
knowledge of reality in inferential inductions derived from the systematic observation 
and classification of empirically verified “facts”.236  
Baillie, defending the ordinary person’s theory of religion, criticizes the rationalist 
theory of religion from a few angles. For one, when it grounds religious belief in 
metaphysical speculation, it employs a tact and method “largely remote from the ordinary 
man’s interests”.  “The majority of us feel no obligation to concern ourselves either with 
the quickly-shifting panorama of current scientific theories or with the numerous and 
conflicting philosophical theories that are at any one moment in the field.”  In fact, the 
ordinary person rejects metaphysical speculation with a “perfectly clear conscience”, 
thinks religion not grounded in logical certainty, and finds such inferential reasoning 
bankrupt of the “certainty necessary for religion to feed upon” (“faith”).  Furthermore, 
this theory of religion has failed to achieve consensus (i.e., shared logical certainty) 
amongst even its own scientifically-trained philosophers—this as evidenced in the 
“apparently perennial opposition of idealism and naturalism”. Nonetheless, were even 
such concord achieved, and were it also the case that the ordinary person did intuit an 
obligation to base religion upon “the Law of Cause and Effect [so as] to draw inferences 
                                                           
235 ROR, p. 49; Cf. IOR, p. 174. 
236 “And even the greatest of them, Plato and Aristotle, were convinced that the true way of assuring 
oneself of the goodness of God was by means of arguments drawn from the philosophical theory of 
knowledge on the one hand and mathematical astronomy on the other; and Plato was at least convinced that 
equally strict scientific arguments were available in support of the belief of the future life;  but the rest of 
traditional belief, they said, must be regarded as mere 'myth'", ibid., p. 53.   
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from the facts observed,” the rational theory of religion would continue to endorse a 
theory that the ordinary person could not practice: the ordinary person is often 
exceedingly ignorant of the “kind of knowledge which only scientifically trained 
philosophers can have in perfection.”  Such ignorance applies to many of religion’s great 
religious visionaries themselves237 including Jesus. Aristotle's heralded method of 
inferential induction by abstraction, deduction, observation and classification of the 
sensory-observed facts of experience—here is an epistemological and metaphysical 
program foreign to Jesus. In fact, deed, when it comes to such metaphysical speculation, 
Aristotle’s sophistication of the thought would appear to far surpasses that of Jesus.238   
 
4.2.2.1 Objective, absolute idealism: Hegel’s Religionsphilsophie  
In IOR, Baillie engages specific rationalistic theories of religion, offering passing 
criticism of some, while spending substantially more time with others. Cursory 
treatments include the thought of Spinoza (1632-1677).  Baillie remarks that Spinoza 
rejects the position that ‘demonstrative science can of itself lead us to a sure belief in the 
reality of a Being who is worthy to be called “God”’. The “lineal descendants of 
scholastic orthodoxy”, the Christian apologists Joseph Butler (1692-1752) and William 
Paley (1743-1805) also receive passing criticism. Baillie’s position, in short, is that 
although these thinkers correctly make revelation a source of knowledge of God, they 
wrongly ground religion, as did the Deists before them, in rationalist principles.239 Some 
mention is also made of Christian von Wolff’s (1679-1754) rationalist theory of religion: 
a theory backed by artificial arguments from a an “artificial thinker”, it misguidedly 
repackages Plato’s cosmological argument and Anselm’s ontological argument—and 
advances arguments neither of which “has fully recovered” from the “crushing criticism” 
of Kant. 
                                                           
237 “Those members of our race whose religious insight has been surest and clearest and bravest [e.g., 
Jeremiah, Paul, Augustine, Francis] have, as often as not, been men of little learning and less science.” 
Quotes from ibid., pp. 60-68, passim.   
238 “There is a kind of knowledge which we can get in greater perfection from Aristotle than we can from 
Jesus Christ; and it is clear that this kind of knowledge is what we mean by metaphysics.  We shall in fact 
never be able to persuade men that our Lord and St. Paul were as accomplished and perspicacious 
metaphysicians as Democritus and Aristotle, Hume and Locke, Mr. Bradley and Mr. Russell,” IOR, pp. 
182-183.  
239 Ibid., pp. 72-74.  
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Hegel’s Religionsphilosophie, however, does receive extended treatment in IOR. 
Baillie’s argument against Hegel centers upon Hegel’s conceptualization of the 
epistemological relationship between the Vorstellung of religion and the Begriff of 
philosophy.  Hegel claims that religious knowledge is mere picture knowledge 
(Vorstellung), the cognitive content and essence of which must be interpreted by the 
Begriff.  Baillie rejects the position that inferential reasoning (philosophy’s pure thought 
or Begriff) ultimately provides knowledge of God, and dismisses Hegel’s supporting 
claim that religious faith (i.e. Religion) lacks cognitive content.    
 
 
We are forced to conclude . . . that Hegel and the Hegelian 
theologians do serious injustice to religious faith by thus 
limiting its own native range of self-expression to the realm 
of popular, pictorial and materialised thinking . . . Hegel . . 
. was not afraid of depreciating the cognitive value of faith, 
because it was not in faith that he put his trust but in 
philosophy [emphasis mine].240  
 
 
 
In brief, Baillie supports Hegel’s position that religious knowledge comes in the form of 
an immediate apprehension that is psychologically prior to knowledge derived by 
metaphysical speculation. Baillie also agrees that religion’s immediate knowledge should 
yield to inferential or indirect knowledge, as a means of elucidating its content (e.g., as in 
the language: “religion is a matter of doing what’s right”).  Against Hegel, however, 
Baillie maintains that the immediate apprehension which gives rise to religious faith is in 
and of itself episteme: religious faith is, for Baillie, an immediate knowledge of God’s 
Presence in and to our moral consciousness of value which entails “mental activity” with 
“cognitive value”.      
 
4.2.2.2 Subjective idealism: O. Pfleiderer and H. Rashdall  
In Otto Pfleiderer’s (1839-1908) philosophy of spirit, and Hastings Rashdall’s 
(1858-1924) personal idealism, Baillie finds rationalist theories of religion which mark 
                                                           
240 Ibid., p. 199.   
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“an advance on Plato, Aquinas and Paley”: each theory rightly recognizes the 
impossibility of inferring the goodness of God “by arguments drawn from the sensible 
world”, in favor of grounding religion in moral consciousness.  However, each theory 
wrongly insists that one “cannot learn anything about God’s character, and consequently 
cannot reach any assurance that could in anywise serve as a working basis for religion, 
with out having to resort to further evidence.”  In contradistinction, Baillie maintains that 
“if the ‘moral argument’ can establish the goodness of God, then surely it must, a fortiori, 
be sufficient to establish His existence.”      
Baillie’s criticisms of Pfleiderer and Rashdall’s theories of religion center in part 
upon their reliance on the Berkeleian theory of sense perception. Baillie maintains that 
such reliance effectively undermines what theoretical advances are found in their theories 
of religion, as  
 
 
It could be of no advantage to religion were the impression 
to gain ground that the question of the existence of God is 
connected with the fate of any philosophical hypothesis that 
is so emphatically, and that is so likely to be so perennially, 
of the nature of an open question as the Berkeleian analysis 
of perception.241  
 
 
Berkeley’s theory of sense perception, then, is a hindrance to religion, because its theory 
of perception is perennially open to debate. Secondly, it is out of touch with the reality of 
both the ordinary person’s concerns and views on religion: it is, adds Baillie, a theory of 
sense perception for which “not many of us would be willing to stake our lives”.   
The deeper issue for Baillie, however, is that Pfleiderer's and Rashdall’s particular 
theories place, as does the rationalist theory of religion in general, undue epistemological 
constraints on knowledge of God:     
 
 
 
The very most that any abstract cosmological argument can 
be conceived as establishing is the existence of a Supreme 
Soul of some kind or another; the very least on which 
                                                           
241 Ibid., pp. 92-93. 
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religion has ever managed to subsist, or could possibly 
manage to subsist, is the assured conviction that this 
Supreme Soul takes (or can be induced to take) some 
interest in our welfare and that His values and ours are not 
hopelessly diverse.  Cosmological and epistemological 
idealism may thus be true, and yet religion may remain an 
empty dream.242  
 
 
 
The above remark occurs in the context of Baillie’s general criticism of Plato, Aristotle, 
Butler, and Paley. It raises a fundamental question: Does Baillie actually believe that 
cosmological and epistemological idealism can establish the existence of a Supreme 
Soul? He does not. 
 
 
Every religious man believes, with the primitive animist 
and with Plato, that behind all things there is Mind and 
Will, and that therefore what may broadly be called the 
spiritualistic interpretation of the universe is the one true 
interpretation of it.243  
 
 
This spiritualistic interpretation, continues Baillie, entails belief in a Supreme Soul who is 
known by the entire human race as a personal being who “cares for man”.  This Supreme 
Soul is known by “faith”; and faith, maintains Baillie, resides in humans’ moral sense of 
value. It is here that humans know God as Mind and Will, and not in an intellectual 
assent to a Berkeleian theory of sense perception.244  
Baillie’s criticism of this sample of rationalist thinkers reflects Baillie’s criticism 
of the rationalist theory of religion as a whole. The rationalist theory of religion is a 
hindrance to religion, because it maintains that knowledge of God is an indirect 
knowledge—a product of discursive reasoning. An interrogation of the belief content of 
the ordinary person, however, suggests that most persons believe that they possess an 
intuitive direct knowledge of God that is mediated by their moral consciousness of value. 
                                                           
242Ibid., p. 90. 
243 Ibid., p. 88. 
244 Ibid., pp. 88-90. 
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When variations of the rationalist theory of religion, be they grounded in the position that 
our direct knowledge is knowledge about the external world of nature (e.g., Aristotle, 
Aquinas) or direct knowledge about the thinking human self (e.g. Hegel, Berkeley, 
Descartes, Anselm), fail to propound a theory of religion whose description accurately 
reflects the moral consciousness’ epistemological basis for religious consciousness 
accurately; each invariably affords a depersonalized account of God: God becomes an 
Inference known indirectly through speculation—not a Presence known directly by 
religious consciousness as the ground of all being and knowledge. This includes 
Pfleiderer's and Rashdall’s theories of religion. When they maintain that God’s character 
is not directly known, but rather must be established via a logical abstraction directed at 
the physico-sensory data of experience, they erect a god known by logical abstraction—a 
god alien to the religious consciousness of those ordinary persons who are humankind.  
 
4.2.3. Theological Intuitionism’s Fallacy: A Directly-known and “Immediately 
Evident” Really Real  
 “Theological intuitionism” represents one alternative to rationalist and romantic 
and approaches to knowledge of God. Whereas romanticism grounds knowledge of God 
in pre-reflection, and rationalism, in inferential reasoning, theological intuitionism 
grounds knowledge of God in “immediately evident” a priori truths apprehended by 
cognitive insight.  Baillie explains:   
 
 
The fundamental affirmations of the religious 
consciousness are, according to this view, ultimate truths of 
reason which are intuitively apprehended and immediately 
evident [emphasis mine]. Thus religious knowledge is 
given a firm and independent foundation of its own; a 
foundation, that is to say, which is independent of natural 
science and yet no less firm than that on which natural 
science rests. 245  
 
 
                                                           
245 IOR, p. 235.  
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This theory of the intuitive apprehension of the immediately evident a priori traces back 
to Plato and Aristotle, with a variant of it—that a priori religious truths are immediately 
evident—tracing as far back to the Stoics.  The Stoic teaching is that all humans have  
 
 
‘common notions’ (koinai ennoiai, notitiae communes), or 
‘presumptions’ (prolepseis, praesensiones), i.e., necessary 
pre-conceptions of human thinking . . . natural to the 
human mind (physikai ennoiai) or innate (emphutos, 
innatus) and quite self-evidencing or ‘gripping’ 
(kataleptikos) . . . [including] the judgments that God 
exists, that HE is a living being, that He is eternal, that He 
is well-disposed to man.246    
 
 
4.2.3.1 Troeltsch’s denial: moral consciousness as mediation for religious 
consciousness 
Baillie’s criticism of theological intuitionism focuses primarily upon the thought 
of Ernst Troeltsch (1865-1923), as Troeltsch is the “most distinguished representative” of 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century quest for the religious a priori.  Baillie 
agrees with Troeltsch that religious knowledge is both an immediate knowledge 
(“intuition”) and a mediated knowledge  (“cognitive insight”). Troeltsch’s theory is 
correct also to refuse to ground religion in “cosmological speculation”; to contend that 
Kant’s a priori conceptions should be open to revision as theology’s understanding of 
human experience advances; and to maintain, contra Kant’s theory of religion, that divine 
commands do not constitute the only legitimate content of religion’s historical 
development. Where Baillie disagrees with Troeltsch’s theory of religion is its separation 
of moral consciousness from religious consciousness: here is an unduly radical break 
with the Kantian theory of religion.  Baillie remarks that while “the phrase ‘religious a 
priori’ looks at first sight so Kantian, no phrase could really be less in accord with the 
spirit of the Kantian system, or more calculated to bring confusion into its leading 
principles.”   
                                                           
246 Ibid., p. 236. 
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Kant’s theory of religion, as the Ritschlians correctly interpret, advocates an 
organic epistemological connection between religious consciousness and the moral 
consciousness—that is, it does not ground religious faith in a religious consciousness the 
a priori of which is epistemologically distinct from the content of moral consciousness. 
Rather, Kant contends that religious consciousness is mediated by cognitive insight into 
an ethical a priori (i.e. categorical imperative); that this cognitive insight is, in turn, 
epistemologically linked to humans' immediate intuition of value (i.e. a priori 
consciousness of good and evil); and, that this immediate intuition of value is grounded 
in moral consciousness—not in an epistemologically distinct religious consciousness.247  
When, then, Troeltsch maintains that religious consciousness is mediated by 
immediately intuited knowledge, he rightly mirrors Kant’s theory of religion; however, 
when he separates the organic, epistemological connection between religious 
consciousness and moral consciousness, this by grounding religious consciousness in an 
intuition of a distinctly religious a priori, he errs in his interpretation of Kant: Kant does 
not maintain, as does Troeltsch’s “theological intuitionism”, that the knowledge which 
mediates assent to religious consciousness is knowledge apprehended from a religious a 
priori. 
4.2.3.2 Otto’s description of knowledge of God 
Baillie’s most scathing criticism of theological intuitionism is directed at Rudolf 
Otto’s (1869-1937) formulation thereof.  This is because Otto, unlike Troeltsch, actually 
attempts to isolate the religious a priori.    
Baillie’s argument centers upon “Professor Otto’s most baffling conception of the 
‘non-rational’ element in our experience and in the reality to which our experience 
introduces us.”  Following W.P. Paterson’s criticism of Otto, Baillie maintains that when 
Otto grounds knowledge of God in religious consciousness' sense of the numinous, he 
renders knowledge of God ‘not accessible to our power of conceiving’. Otto’s reliance on 
what Baillie takes to be a pre-rational sense of the numinous, Otto endorses, as such, an 
essentially romantic theory of religion. Consequently, Otto’s theory of religion is subject 
                                                           
247 Troeltsch “reproaches the Ritschlian theologians for speaking as if Kant had emphasized the practical 
character of religion in order thereby to bring out its validity, whereas [Troeltsch contends]what he really 
desired to bring out was merely its independence of speculation . . . Yet surely there can be little question 
that in this matter the Ritschlian are the better Kantians of the two.” Ibid., p. 243. 
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to Baillie’s criticisms of that position.  Problematic also for Otto’s sense of the numinous 
is that it reads, as Paterson also contends, very much like a ‘special religious sense’.248  
Consequently, Otto’s description of religious experience is vulnerable to Baillie’s 
criticism of extreme mysticism.   
Otto's’ conceptualization of the epistemological linkage between religious 
consciousness and moral consciousness is, in particular, “very baffling” for Baillie.  
“That the characteristic element in religion should be non-rational, while morality should 
be characteristically rational—that is a combination of views for which it seems 
impossible to conceive any justification [emphasis mine].”249 This is not so much a 
matter of Otto’s “apparent equation of the rational with the ethical”; rather, it is because 
any such justification presupposes a logic which conjoins the rational ethical with the 
pre-rational religious. When, however, Otto’s epistemology tries to link the two with a 
“very baffling conception of a composite category,” its seemingly muddled logic fails to 
salvage a theory of religion already plagued with a pre-rational religious sense of the 
numinous. 
Baillie, then, finds in Otto’s theological intuitionism a rather poor description of 
religious consciousness, as it fails to elucidate how rational (indirect) and non-rational 
(direct) knowledges are epistemologically linked between moral and religious 
consciousness. Otto’s epistemological shortcomings make his theory of religion 
problematic for the academic theologian’s logic, as well as for the ordinary person’s 
understanding of religious faith.  
      
 
The conception of a complex category, half rational and 
half non-rational, but a priori in respect of both its parts 
and of the conjunction of these parts; the conception of a 
thought-connection which is immediately self-evident and 
yet is entirely devoid of logical necessity; the ‘most 
surprising circumstance in the history of religion’ that a 
Being who began by being wholly non-moral should finally 
be come to be thought of as the arch-guardian of all our 
mores; the splitting up of the thread of religious progress 
                                                           
248 W. P. Paterson, The Nature of Religion, 169 ff., as referenced in IOR., p. 250. 
249 ROR, p. 251. 
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into two utterly distinct and unrelated processes which yet 
‘nearly but not quite’ synchronise with one another; and 
finally, the strange paradox that, while the more we 
rationalise and moralise our religion the better do we make 
it, yet by rationalising and moralising it completely we 
should utterly destroy it—all these are difficulties which 
can only be solved by letting go altogether the radical 
distinction between the numinous and the ethical and 
allowing our knowledge of good and evil an entree into the 
very holy of holies of our religious faith.”250 
 
In passing, Baillie is sympathetic to Otto’s attempt to integrate the moral and 
religious consciousness, if only because he considers the theory fundamentally wrong in 
its marginalization of the ethical content of religious consciousness. Indeed, though 
Baillie is “baffled” by Otto’s logic for connecting immediate, a priori, pre-reflective 
religious truths, said to be intuited by the sense of the numinous, with the contents of a 
rational, moral consciousness; he allows that “a closer acquaintance” with the Friesian 
philosophy to which Otto’s theory of religion is indebted, might yield insight into Otto’s 
attempted conceptual integration of the “‘non-rational’ element in our experience and . . . 
the reality to which our experience introduces us.”  That said, we shall find Baillie, in his 
latter MT, developing his own idea of the immediacy of knowledge of God and, in the 
process, continuing to distance his idea of immediacy from the idea of immediacy 
essential to the epistemology of Otto’s theological intuitionism. 251  
 
4.2.4. Kant’s Fallacy: God is An Indirectly-Known Logical Implicate   
When Baillie turns to Kant’s theory of religion, he centers his criticism upon what 
he considers Kant’s great contribution to the academic study of religion: Kant’s 
description of how moral consciousness develops into religious consciousness.252 What is 
                                                           
250 Ibid., pp. 253-54. 
251 See SPG, p. 54.  Baillie’s neglect of Fries provides a somewhat interesting historical note: Fries himself 
espoused a doctrine of mediated immediacy.  
252 “But later history has shown that the main significance of Kant’s contribution . . . lay precisely in the 
fact that his ‘Moral Proof’ differed from the old Proofs in the all-important respect that it showed itself 
capable of being used not only as a buttress and support for religion but as an explanation of its origin, an 
interpretation of its meaning, and a guide among the manifold competing forms and doctrines of it.  Having 
learned from Schleiermacher a new way of stating the theological question, the Ritschlian School, and 
others who were not Ritschlians, came to realise that the determinative dependence of religious faith on 
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its weakness? Baillie identifies it as Kant’s explication of “the exact nature of the 
transition from the moral to the religious outlook”.  Mounting a line of criticism against 
Kant’s theory of religion—one not unlike his criticism of Otto’s theory of religion—
Baillie scrutinizes Kant’s elucidation of the epistemological “determinative connection” 
“between the beliefs of religion and the utterances of the moral consciousness.”     
Baillie’s argument against Kant on that issues was presented in Chapter 2’s 
consideration of MI as a possible description of universal revelation, and need not be 
repeated here. 
   
4.2.5. The Neo-Kantian Fallacy: God’s Indirectly-Direct Disclosure to Non-
Christian Religious Consciousness: Denied the Christian Theologian     
 
4.2.5.1 As in Ritschl’s method 
 Baillie’s criticism of the neo-Kantian theory of religion centers somewhat upon 
Albrecht Ritschl’s (1822-1889) thought, particularly that expressed in The Christian 
Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation.253This criticism appears in IOR; no mention 
of Ritschl is found in ROR.   
IOR discloses a Baillie somewhat sympathetic to Ritschl’s theory of religion, 
including Ritschl’s claim that religious faith is knowledge of an “Ideal” Value that is the 
Really Real, included.254 Baillie, for example, is eager to defend aspects of Ritschl’s 
                                                                                                                                                                               
moral values was not merely a possible starting-point for the defense of faith, but the source from which 
faith originally springs and the key to its inmost character.” IOR, pp. 273-274. 
253 Albrecht Ritschl, The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation: The Positive Development 
of the Doctrine, Vol. 3 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1900). 
254 Some exposure to Ritschl’s thought may be helpful to the reader. Ritschl’s theory follows that of Lötze 
and Kant, in that it distinguishes between the “ideal” and the “real”, the “ought” and the “is”, “value” and 
“fact”.  The major point of departure concerns its contention that the “ideal” is the “real”.  The nature of the 
epistemological correspondence between the ideal and the real comes out in Ritschl’s distinction between 
“concomitant” and “independent” “value-judgments”: humans, being personalities, are conscious of value, 
including what ought to be.  The world, being imperfect, evidences that the intuited ought is not however 
typically realized. This disparity between what should be and what appears to be creates crisis for the 
individual. This crisis precipitates a quest to discover what “is”—this in an effort to harmonize one’s 
personality with nature. When such harmony-seeking is primarily motivated by self-interest, “concomitant-
value judgments” are brought to bear upon the investigation of perceived “facts”. When, however, it’s 
primary motivation is interest in an ideal order, the method employed entails a bearing of such 
“independent-value judgments” upon the non-sensory facts—as intuited by one’s moral consciousness of 
value.  Each method can and does yield knowledge: the theoretical cognition of the former advances 
scientific knowledge. Theoretical cognition, which arises from concomitant value judgments and the 
employment of the scientific method, gives rise to scientific discovery, as well as to scientific speculation-
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theory of religion—Ritschl’s position that value-judgments provide insight into 
understanding religion, in particular.255 Moreover, when Baillie does identify a deficiency 
in Ritschl’s thought, he offers no severe criticism of it. When, for instance, Baillie 
addresses the anti-mystical element in Ritschl's theory of religion, Baillie, whose great 
affinity for authentic mysticism has been documented, remarks merely that Ritschl’s 
theory could accommodate mysticism, were Ritschl not falsely inclined to think that all 
theories of mysticism espouse extreme mysticism’s theory of perception.256 In fact, 
Baillie offers no direct criticism of Ritschl’s thought per se, but rather typically provides 
only passing criticism (such as the aforementioned)—and then only amidst a seeming 
tone of deference to “Ritschl’s greatest contribution to theological science . . . 
unquestionably the admirably fruitful ‘dogmatic method’ which he used in the 
interpretation of Christian doctrine.” 257  
This changes, however, when Baillie, writing four years after the publication of 
IOR, confesses in his “Confessions”:  
 
 
I never had any sympathy with the subjectivist trend in 
Schleiermacher’s thought, nor with his equation of religion 
with feeling, nor with his psychological doctrine of the 
                                                                                                                                                                               
based judgments about the positive value of sensory data. Conversely, faith, arises from independent-value 
judgments grounded in belief in the reality of the values given to one’s moral consciousness of value, and 
gives rise to religious knowledge, including religion’s value judgments about religion’s essence—
“independent value judgments.” IOR, p. 283. 
255 For instance, some thinkers (no names provided) argue that Ritschl reduces religion “to an ideal realm 
which has no existence apart from our thoughts”, on the ground that Ritschl’s states that ‘religious 
knowledge consists within independent value-judgments.’ Baillie maintains that, to the contrary, this 
statement is a testimony to “the reality of the ideal world (or world of values).”  As support for the needed 
corrective, Baillie appeals to Ritschl’s idea of “faith”: it “does assert the reality of its own objects, but its 
conviction of their reality is always grounded in a priori recognition of their value.”  He also appeals to 
Ritschl’s idea of religious faith is used to argue another erroneous interpretation: that Ritschl’s theory 
endorses a phenomenalistic idealism, on the ground that  Ritschl teaches that ‘religious knowledge consists 
within independent value-judgments’. These are false claims, contends Baillie. Rather, it is truer to the fact 
to interpret Ritschl’s grounding of concomitant value judgments in the human desire to ascertain facts 
pertaining to external nature, and independent value judgments in the human personality’s desire to 
ascertain the fact of the moral consciousness, as a collective reiteration of the Kantian distinction between 
“the starry heavens above” and “the moral law within”—that is, not a denial of knowledge about their 
objective existence.  Baillie’s assessment of Ritschl’s theory of religion is found in IOR, pp. 282-290, from 
which these quotations have been taken.  See also ibid. pages: 30, 36 f., 66, 144, 151, 186, 190, 225, 291, 
308, 319, 347, 361, 364, 365, 379. 
256 Ibid., pp. 224-225.   
257 Ibid., p. 283. 
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primordial character of felling as over against thought. . . 
Nor did I ever have much sympathy with the other aspects 
of Ritschlianism—its bitter anti-Catholic polemic, its 
narrow Lutheran Christocentrism, its inhospitable attitude 
toward whatever religious insight stands outside of the 
Christian tradition, its Marcionite tendency in regard to the 
Old testament, its extreme opposition to mysticism, its 
disqualification of the Greek contribution to Christianity as 
embodied in the Catholic dogmatic and ecclesiastical 
system.258    
 
 
We find Baillie, then, now maintaining that Ritschl’s fruitful method yields a rather thin 
and unsavory theological glean. In what specific respect is Ritschl’s method unduly 
narrow? What are its implications for understanding religious consciousness and divine 
revelation? Ritschl’s method limits the Christian theologian’s interrogation of religious 
consciousness to his or her own sect.  Baillie, however, staunchly maintains that 
“religious insight stands outside of the Christian tradition”: although the Christian 
tradition is indeed the highest manifestation of Religion, its tradition is nevertheless both 
historically and conceptually grounded in religion’s broader and more universal 
development. This is to say that Baillie conceives of the Christian religious community as 
a participant in a broader religious community that extends across all ages and religious 
sects.259  The historical tradition of Religion in which the Christian tradition stands, not 
unlike the moral consciousness which informs its development, is always developing. 
Accordingly, Christian religious consciousness is dynamic.260 Consequently, the 
Christian theological scientist must probe religious consciousness well beyond the 
Christian community for insight into religion. This requires that the same stay abreast of 
religious consciousness' developments—essential for the deeper understanding an richer 
description religious consciousness’ fuller exhibition. The epistemological 
                                                           
258 "Confessions”, p. 52. 
259 To contend with Ritschl that the Christian and the Jew have no common ultimate ground of faith 
between them is to “exaggerate the distinctness” of  Christianity so as to contradict the Christian Church 
and the Gospels.  “Nothing . . . could be well be more unhistorical than such a view.  On the whole it must 
be said that our Lord placed even more emphasis on the basic identity of His Gospel with the traditional 
religion of His people than on its culminating differences from that religion.”  IOR, p. 61.  
260 Ibid., p. 62. Here we see Baillie advocating something like an "open theological" method.  Cf. Keith 
Ward, Religion and Revelation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 36-42; 339-340.  
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presuppositions underlying Ritschl’s method disallow that knowledge however, as it 
disallows knowledge of the mediation of knowledge of God beyond one’s sect. 
 Baillie’s method (discussed in detail in Chapter 2), unlike Ritschl's method, 
presupposes that revelation extends to all persons (and, hence, religious communities), 
and that there are points of contact between Christian religious consciousness and non-
Christian religious consciousness. Baillie thinks that presumption justified in part because 
one cannot draw hard lines of demarcation between the various religious tradition's ideas 
of religious experience—an implicit epistemological assumption of Ritschl’s method, its 
theological-epistemological constraints included. However, it is Baillie’s position that “to 
stop short anywhere within the religious experience of our race is to express a purely 
arbitrary preference and to draw a line for ourselves where no line exists.”261 Assured, 
then, on historical grounds that no line exists between one religious tradition’s ideas of 
religious experience and another’s, Baillie is persuaded that when Ritschl draws such 
lines, he unduly denies the Christian theologian an understanding of how God’s direct 
Self-disclosure is mediated by non-Christian religious consciousness.  
 
4.2.5.2 As in Herrmann’s description of knowledge of God  
Whereas Baillie’s criticism of Ritschl’s neo-Kantianism in IOR is somewhat brief, 
his criticism of Wilhelm Herrmann’s (1846-1922) theory of religion in IOR is extensive.  
Here is a marked improvement on Ritschl’s neo-Kantianism; and we are reminded that in 
Herrmann’s thought Baillie finds that “the process by which Christian conviction 
develops in the soul has never been so faithfully set forth.  Nor has there been any more 
distinguished contribution made to theology in our time than that made by 
Herrmann....”262 The strength of Herrmann’s description of CRE derives in part from its 
staunch rejection of Ritschl’s narrow epistemology.  For one, whereas Ritschl’s theory of 
religion rejects the language of “philosophy of religion” and “philosophical theology”, 
Herrmann’s theory of religion rightly, according to Baillie, embraces it.   Accordingly, 
Herrmann’s epistemology is “less biblicist” than is Ritschl’s, although it rightly maintains 
that the Bible is normative for understanding Christian faith. Of particular excellence for 
                                                           
261 Ibid., p. 62. 
262 Ibid., p. 296. 
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Herrmann’s epistemology is that it, when compared to Ritschl's method, lays “more 
stress on the recognisability of the common Christian experience shared alike by 
ourselves to-day and the New Testament writers long ago”.263  What then is the problem 
for Herrmann’s distinguished description of religious experience?  We have found that, 
by Baillie’s estimation, Herrmann’s otherwise outstanding description of the 
epistemology of CRE effectively denies that which his idea of revelation and theological 
method, each of which is an advance on Ritschl’s thought, would permit: universal 
revelation of God and an interrogation of humans’ religious consciousness. How? In 
short, it “breaks the chain of reason”, when it denies that the mediation of knowledge of 
God is an “act of intelligent insight”. 
 
                                                           
263 Ibid., p. 56. 
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5. BAILLIE’S LATTER MEDIATING THEOLOGY (1939-60) 
We are in the process of determining the focus of Baillie’s MT—this with an eye 
toward resolving the issue of MI’s importance for Baillie’s MT. In the previous chapter, 
we took some strides in this direction with our elucidation of the structure and the claims 
advanced by Baillie’s apologetic. We found a Baillie arguing against various theories of 
religion, focusing his criticism on their epistemologies, and maintaining that these 
theories’ epistemologies make knowledge of God either too direct (immediate) or too 
indirect (mediated).  
This chapter diachronically traces the development of Baillie’s latter MT, 
focusing primarily on the claims advanced by Baillie’s apologetic. It begins with an 
elucidation of Baillie’s thought in Our Knowledge of God (1939) and subsequently 
considers Baillie’s thought in both his The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought (1956) 
and posthumously published The Sense of the Presence of God (1962). This second stage 
of a two-stage diachronic trace provides evidence that the mediating theologian was 
actively relying on MI for his Christian apologetic until his death.  
 
5.1. OUR KNOWLEDGE OF GOD (1939) 
Our Knowledge of God (1939) is pivotal for the development of Baillie’s MT.  
Fergusson provides an excellent summary of the epistemological developments in the 
work:   
 
 
In his earlier work, we see the influence of the post-Kantian 
philosophy of Pringle-Pattison in which all knowledge is 
dependent upon the primary data of experience.  An 
epistemology in which the conscious subject reflects upon 
and interprets the primary deliverances of moral experience 
is implicit in his theological strategy.  We now find this 
being replaced by a critical realism in which experience 
and self-consciousness are firmly set within the social and 
physical environment inhabited by the physical subject.264   
 
                                                           
264 Fergusson, "Orthodox Liberal", p. 141.    
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Fergusson notes that the epistemological shift in Our Knowledge of God (hereafter, 
OKG) accordingly, “paves the way for a stronger theology of revelation than had hitherto 
been apparent in Baillie’s theology”.  The work also lays the groundwork for what now 
is, and will become, an increased Christocentrism in Baillie’s critical thought. In 
particular, the work’s elucidation of “the way in which the incarnation and the cross 
mediate the glory of God” makes it “an important development in Baillie’s thinking 
which brings with it a greater emphasis on special revelation and the contextuality of all 
human knowledge”.265 These epistemological and christological developments in OKG 
would impact Baillie’s subsequent thought, as evidenced in The Idea of Revelation in 
Recent Thought and the Sense of the Presence of God.  Works which “display [Baillie’s] 
continuing interest in the concept of revelation,” they also evidence an “increasing 
Christocentrism in his thinking towards the end of his life”.266 Given the developments in 
OKG, as well as the works anticipation of the trajectory of Baillie’s latter thought, it is no 
wonder that some consider OKG Baillie’s “most important work”.267  
At the very center of Baillie’s epistemological shift, increased Christocentrism, 
and now stronger theology of revelation, lies MI.  A concept first explicitly mentioned in 
OKG, it is, as we shall soon find, also important for other developments in Baillie’s 
thought, including Baillie’s increased dialogue with Barth.  
 
5.1.1. Neo-Orthodoxy’s Problem: No Immediate, Universal Knowledge of God 
It is not as if Baillie was previously unfamiliar with Barth's thought; Baillie had 
defended Barth’s thought, at points, in the 1920’s,268 had met with Barth in 1930 (one 
year after IOR’s publication), and had criticized Barth’s doctrine of revelation (in 
particular), in his 1933 “Confessions”.269  In OKG, however, one finds Baillie debating 
Barth with full force. This debate, as we shall see, would carry over into Baillie’s Sense 
of the Presence of God.  
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In OKG, Baillie advocates positions which suggest his affinity for neo-orthodox 
theology. For one, Baillie commends Barth’s emphasis on God’s transcendence. 
Secondly, Baillie agrees that knowledge of God is a matter of divine initiative. Thirdly, 
Baillie endorses a doctrine of the verbal inspiration of the Bible, not unlike Barth. 
Fourthly, Baillie shares Barth’s disdain for natural theology’s attempt to establish God’s 
existence. In light thereof, that Baillie’s doctrine of revelation may have much in 
common with Barth’s (latter) idea of revelation seems, at least on the surface, a 
reasonable suggestion.270   
In addition, Baillie is quick to affirm the value of Barth’s dogmatic theological 
method for modern Christian thought, when Baillie considers the “spiritual situation” of 
the modern western world: it is one under the “delusion” of its own “self-sufficiency”—a 
consequence of its “repression” of knowledge about Jesus Christ.  This delusion has not 
gone unchallenged; indeed, both God and Barth have had something to say about it: God 
has continually pricked the modern person’s consciousness with God’s continual self-
disclosure in and thereto;271 Barth, confronting the modern west with his routine 
dogmatic proclamation of the Christian Gospel, has disclosed the “hidden canker of [its] 
uneasy conscience” while heightening the western world’s consciousness of God’s 
transcendence, in particular.  In this regard, Barth’s dogmatic theology has proven an 
antidote for an ailing modern society.272 It has also proven a much-needed antidote for an 
ailing Christian theology: Barth’s refusal to debate God’s existence has reawakened 
Christian theology to the power of the Gospel proclamation.273  
Barth’s theological prescription hardly constitutes a panacea, however, according 
to the Baillie. Indeed, it cannot be, as Barth’s is misdiagnosis of the “spiritual situation” 
of the West. A position already advanced by Baillie in his 1933 “Confessions”, it receives 
fuller expression in OKG.  
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Dr. Barth is guilty of unduly simplifying the delicate 
complexity of the spiritual situation with which we have 
here to do, and that in his anxiety to recover and conserve 
one precious evangelic truth he is going far towards 
surrendering another.274    
 
 
The truth which Barth’s doctrine of revelation recovers is that God transcends creation, 
and is revealed most profoundly in Jesus Christ; the truth which Barth surrenders, is that 
God is immanently present in and to all of creation’s consciousness.  Here is Barth’s 
oversimplification of the spiritual situation of the West; here is what renders his medicine 
hard to swallow theologically for Baillie; and here, Baillie maintains, is a doctrine of 
revelation alien to the moral consciousness of the entire human race. 
Believing at this time that the modern theologian must work through Barth’s 
thought,275 Baillie does just that.  Taking aim at Barth’s denial of an Anknüpfungspunkt 
between God and all humans, Baillie contends that this doctrine readily evidences Barth’s 
misdiagnosis of the human situation: there must be, argues Baillie, some ontological 
connection between unregenerate humans and God; elsewise, the “uneasy consciousness” 
of unregenerate persons would not be able to appropriate the revelation mediated by the 
Gospel proclamation—Barth’s own proclamation included.276 Baillie, of course, does not 
think human nature unflawed: he readily agrees, for example, with Barth’s position that 
both humans’ rationality (“goodness”) and responsibility (“freedom of will”) are corrupt.  
However, he firmly rejects the neo-orthodox position that the imago dei has been 
obliterated to such an extent that neither the form of its rationality (Barth) nor the 
material content of its goodness (Barth and Brunner) remains. This is out of keeping with 
an accurate reading of the spiritual situation: it evidences that the modern person, be that 
person regenerate or unregenerate, does well “participate” in the divine likeness—that 
humans are not entirely qualitatively distinct from the “Wholly Other” whose 
transcendence Barth rightly emphasizes. 
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But the truth of it is surely that the doctrine of the imago 
dei, far from being a doctrine derived from any direct 
knowledge of what happens at creation, is a doctrine 
suggested to us by, and derived by us from, our knowledge 
of present human nature. . . . 
. . .The doctrine of the imago dei has its basis in the fact 
that our existent human nature presents itself to us, not as 
simply a bad thing, but as a good thing spoiled.  277 
 
 
Baillie’s position, that all humans are ontologically connected with God, albeit 
imperfectly, mirrors his epistemological position that all humans have an immediate 
knowledge of God—that which Barth’s epistemology denies.  And it is here—Barth’s 
rejection of universal immediate knowledge of God—that Baillie mounts his most 
stringent argument against Barth: here is the root of Barth’s misreading of the spiritual 
situation of the West, and his consequent over-prescription of dogmatic proclamation as a 
cure for modern western society’s spiritual ills.     
 
 
In the case of Dr. Barth himself, his rejection of apologetic 
seems to be based, not on his recognition of an implicit 
knowledge of God which requires no argument to support 
it, but on his denial that there is any implicit knowledge 
which could serve as a starting-point for argument 
[emphasis mine].278 
 
 
Hence, while Baillie’s argument against Barth’s dogmatic theology does center in part on 
the Barth’s anthropology, whose doctrine of the imago dei misrepresents the spiritual 
situation of the West, the issue for Baillie is an epistemological one: Barth denies that all 
humans having implicit knowledge of God.279 
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Accordingly, Baillie also takes aim at Barth’s doctrine of revelation, as evidenced 
for Barth’s misreading of the spiritual situation of the West. Here, again, Baillie centers 
his criticism on Barth’s rejection of a universally immediate knowledge of God. Barth, 
observes Baillie, denies universal immediate knowledge of God, in favor of an idea of 
knowledge of God whose scope of mediation is substantially more limited: knowledge of 
God is solely mediated by knowledge about, and of, the Mediator, Jesus of Nazareth, 
according to Barth.  Baillie agrees that the Mediator is God’s supreme self-disclosure in 
history, and that a distinctly Christian knowledge of God is no mere knowledge about 
Jesus: Christian knowledge of God must be mediated by “our direct personal encounter 
with Him in the Person of Jesus Christ His Son our Lord.”280  However, to limit the 
mediation of revelation of God’s self-disclosure to Jesus is to suppose that some humans 
know nothing of God’s grace. This is problematic for both Barth’s reading of the spiritual 
situation and for Barth’s theology of revelation. 
Barth’s theology of revelation, to its credit: contends that revelatory content 
(contra Brunner) presupposes no “absolute distinction” between a ‘sustaining’ grace 
through general revelation and a special, saving grace “through Christ alone” (“special 
revelation”); does not separate the ‘material form’ and ‘content’ of the imago dei; and 
does not as such commit one to the rejection of the position “that the capacity for spiritual 
life was given first and the reality of it afterwards”.  Barth’s theology also rightly 
maintains that God’s grace is such “that the capacity to receive revelation ... is given in 
and with revelation itself”.  However, when Barth maintains, “Man was not reasonable 
prior to his apprehension of the first inkling of truth, but in that apprehension his 
rationality is first born,” he advances a position based on the faulty supposition that 
extent of God’s grace limits the mediation of rationality and truth only to those with 
knowledge about Jesus Christ—and this only when humans come to saving faith in Jesus 
Christ.281  However, it is Baillie’s position that it is only because all humans have 
immediate knowledge of God, that the Gospel message can mediate God’s Presence to, 
and become revelatory for, humans. Consequently, when Barth conceives of revelation as 
a vertical disclosure of God’s presence at only one point in history, he not only limits the 
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mediation of knowledge of God (divine action) to knowledge of the Mediator 
(revelation); he unduly truncates, so to speak, the horizontal breadth of divine action 
whose Self-disclosure and accompanying grace enables the very rationality and truth 
wherewith divine action can be appropriated as revelation. In this regard, Baillie thinks it 
better to side with Brunner’s position:  God’s grace extends to the human race as a whole 
in the form of a “’revelation in creation’ [which includes] . . . ‘the law written in the 
hearts’ of the Gentiles and . . . God’s manifestation of his invisible nature to them 
‘through the things that he made’”.282  
What, then, should a better theology of the revelation in creation include, 
according to Baillie? Fundamentally, it should maintain that all humans have the implicit 
knowledge denied by Barth’s idea of revelation—in several respects. Specifically, it 
should be maintained that all persons have at least implicit knowledge of: (1) being 
“aware of not living up to its own interior and acknowledged nature”; 283 (2) evil’s 
presence within humans’ “inner” and “outer worlds”; (3) God’s being the “deliverer” 
from the throes of human exigency; (4) a priori, moral “conceptions” of this “Ideal 
Personality”, including God’s attributes of  “goodness”, “infinity”, “eternity”, 
“omniscience”, “omnipresence”284 “immutability”, “omnipotence”, and 
“impassability”—logically a priori conceptions which, being not inborn-innate, are 
couched rather in humans’ implicit knowledge of God’s unconditional moral demand—a 
knowledge which, by God’s grace, is disclosed through God’s continuous, direct self-
disclosure to individuals “in, with and under” human experience.  This implicit or 
immediate knowledge of God does not require mediated knowledge about the event of 
Jesus Christ; it can be mediated, and is mediated, by the individual’s knowledge about 
any number of events. This includes knowledge “about” and “of” the world, others, and 
oneself.285 All of this is, also by God’s grace, possible as God has left no person mente 
alienati, but has provided immediate knowledge of God to all. Indeed, to contend that 
non-regenerate persons have no knowledge of God is not only to objectify humans by 
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denying that each is “personality”; it is to depersonalize the personal relationship between 
God and all humans.  
Barth, then, oversimplifies the spiritual situation of the West, because he denies 
that all humans have immediate knowledge of God. It is a denial backed by an 
anthropology foreign to the human situation, a doctrine of revelation excessively narrow, 
and a concept of God’s grace which unduly limits the scope of God’s grace. A more 
astute reading of the human situation, however, attests to all humans having, by God’s 
grace, knowledge of God. Barth’s otherwise welcome dogmatic-theological affirmation 
of God’s transcendence comes with an unfortunate theological surrender:  God’s 
immanent and continually disclosed Presence in and to all humans, as “in, with and 
under” a sacramental universe.   
In passing, Brunner’s thought serves Baillie’s purposes in OKG.  With regard to 
Baillie’s debate with Barth, Brunner’s demarcation of “revealed knowledge” of God from 
“natural knowledge” about God provides Baillie a working structure with which he can 
articulate his position that all persons have an immediate, personal knowledge of God in 
their moral consciousness of value. It also provides Baillie a means for rejecting Barth’s 
position that knowledge of God can be established by natural theology. Furthermore, it 
provides a means for Baillie to resume his debate with the rationalist theory of religion 
over this issue: the epistemological relationship between direct and indirect knowledge 
for knowledge of God. Maintaining that all humans have an immediate knowledge of 
Personality, Baillie, we shall now see, contests the rationalist theory’s epistemological 
claim that some learned humans can arrive at inferentially-derived knowledge about 
God.286    
 
5.1.2. The Rationalist Theory of Religion’s Problem: No Immediate Knowledge of 
Personality      
In OKG, Baillie picks up his long-standing debate with the rationalist theory of 
religion over the issue of knowledge of God.  Here we find that, whereas in his early 
thought he primarily employs the language of indirect and direct to refer to knowledge of 
God and the ground of religion, Baillie now employs more readily the language of 
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mediated and immediacy.  Baillie’s line of criticism remains the same, however: the 
rationalist theory of religion delivers, at best, only an indirect knowledge about an 
impersonal God.    
Anselm’s ontological proof is one such target in OKG. Baillie, who makes but 
passing criticism of the rationalist Anselm in IOR, now concedes that the proof is, 
psychologically speaking, rather powerful.  Its power derives from its ability to describe 
the inward quality of religious experience and to drive the proof’s contemplator toward a 
deeper reflection upon God’s presence in and to the soul. As Baillie puts it: “The faith or 
belief which [Anselm] considers must precede rational understanding is very far from a 
blind acceptance of tradition; rather it is such an inward laying hold of God as, following 
upon the gracious act by which God lays a hold of us, forms the secret of the deepest 
personal religion.”287  The proof also rightly operates on the assumption that humans can 
have a direct knowledge of God via insight into the “logical structure” “implicitly 
contained” in faith’s “mental processes”.  Add that the proof presupposes knowledge of 
God’s being inherently “personal”, and the argument res cogitans proves a marked 
improvement over Aquinas’s argument for God’s existence res extensa.   
Baillie’s fundamental difficulty with the epistemology that undergirds Anselm’s 
proof is its supposition that grounds for religious faith can be established by logical 
demonstration: for although the proof does beckon reflection upon God’s immediate, 
personal presence in and to the soul, its ultimate objective is to move beyond such a 
stimulation of subjective reflection to the logical establishment of God’s objective 
existence—this by demonstrating “that the form of the conception of God in our minds is 
already to believe in His reality.”  When, however, Anselm attempts to ground religious 
faith in the understanding (intelligere and comprehende), he proposes a criterion for the 
validation of religious faith that conflicts with the deliverances of religious consciousness 
properly understood.  “And it is just here, as I believe, that we must part company with 
him.”288  Specifically,  
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If our faith does not rest on argument, then how can the 
construction of an argument lead, as St. Anselm says it 
does, to the correct understanding of that faith?  The only 
possible answer would be to claim that the argument which 
was afterwards hit upon was no more than a clear 
explication of a logical structure which had been already 
implicitly contained in the mental process by which faith 
was originally contained [emphasis mine]...289 
 
 
Baillie concurs, of course, that religious faith is mediated by mental processes; but he 
insists that such mediation entails reflection upon a logical structure latently embedded in 
moral consciousness' (as opposed to theoretical reason’s) immediate knowledge of 
logical a priori's—“conceptions” which, via immediate knowledge of God, are believed 
by the moral consciousness to correspond epistemologically to God, the knowledge of 
Whom is “logically prior” to all human knowledge (including knowledge about Anselm's 
proof). It is upon these conceptions, and the God whom moral consciousness believes to 
exist, that humans reflect; and it is in this “logical structure” that humans find ground for 
the belief in God that characterizes assent to religious consciousness—not in a theoretical 
speculation whose discursive reasoning mediates indirect knowledge about an ontological 
proof. To put it differently, the chief weakness of Anselm’s proof is that it attempts to 
ground religious faith in second-order (indirect) mental processes, as opposed to 
grounding it in humans’ first-order (direct) knowledge of God.  This, in Baillie’s mind, 
effectively negates knowledge of Personality. 
Baillie’s criticisms of Aquinas’s thought also center upon a supposedly faulty 
conceptualization of the epistemological relationship between immediate and mediated 
knowledge for knowledge of God. That this is Baillie’s central apologetic concern comes 
out in Baillie’s remarks that 
 
We are directly challenging St. Thomas’s doctrine that we 
have no knowledge of God per se but only per ea quae 
facta sunt—through his effects in the world of nature, and 
are allying ourselves rather with . . . the doctrine 
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represented by St. Bonaventure’s dictum that God is 
present to the soul itself (Deus praesens est ipsi animae).290 
 
 
 
Baillie elaborates on the underlying tension in Aquinas’s thought, observing that  
 
 
 
According to St. Thomas, no direct knowledge of any 
existence save the world of nature as perceived by the five 
senses.  Our knowledge of all non-sensible realities is 
discursive in character, being regarded by inference from 
the things we can see and touch.291   
 
 
 
Baillie subsequently brings his criticism of Aquinas’s theology into sharper focus: 
 
 
 
[Aquinas’s] teaching was that all of our knowledge of God 
is indirect and mediate, and that the immediate knowledge 
of God proper to the state of Glory is completely 
impossible to us in our earthly condition [emphasis 
mine].292  
 
 
 
Problematic for Aquinas’s understanding of the epistemological relationship between 
direct knowledge and indirect knowledge for knowledge of God, is an “indirect and 
mediate” knowledge about the “world of nature” (i.e., Aquinas’s proofs) cannot prove the 
existence of Personality—anymore than can direct knowledge about the human mind 
(i.e., Anselm’s proof; Descartes’ method). At best, this half of Aquinas’ mediaeval 
synthesis can provide only indirect knowledge about effects—and, then only, of an 
impersonal Inference. Religious faith, however, thrives on direct knowledge of the 
character of Presence, maintains Baillie, as humans do have, contra Aquinas’s 
epistemology, an ontologically direct (though epistemologically indirect) knowledge of 
God’s nature (e.g., God is Goodness)—a direct knowledge of God being a personal God.   
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Baillie’s criticism of Descartes centers upon what Descartes claims to be 
epistemologically direct and indirect for our knowledge of God.  In one respect, 
Descartes’ revolution “registered a very real gain. God was now recognized as a Reality 
who more directly confronts us than do the things of sense, and our certainty of him 
became prior to the certainties of science rather than dependent upon them.”293 However, 
it also registered a “very serious loss”.  
 
 
Exactly where, then, did Descartes' mistake lie? It lay, 
surely, in supposing that the consciousness of the self 
preceded the consciousness of the not-self, or could remain 
after the consciousness of the not-self had disappeared.  
The truth is that only in the knowledge of what is other than 
myself am I able to rise to knowledge of my own existence 
at all.  Descartes agreed that the very existence of his doubt 
implied the existence of himself who doubted; what he 
should have argued was that this implied the indubitable 
presence to his experience of something not himself which 
should be his standard for judging whether other things 
were doubtful or not doubtful; for it is clear that if he had 
no sense of reality he could have no disposition to doubt.294  
  
 
Descartes’ epistemology’s downfall, then, is twofold: (1) it makes knowledge of oneself 
humans’ most direct knowledge; (2) it seeks to pass from this type and ground of 
knowledge to knowledge of God.  
 
5.1.3. Romantic Theology’s Problem: Immediate Knowledge as Saving Knowledge  
The mediating theologian’s earlier thought, as we have found, derides William 
James’s “new-fangled concept of the subconscious”, on the ground that it adds nothing to 
James’s theory that knowledge of the Really Real is “pre-reflective” knowledge.  In 
OKG, however, Baillie appears to rely most heavily on his own version of “pre-
reflective” knowledge as support for his thought. For example, Baillie’s criticism of 
Barth and Aquinas, for instance—specifically, their mutual rejection of universal 
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immediate knowledge of God—presupposes that humans do have a knowledge of God 
that is ordinarily beyond humans’ threshold of awareness.  
Here, then, is an important development in Baillie’s MT. A brief digression into 
Baillie’s thoughts on the subconscious will prove helpful, as it will illuminate: what 
immediate knowledge of God means to Baillie’s MT at this stage of development; 
document Baillie’s continued criticism of the romantic theory of religion’s take on the 
epistemological relationship between mediated knowledge and immediate knowledge for 
knowledge of God; and document Baillie’s concessions toward the romantic theory in 
OKG and his latter thought.  
Baillie’s conceptualization of subconscious knowledge of God comes out in his 
argument against atheism.  Here one finds a mediating theologian yet again coming to the 
aid of the ordinary person.  
 
 
 
Many men of our time are . . . in the position that, while 
they do (as I should contend) believe in God in the bottom 
of their hearts, they cannot think how to answer the 
arguments which certain prevailing philosophies direct 
against His reality, and are thus led to doubt Him with the 
‘top of their minds’. 295    
 
 
 
Baillie, still keenly interested in psychological theory, turns to Freudian psychology and 
to Cook Wilson’s philosophy to challenge the intellectual atheism that challenges 
Baillie’s position that all humans have an implicit knowledge of God, the atheist 
included.  Baillie maintains, following Freud, that all humans have a subconscious which 
seeks “to banish our less reasonable and reputable desires from self-consciousness, and 
repress them in the subliminal mind. . .” Such repression occurs both on an individual 
basis and in societies as a whole. Indeed, “The surface life of our society may appear to 
be unruffled, but this is only because the disturbances are being forcibly held down in the 
interior depths of the human minds.” Baillie, breaking with Freud, extends this repression 
to include a repression of knowledge of God.  Attributing the West’s banishment of 
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knowledge of God to the depths of the “subliminal mind” to ideological-historical, 
cognitive-psychological and moral-anthropological factors, 296Baillie advances the claim 
that atheism essentially does not exist: when atheists deny God’s existence, what is 
ensuing is merely atheist’s intellectual denial of God’s existence with the “top of their 
heads”, and not a denial of God’s existence as such: everyone, maintains Baillie, believes 
in God with the “bottom of their hearts”.  As support for his claim, Baillie appeals to 
Cook Wilson’s general position that “not only may men’s faces and their words belie 
their thoughts, but likewise their conscious thoughts may belie the ‘subconscious’ 
workings of their minds.”  The deeper issue, however, is that this epistemological move 
allows the apologist Baillie to defend his position that all humans have a universal 
immediate knowledge of God. 
 
 
Why, then, should we, who believe in God, think it 
necessary to allow that because some men, the so-called 
atheists, deny the existence of God, God cannot therefore 
be directly present to their consciousness as He is to 
ours?297 
 
 
Accordingly, Baillie argues that the human mind is aware of God’s Presence, but that 
some minds can become unaware that it is aware of God’s Presence.   
    
 
All belief must in some sense be conscious—unconscious 
beings cannot entertain beliefs—but all belief need be 
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conscious of itself.  We may have an awareness of a certain 
reality without being aware of that awareness.  And we 
may therefore, without ceasing to be aware of such a 
reality, set about denying its existence—and that in all good 
faith.298 
 
 
 
All humans, then, are immediately aware of God’s presence by God’s direct disclosure in 
and to the soul; however, the human mind can become consumed with second-order 
reflection about the logical possibility of God’s existence to the extent that, for want of an 
ability to reconcile competing “truth” claims “about” the logical possibility of God’s 
existence with knowledge “of” the “reality” of God, such immediate knowledge is 
repressed.   
Baillie’s reliance on Freud and Wilson is also used to support the epistemological 
undergirding for his doctrine of fides salvifica. The above quote, taken from Baillie’s 
discussion of this issue, addresses the subconscious mind’s role in the mediation of fides 
salvifica: Baillie, we recall, contends in IOR that immediate knowledge of God (1) is 
available to the moral consciousness of all humans and (2) epistemologically 
correspondent to logically a priori “conceptions” of  “Ideal Personality”. Baillie develops 
this idea of immediacy further still in OKG: indeed, one need not even be consciously 
aware of one’s immediate knowledge of God (1-2) in order to possess saving faith. An 
epistemological move with negative implications for MI’s present-day epistemological 
value,299 it testifies to an apparent concession toward the romantic theory of religion in 
OKG.   
We recall that Baillie’s early MT characterizes the romantic theory of religion as 
one whose epistemology makes knowledge of the Really Real essentially “pre-
reflective”.  In OKG, however, Baillie’s epistemology is clearly relying on pre-reflective 
“subliminal” knowledge of God—something which Baillie’s epistemology logically 
equates with knowing God “in the bottom of the heart”—as support for the universal 
immediate knowledge of God that is crucial for Baillie’s theory of religion. It is also 
important for his efforts as a mediating theologian. For Baillie’s reliance on this 
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romantic-like epistemological move is not only showcased in Baillie’s mediation between 
Christianity, the ordinary person, and the atheist, Baillie parades it in his would-be 
mediation between orthodox Protestant and Catholic doctrines of saving faith. For 
instance, Baillie observes in OKG that each tradition maintains that saving faith (i.e. 
religious faith) must be mediated by knowledge about propositions and conscious assent 
to them. (We have already witnessed Baillie arguing against Aquinas on this issue in 
OKG—Aquinas makes religious faith, at least the Aristotelian foundation for it, 
contingent upon indirect knowledge.) In the same work, he chastens the epistemology of 
his own theological inheritance, the Reformed Protestant tradition: it wrongly maintains 
that that fides salvifica must be mediated by conscious assent to propositional 
knowledge.300 Here, again, is a mediating theologian whose apologetic concern is with 
the epistemological relationship between indirect knowledge and direct knowledge for 
(saving) knowledge of God. 
It should be said, that Baillie’s defense of the ordinary man, does not come with 
the overt claim that Protestant and Catholic theology are contributing to the atheists’ 
denial of God “with the top of their heads”; however, Baillie would seem to imply as 
much: for when these traditions, broadly defined, insist that saving knowledge of God 
must be mediated by consciousness knowledge about Jesus Christ, their epistemologies 
disallow the possibility that God speaks directly to the “hearts” of persons devoid of the 
indirect knowledge about God’s being in Jesus Christ that is epistemologically necessary 
for saving knowledge.301   
It is apparent, then, that Baillie’s criticism of, if also indebtedness to, the romantic 
theory of religion in OKG is one directed at its conceptualization of the epistemological 
relationship between indirect and direct knowledge in (saving) knowledge of God.  
                                                           
300 “If we ask why such a body as the Westminster Assembly found it difficult to conceive of an assent that 
was not conscious of itself than of a trust that was not thus self-conscious, the answer is apparent.  It is that 
the members of that Assembly were too intellectualistic in their interpretation of the Christian faith, too 
much in love with credal orthodoxy, too ready to understand revelation as consisting in communicated 
information.  But for us there is no reason why we should not extend the distinction between fides directa 
and fides reflexa to the element of assensus as well as to that of fiducia, and speak of an unconscious assent 
. . . We who know that we believe in God have received no right to deny that His saving power is at work 
also in the lives of those who do not know that they believe in Him—or in His Son Jesus Christ our Lord.” 
Ibid., pp. 72-73. 
301 "The man who doubts or denies God with the top of his mind may nevertheless possess in himself, the 
forma fidei essentialis." Ibid., pp. 75. 
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5.2. THE IDEA OF REVELATION IN RECENT THOUGHT (1956) 
The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought (hereafter, IRRT) is a revision of 
Baillie’s 1954 Bampton Lectures. Baillie indicates that it is not a fully systematic 
treatment of the subject, but “might be described as an extended review” of recent 
thought on revelation. Accordingly, this work’s length, content, and depth of analysis 
tend to be somewhat thin. Nevertheless, its consideration is important. For one, it 
evidences a mediating theologian still preoccupied with the issue of the epistemological 
relationship between indirect and indirect knowledge for knowledge of God (e.g., 
Baillie’s criticism of Farrer and Temple). It also evidences Baillie’s reliance on MI, 
almost two decades after OKG’s publication.  
 
5.2.1. Austin Farrer: Direct Knowledge of Mere Images from God 
Though IRRT is primarily a historical-expository work, Baillie provides two 
extended criticisms within it—criticisms of the thought of Austin Farrer and William 
Temple. Following the “historical reminder” of the idea of revelation’s development in 
Christian thought (Chapter 1), Chapter 2 explicates the “divine self-disclosure”. It is here 
that Baillie provides the chapter’s most sustained argument, Baillie’s argument against 
Farrer’s position that ‘divine truth is supernaturally communicated to men in an act of 
inspired thinking which falls into the shape of certain images.’302 Baillie generally 
welcomes Farrer’s emphasis on imagination as a mode of apprehension of knowledge of 
God; however, he staunchly rejects Farrer’s epistemological “exaggeration of the 
distinctness” between imagination and the intellect. Speaking to that differentiation, 
Baillie remarks that  
 
This, however, can be only if it is believed that, whereas all 
propositional knowledge apprehension of truth contains an 
element of possible error, the images are given directly 
[emphasis mine] by God and contain no such element.303  
 
 
                                                           
302 Austin Farrer, The Glass of Vision (Westminster [London], 1948),  p.57, as cited in Baillie, IRRT, p. 37. 
303 IRRT, p. 38. 
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As support for his line of criticism, Baillie offers the following.   
 
(1) “It is difficult to know why we should suppose that [images] are directly the medium 
of revelation in a sense in which [propositional truths] are not”;  
(2) Farrer’s idea of revelation presupposes that human imagination, and its operation 
upon non-propositional symbols, is less fallible than the “judgment-forming intellect” 
which operates upon “propositional truths”—without sufficient ground;   
(3)  “It offers us something less than personal encounter and person communion” with 
God, when it makes “implanted images” the primary medium for knowledge of God. 
(4) It gives rise to a “mechanical idea of inspiration”, as it presupposes that the prophets 
and apostles received revelation when “God directly injected into their mind 
archetypal images”.304   
 
 
Farrer, then, is claimed to advance a faulty idea of revelation, as it epistemologically 
reduces direct knowledge of God to direct knowledge about images from God.    
 
5.2.2. Willliam Temple: No Direct Knowledge of Personality  
Chapter 3’s exposition of the New Testament’s thought on “aspects of the 
revealed content” instances Baillie’s enduring epistemological position that revelation is 
a direct knowledge of God and not a direct knowledge about propositions. Baillie’s 
conclusion for the chapter, for instance, is that revealed content “is not a body of 
information or doctrine” but “God Himself”.  “When”, for example, “we read of ‘the 
revelation in Jesus Christ,’ what we are to understand is that God Himself is in Him.”305  
Chapter 4 explicates the mediation of divine action and revelation, laying 
emphasis on the “mighty acts of God.” The chapter’s opening paragraph announces that 
Baillie will emphasize that the mighty acts which mediate God’s Presence are acts which 
mediate a direct or immediate knowledge of God:  
 
 
                                                           
304 Ibid., pp. 36-40. 
305 Ibid., p. 60. 
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No affirmation runs more broadly throughout recent 
writing on our subject than that which in the last chapter we 
were concerned to make, namely that all revelation is 
given, not in the form of directly communicated 
information, but through events occurring the historical 
experience of mankind, events which are apprehended by 
faith as the ‘mighty acts’ of God, and which therefore 
engender in the mind of man such reflective knowledge of 
God as it is given to him to possess [emphasis mine].306  
  
 
Accordingly, Baillie’s speaks to how direct knowledge of God is, paradoxically, a 
knowledge mediated by concrete events. Addressing also direct knowledge of God’s 
corollary, that knowledge of God is personal knowledge, Baillie elucidates how reflective 
knowledge of God, as mediated in particular by knowledge about nature, relates to 
Christian faith.  
 
 
And the question is whether [nature] could reveal to men 
the Living God who created and sustains it, if God had not 
already shown, or did not at the same time show, Himself 
to them as something more than the Creator and Sustainer 
of such an impersonal system.307       
  
 
This question is one put to Temple, with whose thought Baillie tangles in this chapter.  
Temple maintains that all events in history are revelatory in character; Baillie agrees 
“there is nothing through which God cannot reveal Himself to me”.308  However, while 
rightly maintains that any natural occurrence can and do mediate revelation, and that 
nature’s orderliness does mediate something of the divine Will and Wisdom; Temple 
wrongly asserts that ‘all occurrences are in some degree revelation’.  Why is Temple’s 
epistemological assertion of the mark? Baillie takes aim at Temple’s description of the 
psychological conditions that mediate knowledge of God. ‘The intercourse and 
                                                           
306 Ibid., p. 62. 
307 Ibid., p. 73. 
308 Ibid., p. 26.  Cf. ibid., p. 74. 
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interaction of mind and event’; ‘the coincidence of event and interpretation’—these 
rightly emphasize the epistemological necessity of human for revelation. However,  
 
(1) Not every human interprets all events as being revelatory.  
(2) Humans presumably cannot interpret all events as being revelatory: humans 
possess an imperfect “psychosomatic organization”,309 are liable to faulty 
knowledge “about” objects or  “of” subjects,310 and, as such, susceptible to failure 
regarding the apprehension of revelation.    
(3) Nature, in and of itself, is ill equipped to mediate revelation: it is “impersonal”.   
(4) Revelation is necessarily contingent upon prior knowledge of divine 
Personality—as mediated by personalities.311  
 
Baillie’s counter position is that 
 
 
Revelation is always given us through events; yet not 
through all events, but only through such as appear to be 
God's mighty works; and through no event in its bare 
character or occurrence, but only as men are enabled by the 
Spirit of God to apprehend and receive its revelatory 
power. 312 
 
 
Accordingly, Baillie maintains that the events thought to instance God’s particularly 
“mighty works” (δυναµεις)—events, that is, when God’s divine action, the human 
intercourse and interaction of mind and event with God’s self-disclosure, and the 
revelation received causes wonder and astonishment313—should neither be interpreted as 
a disruption of the natural order, nor consequently be deemed the criterion for the 
                                                           
309 OKG, p. 222.  Cf.  IRRT, p. 26.  
310 IRRT, p. 26.  
311 See ibid., p. 72. For Baillie’s thought on Temple’s idea of the mediation of revelation, see ibid., pp. 66-
82, passim. 
312 Ibid., p. 78.  
313 Or, in the language of H.H Farmer, approvingly quoted by Baillie, when ‘the experience of God as 
personal reaches its maximum concentration’. Herbert Henry Farmer, The World and God; A Study of 
Prayer, Providence and Miracle in Christian Experience (London, 1935), pp. 115-118, as cited in ibid., p. 
77. 
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assessment of the status of an act: if it be a mighty act of God (i.e., revelation).  Temple, 
however, appears to employ such a criterion, when his idea of revelation emphasizes the 
disruption of a uniform natural order as ontologically and epistemologically necessary for 
the mediation of divine action and revelation. Save that this would appear to run contrary 
to Temple’s apparent inclination to think that revelations finds its fullest and most 
profound expression when mediated by the lives of persons—namely, as in “an 
Incarnation”314——it is nonetheless the case that Temple’s thought on the mediation of 
revelation compromises both nature’s mediation of Personality and humans’ knowledge 
of God as Personality.315 Baillie rejects such a depersonalization of Personality and of a 
universe in whose order Baillie finds a sacramental testimony of God’s pledge to, and 
presence amongst, creation. Indeed, it is in our knowledge of personalities that the 
knowledge of Personality reaches us most assuredly and profoundly—as it must: without 
personal knowledge, there is no revelation, as personal knowledge is epistemologically 
necessary for knowledge of Personality, who acts mightily.316  
In the fifth and final chapter of the work, Baillie elucidates the proper “response 
to revelation”.  Here Baillie probes the nature of the Divine-human relationship, 
particularly the epistemological relationship between scripture’s indirect (propositional) 
knowledge about God and what Baillie continues to maintain is God’s direct presence to 
the human soul.  
 
5.3. THE SENSE OF THE PRESENCE OF GOD (1962) 
The final major work under consideration is Baillie’s 1960 Gifford Lecture, The 
Sense of the Presence of God (hereafter, SPG). A work whose content is considerably 
more substantive than that found in IRRT, SPG represents the mediating theologian’s 
final thought on the issues of knowledge of God, revelation and religious experience.   
The 1959 re-issue of OKG anticipates something of SPG’s trajectory. Here, 
Baillie expresses desire to engage “the thought and to answer the challenge of that 
philosophical trend which in its rapidly succeeding changes has answered in turn to the 
                                                           
314 Ibid., p. 80. 
315 Ibid., p. 73. 
316 Baillie’s argument in IRRT against Temple’s thought on the mediation of revelation is somewhat 
disjointed. Hence, I have had to rely somewhat on Baillie’s criticism of Temple in OKG. It is clear, 
however, that in IRRT Baillie has difficulties with Temple’s emphasis on nature’s mediation of revelation. 
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names of logical atomism, logical positivism, and logical or linguistic analysis.”317  An 
aspiration unrealized in the OKG re-issue (which, save the preface, mirrors the 1939 
issue), it is effectively carried out by Baillie in SPG.  Accordingly, my exposition of the 
work centers primarily upon Baillie’s criticism of the above-mentioned philosophies, 
with a focus on Baillie’s criticism of Bertrand Russell’s reductive naturalism and 
Baillie’s response to Antony Flew’s falsification challenge, in particular. These are not 
the only thinkers whom Baillie debates in the work. However, as the present exposition 
must account for major developments in Baillie’s MT, what appear to be essentially 
reiterations of OKG’s lines of criticism—for example, as Newlands suggests,318 Baillie’s 
critique of Barth (and others)—receive only incidental consideration. Furthermore, this 
focus on Baillie’s new dialoguing partners will evidence if also underscore that Baillie, 
despite the change in intellectual context, continued, to the end, to mount the same line of 
attack, as a theologian whose Christian apologetic found him mediating amongst a 
variety of intellectual currents.   
 
5.3.1. Logical Empiricism: Direct Knowledge of The Really Real Denied   
Baillie’s major point of disagreement with logical empiricism is found in the final 
chapter of SPG:     
 
 
 
My main contention throughout . . .  is that we have to do, 
not with an absent God about whom we have a certain 
amount of information, but with a God whose living and 
active presence with us can be perceived by faith in a large 
variety of human contexts and situations.319  
 
 
This remark discloses that the mediating theologian is concerned with at least three major 
issues in the work: (1) information “about” God verses faith’s perception of God; (2) 
God’s “absence” verses God’s “presence with us”;  (3) “The large variety of human 
contexts and situations” in which God’s presence is “perceived”.   
                                                           
317 OKG, p. viii. 
318 Newlands, “The Sense of the Presence of God”, p. 155. 
319 SPG, p. 261. 
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5.3.1.1 Russell’s knowledge by acquiantance: (1) information about realities verses 
faith’s perception of Personality  
Baillie’s debate with Russell centers upon the object of which one has knowledge 
by acquaintance, as anticipated by Baillie’s remark that  
       
 
Thought implies a ratiocinative process which makes use of 
the apparatus of inference.  But it must not be supposed that 
what is here called ‘immediate knowledge’ [of God] is 
merely sensation, the reception of the organism of sense-
data. It too is a product of intelligence, though not yet of 
reflection . . . the work of nous; but of the nous aisthetikos, 
not of the nous apodeiktikos (or, in the Latin equivalents . . 
. of the ratio intuitiva, not of the ratio discursiva).  When 
such knowledge is said to be immediate, what is meant is 
that it is not mediated by any process of inference.  It is  . . . 
a direct knowledge of the real, extra mental world.  It is 
indeed mediated by sense-data, but it is not one of logical 
entailment [emphasis mine].320  
 
 
Baillie’s epistemology of mediation and immediacy provides insight into Baillie’s points 
of agreement and disagreement with Russell’s epistemology on the issue of immediate 
knowledge by personal acquaintance.  With regard points of agreement, Baillie’s 
distinction of “direct knowledge of the real, extra mental world” from “conceptual 
knowledge” parallels Russell’s distinction between “knowledge by acquaintance” and 
“knowledge by description”.  Points of agreement are also found specifically within 
Russell’s epistemic category of “knowledge by acquaintance”.  For one, Baillie agrees 
that knowledge by acquaintance is “logically prior to [knowledge by description], 
because our ability to make affirmations about anything presupposes our acquaintance 
with it.”  This point of agreement is instanced, for example, in Baillie’s epistemological 
                                                           
320 Ibid., pp. 51-52. This is Baillie’s interpretation of MacMurray’s concept of mediated immediacy— a 
concept which Baillie suports on the point indicated.  
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perspective on human’s “knowledge of reality”321—an “intimate” and “direct” 
knowledge (‘I know X’).  Secondly, Baillie agrees that second-order “knowledge of 
truth” presupposes “knowledge of reality” (in Russell’s word, “knowledge by 
acquaintance”). Thirdly, Baillie agrees that  “knowledge of truth” (specifically, 
“knowledge of propositions”) can describe, as does Russell’s “knowledge by 
description”, realities known by acquaintance (i.e., ‘I know that X is Y’). Baillie 
illuminates this point of agreement with his description of the cognition involved in such 
knowledge:     
 
 
We bring our powers of rational analysis to bear on our 
experience, and to do this we have to concentrate our 
attention at any one time on a single strand or aspect of it 
[the initial experience], forming abstract mental concepts 
which . . . enable us to regard it in convenient temporary 
isolation from the rest.  These concepts we then use to draw 
inferences from the fundamental knowledge we already 
have, and to extend and improve that knowledge in such a 
way that we now understand the temporarily abstracted 
aspect better than we understood it before . . . such abstract 
analysis cannot begin unless we already have some 
knowledge of the reality we are analysing. 322  
 
 
 
Baillie’s epistemology, like Russell’s, then, is a critical realist epistemology. For one, it 
maintains that indirect or inferential knowledge can provide truths that corresponding to 
objectively realities known by experience. Secondly, it maintains that knowledge by 
direct acquaintance is epistemically basic to truths about those realities. Thirdly, it 
maintains that knowledge about the corporeal world is the product of the mind being both 
an active (i.e., a “concentrating of one’s attention”) and “receptive” agent.323 Lastly, 
                                                           
321 "For when we say 'reality', we mean simply being or that which is; and Aristotle's way of saying 
ultimate reality is to ontos on—essential esse, that which is-ly is." Ibid., p. 32.   
322 Ibid., pp. 50-51.  Baillie concurs with Macmurray that, as concerning scientific conclusions, 'All thought 
presupposes knowledge'. John Macmurray, Interpreting the Universe (1933), p. 15. Macmurray's italics. 
323 "The knowing mind is active in attending, selecting, and interpreting;  but it must attend to, select from, 
and interpret what is presented to it; and therefore it must be passive as well as active."  IRRT, p.19.  
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Baillie’s epistemology permits empirical knowledge about the material order through 
reflection, analysis, and abstraction.  Baillie’s epistemology rejects, however, reject the 
epistemic limitations placed on knowledge of realities by Russell’s knowledge by 
aquiantance: sense data, objects of memory, internal states, and our selves.  This brings 
us to the issue that Baillie has with Russell’s epistemology: that “apart from ‘universals’, 
knowledge by acquaintance is only with sense-data and not with real objects or with real 
subjects.”324Rejecting Russell’s corollary position that knowledge of other selves and 
physical objects (as constructs, not sense data) reduces to discursive knowledge about 
truths—that is, to “knowledge by description”—Baillie maintains that counters that 
immediate knowledge by acquaintance extends to knowledge of realties, including 
knowledge of the Really Real. Baillie’s basic thought on the exactly nature of our 
knowledge of realities by acquaintance is found in his remark that 
 
 
 
We are directly aware of reality, and of such realities as the 
external world, ourselves, our fellow man and God.  It is 
this direct awareness (our knowledge of S) that is primarily, 
our propositional affirmations (our knowledge that S is P) 
being secondary and derivative and always more tentative 
[emphasis mine] . . .325 
 
 
Thus, when Baillie contends that our direct awareness of realities extends beyond 
propositional knowledge about sensibilia, he describes direct awareness as one which 
should include our direct awareness of “the external world, ourselves, our fellow man and 
God.”  Here is nothing less than appeal to MI’s four primary loci, each of which mediates 
immediate knowledge of realities and Reality, as support for his position that direct 
awareness of Reality is “capable of defense”.  Elsewhere in SPG (addressed in the 
following sections), Baillie employs the language of mediation and immediacy to restate 
his position that knowledge by acquaintance is not limited to information about sensory 
                                                           
324SPG, p. 16. 
325 Ibid., p. 89. 
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data, but rather a “direct but mediate” knowledge of the Really Real. All of this is in 
keeping with the thought of Mascal, whose position Baillie approvingly cites:     
 
 
While there is no perception without sensation, the sense-
datum is not the terminus of perception, not the objectum 
quod . . . but the objectum quo, through which the intellect 
grasps, in a direct [i.e. immediate] but mediate [i.e., 
indirect] activity, the intelligible extra-mental reality which 
is the real thing.326   
 
 
When, then, Baillie engages the first issue with which he says SPG is concerned—
“information about realities verses faith’s perception of Personality”—he appeals to ideas 
of mediation and immediacy and references MI as the prescription for a better 
conceptualization of direct knowledge of Reality and realities. Russell’s knowledge by 
acquaintance correctly allows for second-order “information about” three realities; 
however, it falsely makes sense data the terminus, or final object, of such knowledge. 
Baillie rejects that epistemological premise in favor of “faith’s perception” as a direct 
awareness and knowledge of Personality and personalities by acquaintance.    
 
5.3.1.2  Russell’s knowledge by aquaintance: (2) God’s absence verses Personality’s 
Presence  
Whereas Baillie’s epistemology presupposes that “there is no reality by which we 
are more directly confronted than we are by the Living God”,327 Russell's epistemology 
disallows knowledge of a God who is Personality. Baillie debates Russell on this point. 
For one, Russell’s limitations on knowledge by direct acquaintance make humans “half-
men”. Persons unable to have knowledge of humans as personalities by direct 
acquaintance, such half-men must settle for direct acquaintance with (discursive 
knowledge about) sense data about bodies. To contend this, however, is to engage in 
much contradiction.  For example, it contradicts human experience: “knowledge of 
persons is the very pattern we mean by knowledge.  Of no other existents is our 
                                                           
326 E.L Mascall, Words and Images, 1957, as cited in SPG, p. 14.   
327 OKG, p. 166. 
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knowledge so intimate and direct.”328 It is also contradicts ordinary human language 
about human experience—one which also presupposes persons’ acquaintance with other 
persons via an “intimate and direct” knowledge of other minds. Phrases like “Yes, I know 
him, but I do not know him very well.  I hope soon to get to know him better”—these 
evidence that knowledge of other human minds is “more fundamental than the knowledge 
of propositions which may be enunciated concerning them.”  In addition, it contradicts 
the language of religious experience, as articulated, for example, in the New Testament.  
Its language also indicates that knowledge by acquaintance is often believed to be direct 
knowledge of other personalities, including Personality.  “Faith” itself comes from 
knowledge by acquaintance between personalities (e.g., ‘Ye have known God, or rather 
been known by Him’ (Gal. 4:9). Hence, while “saving faith” does entail a “latent” assent 
to knowledge “about” God (truths), “faith is faith in God, confidence in Him rather than 
the uttering of judgments concerning him.” 329   
 By Baillie’s estimation, then, Russell’s knowledge by acquaintance further 
depersonalizes humans: not only does it deny humans knowledge of each other; it denies 
humans knowledge of God. It makes them half-men. 
 
5.3.1.3 Russell’s knowledge by aquaintance: (3) the variety of human contexts and 
situations in which God’s presence is perceived 
When Russell’s “knowledge by acquaintance” limits direct knowledge to 
propositional knowledge about sense data and universals, it not only conflicts with a wide 
range of human experience, it also advances, as Russell would have it, a human context 
devoid of any certitude of God’s existence. This is because it is through the mediation of 
immediate knowledge of other minds—minds known by personal acquaintance—that 
Reality discloses Itself. In SPG language that sounds like it is straight from OKG, Baillie 
asserts       
 
Where I find myself in most assured contact with reality is 
in the relation with God that is mediated to me through my 
relation with my fellows, and in the relation with my 
                                                           
328 SPG, p. 16. 
329 Ibid., pp. 17-18. 
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fellows that is mediated to me through my relation with 
God.330  
 
 
Emphasizing, then, the epistemological necessity of knowledge of other minds for the 
mediation of knowledge of God, Baillie contends for MI’s also-central claim that these 
personal relations are ideally characterized by agapē:    
 
 
In Christian thought, the two great commandments, 
enjoining the love of God and the love of the neighbour, are 
related to one another in precisely this way. The way to 
God passes through my relation to my neighbour, and the 
way to my neighbour passes through my relationship to 
God [emphasis mine].331  
 
 
This agapē, which, for the Christian, includes the “love of God and his Christ”,332 
presupposes that humans have a moral consciousness of value: when humans’ encounter 
the Mediator, their cognitive insight into their moral consciousness of value enables them 
to recognize Jesus' being the bearer of the highest value, love.333  
When Russell’s knowledge by acquaintance denies knowledge of personalities 
and Personalities presence, it not only contradicts humans’ experience with each other, 
and the Christian experience of God; it also contradicts humankinds relationship with the 
world—a sense of “being at home in the universe” that derives in large from a “sense of 
the reality of other selves”. Moreover, Russell’s epistemology would seem to contradict 
the reality of Russell’s own life.  For although Russell qua philosopher advances an 
epistemology whose denial of human knowledge of humans and God by acquaintance 
                                                           
330 Ibid., p. 39.  
331 Ibid., p. 37.  Baillie instance I John 4: 20 and Matt. 25: 40, 45 for support. The command to "love one's 
neighbour as thyself" is a divine command to treat persons as "subjects", not "objects".  To objectify 
persons is to fail to act on "claims" made by God as mediated by one's neighbors.  Ibid., pp. 36-37.   
332 "[I]t is only in our togetherness with our neighbour that the love of God and his Christ effectively 
reaches us, so conversely . . . our own love for God and his Christ can find effective expression only in our 
love for our  neighbour." Ibid., p. 139. 
333 In his analysis of OKG, Fergusson observes: “By identifying an implict knowledge of the moral 
demands that are imposed upong each person Baillie seems to be reiterating his earlier theological 
epistemology.” “Orthodox Liberal”, p. 143. 
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ontologically reduces humans to “half-men”; as a personality who philosophizes, Russell 
lives the life of a whole man, as evidences in the quality of his relations with his 
acquaintances. A comportment that presupposes these acquaintances to be personalities, 
Russell’s quality of living suggests to Baillie that, at least in the bottom of his heart, 
Russell believes in the objective existence of personality, Personality and moral 
absolutes.334 From an epistemological perspective, however, Russell’s knowledge by 
acquaintance situates the human in a universe wholly impersonal, as it denies the variety 
of human contexts and situations in which God’s presence is  perceived.  
 
5.3.1.4 Flew’s falsification challenge 
Baillie's argument against Flew's falsification challenge rests squarely upon 
Baillie's epistemology of the universal immediacy of knowledge of God. As support for 
immediate knowledge of God, Baillie draws from his thought on three issues: the 
meaningfulness of the language sense of the presence of God, the conditions of 
falsification of belief in God, and the theological-experiential basis for belief in God.  
5.3.1.4.1 A "sense" of God’s Presence: meaningful language   
Baillie's argument for the meaningful language of knowledge of God focuses on 
the language of "sense". He argues that humans have a sense of God's presence, and that 
the language of sense is not meaningless because it corresponds to ordinary language 
usage pertaining to sense: namely, our so-called “senses” of proportion, literary style, 
duty, and the holy.  When mention of these sense are made, it is generally understood, 
and granted, that the sense-language epistemologically corresponds to realities that 
objectively exist—i.e., that these senses are "modes of apprehension" wherewith one can 
apprehend objects that exist apart from the knower and can state truths about them.  This 
realism, notes Baillie, presupposes that each knowledge type is a mediated knowledge: 
each “presuppose for their possibility the experience gained through the bodily senses”.  
It is also presupposed that this sense-knowledge is an immediate awareness of the 
object—that each sense can “enable us to perceive something not otherwise perceptible; 
to perceive it ... not merely to conceive it.” Specifically, what is granted as knowledge is 
                                                           
334 Ibid., pp. 30-31. 
 157 
“an aspect of reality” which, although mediated by truths about the object of 
apprehension, does yet extend “beyond the bodily senses” and any one "truth or 
proposition” about the object.335 “Faith” likewise presupposes that its knowledge is 
mediated by sensory data about objects situated in the corporeal world.  It is analogous to 
the other senses also in that it presupposes immediate knowledge of an aspect of reality: 
it is “a mode of apprehension which perceives something more [God] than the total 
reality with which we are confronted than is manifest, or is expected to be manifest, to 
the senses”.336  Faith's analogous correspondence with the epistemology presupposed by 
other senses warrants the admittance of the language “sense of the presence of God” as 
meaningful.   Faith, a knowledge of God by direct acquaintance is, suggests Baillie, 
available to all of humankind: for salvation means “wholeness, health, [and] well-being . 
. . of the whole man, body, soul, and spirit”;337 and Jesus’ mediation of “saving grace” 
extends not only to those in the present, but also to those “men of the Old Testament” 
who “could yet call upon his name”.338 This faith admits of varying degrees; however, 
God apparently has left no soul untouched—that is, unable to “sense” the presence of 
God. 
5.3.1.4.2 A “sense” of God’s Presence: falsifiable  
Flew's falsification challenge demands the acknowledgment of circumstances 
under which one would be willing to reject belief in God's existence. Under what 
concrete circumstances would one willing surrender belief in God?  
 
 
Faith would be lost only if this primary apprehension 
should itself utterly fail, if we were no longer able to 
discover any such meaning in any events but came to 
regard the whole of our experience and everything that has 
ever happened as a meaningless jumble.339 
 
 
                                                           
335 Ibid., pp. 50-59, passim. 
336 Ibid., p. 126.  
337 Ibid., p. 197. 
338 Ibid., p. 93. 
339 Ibid., p. 73. 
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Baillie's response to Flew's challenge on this point reflects his position on how 
theological language is verified.    
 
 
The formal pattern of the verificatory procedure is thus the 
same in theology as in physical science, the difference 
being that in the latter case the appeal is to what is 
‘revealed’ to ordinary sense perception, but in the former to 
what is revealed to the ‘eye’ of faith.340 
 
 
5.3.1.4.3 A “sense” of God’s Presence: a Christological basis  
Baillie’s rejection of empirical reductionism throughout SPG is ultimately incarnational. 
This applies to Flew’s challenge, to Russell’s epistemology, as well as to the idealists 
Plato and Bradley, who also deny direct knowledge of God is mediated by tactile-sensory 
knowledge about the corporeal world. Baillie's response is a concession accompanied by 
a faith statement:  
 
 
I cannot claim that such doubts [God’s existence; existence 
of other minds] are entirely foreign to my own mind, but if 
I am asked how I am able to overcome them, I shall have to 
confess that for me their ultimate refutation is theological 
and incarnational.341   
 
     
 
It befits Baillie’s life and thought, that he should end his career by putting Jesus Christ at 
the center of his thought.  
 
 
 
                                                           
340 Ibid., p. 68. 
341 Ibid., pp. 85. 
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5.4. CONCLUSION 
I have noted that previous research has documented an increased Christocentrism 
and stronger idea of revelation in Baillie’s thought from OKG onward. Our examination 
of Baillie’s latter MT bears this out. My conclusion for this chapter is that we also see a 
stronger doctrine of the Holy Spirit in Baillie’s latter MT.  
We need but consider Baillie’s response to Flew. Although Baillie does not 
appeal explicitly to the Holy Spirit, when he responds to Flew, when Baillie appeals to a 
theology of revelation—particularly to the mode of apprehension (faith) that appropriates 
divine action as revelatory (i.e., immediate knowledge of God)—his epistemology relies 
substantially on an implicit epistemology of the Holy Spirit. For how does faith arrive at 
revelation—immediate knowledge of God? Baillie's idea of revelation, as Ward observes, 
emphasizes the unity of the Divine and the human through "the work of the Holy Spirit 
within the believer."342 Accordingly, the Holy Spirit's work in the believer is that which 
underwrites Baillie's response to Flew’s challenge in SPG. Indeed, while human relations 
with “individual personalities” are important for the mediation of revelation, they are not 
“entirely analogous” to the God-human relationship—a relationship with “Personality 
Itself”.  This is to say that “there is a point beyond which our relation to one another 
ceases to be analogous to our relation to God”:     
 
 
 
The indwelling of the Holy Spirit of God in the heart of 
man is a togetherness of a more complex and intimate kind 
than any relation that can exist between one finite spirit and 
another. The relation between two individual personalities 
cannot be entirely analogous [to that between one 
individual personality and Another who is not only 
individual personality but Personality Itself . . . not only 
good but Goodness . . . not only loving but Love.343   
 
 
                                                           
342 Keith Ward, Religion and Revelation, p. 228. 
343 OKG, pp. 238-239. 
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Accordingly, Baillie's epistemology of revelation presupposes that knowledge from the 
Holy-Spirit human relationship is qualitatively more complex and intimate than that from 
human-human relationships.   
How does this relate to Flew’s falsification challenge? To deny immediate 
knowledge of God, as the condition for the satisfaction of Flew’s falsification challenge, 
would require a denial of the Holy Spirit. For it is clearly that it is the Holy Spirit who 
enables faith to be the "primary mode of apprehension"; that it is the Holy Spirit who is 
involved at all stages of assent to trust in God: for it is the Holy Spirit who develops 
humans' latent, immediate awareness of God (a “sense” of God’s presence); that it is the 
Holy Spirit who prompts the will's assent to belief in God; that it is the Holy Spirit who 
provides the immediate confirmation—a “psychological certitude” by direct acquaintance 
(as opposed to logical certainty established by a highest inference)—of God's being 
incarnate in Jesus Christ; that it is the Holy Spirit who, as the above passage makes plain, 
enables personalities a qualitatively more intimate relationship with, through immediate 
knowledge by acquaintance of, Personality than can ever be shared between two or more 
human minds. Such an enablement is supposed not only by Baillie’s epistemological 
claim for the legitimacy of a sense of God’s presence as a primary mode of apprehension; 
it is supposed also by Baillie’s confession that the refutation of empirical reductionism is, 
for him, ultimately Incarnational.   
Moreover, we have seen that MI's own description of revelation assumes that the 
Holy Spirit is the One who provides the epistemological connection between our 
knowledge about second-order truths about God’s divine action, and our immediate 
knowledge of God.  Although Baillie does not elaborate on this epistemological 
connection in OKG, he does elaborate on the Holy Spirit’s action in SPG. There, he 
indicates that the Holy Spirit mediates CRE, by illuminating the mind with at least three 
types of immediacy. Specifically, the Holy Spirit’s relation with the human in soul is 
such that: (1) the Holy Spirits enables an immediate perception (cf. a “sense” of God’s 
presence; faith as a “mode of apprehension”) of God’s having been directly present in 
Jesus Christ—this despite God’s self disclosure's mediation by an indirect, veiled form 
(flesh); (2) the Holy Spirit enables an immediate trust in God, as Self-disclosed in Jesus 
Christ: “faith” whose evidence is ultimately irreducible to sensory perception (that which 
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is seen); and (3) the Holy Spirit enables an immediate confirmation—a “psychological 
certitude” by (direct acquaintance), of knowledge of God and of Jesus’ being the proper 
Subject of Christian faith (contra confirmation by indirect knowledge—namely, 
knowledge about God from a “highest inference”).  Each type of immediacy cannot be 
established by propositional knowledge—in Baillie’s words, established by a “well-
turned syllogism”, “no matter how swiftly intuited”. Rather, the Holy Spirit's agency 
enables each type of immediacy. 
When, then, Baillie maintains that the obliteration of a sense of God's presence 
would satisfy Flew’s conditions for the falsification of belief in God's existence, while he 
is surely advancing an epistemologically-oriented, empirico-sensory mediated, ordinary 
language-reconcilable overt appeal to the possible denial of the “the primary mode of 
apprehension”; he is also advancing, inasmuch as his epistemology of divine revelation is 
coherent, a revelation-oriented, faith-grounded, theologically-reconcilable implicit appeal 
to the possible denial of the Holy Spirit, the primary means of apprehension.  
 In passing, it strikes me as somewhat criminal that I should expound Baillie’s 
epistemology of the Holy Spirit within the context of his debate with Flew; the Holy 
Spirit’s importance for Baillie’s thought far exceeds that particular debate. However, I 
hope that this research observation suffices to make the point effectively.
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DIVISION III: MOVING FORWARD WITH MI: RESEARCH ISSUES 
RESOLVED 
 
6. THE MEANING OF MI: CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS RESOLVED 
In this the final division of the thesis, I tackle and resolve the three primary 
research issues facing Baillie research today: (1) MI's meaning, (2) MI's importance for 
Baillie's MT, and (3) MI's promise for contemporary Christian thought.  
The present chapter is concerned with MI’s meaning. Does MI separate faith from 
knowledge, or does it contend for an organic epistemological connection between faith 
and knowledge? Does MI evidence Baillie’s being logically agnostic? Does its idea of 
immediacy fail to express a “theologically understanding” of Christian knowledge of 
God,  or does it convey the very “logic of faith” itself?  Is MI a metaphysical structure or 
argument?  Does it de-personalize Christian faith in Jesus Christ? Does MI’s logic reduce 
to an historical or sacramental model? Does MI describe the mediation of knowledge of 
God as being a dyadic or a triadic relationship? We are now in a position to make 
research contributions on these minor, meaning-related research issues, as preparation for 
the resolution of one of the major research issues at present, MI's value for contemporary 
Christian thought. In this chapter, I will draw extensively from the groundwork provided 
by the elucidation of MI's four functions (Chapter 2) and the diachronic trace’s insight 
into MI’s meaning (Chapters 3-5). 
 
6.1. NEITHER A THEISTIC NOR A METAPHYSICAL PROOF  
We begin with Stearns’s criticism of MI.  Stearns's criticism suggests that he 
interprets MI as an argument for a metaphysic. The evidence for that interpretation comes 
from the metaphysical language used by Stearns to criticize Baillie’s model of MI: it 
fails, he says, to elucidate “how the infinite can be known in the finite”. One so-called 
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“advantage” of Stearns’s model of mediated immediacy is its being, unlike Baillie’s, 
“tied to no particular metaphysics.”344  
In Chapter 2 we found that MI's logic presupposes the objective existence of an 
Infinite (God), finite realities (human minds, the self, and the corporeal world), and an 
organic relationship (ontologically and epistemologically) between these realities: 
humans and the corporeal world instance something of the mind of God; and knowledge 
of God is always mediated by realties created by God.  We have also found MI’s logic to 
suppose that “the infinite invades the finite world”. In this respect, MI constitutes an 
attempt by the mediating theologian Baillie to correlate a theology of the Infinite (i.e., 
revelation) with the religious experience of the finite.  That each of MI’s four major 
functions describes how God relates to the human soul; that Baillie himself does not 
refrain from metaphysical language—God is the “Really Real” and “the ground of being 
and knowing”—also makes understandable how MI could be interpreted as a 
metaphysical concept.  
However, I must firmly reject Stearns’s interpretation of MI as a metaphysical 
construct. For one, MI’s logic presupposes an immediate universal knowledge of God 
that is not established by metaphysical speculation.  Secondly, were Baillie to ground 
religion in metaphysical speculation or, as Stearns's criticism suggests, to advance a 
theory of religion whose end is an all-encompassing explanation of reality, Baillie would 
certainly contend as much and maintain that MI is part of Baillie's plan to realize such 
ends; for as Stearns himself recognizes, MI’s epistemology is most central to the idea of 
revelation to Baillie’s description of how God divinely acts "in, with and under" the 
universe. What, however, does one find, when considering Baillie's idea of revelation, in 
general? To be sure, Baillie's is the persistent and forthright claim that humans' universal 
knowledge of God; and Baillie, accordingly, ties MI’s epistemology to such a universal 
and immediate knowledge. Nonetheless, Baillie does maintain that theological language 
(or any other language) can demonstrate the veridicality of the core metaphysical realities 
supposed to exist objectively and to mediate knowledge of God. This includes Baillie’s 
refusal to demonstrate the existences of those media “in, with and” which the so-called 
                                                           
344 J. Brenton Stearns,  "Mediated Immediacy: A Search for Some Models",  International Journal for the 
Philosophy of Religion, 3, winter, 1972,  (pp. 195-211), pp. 201-207 passim. 
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Really Real, God, manifest Itself: the realties that are the self, other human minds, and 
the corporeal world. Rather, the apologist uses the language of MI to evoke knowledge 
of, and to deepen faith's response to, the Reality and realities already known immediately, 
as mediated by human experience—all of this with the aim to drive persons to faith in, or 
to a deeper faith in Jesus Christ, the Mediator in whom the Really Real supremely dwells. 
Furthermore, were MI a construct whose logic represented an attempt to provide a 
demonstration of “how the infinite can be known in the finite",345 one would expect MI's 
functions to lay primary emphasis on universal knowledge of God. While it does lend 
itself to a description of universal revelation, and certainly presupposes universal 
revelation, each of its four functions focuses primarily on the mediation of a specifically 
Christian knowledge of God. This too counts against Stearns's faulty interpretation. 
 
6.2. DOES NOT DIVORCE CHRISTIAN FAITH FROM PROPOSITIONAL 
KNOWLEDGE ABOUT GOD  
D.W. Torrance maintains that “immediated immediacy” (sic) evidences a 
“liberal” “separation of faith and knowledge” and that Baillie never “theologically . . . 
really understood the real significance of faith as knowledge, or personal encounter with 
God in Jesus Christ”.346 Torrance's position is consistent with D.C. Macintosh's claim that 
MI's idea of immediacy evidences that Baillie is “logically agnostic” “at the bottom of his 
mind”.   
I begin by noting that these thinkers have failed to indicate what is necessary for 
qualifying my evaluation of their criticism—namely, details. For instance, Macintosh 
does not define what he means by logical agnosticism. If his claim amounts to the 
assertion that Baillie rejects the possibility of a logical demonstration of God, then the 
empirical theologian has correctly stated the obvious. Perhaps, however, Macintosh is 
contending that Baillie's idea of immediacy evidences that there is no rational basis for 
either belief or disbelief in God? Perhaps this also what D.W. Torrance has in mind? For 
it unclear what Torrance has in mind when it comes to faith, knowledge and the assertion 
                                                           
345OKG, p. 240.  
346 David W. Torrance, a review of Fergusson's Christ Church and Society, in "The Evangelical Quarterly”, 
Vol. 68, No. 1, January 1996, p. 87.  
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that MI's supposedly separates the two: he offers no qualification—just the assertion that 
“immediated immediacy”, which I have presumed to be MI, evidences such a separation.  
We do know that claims to immediate knowledge of God typically court criticism to the 
effect that immediate knowledge results in a propositionally contentless faith, as it 
precludes possible knowledge of an objectively existing God..347 Henry, as we have 
found, criticizes Baillie’s idea of revelation along similar lines, maintaining that Baillie’s 
idea of immediacy denies “epistemic access” to God. As such, his criticism is in keeping 
with the thrust of Macintosh’s criticism of MI’s analogy of other minds (see Chapter 1). 
The claim, then, is that MI endorses logical agnosticism. The general ground or 
supporting evidence appears to be researchers’ shared position that Baillie's idea of 
immediacy separates discursive (mediated) knowledge about God (truths) from a direct 
apprehension of God (immediate knowledge of Reality), thereby rendering knowledge of 
God illogical.  Does MI's epistemology provide no rational basis for belief or disbelief in 
God?  
MI’s function as a description of the cognition involved in CRE does juxtapose 
the mode (logical abstraction) and the content (“truth”) of mediated knowledge 
(propositional knowledge) with the mode (faith-as-a primary mode of apprehension) and 
the content (“realities”) of non-abstracted knowledge (immediate knowledge). This alone 
could suggest a separation of Christian faith’s apprehension of God from discursive 
knowledge about God, if immediate knowledge of God is interpreted as an assent to a 
God about whom one does not have propositional knowledge. However, MI’s logic does 
not epistemologically separate discursive knowledge from faith’s immediate knowledge 
of God. This is apparent when we consider Baillie’s though on the primary target of MI’s 
critics, its idea of immediacy.  Here, one can quote Baillie at random.   
 
From IRRT: 
 
                                                           
347 See, e.g., Steven T. Katz, "Language, Epistemology and Philosophical Analysis", in Mysticism and 
Philosophical Analysis, ed. Steven T. Katz, pp. 22-74.  London:  Sheldon Press, 1978. 
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Our contention has been that Christian faith (fides salvifica) 
consists essentially in reliance (fiducia) upon the revelation 
of God in Christ, that this reliance [fiducia] necessarily 
presupposes an acquaintance (notitia) with its object and 
also latently contains an assent (assensus) to certain 
affirmations that can be made about that object, but that 
there are many variations in the degree to which this latent 
assent becomes patent in men’s minds and these 
affirmations are explicitly drawn out [emphasis mine].348  
 
 
Christian saving faith, then, requires immediate knowledge, by direct acquaintance with 
God, of God being in Christ (i.e., an immediate knowledge). However, assent to Christian 
faith is also mediated by propositional knowledge in at least two senses: (1) notitia of an 
object (God); (2) a “latent” assent to “certain affirmations that can be made about that 
object”(God).  Hence, Baillie’s position is that propositional knowledge about God 
(truths) can epistemologically correspond to immediate knowledge of God (Reality).  
Accordingly, inasmuch as language about God is logically consistent with CRE, it can 
correspond epistemologically to God-as-immediately known, although it can never 
totalize God's being.    
  
From SPG: 
 
 
The Westminster Shorter Catechism is . . . using directly 
applicable and non-symbolic language [emphasis mine] 
when it answers the question ‘What is God?’ by saying 
‘God is a Spirit, infinite, eternal and unchangeable, in his 
being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and 
truth.’ 349  
 
 
 
Even when Baillie argues, problematically,350 for an awareness of God about which one 
is consciously unaware—namely, that fides salvifica is possible at the subconscious level, 
                                                           
348 IRRT,  p. 100.  
349 SPG, p. 119.   
350 E.g., H.D. Lewis, Philosophy of Religion (London: English University Press, 1965), pp. 113-122; John 
Macquarrie, In Search of Deity (London: SCM, 1984), p. 44. 
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even when God’s existence is denied “with the top of one’s head”—he still stipulates that 
subconscious or “pre-reflective” knowledge “in the bottom of the heart” must be 
mediated by propositional knowledge whose logic corresponds to God.   
 
 
 
There is no reason why we should not extend the 
distinction between fides directa and fides reflexa to the 
element assensus as well as to that of fiducia, and to speak 
of an unconscious assent.351 
 
 
 
When even, then, Baillie’s idea of immediacy engages what it takes to be pre-reflective 
knowledge of God, it hardly “fails to emphasize . . . the gift of our mental equipment that 
divine revelation addresses”, as Henry maintains.  
Baillie’s emphasis on the logical epistemological connection between faith and 
propositional is, furthermore, apparent in Baillie's anthropology. When, for example, 
Baillie debates Barth, Baillie emphasizes that human nature is but “a good thing spoiled”:  
neither its form nor its content have been entirely obliterated by the human situation. This 
is to say that, according to Baillie, even the “mental equipment” of unregenerate minds 
can and does have “epistemic access” to God’s mind.    
Accordingly, MI’s epistemology presupposes that Christian faith is mediated by 
propositional knowledge about “objective reality” of God: without this germinal 
knowledge (notitia), there can be no perfectly saving faith in Jesus Christ, as there can be 
no recognition of God's being in Jesus Christ. Furthermore, MI’s epistemology does 
insist that faith in Jesus Christ must be mediated by, to use Henry's phrase, “a Truth to be 
acknowledged and a Word to be heard”. Baillie calls it the Gospel of Jesus Christ.      
 
 
The Christian knowledge of God is not given to any man 
save in conjunction with the telling of an ‘old, old, story’ ...  
. . . .  ‘For there is one God, and one mediator between God 
and men, the man Jesus Christ; who gave himself a ransom 
for all, to be testified in due time . . . 352 
                                                           
351 OKG, p. 72. 
352 Ibid., p. 180. 
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. . . . And to this day all the history that has Presence in it 
for me, all the history that has anything to say to me, all of 
the past through which I am addressed in the present, is 
centered in the story of the Cross.353 
 
 
 
The Holy Spirit, contends Baillie, enables the apprehension of, and commitment to (i.e., 
faith), God: for the Holy Spirit provides the epistemological linkage between immediate 
of Reality and mediated knowledge about truths. How does the Holy Spirit do so? Does 
the Holy Spirit, for instance, compel one to “separate” faith from reason, on Baillie’s 
reading? To the contrary: when probing the enigmatic depths of God’s relations to the 
soul, Baillie emerges with the emphasis that Christian faith must be mediated by 
propositional knowledge about God: for it is when the Holy Spirit is thinking within our 
own thoughts, that our minds are illuminated.     
 
 
When God speaks to us in the Epistle, it is at the same time 
St. Paul who speaks to us.  St. Paul’s thinking is not 
extinguished, but is rather at its best, when God is most 
plainly thinking in him [emphasis mine].354  
 
 
 
When, then, the Holy Spirit “thinks” within persons, the epistemic content is not a-
rational (contra-rational); rather, it has a rational basis. To be sure, the content is supra-
rational,355as it apparently must be: although the Holy Spirit thinks in human thoughts to 
enable the epistemological connection between knowledge of invisible realties (God, 
human minds) and knowledge about these realities as manifest in the corporeal world 
(i.e., the sacramental universe; the human body), those thoughts do convey knowledge of 
and about minds whose ontology or essence transcends bodies (such as God, if Henry 
will allow). Nonetheless, Baillie does not maintain that the Holy Spirit violates reason.  
MI’s idea of immediacy also presupposes, as we have found, that the Holy Spirit 
provides an immediate “psychological certitude” of the objective existence of  Reality 
                                                           
353 Ibid., p. 186. 
354 Ibid., p. 236.   
355 Baillie does not use this language.  As Baillie is fond of saying, discursive reasoning in its entirety 
“cannot get its arms around faith”. 
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(and realities) to Whom  truths can and do epistemologically correspond—a confirmation 
due to the Holy Spirit’s thinking the Holy Spirit’s thoughts in one’s own thoughts.  
Moreover, the Holy Spirit-provides an epistemological correspondence between 
knowledge of God (and human minds) by faith, and knowledge about God (and humans) 
via abstraction, enables Christian’s to have a “frame of reference”—a practical 
knowledge concerning “a way of living, which includes a way of thinking, a way of 
feeling and a way of behaving”.356 A reiteration of Baillie's insistence upon an 
epistemological connection between faith and propositional knowledge, it too counts 
against the claim that MI's idea of immediacy “separates faith from knowledge”. So too 
does Baillie’s position that contemplating the physical order can facilitate one’s sense of 
the unseen presence of God.  Baillie’s idea of immediacy does not conceive of 
propositional knowledge and faith’s immediate knowledge of God as being 
epistemologically separated; Baillie’s idea of immediacy contends that they are logically 
connected complementary modes for understanding God, the corporeal world, the self, 
and other humans. MI’s four functions endeavor to capture that very ontological and 
epistemological dynamic. 
 Baillie insists: “Faith and reason must not…be enemies but the best of 
friends”.357This is to say that faith and reason's epistemological limitations should be 
acknowledged, though never separated.358 MI’s idea of immediacy presupposes that faith 
and reason are epistemologically connected: Christian faith is a logic which presupposes 
that God objectively exists apart from God’s creation, “in, with and under which” God is 
immediately known (i.e., epistemic access to reality); this, in turn, presupposes an 
epistemological correspondence between faith’s immediate apprehension of God and 
second-order truths about God; this, in turn, presupposes that propositional knowledge 
about certain truths (e.g., Jesus Christ) mediate immediate knowledge of Reality (God) 
and other “realities”;  this, in turn, presupposes that knowledge about God can regulate 
the progressive development of Christian faith-as-lived—that an immediate sense of 
God’s presence (faith, in general), including an immediate sense of God’s being in Christ 
                                                           
356 SPG, 137.  See ibid., pp. 130-148.  
357 Invitation to Pilgrimage, p. 42. 
358 “It is, however, a mistake to set faith, as Kant did, in contrast to knowledge . . . The Biblical contrast is 
rather between faith and sight . . . In the New Testament to know God and to have faith in him are often 
hardly more than two ways of saying the same thing.” SPG, pp. 4-5. 
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(Christian faith), always entails: an Object (Reality) of faith known immediately (as 
Subject); reflection upon propositions (truths) which may or may not epistemologically 
correspond to latent a priori  “conceptions” about God; and an intellectual assent to 
putative truth statements about God.   
Thus, MI’s logic does emphasize that Christian faith has a rational basis—a 
cognitive-propositional  basis—while refusing to reduce knowledge of God to an 
inference based on any sum of propositions.  Indeed, its often suspect element of 
immediacy presupposes propositional knowledge as epistemologically necessary for 
knowledge of God: as direct knowledge of God in Jesus Christ must be mediated by the 
thinking of God's thoughts about Jesus Christ and an assent to Gospel truths.  Important 
in this respect, is Baillie's though on the Holy Spirit: The Holy Spirit enables humans to 
think God’s thought’s—this by thinking God’s thoughts in the thoughts of humans.  MI’s 
core position on the mediation of Christian knowledge of God—it is always mediated by 
knowledge of God, others, the corporeal world, oneself, and Jesus Christ—underscores 
that Christian faith is epistemologically tied to, as it is necessarily mediated by, 
knowledge about God. MI’s logic presupposes that the Holy Spirit is the One who makes 
that connection possible. Consequently, should one insist upon Baillie's separation of 
faith and reason, support for that claim would have to be established by demonstrating 
that Baillie's idea of immediacy presupposes a faulty conceptualization of the Holy 
Spirit's action in and to the human mind.  Neither D.W. Torrance, nor Henry, nor 
Macintosh have to say on this matter; nor do they, for that matter, have any illumination 
to offer on Baillie’s idea of immediacy at all. And on the issue of Baillie’s supposed 
separation of faith and knowledge, we would be wrong to place faith in the legitimacy of 
their dogmatic assertion, as such faith would demand our own separation from 
knowledge of Baillie’s thought, properly understood.  
 
6.3. DOES NOT ADVOCATE LOGICAL AGNOSTICISM  
If, then, we are right to presume that “logical agnosticism” means that there is no 
rational basis for either belief or disbelief that God exists; and rightly presume that Baillie 
believes, to use Macintosh's phrase, “in the bottom of his mind” the logic of immediacy 
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for MI’s epistemology contends; then, in light of the above criticism, we can rightly 
conclude, as I do, that MI does not advocate logical agnosticism. 
 
6.4. EMPHASIZES PERSONAL ENCOUNTER WITH GOD IN CHRIST  
D.W. Torrance also claims that MI evidences a failure on Baillie's part to 
understand theologically “the real significance of  . . . personal encounter with God in 
Jesus Christ.”  This is a serious charge, if perhaps one tempered somewhat by Torrance's 
failure to explain the meaning of “real significance”. Presumably, the thought is that MI 
evidences Baillie's failure as a theologian to emphasize that knowledge of God is a 
personal encounter with God in Jesus Christ.  
Does MI not underscore the epistemological necessity of personal encounter with 
Jesus Christ for Christian knowledge of God? Baillie's makes plain that it does.   
 
 
The kind of directness for which we have contended in our 
knowledge of God is thus not at all interfered with, but is 
rather implemented, by the fact of Christ’s mediatorship. 
This is what I have tried to express in the conception of a 
mediated immediacy.  In Christ we know God not by 
argument but by personal acquaintance.  In Christ God 
comes to us directly [emphasis mine].359  
 
 
 
How is personal acquaintance with Christ mediated by humans' direct encounter with 
God?  It is always mediated by personal acquaintance with humans:  
 
 
The service of others, the fellowship with others, and the 
historical tradition in which I stand are all media that lead 
me to the Mediator, and the Mediator leads me to God . . .  
. . . . Clearly, then, the immediacy of God’s presence to our 
souls is a mediated immediacy.360 
 
 
 
                                                           
359 OKG, pp. 196-197.  
360 Ibid., p. 181. 
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MI's formal structure, then, demands personal acquaintance with Jesus Christ for 
Christian knowledge of God. How does MI describe the quality of these personal 
relations? What, for instance, does mediated contend with regard to the nature of the 
fellowship between persons that is said to be epistemologically necessary for Christian 
knowledge of God? Personal acquaintance with Christ, as has been emphasized in 
previous chapters, must be mediated by agapē in the koinonia of human relations: to 
fellowship with humans in such a context is to fellowship with God in agapē.361    
Perhaps the author of works such as And The Life Everlasting, A Diary of Private 
Prayer, and Christian Devotion,  did not really "theologically understand" the 
significance of what it means to have a personal encounter with God in Jesus Christ.  
Nevertheless, MI does not de-emphasize a personal encounter with Jesus Christ, as D.W. 
Torrance maintains. This will become increasingly apparent in the following section. 
There, we will find MI rather emphasizing the deeply personal and intimate quality of 
Christian knowledge of God—this, in keeping with Newlands's observation that Baillie's 
critical thought is characteristically personal.362  
  
6.5.  DESCRIBES A TRIADIC MEDIATION OF KNOWLEDGE OF GOD  
Does MI's logic conceive of the mediation of immediate knowledge of God as 
being a dyadic or triadic process of mediation?  
Stearns, as we have found, argues that (1) Baillie’s model of MI is an inadequate 
model of knowledge of God, because it (2) fails to demonstrate “how the infinite can be 
known in the finite.” His support for (2): (2a) MI’s logic is tied to a particular 
metaphysical system; (2b) MI’s logic does not conceive of knowledge of God as being 
mediated by a triadic relationship; (2c) MI’s logic reduces to that of a Lutheran 
sacramental model; (2d) MI’s analogy of other minds (knowledge of God and knowledge 
of human minds is a mediated immediacy) is problematic, on grounds: (2d1) “there may 
yet be inferences that are very fast, habitual, or tacit” in our knowledge of human minds; 
(2d2) “as Tennant tells us, we cannot move from psychological immediacy to 
epistemological ground for our beliefs without argument”; (2d3) it lacks “the 
                                                           
361 ‘He that loveth not knoweth not God’ [I John 4:8] , whereas ‘If we love one another, God dwelleth in 
us’ [I John 4:12].  As cited in ibid., p. 179. 
362 Newlands, “The Sense of the Presence of God”, passim. 
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epistemological credentials that make a belief rational . . .” (as evidenced in Plantinga's 
concession that “he has no answer to the epistemological problem as to how we know 
them 
I have already argued against ground (2a), maintaining that MI is not arguing for 
a metaphysical system. Here, I shall focus on claim (2b): that Baillie’s “other minds 
model” of MI does not conceive of the mediation of knowledge of God as a triadic 
process. Stearns maintains that a model of mediated immediacy should conceive of 
knowledge of God as being mediated by a threefold or triadic relationship.    
 
 
 
The relation between the believer and God is to be 
constructed, like the relation between the reader and what 
he reads, as triadic.  Imagine the worshiper, God, and 
religiously significant finite events as represented by three 
points on a triangle.  The route from the worshipper to God 
is then both immediate (taking the short route along one 
side of a triangle) and mediated by the religiously 
significant finite events (taking the long route via the third 
point of the triangle. Mediated immediacy presents a 
problem only to the person who thinks all relations are 
dyadic.363    
 
 
 
The mediation of knowledge of God to humans, then, should be described as triadic in 
this sense: its three loci are God, significant events, and the worshipper. These loci 
should not be conceived as a collinear mediation of God, as this (dyadic) scheme would 
compromise the immediacy of knowledge of God. Indeed, this is Josiah Royce’s “key 
insight”, as well as part of Stearns’s warrant for rejecting Baillie’s “other minds model” 
in favor of Royce’s “other minds model” of mediated immediacy.    
Stearns’s implicit claim, then, is that Baillie’s model of MI rejects a triadic 
description of the mediation of knowledge of God is plainly incorrect. Consider, 
however, Baillie’s remarks in OKG.   
 
 
                                                           
363 “Mediated Immediacy: A Search for Some Models”, p. 204.   
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The service of others, the fellowship with others, and the 
historical tradition in which I stand are all media that lead 
me to the Mediator, and the Mediator leads me to God . . .  
. . . . Clearly, then, the immediacy of God’s presence to our 
souls is a mediated immediacy.364  
 
 
 
Baillie, then, identifies three loci which mediate knowledge of God’s immediate presence 
in and to our souls: God, history, and one’s fellows.  Elaborating on these same media, 
Baillie suggests that the relationship is not unidirectional, but that knowledge of any one 
locus informs knowledge of the other.   
 
 
All this mediation is part of God’s gracious purpose in 
refusing to unite me to Himself without at the same time 
uniting me to my fellow men-in making it impossible for 
me to obey either of the two great commandments without 
at the same time obeying the other.365 
   
 
We have found Baillie emphasizing the epistemological necessity of a koinonia of agapē 
for the mediation of knowledge of God.  In SPG, he does the same: “The Christian Way . 
. . is the way followed within the koinonia of agapē, and is a form of togetherness 
specific to Christianity in spite of all foreshadowing of it that may elsewhere be 
found.”366  How does the koinonia of agapē mediate knowledge of God and knowledge 
of others?  Baillie indicates in SPG that it does so triadically: 
  
 
The togetherness is essentially that of a triangular 
relationship, the three angles of which [are] oneself, one’s 
fellow Christians, and God as known in Christ; and the 
relationship is such that from any one angle a second angle 
can be effectively reached only by way of the third.  We 
can reach God only through our neighbour. We cannot love 
                                                           
364 OKG, pp. 180-181. 
365 Ibid. 
366 SPG, p. 138. 
 175 
him except  in loving  our neighbour.  Nor does God reach 
us or manifest his love to us save through our neighbour—
that is, save in our togetherness with him.  Christianity is in 
its very essence a matter of fellowship. 
. . . . But if it is only in our togetherness with our neighbour 
that the love of God and his Christ effectively reaches us, 
so conversely it is true that our own love for God and his 
Christ can find effective expression only in our love for our 
neighbour. 
. . . . [T]he current of agapē within the Christian koinonia 
flows also around the triangle in the contrary direction.  
The horizontal path along the base is not viable unless we 
are at the same time following the longer route via the 
apex.  If we can find God, and God can find us, only in the 
finding of our brother, so also is it true that we can find our 
brother only through God’s finding of us and our finding of 
him [emphasis mine].367  
 
 
As these remarks come from SPG, they represent Baillie’s final position on the mediation 
of knowledge of God.  
There is, however, another corner to Stearns's triangle: “significant events”. Does 
MI maintain that knowledge of god is mediated by significant events? It does so most 
thoroughly. For one, two of its functions—as a description of divine action and a 
description of revelation—describe knowledge of God (revelation) as always being an 
event and no ordinary one at that: revelation is always one of God's "mighty acts of 
God".368 Secondly, one might also safely presume that when MI makes knowledge of 
other persons an event, it conceives of that event as being “significant”: it is requisite for 
knowledge of God. Then there is Baillie’s claim: “It is only in the conception of history 
as something that happens in the present that the apparent contradiction in our doctrine 
of mediated immediacy can be reasonably resolved.”369 Thirdly, all of MI’s logic points 
to the historical event. Fourthly, MI’s logic maintains that Pentecost is the paradigmatic 
event today for an understanding of CRE: for we shall find (next chapter), that when 
Baillie speaks of Christianity as a “frame of reference” in SPG, and contends that the 
Holy Spirit’s Presence at the Pentecost is the Paradigmatic Experience for all other 
                                                           
367 SPG, pp. 138-140.   
368 See IRRT, Chapter Four: “The Mighty Acts of God,” pp. 62-82. 
369 OKG, p. 189. 
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paradigmatic experiences (e.g., revelatory moments; moments of faith in Jesus), the core 
epistemological basis for his “frame of reference” is MI.  
We might develop additional support for MI’s position that this corner of the 
triangle mediates knowledge of God—for instance, that MI presupposes that Jesus’ is the 
logical center of history, and that knowledge about the historical event of Jesus Christ’s is 
epistemologically necessary for Christian knowledge of God; or, for that matter, that the 
concept, in its most basic expression, describes each corner of the triangle as being 
epistemologically necessary for knowledge of God: knowledge of God is always 
mediated by knowledge of concrete “events” (the corporeal world), and knowledge of 
others (one’s mind, and other minds).  However, this does not seem necessary as 
additional support for my position that MI’s epistemology, contra Stearns’s 
interpretation, describes the mediation of knowledge of God as triadic. Thus, I agree with 
Power, who appears also to interpret MI’s logic along triadic lines.  
 
6.6. REDUCES NEITHER TO SUGGESTED SACRAMENTAL NOR 
HISTORICAL MODELS OF REVELATION 
Stearns argues that (2c) MI’s logic should be interpreted as reducing to a 
Lutheran, sacramental model; and that when thus understood, that logic compromises the 
coherence of  MI.  Conversely, Klinefelter interprets MI’s logic as reducing to a historical 
model of divine revelation. His position is that when MI's logic is modeled accordingly, 
MI is a promising description of the "very logic of Christian faith".370 My own position is 
that MI's logic reduces neither to neither Klinefelter’s historical model nor to Stearns’s 
sacramental model.  
Stearns rightly recognizes that MI uses sacramental language—that divine action 
and revelation come “in, with and under” our various knowledges. Furthermore, this 
sacramental language does describe in part how history mediates God’s grace and 
knowledge: history, the logical center of which is Jesus Christ, mediates the grace and 
knowledge of God in and to the concrete situations of all persons at all points in history. 
                                                           
370 As indicated in the previous chapter, these researchers are reducing MI’s logic to these models and 
setting each model against the other.  
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However, there is reason to think that MI, as Baillie conceives of it, cannot be reduced to 
either.  
 
(1) Historically speaking, these models are not mutually exclusive models with regard to 
the mediation of God's grace.   
Stearns is not clear what he means by a sacramental model. Consequently, we 
must infer what he might mean with his conjecture about MI’s logic. He could be 
interpreted as maintaining that Baillie’s concept of mediated immediacy reduces a 
theology of the sacraments. If so, then MI cannot be reduced to such a sacramental 
model, inasmuch as that model is opposed to the idea that revelation is mediated by 
history—as the historical model maintains. This is because a Lutheran sacramental model 
presupposes that the redeeming effects of Christ’s atonement must themselves be 
mediated by historical events: it is “in, with, and under” the historical event of one’s 
partaking of the elements, that the redeeming effects of Christ’s atonement are mediated.  
 
(2) MI’s logic resists epistemological reduction to either model, according to Baillie.  
Surely, what Stearns has in mind is more along the lines of this: MI’s logic 
reduces to a logic that maintains that all of the universe can be sacramental in that 
anything can mediate immediate knowledge of God.  We will return to that in moment, 
after considering Klinefelter’s competing perspective.  
  What does it meant to say that  “Baillie explicates the notion of a ‘mediated 
immediacy’ on an historical rather than a moral or sacramental model”371? Unfortunately, 
Klinefelter is not entirely clear on the matter. What is apparent is that he would derive 
ground for his claim from Baillie’s thought, which he quotes at length.  
 
 
“When Dr. Barth insists, as he does so often, that in history 
in general there is no revelation, since revelation interrupts 
history at a single point rather than informs it throughout, 
he is obviously thinking of history as something past and 
done with….Thinking of history in this way the Barthian 
theologians always oppose “The Christ of Faith” to the 
                                                           
371 Klinefelter, “Our Knowledge of God”, p. 409. 
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“Christ of History”….I believe this dichotomy to be 
radically mistaken….and I believe Professor Tillich’s 
doctrine of Christ as the centre around which all history 
arranges itself to be altogether profounder than the Barthian 
attempt to see the rest of history in contrast with Christ. To 
Professor Tillich history is nothing dead and desiccated, 
“the presence of the past in the present” being essential to 
its very nature…. It is only in the conception of history as 
something that happens in the present that the apparent 
contradiction in our doctrine of mediated immediacy can 
be reasonably resolved.” 372 
 
 
Klinefelter adds that “Baillie contends that in the Christian revelation that we have to do 
with an experience of an entirely unique kind, ‘its uniqueness lying precisely in this 
conjunction of immediacy with mediacy—that is, in the fact that God reveals Himself to 
me only through others who went before, yet in so doing reveals Himself to me now’.”373  
 What is one to make of these competing if also opaquely stated verdicts? It 
appears that each position construes the modeling of MI’s logic in light of Baillie’s idea 
of revelation: MI’s logic reduces to either a sacramental or a historical idea of revelation 
and its logic must be understood and critiqued accordingly. As such, we must turn to 
MI’s function as a description of divine revelation to get to the issue of which, if either, 
of these positions is correct. 
 For one, we recall Baillie’s claim that revelation, as opposed to divine action, is 
contingent upon a human response: faith or trust in God.  Thus, we can infer that a logic 
of faith’s response to divine action account for “history as something that happens in the 
present”. What does “account for” mean specifically, according to Baillie? It is clear 
from the above passage, as well as from our elucidation of MI’s logic in Chapter 2, that 
Baillie has in mind the mediation of divine action qua revelatory action. Specifically, 
MI’s logic maintains that revelation must be mediated by historical events (ontological 
claim) and by our discursive knowledge about those historical (epistemological claim). 
This includes faith in Jesus Christ (we might say, “special revelation”): one must have 
discursive or indirect knowledge about the historical event, or “Christ of History” who 
                                                           
372 John Baillie, OKG, pp. 187-89. Cited in Klinefelter, “Our Knowledge of God”,  pp. 408-9. Baillie’s 
italicized emphasis. 
373 John Baillie, ibid., p. 185. Cited in ibid., p. 409. 
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was Jesus, in order to have immediate saving knowledge of the “Christ of Faith” who is 
Jesus.  
 Based on what these researchers say, and do not say, my position is that a 
modified version of Stearns’s sacramental model best accommodates the logic of MI’s 
description of revelation. For one, the sacramental model of revelation suggested by 
Stearns can accommodate, with qualification, the historical model, whereas the historical 
model suggested by Klinefelter cannot. To contend for a sacramental model is not 
necessarily to deny that divine revelation can take place in concrete historical events.  
MI’s logic does itself suppose that all revelation occurs “in, with and under” historical 
events. However, it is possible to conceive of an idea of revelation which, not unlike 
Barth’s early thought, denies that all of history is sacramental of knowledge of God. 
Clearly, MI rejects such a position, as Klinefelter’s extended quotation of Baillie makes 
plain. Such a sacramental model would need, however, a qualification that Stearns does 
not provide when he maintains that MI’s logic reduces to a sacramental model: not every 
reality that exists in a sacramental universe (i.e., is a historical event) is equally endowed 
to mediate God’s self-disclosure: God, according to MI’s logic of revelation, is 
Personality; and God’s Presence is most immediate when humans are, qua personalities, 
engaged in agapē.  MI’s logic does not deny that God can use anything to mediate God’s 
presence; neither does it deny that all of creation—a sacramental universe, if one will—
says something about its Creator. However, MI’s logic does maintain that some media 
can mediate the fullness of God better than others—that some situations are better adept 
for putting one in what can become, to use (with Baillie) Tillich’s language, a “revelatory 
situation”: personal relations whose fellowship mediates, not unlike those relations which 
impacted young John’s spiritual development, agapē. Likewise, MI’s logic identifies 
Jesus the Mediator as the supreme mediator of Personality, and not, for example, objects 
ontologically grounded in the sacramental firmament, the capacity of such artifacts, such 
as sticks and stones, to mediate revelation as historical events (Rom. 1:19-21) 
notwithstanding.  
This leads to another reason why the sacramental model, with additional 
qualification, is superior to Klinefelter’s reduction of MI’s logic to a historical model of 
revelation: Klinefelter’s proposed model appears to juxtapose a historical model of MI 
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with not only a sacramental model but also with a moral model of MI’s logic. It may be 
the case that what Klinefelter has in mind is that MI’s descriptive epistemology of 
revelation is not overtly expressed in Kantian terms. If so, then he is, of course, correct. 
Nonetheless, Klinefelter fail to delineate the differences.  Moreover, he fails to 
acknowledge that MI’s logic of revelation is in fact colored by, as well as supportive of, 
Baillie’s moral-theological commitment to certain values—namely, agapē. His own 
extended quotation of Baillie suggests this moral commitment, when it notes that Jesus is 
the Centre around which all of history is arranged. Why does Baillie say that? Klinefelter 
need but turn back a page in OKG to find Baillie providing some rationale for why MI’s 
logic identifies the Mediator as the Center of both history and faith: of all concrete 
histories, Baillie finds the history of the Mediator to be the most profound at mediating 
God’s presence:  
 
 
And to this day all the history that has Presence in it for me, 
all the history that has anything to say to me, all of the past 
through which I am addressed in the present, is centered in 
the story of the Cross. All that history has to say to me is 
somehow related to that.374 
 
 
Does Stearns’s interpretation of MI’s logic do better service to MI’s articulation of the 
values inherent in Baillie’s idea of revelation. It does not. A review of his aforementioned 
lines of criticism shows that he makes no mention of this. This marks a deficiency for his 
interpretation: a modeling of MI’s description of revelation along sacramental (or other) 
lines must include, as have I in Chapter 2, reference to Baillie’s use of MI to affirm his 
commitment to values, such as agapē. 
There are other lesser reasons for rejecting Klinefelter’s account. For instance, if 
what Klinefelter says, and does not say, is taken at face value, a historical modeling of 
MI’s logic would plausibly require the re-conceptualization of MI's language pertaining 
to the mediation of knowledge of God—namely, the jettisoning of the sacramental 
language altogether. MI’s logic, however, relies most heavily upon sacramental language 
                                                           
374 OKG, p. 186.  
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to articulate the mediation of divine action and revelation —and this while maintaining 
that historical events mediate knowledge of God.  In short, MI’s sacramental language is 
not merely a matter of semantics; rather, MI is Baillie’s attempt to conjoin conceptually 
both the sacramental and historical elements entailed in his idea of revelation. As such, 
MI’s logic would appear to resist what appears to be Klinefelter’s historical-reductionist 
hermeneutic.    
To reduce MI’s logic to a sacramental model which, according to Stearns, “hints” 
of a reduction to a Lutheran modification of the doctrine of transubstantiation, would 
appear also to run the risk of explanatory reductionism. Such a modeling would, for 
example, have to accommodate MI’s supposition that God’s Presence and grace are 
mediated “in, with and under” historical events, and thereby provide, amongst other 
graces, God’s universal salvation to all humans (to varying degrees). The Lutheran 
sacramental model’s conception of history's mediation of knowledge of God however 
disallows for a universal salvation mediated “in, with, and under” historical events. As 
such, MI's logic cannot be rightly construed as reducing to a strictly Lutheran, 
sacramental model. Consequently, I must reject Stearns’s claim that MI's logic should be 
interpreted as being a strictly sacramental logic, despite my inclination to give Stearns the 
benefit of the doubt on his interpretation of this aspect of MI’s logic—namely, that its 
sacramental-like logic and semantic is better interpreted as reference to a sacramental 
universe. 
Additionally, we must bear in mind that while Klinefelter is certain that MI's logic 
explains Christian faith perfectly, he is also certain that MI’s logic cannot be explained 
by any logic. Save that such reasoning is itself seemingly self-contradictory; Klinefelter’s 
logic seemingly negates the possibility that one can explain how MI’s logic must 
elucidate the logic of faith in Jesus Christ on a historical model. This too undermines my 
confidence in his prescription. Indeed, Klinefelter sounds not unlike Stearns, who also 
fails to produce the logic which might justify his position: persuaded that MI's (faulty) 
logic is sacramental, and hence inferior to his own model of mediated immediacy, 
Stearns never, to my knowledge, bequeathed to the research such insight.  
My conclusion on this issue is that MI’s logic reduces to neither Stearns’s 
sacramental interpretation of MI’s logic nor Klinefelter’s historical interpretation of MI’s 
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logic. My reasons for this conclusion are twofold: (1) neither researcher is entirely clear 
about what they mean; (2) a modified model of Stearns’s (muddled) sacramental model 
would be the generally better line of interpretation, as a sacramental model would better  
accommodate, seemingly,375 MI’s descriptive epistemology of the historical and 
sacramental mediation of divine revelation.  
 
6.7. CONCLUSION ON MAJOR RESEARCH ISSUE #1: MI’S MEANING 
My conclusion is that this chapter has resolved a host of minor research issues 
pertaining to MI's meaning. Clarifications which further enhance our understanding of 
MI’s meaning (Chapter 2), they will prove helpful, when we subject MI’s logic to 
criticism substantially more stringent than that which we have being afforded by MI’s 
largely confused critics. That subjugation of MI to more contemporary criticism is found 
in Chapter 8’s assessment of MI’s potential for contemporary Christian thought.
                                                           
375 For I am asking, in effect: “Which interpretation better describes MI’s logic of the mediation of 
knowledge of God: humans’ universal knowledge of God, as mediated “in, with and under” a sacramental 
universe (i.e., in and to humans’ moral consciousness of value), or humans’ knowledge about divine action, 
as mediated by historical events (i.e., the historical event Jesus Christ)?” If Baillie’s thought is ambiguous 
about the primarily locus for mediaion of knowledge of God—Is it humans’ universal moral consciousness 
of value, or the Christian church’s proclamation of the Gospel?—it would seem impossible to be certain 
that that question can been answered correctly.  
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7.  MI’S IMPORTANCE FOR BAILLIE’S MEDIATING THEOLOGY:  
SEVERELY UNDERESTIMATED 
The previous chapter considered research issues pertaining to MI's meaning and 
put to rest previously conflicting interpretations about MI's logic in particular. The 
present chapter builds on the now clarified understanding of MI's meaning to ascertain 
MI's importance for Baillie's MT, the second major research issue under examination.  
In this chapter, I will draw exclusively from my diachronic trace (Chapters 3-5) to 
argue that MI is the most important concept for Baillie’s MT, throughout its development 
(1926-1960).  As support for my position, I will establish that there is one problem to 
which Baillie’s MT returned throughout Baillie’s career—the epistemological 
relationship between indirect (mediated) knowledge and direct (immediate) knowledge 
for knowledge of God—and demonstrate that Baillie uses MI for over thirty years to 
respond to what was a very important problem for his apologetic agenda. Specifically, I 
will show not only that MI important for Baillie’s OKG (1939); MI is central to Baillie’s 
early MT (pre-1939) and his latter MT (1939).  As already ascertained, my argument will 
rely in part on the novel interpretation that an implicit form of MI exists in Baillie’s MT 
prior to the concept’s first explicit mention in OKG.  
 
7.1. BAILLIE'S EARLY MEDIATING THEOLOGY REVISTED 
In order to assess MI’s importance for Baillie’s MT as a whole, I must do at least 
two things: (1) locate a problem which is important for Baillie’s MT as a whole; (2) 
ascertain the extent to which Baillie appeals to MI as solution to that problem. I will 
begin by revisiting Baillie’s early MT. My organizational scheme is to recall the basic 
contours of Baillie’s argument against each position, to observe conceptual parallels 
between each of those and Baillie’s thought on MI, and to draw conclusions on Baillie’s 
early MT, in light thereof. I follow the same organizational scheme when I subsequently 
move to Baillie’s latter MT. I then draw conclusions on the issue of MI’s importance for 
Baillie’s MT.   
 
 184 
7.1.1. Bailllie’s Critique of the Romantic Theory of Religion 
We recall from the diachronic trace of Baillie’s early thought, Baillie's chief 
criticism of the romantic theory of religion . Baillie observes that it grounds knowledge 
of God in “pre-reflection” in the form of an “immediate feeling” (Schleiermacher, Pratt), 
“immediate experience” (James), or an “immediate vision” or “immediate [sensory] 
perception” (extreme mysticism).  Baillie’s argument against these types of immediacy is 
that religious faith is not grounded in direct knowledge of one’s self—be it direct 
knowledge of one’s feelings (of “absolute dependence upon God”; of “the More”) nor in 
direct knowledge of one’s sensory impressions (direct knowledge of a vision of God). 
Rather, Baillie’s interrogation of religious consciousness discloses that the faith in God 
which epistemologically instigates religious consciousness is believed to be direct 
knowledge of God. Baillie also maintains that his direct knowledge of God is, 
paradoxically, also an indirect knowledge: it is mediated by cognitive insight—an insight 
which is “psychologically prior” to the movement from moral consciousness to religious 
consciousness. The epistemologies of the various romantic theories rightly emphasize the 
immediacy of religion’s ground and deny that knowledge of God a highest inference—
rationalism's primary shortcoming; however, its ideas of "immediacy" are excessive. 
Such a “sheltering of [religion] from the criticism of reflection of intelligence” in general 
fails to recognize, for instance, the commonplace “psychological fact” that “[p]ure 
feeling . . . is pure nonsense”. The ordinary person, however, believes that religious 
feeling contains cognitive content, in that it is always mediating by discursive knowledge. 
Such is the same with regard to feelings related to religious experience in particular—
feelings that, to the ordinary person, are “obviously mediated by the ideas present in our 
minds”.376 Save that it unduly marginalizes the mediation of knowledge of God by 
cognitive insight,  its overemphasis on immediate pre-reflective knowledge wrongly 
grounds religion in self-knowledge—one’s feelings, one’s sensory impressions (God’s 
audible “voice” or visual presence). However, direct knowledge of oneself is neither 
presupposed by the ordinary person in general, nor presupposed by the religious 
                                                           
376 “And if it be true of all feeling, it seems doubly true of religious feeling.  For it would seem that this 
kind of feeling is dependent, not on cognition merely (which might mean only sense perception), but on 
nothing less than reflective intelligence . . . Hardly any kind of feelings, therefore, are more obviously 
mediated by the ideas present in our minds than are our religious feelings [emphasis mine].” ROR, pp. 79.   
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consciousness of the person who trusts God, as being that upon which religious faith is 
(descriptive epistemology), and hence, should be (normative epistemology), established. 
God is not an inference from self-examination of one’s feelings; rather, the ordinary 
person believes that knowledge of God is our most direct knowledge. The romantic 
theory, however, not unlike the rationalist theory, makes knowledge of God unduly 
indirect: God is now an inference from a more immediate or pre-reflective self-
knowledge. Better, argues Baillie, to maintain that the directness of religious 
consciousness is epistemologically grounded in a direct perception of other-knowledge—
namely, God. This better reflects the belief content of religious consciousness: assent to 
trust in God (religious consciousness) is mediated by a direct knowledge of God that is 
mediated by moral consciousness of value—a latent knowledge whose cognitive content 
mediates the act of faith—that is, trusting in God (i.e., religious consciousness).   
We see, then, that the issue for the early mediating theologian is the 
epistemological relationship between direct knowledge and direct knowledge for 
knowledge of ultimate reality: the romantic theory of religion correctly grounds religion 
in feelings accompanied by intuition; however, it’s interrogation of religious 
consciousness fails to recognize that direct knowledge of God is, if indeed 
psychologically contemporaneous with our knowledge of our internal states, yet also 
logically prior to them. A byproduct of its interrogation’s undue marginalization of 
cognitive insight in the mediation of knowledge of God,377 it results in a theory of 
religion also alien to the ordinary person’s beliefs about feelings, religious or otherwise. 
 
Observation: MI’s epistemology maintains, with the romantic theory’s epistemology, that 
knowledge of God is grounded in pre-reflection. MI’s logic resists each of Baillie’s lines 
of criticism against the romantic theory.  
 
7.1.2. Baillie’s Critique of the Rationalist Theory of Religion 
Conversely, the rationalist theory of religion’s epistemology emphasizes that 
religious consciousness is mediated by discursive reflection. An emphasis welcomed by 
                                                           
377 “The fact is that religion has come to a sorry pass if it is driven to take refuge in nothing more solid than 
our feelings.” ROR, p. 76. 
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Baillie, it militates against romanticism's epistemologically excessive emphasis on a pre-
reflective immediacy as religion’s ground. However, its epistemology, like the romantic 
theory’s epistemology, wrongly takes its emphasis to an extreme. Aquinas’s five ways; 
Anselm’s ontological proof; Hegel’s Begriff; Rashdall, Pfleiderer and Berkeley’s 
Berkeleian theory of perception; Descartes' epistemological inward turn to the self—
each, Baillie argues,  overestimates the deliverances of discursive reason for the 
mediation of religious consciousness, thereby rendering each theory’s aspiration to 
capture the essence of Reality but “an empty dream.”378 To be sure, elaborates Baillie, the 
rationalist theory of religion correctly maintains that knowledge of ultimate reality must 
be mediated by humans’ discursive reasoning; however, when it maintains that 
metaphysical speculation alone—that is, speculation without allowance for non-
ratiocinative (immediate) knowledge of God in humans' moral consciousness of value—it 
provides, at best, ground for belief in a less-than-personal God—for belief in a Supreme 
Soul who is not “interest[ed] in our welfare”. Such a Supreme Soul, however, conflicts 
with ordinary persons' beliefs about God, the beliefs of whom typically suppose direct 
knowledge of a Personality, and no mere indirect knowledge about a concept.  Indeed, 
mere propositional knowledge about an impersonal God strikes the ordinary person as 
“unreal", in that it denies the knowledge of God directly disclosed in and to soldier's 
individual moral consciousness of value. There is, furthermore, the failed correspondence 
between method and training for knowledge of God: the ordinary person does not think 
knowledge of God the byproduct of formal training in metaphysical speculation and 
inferential reasoning; rather, in so believing knowledge of God to be directly available in 
and to his or her moral consciousness of value, the ordinary believes that it is rather the 
subsequent action of discursive reasoning that helps to persuade, while not logically 
demonstrating, that  God-oriented religious praxis is a matter of “doing what’s right”.   
 Additionally, and accordingly, there is the rationalist theory's allegedly failed 
account for the epistemological basis for religious belief.  The ordinary person's religion 
thrives on a certitude for which the rationalist emphasis on discursive reasoning fails to 
give adequate account. It fails, for instance, to provide a certitude that one’s values do 
correspond to those of a trans-subjective Being—the very certitude upon which religious 
                                                           
378 See IOR, p. 90. 
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faith “feeds” and develops: for an accurate interrogation of the religious consciousness of 
the ordinary person exhibits that, while knowledge of God is generally regarded by the 
ordinary person to be mediated by inferential processes, ordinary persons' religious 
consciousness (i.e. belief in God), astutely discerned, divulge the supposition that an 
immediate intuition of the Ideal Ought is Personality. An organic connection between 
religious consciousness and moral consciousness which is fundamental to religious 
certitude, it is not generally regarded by the ordinary person to be an indirect knowledge 
provided by inferential reasoning; rather it is generally regarded as being a direct 
knowledge whose logic presupposes: (1) a direct apprehension of God’s Presence in and 
to one’s moral consciousness of value—one might say, of the Given;  (2) a non-
inferentially totalized certitude of the Really Real’s being Ultimate Value; (3) a direct 
knowledge sui generis, a mode of apprehension, and activity of the will—in sum, faith—
which,  “going  beyond” metaphysical speculation, be that speculation concerned with 
concepts about God, the corporeal world, ourselves, and other persons, reduce not to 
intellectual assent to a highest inference.  
We see, then, that the early mediating theologian's arguments against the 
rationalist theory of religion center upon the issue of the epistemological relationship 
between direct knowledge and indirect knowledge for knowledge of ultimate reality. The 
rationalist theory rightly conceives of knowledge of ultimate reality as being in some 
sense indirect, in that it conceives of such knowledge as being mediated by discursive 
reasoning and propositional knowledge. However, when it fails to allow for immediate 
knowledge of God, it makes knowledge of a God who is Personality excessively indirect. 
Hence, the rationalist theory of religion is, without modification, a hindrance to religion, 
including the ordinary person’s understanding thereof. Indeed, the ordinary person qua 
believer in God rejects metaphysical arguments, be they res cogitans or res extensa, with 
a “clear conscience”, grounding their faith rather in what is believed to be direct 
knowledge of a God whose self-disclosure is the ground for, and never an inference from, 
either the corporeal world or the thinking self.       
Not unlike the romantic theory, then, the rationalist theory’s epistemology does 
not avail a concept of a personal God: for each epistemology reduces religious 
consciousness’ ground to inferential knowledge about a Datum. Such abstraction, 
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however, conflicts with the ordinary person’s belief—both with regard to religion’s 
ground and with regard to the object of religious faith: the ordinary person grounds 
religion in a direct perception of God’s Presence, not in an indirect knowledge about a 
second-order datum.  God is not an Inference known indirectly through abstraction; 
rather God is Presence directly known in and to the moral consciousness which intimates, 
pre-religious consciousness, that religion is a matter of “doing what is right”. Moreover, 
while the rationalist epistemology rightly maintains that religious consciousness (trust in 
God) is mediated by cognition, such cogitation, properly construed, must be considered 
but an indirect knowledge about God: faith’s latent reflection upon the moral 
consciousness of value which mediates assent to religious consciousness. That 
epistemology is effectively bypassed, when the rationalist theory’s epistemology aims for 
direct knowledge of God via ratiocination.379 
 
Observation: MI’s epistemology maintains, with the rationalist theory’s epistemology,  
that knowledge of God is mediated by cognitive insight. MI’s logic resists each of 
Baillie’s criticism of the rationalist theory. 
  
7.1.3. Baillie’s Critique of Kant's Theory of Religion 
Baillie’s criticism of Kant’s theory of religion has been found to center upon 
Kant’s conceptualization of the processes involved in the transition from moral 
consciousness to religious faith: Baillie maintains that Kant qua philosopher espouses a 
theory of religion whose epistemology effectively reduces religious faith to a logical 
implicate of practical reason—this despite Kant’s seeming affinity, as evidenced in his 
abandoned fourth critique, for a concept of religious faith whose ground transcends the 
logical entailments of practical reason. Kant correctly maintains that there is an organic  
“determinative connection” between religious faith and moral consciousness. The 
ordinary person’s testimony also supports Kant’s position that knowledge of God's is in a 
sense indirect—mediated by reflection upon the logical structure of moral consciousness. 
                                                           
379 “Rationalism seems to have been right in insisting that religion is grounded in intelligent insight, but 
wrong as to the sources of that insight.  Romanticism seeks to have been right in seeking a foundation for 
religion which should render it independent of scientific and metaphysical speculation, but wrong in 
thinking to find such a foundation in some religion of the mind that lies below the level of reflective 
thought.” ROR, p. 87. 
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However, the ordinary person does not ground religious faith's putative knowledge of 
God in a logical implicate of the practical reason, be that implicate construed as either an 
act or as a mode of apprehension. The ordinary person conceives of faith, as both 
apprehension and act, as a direct knowledge not established by Kant’s practical reason.380 
Baillie argues that the better conceptualization of the determinative 
epistemological connection between moral and religious consciousness will contend for 
direct and indirect knowledge of God. Baillie uses this language in 1928:  
 
 
Our fundamental moral values are given to us directly, and 
intuited by us directly; but for everything in religion that 
goes beyond this direct intuition of moral value, there is 
required the activity of faith [underlined emphasis mine].381  
 
 
 
Elsewhere in Baillie’s early thought, he provides specifics about the indirect and indirect 
knowledge’s and processes involved in the cognitive-psychological epistemology of 
religious faith (i.e., religious consciousness).  
 
 
The psychological order of events is not that we first, by 
purely intellectual paths of discovery, reach the certainty of 
God’s existence and worthiness to be trusted, and then put 
our trust in Him and live our lives accordingly.  Rather is it 
that out of a certain kind of living, and a certain 
attentiveness to the deeper significance of such living, there 
grows up in our hearts a loyal and steadfast trust in that 
Reality within which our lives are set, and then we see that 
within such trust is latently and germinally contained an 
acceptance of the propositions (let us say) that God exists 
and he is good.382 
                                                           
380 “Surely the real root of our difficulty with Kant lies not in the nature of the bond which he forges 
between faith and morality but rather in the kind of morality to which religion is thus attached and in terms 
of which it accordingly comes to be interpreted.  If morality means only keeping the commandments—
“obedience to a categorical imperative”—we may feel that it provides too narrow a basis for Christian faith 
to rest upon.” IOR, p. 274. 
381 Ibid., p. 246.  Baillie’s italicized emphasis. "It is plain enough . . . that it was not as a result of an 
argument that faith first arose in the world and that it is not as the result of an argument that it normally 
arises in men's minds to this day."  Ibid., p. 360. 
382 Ibid., p. 377. 
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In 1929, then, Baillie maintains that religious faith is indirect in that is mediated by 
reflection—which, in turn, mediates assent to belief in God’s existence—which, in turn, 
enables humans to perceive with renewed clarity God—Whom moral consciousness has 
latently believed to exist all along. Baillie conceives of trust in God (i.e., religious 
consciousness) as being indirect knowledge in several senses—it is mediated by the 
logical structure of the moral consciousness; mediated by reflective inferential thinking 
upon humans' moral consciousness of value; mediated propositional knowledge derived 
from our individual experiences. All of this mediation sounds fairly Kantian, thus far. 
The difference, however, comes out when Baillie asserts that this mediation must mediate 
a direct knowledge perception, as both the conditions for the possibility of religious 
consciousness and religious consciousness’ latent reflection on human experience testify 
to faith’s being grounded in a direct perception. For when we are dealing with religion  
 
 
 
We are dealing here directly with the things that we know 
to matter most—with justice and honor, with character and 
the will to serve.  And however uncertain our hold upon the 
divine significance of these things may sometime seem to 
be, yet when it is within our grasp we recognise it to be the 
only quite authentic certainty there is [emphases mine].383  
 
 
 
This direct and certain knowledge of the existence of Goodness, the only quite authentic 
certainty according to Baillie, differs not only in degree from scientific certainty, but also 
in kind.384  This certainty, called faith, is a gift from God.385 Accordingly, its veridicality 
is authenticated not by discursive reasoning—i.e., practical reason—but rather from 
living according to what the individual’s moral consciousness intuitively understands 
                                                           
383 Ibid., p. 375.   
384 Ibid., p. 374. 
385 "[T]he graces of character in which faith takes its rise are graces not of satisfied achievement but rather 
of receptiveness; and faith, when it comes, comes not as a thing accomplished but as a thing found—not as 
a meritorious performance on our part but as a gift on God's part." Ibid., p. 368. 
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directly or immediately to be of value.  This precipitates a developmental process 
characterized by an increasingly clear “voice of conscience”—an increased “awareness” 
and “consciousness” (perception) of higher values situated within a gradated valuational 
field—coupled with the development of a volition more inclined to act in light of such 
guidance.386 It is in such concrete situations characterized ideally with moral 
development, that God encounters each person qua personality to provide subjective 
certainty that the individual is, in both thought and deed, living a life whose moral 
evolution is approximating the highest value. 387  
This is to say that, for Baillie, it is in this concrete activity of faith—in praxis 
reflective of what one indirectly-directly knows as highest value—that one, approaching 
a goodness of living, transitions from moral consciousness to the religious consciousness 
to which moral consciousness is organically connected (both epistemologically and, 
ultimately, ontologically): for religious consciousness, initiated by religious faith (trust in 
God), is mediated by a steadfast assurance that there is a personal Good, and no mere 
impersonal Apex of Being, to Whom one’s intuitive sense of oughtness ontologically and 
epistemologically corresponds—that is, a Whom to Whom one should, out of gratitude 
for the Goodness received, give one's allegiance.  
When, however, Kant insists that practical reason should mediate the assent from 
moral consciousness to religious belief, Kant’s logic of religious faith secures—at best—
merely indirect knowledge—and then, indirect knowledge of an impersonal god: an 
“Apex of all Being” in whom one should trust, based on ratiocinative operations, 
according to Baillie.  But again, Baillie maintains that Kant should contend for a direct 
knowledge of God’s Presence—one mediated by the living of one’s life as a complete 
personality: “It [religion] is no longer a matter of giving assent merely to propositions; it 
is a matter of placing honourable reliance in a Reality which claims our loyalty.”388  
Reliance or trust in  Personality—this better reflects the ordinary person's perspective on 
the nature of the determinative connection between moral consciousness and religious 
consciousness, as it lays emphasis on the importance of praxis for developing deeper 
                                                           
386 Ibid., p. 361. 
387 “To the man who follows faithfully such light as he possesses there must in the end come all the light he 
needs.” Ibid., p. 370. 
388 Ibid., p. 376. 
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insight into moral consciousness’ impact on religious consciousness. Indeed, it is the 
testimony of the human race that 
 
 
 
The mere passive contemplation of the moral law never led 
any man to a realisation of its deeper meaning, but only to 
an active surrender to its ever-developing demands.  
Argument therefore here is at a far-reaching disadvantage, 
that it carries conviction only in proportion to the depth of 
each man’s moral consciousness, and that in the same 
proportion it is likely to have been already anticipated by 
the intuitive understanding.389 
 
 
 
Jesus himself (in whom the Goodness anticipated by the intuitive understanding most 
fully dwelt) would appear to have conceived of the transition from moral consciousness 
to religious consciousness as being no mere assent to a set of propositions, but rather a 
courageous surrender to and trust in God’s love.390 
Again, the issue for Baillie is the relationship between direct and indirect 
knowledge for knowledge of God. Is the moral consciousness' epistemological movement 
toward faith in God (i.e. religious consciousness) ultimately precipitated by direct 
knowledge (intuition) or indirect knowledge (logical demonstration)? Kant’s theory of 
religion is criticized for its ambiguity about how these knowledge types relate to each 
other for knowledge of God: Kant rightly recognizes that the transformation is initiated 
with belief in an “Is” to Whom our immediate intuition of “oughtness” corresponds; 
Kant, however, “wavers” with regard to how they are ultimately connected 
epistemologically. Baillie’s criticism of Kant’s theory of religion raises thus the 
fundamental question of whether Kant conceives of religious faith as a logical entailment 
whose validity is established by the postulates inferred from the practical reason’s 
schematization of the moral consciousness’ sense of “oughtness”; or, rather, if faith 
presupposes a “determinative connection” between religious consciousness and moral 
                                                           
389 Ibid., pp. 361-362. 
390 Ibid., p. 377. This also evidences Baillie’s position that it is “rational” for the Christian theologian to 
elucidate the “highest value” mediated by humans’ “cognitive insight” into the “logical structure” of moral 
consciousness. 
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consciousness, the deliverances of which transcend logical demonstration. Yet whereas 
Kant seems to waver, the religious consciousness of humankind, on Baillie’s 
interpretation, does not: the ordinary person's theory of religion does not reduce religious 
faith to mere discursive knowledge about a logical implicate of practical reason; rather, 
the ordinary person's religious consciousness unhesitatingly contends for a religious faith 
whose direct knowledge of God transcends the logical implicates of a practical reason 
that denies direct knowledge of God.       
 
Observation: MI’s epistemology, unlike Kant’s epistemology, reflects Baillie’s 
understanding of the ordinary person’s understanding of the logic of religious faith. For 
one, it maintains that religious faith is a direct perception of God’s presence. Secondly, it 
maintains that religious consciousness is epistemologically connected to moral 
consciousness: it is mediated by reflexive thinking upon the moral consciousness’ logical 
structure.  Thirdly, MI advances the ordinary person's claim that religious faith's certainty 
is mediated by a variety of knowledges (self-knowledge, other-knowledge, world-
knowledge, God-knowledge), though neither epistemologically established by logical 
entailment nor ontologically grounded in a Logical Implicate: faith in God is an 
immediate "psychological certitude" of the veridicality of the God-human relationship, 
God’s moral injunctions included. Fourthly, MI maintains that immediate knowledge of 
God is grounded in God's encounter with humans qua personalities—this, as “in, with 
and under” individual lives-as-lived, and not as merely thought—and not in the human 
qua logician’s abstraction of the practical reason's abstraction of the moral consciousness.  
All of this is in keeping with Baillie's position that neither religious faith-as-lived in 
general, nor the morality that is the praxis of the Christian faith in particular, is prompted 
by humans’’ unquestioning obedience to knowledge about a highest value: rather, history 
shows that religion "feeds upon" direct knowledge of God’s gracious self-disclosure in 
and to the soul.391 
    
                                                           
391 “Is not the doctrine of the summum bonum itself already a religious doctrine, and indeed the central 
doctrine of all religion?”  Ibid., p. 275. 
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7.1.4. Baillie’s Critique of Theological Intuitionism 
Baillie’s arguments against theological intuitionism have been found to center 
upon Troeltsch and Otto’s shared claim that direct knowledge of an immediately evident, 
religious a priori is possible. Troeltsch’s theological intuitionism rightly grounds religion 
in both a direct knowledge (intuition) and indirect knowledge (mediated by cognitive 
insight). As such, his theory is an advance over the romantic theory. However, his 
epistemology incorrectly grounds this indirect-direct knowledge of God in a religious a 
priori.  Baillie maintains that religious consciousness is not a self-contained 
consciousness; rather, it epistemologically and organically links to moral consciousness. 
When Troeltsch, in his quest for the epistemologically “immediately evident”, severs the 
epistemological link between religious consciousness and moral consciousness, he makes 
the ground for religious faith unduly direct. Religious faith, properly conceived, is 
mediated by “cognitive insight” into moral consciousness (indirectly-direct) knowledge 
of value; mediated by the individual’s knowledge about the world; mediated by assent to 
belief in the Ideal Ought’s being God whom objectively exists. Troeltsch’s pursuit of the 
religious a priori rejects the moral consciousness’ mediation of knowledge of God, 
however. To compound matters, his logic fails to provide a “‘deduction of the categories’ 
of the religious consciousness” that he has epistemologically isolated, thereby making 
further indirect what insight might be gleaned from his analysis. Otto’s theological 
intuitionism, Baillie maintains, rightly tries to reforge the epistemological connection 
between religious consciousness and moral consciousness. However, his logic for doing 
so is convoluted. This is readily evidenced in Otto's positing of a “thought-connection 
which is immediately self-evident and yet is entirely devoid of logical necessity”—but 
one of many facet of Otto’s logic which baffles Baillie.  
 
Observation: MI's epistemology, in keeping with Baillie's criticism of Otto and 
Troeltsch’s epistemologies, does not attempt to ground knowledge of God in an a priori 
situated in religious consciousness.  
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7.1.5. Baillie’s Critique of Neo-Kantian Theories of Religion 
We have found that Baillie's attack on Ritschl and Herrmann’s Neo-Kantian 
theories of religion concerns the limitations placed by each on the Christian theologian's 
knowledge of the mediation of divine action. Baillie's criticism of Ritschl's' theory 
centers upon Ritschl's method, that method's byproducts, and their collective 
epistemological implication for the interrogation and understanding of religious 
consciousness. Ritschl’s neo-Kantian theory of religion rightly affirms an organic 
connection between morality and religion—the “relation of moral value to real 
existence”—as well as insists upon the “the reality of the ideal world”.  Its reflection on 
“independent-value judgments” as “ethical judgments” is also said by Baillie to be of 
practical value to religion, in that militates against pragmatic theories of religion.392 
Nonetheless, Ritschl's theory of religion compromises the Christian theologian’s ability 
to understand how direct knowledge of God is mediated in and to both the moral and 
religious consciousness of humankind. This is because his theory’s method places severe 
constraints on the Christian theologian’s investigation of moral consciousness, religious 
consciousness, and how they are related, contends Baillie.  Baillie, however, is persuaded 
that religious consciousness admits of many gradations—this, in part, because religious 
consciousness is mediated by inferential knowledge which is not the same for every 
person. For example, religious consciousness is mediated (or “framed”393) by knowledge 
about one’s religious tradition. Consequently, the Christian theologian’s “interrogation” 
of religious consciousness requires, according to Baillie, an elucidation of how 
knowledge about historical events (e.g., Jesus Christ) is thought to mediate the 
development of what is humankind's organically developing religious consciousness—a 
development whose epistemological underpinning is, as we have seen, conceived as 
ontologically grounded in (though, not epistemologically reducible to) humankind's’ 
moral consciousness of “value” (in and to which God universally resides).   
Ritschl’s method denies the Christian theologian a full-fledged investigation into 
how that universally direct knowledge of God is mediated by the diverse range of human 
                                                           
392 Ritschl’s distinction between independent and concomitant value-judgments must be preserved if, e.g., 
philosophical theology is to avoid grounding religion in a pragmatic criteria of truth— “that all value 
judgments can be reduced, without remainder, to judgments of value.” 
393 Likewise, Baillie speaks of knowledge of God as a "frame of reference" in his later thought.  See SPG, 
Ch. 7, pp. 130-148.  
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experience, restricting the theologian's interrogation of religious consciousness to persons 
who belong to the theologian’s present, religious sect, its historical development, 
included. Baillie, contending that the religious community is far bigger than one's 
tradition, rejects that methodological constraint; rejects as well Ritschl’s “inhospitable 
attitude toward whatever religious insight stands outside of the Christian tradition”; and 
insists that the modern Christian theologian must also should reject the arbitrary 
demarcation between religious experience and revelation394 that underwrites the 
Ritschlian agenda—all of this in favor of an examination and elucidation of how the 
religious experience of humankind as a whole, rather, is mediated by knowledge about 
historical events, those historical events apprehended as disclosing God’s presence 
outside of one's religious tradition proper, included. Here is the method of promise for 
arriving at a fuller understanding of religious consciousness’ diverse manifestation of The 
God known universally and directly in our moral consciousness of value, maintains 
Baillie. 
We recall that the Baillie finds several difficulties with Herrmann’s theory of 
religion, and that Baillie’s criticism centers on Herrmann’s epistemology of religious 
experience, Herrmann's elucidation of the relationship between direct and indirect 
knowledge more particularly still. Specifically, Herrmann fails to elucidate how faith in 
Jesus Christ (Christian religious experience) arises out indirect knowledge about Jesus 
(“the historical fact of Jesus”) which, in turn, is mediated by the fact of duty’s claim upon 
our moral consciousness of value. What is Herrmann’s solution for relating what is direct 
and indirect in Christian knowledge of God?  It is, according to Baillie, that Jesus makes 
an “impression” upon humans’ moral consciousness of value, thereby prompting humans' 
assent to Christian faith. This description lacks precision. Such is the same with 
Herrmann’s description of how knowledge of God is mediated to non-Christian religion 
consciousness: “we cannot know how” this mediation is accomplished. Herrmann's 
allegedly muddled description of how knowledge of God is both mediated to moral 
consciousness and apprehended by religious consciousness further evidences that 
Herrmann’s epistemology has “broken the chain of reason” on the nature of the assent to 
                                                           
394 Indeed, “to stop short anywhere within the religious experience of our race is to express a purely 
arbitrary preference and to draw a line for ourselves where no line exists.” IOR, p. 62.   
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Christian faith.  Indeed, Herrmann’s epistemology suggests that faith is not “an act of 
intelligent insight” at all. Baillie maintains that the “act” of faith must not, however, 
break the chain of reason: its epistemology must have “some logical basis” mediated by 
an “act of intelligent insight” that derives in part from (i.e., is mediated by) humans’ 
moral intuition of value. 
Herrmann’s epistemology, then, allegedly fails to elucidate: (1) how assent to 
Christian religious consciousness (i.e. Christian “faith”) is mediated by knowledge about 
and knowledge of the Mediator; (2) how knowledge about “the historical fact” of the 
Mediator mediates knowledge of God in and to humans’ moral consciousness; (3) how 
Christian religious consciousness is epistemologically connected to moral consciousness 
and (4) non-Christian religious consciousness; (5) how that epistemology can be applied 
to an interrogation and understanding of religious consciousness in general, because of 
the epistemological breakdown in Herrmann’s would-be idea of general revelation; that 
fundamental to difficulties (1-5), is that it “breaks the chain of reason”, when it (6) fails 
to conceive of knowledge of God as “as act of intelligent insight”;  and that that all of this 
(1-6) makes Herrmann’s (7) understanding of religious experience “excessively narrow”.  
In an allusion to Herrmann's neo-Kantian-indebted confusion about how to 
construct a theology of general revelation, Baillie wryly remarks that  
 
 
We cannot be aware of an element of paradox in 
Herrmann’s declaration that ‘he does not know’ through 
what media the knowledge of God comes to men who have 
no knowledge of Christ.  Would it be impardonable to 
suggest that he ought to know?395   
 
 
 
With what “media” would the modern Christian theologian reconnect Herrmann’s chain 
of reason with the historical fact of Jesus; reconnect our moral consciousness of duty and 
CRE's epistemologically necessary assent to faith in Jesus Christ; reconnect Christian 
revelation with the universal theory of revelation that epistemologically mediates 
                                                           
395 Ibid., p. 61. 
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humans’ recognition of, and trust in, Jesus? In 1929 Baillie contends that the solution 
requires a concept which: faithfully describes CRE; epistemologically integrates that 
description with one faithful to our moral consciousness of Divine Love; and elucidates, 
from a Christian theological perspective, how religious consciousness comes to 
recognize, through divine revelation, the Mediator who is the fullest expression of Divine 
Love:     
 
 
The answer must surely be that this is not another fact at 
all.  The experience of the inner life of Jesus is but the 
moral experience itself in a supreme exemplification of it.  
It is the same word; but it is the Word made flesh . . . [This] 
Divine Love is sufficiently revealed to us in our common 
human values . . .  Revelation alone leaves godlessness, as 
Paul says, ‘without excuse’. But ‘values reside in the 
individual’ rather than in the abstract and the general, and 
hence our values become both deepened and fortified by 
every new incarnation that meets us in experience.  So to 
our human frailty there have been from time to time 
granted certain more ‘special’ revelations of the Divine 
Love. Supreme among such has been the revelation of God 
in the soul of Jesus. God . . .  hath now spoken unto us 
through a more perfect Love and Goodness than any that 
come before.  In this Love and Goodness men have found . 
. . ‘the portrait of the invisible God’.’396 
 
 
Observation: MI meets all of the criteria prescribed by Baillie in 1929 for a description of 
CRE.  MI’s epistemology of religious experience describes (1-5), does conceive of 
knowledge of God as mediated (6) by an act of intelligent insight, and does emphasize 
that assent to Christian religious consciousness is mediated in particular by personal 
relations characterized by Divine Love. Furthermore, MI describes all of these media as 
pointing to Jesus, the incarnational, logical and historical center (following Tillich) of the 
mediation of God’s grace. MI also lends itself to a description of general revelation, 
unlike Herrmann’s epistemology, on Baillie’s reading.  
                                                           
396 Ibid., p. 297. Baillie cites Romans I: 20, II: 15 and Col. I: 15. Baillie’s remark is informative as it finds 
Baillie arguing for certain "special", general revelations—a concept which will find fuller development in 
his latter thought.     
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7.2. CONCLUSIONS ON BAILLIE’S EARLY MEDIATING THEOLOGY  
Baillie’s early works evidence a mediating theologian preoccupied with religious 
experience, though vying, if somewhat incidentally, for his idea of Christian revelation. 
Underwriting Baillie’s apologetic strategy is Baillie’s epistemology of universal 
revelation: God directly discloses God to all of humanity in all humans’ moral 
consciousness of value. Within the context of this apologetic agenda and epistemological 
framework, Baillie argues for the supremacy of CRE (i.e., the Christian religion). In so 
doing, Baillie engages manifold competing theologies and philosophies, arguing that each 
theory of religion is, to varying degrees, unreal to the reality of religion, as each advances 
an idea of Reality antagonistic to the deliverances of religious consciousness, Christian or 
otherwise. As support for this general line of criticism, Baillie centers his arguments on 
each theory’s epistemology and maintains that when its epistemology makes knowledge 
about the self or the world the primary ground for knowledge for God, such a move 
invariably compromises knowledge of God: it makes knowledge of God too indirect, 
often to the point that knowledge of God, Personality, is practically unknowable.    
 
7.2.1. Baillie’s Early MT: Its Apology’s Focus 
We have found Baillie repeatedly attacking a host of theories and thinkers on the 
ground that they fail to provide an adequate conceptualization of the epistemological 
relationship between indirect knowledge and direct knowledge for knowledge of God: 
one theory makes knowledge of God too indirect, by overestimating the mediation of 
religious experience by conscious ratiocination; another makes knowledge of God too 
indirect, by deemphasizing the cognitive insight that mediates religious consciousness, in 
favor of the other extreme, the grounding of knowledge of God in pre-reflective 
‘immediacy”.  On the strength of the diachronic trace of Baillie’s early MT, I therefore 
conclude that the most important problem for Baillie’s early MT is: 
 
The epistemological relationship between indirect knowledge and indirect knowledge  
for knowledge of God. 
 
As this is the mediating theologian’s primary problem, I shall denote it with MTPP.   
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7.2.2. Baillie’s Early MT: MI’S Nascent Presence 
What is Baillie’s solution to MTPP? Repeatedly, Baillie contends for what I am 
calling an “indirectly direct” epistemology of religious experience in his early MT. That 
Baillie does rely heavily on a conceptualization of religious as being an indirectly direct 
epistemology of knowledge of God (hereafter, ID) is evidenced in the claims advanced 
by the apologist in his analyses of, and arguments against, the many theories documented 
in the diachronic trace. Repeatedly, Baillie contends that a faithful description of 
religious consciousness will conceive of faith in God as being occasioned by knowledge 
that is both direct—immediate knowledge of God is not derived from human reason, be 
that reasoning metaphysical, scientific, philosophical, theoretical or practical, a priori or 
a posteriori in orientation—and indirect: it is mediated by human reason (“cognitive 
insight”), including various knowledge types and valuational grades  (e.g., scientific, 
logical, aesthetic; reflection on moral consciousness), none of which can provide the 
Ground for religious experience that is sui generis: grounded in immediate knowledge of 
Personality. All of this is in keeping with Baillie’s thought on: the aims of apologetics; 
the epistemological limitations of language; Baillie’s conceptualization of the 
epistemological relationship between second-order knowledge about truths (reflective, 
mediated knowledge) and first-order knowledge of (pr-reflective, immediate) Reality and 
realities; and Baillie’s concept of MI (see Chapter 2 for all of the above). 
I therefore conclude that:  
 
In Baillie’s early MT, we see a nascent version of MI.   
 
Partial support for my position derives from my observations provided at the end of each 
of the just-mentioned sections: here we have found close conceptual parallels between ID 
and MI. This support, however, derives primarily from my analysis of MI’s logic 
(Chapter 6), the diachronic trace of Baillie’s early MT (Chapter 3) and from my modeling 
of MI’s logic (Chapter 2).  
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7.3. BAILLIE’S LATTER MEDIATING THEOLOGY REVISTED 
 
7.3.1. Our Knowledge of God (1939) 
Turning now to a brief reconsideration of Baillie's later MT (1939-1962), we 
recall from the diachronic trace that Baillie’s latter MT develops its criticism of the 
rationalist theory of religion in particular, increasingly debates neo-orthodox theology, 
and engages the analytic tradition.   
 
7.3.1.1 MI: Contra scholastic orthodoxy’s depersonalized Really Real  
In OKG, Baillie remarks that “The conception of a sacramental universe . . . 
expresses the truth that lay behind St. Thomas’s natural theology, while being free from 
the errors in which the latter became involved.”397 What is true about Aquinas’s natural 
theology? We have found Baillie supporting its position that knowledge about God is 
mediated by our sensory-derived knowledge about a sacramental universe.  Its error, 
however, is that it makes that direct knowledge a knowledge about God's effects in a 
sacramental universe. Rather, a sacramental universe mediates, paradoxically, an 
immediate knowledge of God. As support for this position, Baillie appeals to MI.          
 
 
YET, though we are more directly and intimately 
confronted with e presence of God than with any other 
presence, it does not follow that He is ever present to us 
apart from all other experiences  . . . 
. . . No one of the four subjects of our knowledge—
ourselves, our fellows, the corporeal world, and God—is 
ever presented to us except in conjunction with all three of 
the others . . . .  
. . . We do not know God through the world, but we know 
him with the world; and in knowing Him with the world, 
we know him as its ground.  Nature is not an argument for 
God, but it is a sacrament of Him.  Just as in the sacrament 
of Holy Communion the Real Presence of Christ is given 
(if the Lutheran phrase may here be used without prejudice) 
‘in, with and under‘ the bread and wine, so in a wider sense 
                                                           
397 OKG, pp. 179. 
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the whole corporeal world may become sacramental to us 
of the presence of the Triune God.398   
 
 
 
When Aquinas makes knowledge of God’s effects in the universe our most direct 
knowledge, he commits the rationalist fallacy: making God an indirectly known, 
abstracted It. “We can know that God is and what He is not.”399  
 
Observation: When MI emphasizes that knowledge of God is mediated by knowledge 
about the universe, though rejects the position that direct knowledge about the effects of 
God can demonstrate God's existence, it is contending that knowledge of God is a direct 
or immediate knowledge of Personality.    
 
7.3.1.2  MI and the Barthian denial of immediate knowledge of God   
We have also found Baillie maintaining in OKG that Barth oversimplifies the 
spiritual situation of the western world, when  he denies that all humans have immediate 
knowledge of God. Baillie argues that this misreading is backed by anthropology that 
conflicts with the human situation properly interpreted, a doctrine of revelation 
excessively narrow, and a concept of God’s grace which unduly limits the scope of God’s 
grace. Baillie counters with the position that a truer account of the human situation will 
contend that all humans have an immediate knowledge of God through God’s gracious 
self-disclosure “in, with and under” a sacramental universe, albeit an immediate 
knowledge which can be and is repressed. Indeed,  
 
 
Great as is the service which Dr. Barth has rendered us in 
weaning us from the enticements of one-sided 
immanentism, he has tended to lead us astray in his 
                                                           
398 Ibid., pp. 178-179. 
399 Ibid., p. 109.  ‘But as to what He positively is— ‘the divine essence (substantia) so far exceeds in its 
immensity every form to which our intellect reaches that we are unable to apprehend it in such a way as to 
know what it is.’ Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, i.14.  Cited in Baillie, ibid., p. 110. 
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apparent complete rejection of the truth for which 
immanentism and mysticism alike contend.400 
 
 
We have found that Baillie’s reliance upon MI is rather important for Baillie’s criticism 
of Barth in OKG.  As such, I shall allocate sections to my observation. 
 Observation!(extended):  
 
7.3.1.3 God's transcendence and immanence: resetting the balance 
MI provides Baillie a concept for resetting the balance between God’s 
transcendence and immanent Presence in and to creation—a balance disrupted by Barth’s 
denial of universal immediate knowledge of God, in favor of an overemphasis on God’s 
transcendence.  
MI, like Barth's theology, does emphasize God's transcendence. For instance, it 
contends that knowledge of God is not entirely direct, but rather mediated by “knowledge 
of ourselves, our fellows, the corporeal world”.  God's transcendence is also affirmed by 
the position that one cannot as it were infer God's existence: there is no “’unaided’ 
natural knowledge” of God.401 Accordingly, MI maintains, with Barth, that knowledge of 
God is always a matter of divine initiative. Moreover, the concept emphasizes God's 
"otherness" when it contends that knowledge of God is not on the same logical footing as 
knowledge of other minds, but is “logically prior” to the other knowledge types 
(corporeal world, humans, oneself).  The concept emphasizes the epistemological 
disjunction between knowledge of God and knowledge of other minds furthermore in 
that, when functioning as an analogy, it is said to be an imperfect analogy: knowledge of 
God is of a complexity and directness which surpasses humans' knowledge of human 
minds. Here, as with Barth, is an acknowledgment of the inability to demonstrate God's 
existence via analogia.  MI, also like Barth, rejects the claim that all humans have an 
inborn, innate knowledge of God: not one of the four knowledges is temporally 
                                                           
400 Ibid., p. 237.  Baillie indicates in a footnote that refers to the aforementioned remark, that the issue here 
revolves around Barth’s interpretation of immanence as God’s “presence to, and not as presence in” the 
world.  
 401Ibid., p. 43. 
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antecedent to the other (i.e., an inborn, innate knowledge cannot temporally precede 
knowledge from experience.)  The concept also emphasizes God's transcendence in that 
it, like Barth, presupposes that the human’s capacity for knowledge of God is contingent 
upon God’s grace as extended to the imago dei via divine disclosure.402   
Nevertheless, MI also contends for an immanentism unduly rejected by Barth, 
according to Baillie.  This is apparent in MI’s idea of immediacy. For example, although 
MI’s logic assumes that God is transcendent in the sense that God is quantitatively 
distinct from all of creation, its logic does not contend that God is wholly other in the 
sense of God's being qualitatively distinct—either ontologically or epistemologically—
from humans: the human situation, presupposes MI’s logic, is that the imago dei mirrors 
something of the form and content of God, as human nature is merely "a good thing 
spooled".  It is within this context that we can appreciate the importance of MI’s idea of 
immediacy for Baillie’s critique of Barth’s overemphasis on God’s transcendence. 
 
7.3.1.4 The Christ of Faith and the Christ of History: a reconciliation attempted  
In order to undermine Barth's rejection of universal immediate knowledge of God, 
Baillie has to persuade that God continually invades history to provide Self-disclosure 
beyond the historical event of the Mediator: save that this would lend support to Baillie's 
claim for universal immediate knowledge of God and, with that, the immanence of God’s 
presence denied by Barth; it would also lend credibility to Baillie's broader claim:  
allegiance to Barth's dogmatic prescription for an ailing human situation comes with ill 
effects: a surrendering of those insights for which immanentism and mysticism have 
contended—namely, that God's presence is disclosed in and to historical events beyond 
the  event of the Incarnation.  
 
 
Christ,  [Barth] says, comes vertically into history and He 
alone reveals God; the history into which He comes does 
                                                           
402 Baillie is “the last to hold that the capacity for spiritual life was given first and the reality of it 
afterwards, that God first created a being to whom he could reveal Himself, and afterwards revealed 
Himself to that being . . . Man was not reasonable prior to his apprehension of the first inkling, but in that 
apprehension his rationality is born.  I find no difficulty of principle . . . in Dr. Barth’s conception of a 
capacity to receive revelation which is given in and with the revelation itself.” Ibid., pp. 22-23. 
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not reveal God at all.  Thinking of history in this way, the 
Barthian theologians always oppose ‘the Christ of Faith’ to 
‘the Christ of History’.  History, they say, cannot give you 
truth about Christ; only faith can do that.  I believe this 
dichotomy to be radically mistaken.403 
 
 
To its credit, Barth's thought maintains that the Incarnation is God’s “vertical” invasion 
of History; that Jesus is (as did Herrmann, Ritschl and Luther) the Mediator of God in 
history; that the historical event of the Incarnation is ontologically necessary for human 
salvation; that Christian faith requires a subjective appropriation of Jesus' being the 
truth.404 However, Baillie thinks Barth’s  “dichotomy radically mistaken,” when its 
dialectic rejects Baillie’s competing position: “there is nothing in our experience, which 
may not be the medium of God’s revelation”.405  
That Baillie would think Barth’s thought fundamentally flawed on this issue 
reflects what he found in our consideration of MI’s logic (Chapter 2): MI’s logic 
maintains that God’s self disclosure “continually invades” a sacramental universe “in, 
with and under” whose history God provides an immediate knowledge of God—one 
available to all persons, albeit it mediated by any number of historical events, depending 
on the particularities of each person’s concrete situation. Accordingly,  Baillie uses MI to 
contend, contra Barth, there is universal immediate knowledge of God. Specifically, he 
uses MI to meet objectives that would substantiate belief in such knowledge: (1) to 
provide an elucidation of how history happens in the present, and (2) to attempt 
reconciliation between the "Christ of Faith" with the "Christ of History". That the former 
is a key objective for MI has already been acknowledged with Baillie’s emphasized 
remark that: It is only in the conception of history as something that happens in the 
present that the apparent contradiction in our doctrine of mediated immediacy can be 
reasonably resolved.406 With regard to Baillie’s latter objective, Baillie's counters Barth's 
claim that history provides no revelation at all about the “Christ of History”, by using MI 
to reconcile the “Christ of Faith” with the “Christ of History”. Specifically,  he maintains 
                                                           
403 Ibid., p. 188. 
404 Ibid., p. 96. 
405 Ibid.,  p. 222.   
406 Ibid., p. 189. Baillie’s italicized emphasis. 
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that we must conceive of Jesus Christ's being the logical center of history which 
illuminates the meaning of other historical events, including those mighty events “in, 
with and under” which God has divinely acted and divinely acts. According to Baillie,  
 
Salvation means fellowship with God.  The state of being 
saved is the state of being in fellowship with Him.  To 
believe that some men are wholly out of such fellowship is 
the same as to believe that they are totally corrupt; for good 
in the Creator, who is the alone Source of all the good there 
is.  But ... a creature from which the image of God was thus 
wholly effaced would no longer be a man at all.407 
 
 
Hence, while God's self-disclosure in the "Christ of History" is ontologically necessary 
for the redemption of humankind, and the full realization of fides salvifica, knowledge 
about of this Event—i.e., trust in the "Christ of Faith"—is not epistemologically 
necessary for salvation.  How does MI’s logic explain the mediation of Christ's 
redemptive effects across history? We have found that when MI identifies Christ as the 
logical center of history, it lays emphasis upon humans’ knowledge “of” others.  
 
 
We have to face the fact that we have to do here with an 
experience of an entirely unique kind, its uniqueness lying 
precisely in this conjunction of immediacy with mediacy—
that is, in the fact that God reveals Himself to me only 
through others who went before, yet in so doing reveals 
himself to me now.408   
 
 
This fellowship is characterized by agapē and self-service to others409—that is, by those 
historical events which, characterized by personalities at their best, most profoundly 
mediate God’s love and grace, save fellowship with the Mediator, the Christ of Faith, in 
whom God dwelt. MI’s logic also emphasizes the importance of knowledge “about” the 
                                                           
407  Ibid., p. 96. 
408 Ibid.,  p. 185.  
409 "Only when I am in fellowship with my fellow men does the knowledge of God come to me 
individually.”  Ibid., p. 179. Baillie’s italicized emphasis. 
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history of God’s action in and to history for the mediation of knowledge of God. For 
example, Baillie maintains that God can and does disclose God’s Presence, for example, 
“in, with and under” the stories of “Abraham and Moses” to make present the historical 
past. 410 Accordingly, MI’s logic maintains that immediate knowledge of the subject of 
Christian faith, the "Christ of Faith", is one that must be mediated by discursive and 
indirect knowledge about the "Christ of History".  
 
 
 
The Christian knowledge of God is not given to any man 
save in conjunction with the telling of an ‘old, old, story’. . 
.   
. . . .  ‘For there is one God, and one mediator between God 
and men, the man Jesus Christ; who gave himself a ransom 
for all, to be testified in due time." The service of others, 
the fellowship with others, and the historical tradition in 
which I stand are all media which lead me to the Mediator, 
and the Mediator leads me to God. 411 
. . . . And to this day all the history that has Presence in it 
for me, all the history that has anything to say to me, all of 
the past through which I am addressed in the present, is 
centered in the story of the Cross [emphasis mine].412  
 
 
 
While it is helpful to be reminded that MI's articulation of God’s “continual 
invasion” of history “in, with and under” includes the mediation of God’s grace in and to 
personal histories which pre-date and post-date the cross; and to be reminded that it is 
Baillie’s position that, inasmuch as God's logic of redemption is understood and obeyed, 
one is, by God's grace, able to appropriate the ontic effects of the Cross to varying 
degrees; the point here is not whether MI’s logic successfully counters Barth’s position. 
Rather, the point is that MI is central to Baillie’s debate with a Barth whom, Baillie 
contends, makes knowledge of God unduly indirect, when he denies that all persons have 
immediate knowledge of God.  
                                                           
410 See Ibid., p. 184. 
411 Ibid., p. 180. 
412 Ibid., p. 186.  
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7.3.2. The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought (1956) 
Returning to Baillie’s thought published after OKG, we have found that there is 
no explicit mention of MI in IRRT.  Nonetheless, the work employs language which 
sounds very much like the language of MI. More importantly, it advances an idea of 
revelation which, presupposing as it does, discloses that MI continues to be the concept to 
which Baillie appeals when Baillie continues to focus on the problem of the 
epistemological relationship between indirect and direct knowledge for knowledge of 
God This is suggested somewhat when one considers the source and content of 
revelation; it is most readily apparent when one considers the mediation and mode of 
apprehension for the mediating theologian contends in his latter thought. 
 
7.3.2.1 The source and content of revelation: the Really Real   
In IRRT, God is identified as the source and content of revelation. That God is the 
source of revelation is expressed in Baillie’s remark that revelation is always divinely 
initiated, though always contingent upon human co-action for divine action’s realization 
as revelation.    
 
 
Revelation and salvation cannot have place unless the 
divine intention to reveal and to save is met by a human 
acceptance of revelation and salvation which is none the 
less a free act for all that is divinely inspired. This initiative 
was always with God.  The first move was always His. But 
his second move depended, as constantly comes out in the 
narratives, upon the response men were enabled to make to 
the first.413 
 
 
 
That revelation is fundamentally knowledge of God,414and not merely knowledge about 
God, is expressed, for instance, in Baillie’s claim that  
 
                                                           
413 IRRT, p. 68.  
414 Baillie approvingly quotes Herrmann's claim that 'God is the revelation.  All revelation is the self-
revelation of God.’  Wilhelm Herrmann, Der Begriff der Offenbarung (1887); reprinted in Offenbarung und 
Wunder (Giessen, 1908), pp. 9f, as cited in ibid., pp. 33-34.   
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According to the Bible, what is revealed to us is not a body 
of information concerning various things of which we 
might otherwise be ignorant.  If it is information at all, it is 
information concerning the nature and mind and purpose of 
God—that and nothing else.  Yet in the last resort it is not 
information about God that is revealed, but very God 
Himself incarnate in Jesus Christ our Lord.415 
 
 
Observation: MI, we have found, maintains the same. However, as my argument shall not 
draw strength from parallel thought on the source and content of revelation—these 
themes dominate Baillie's thought in general, and do not suggest MI's influence per se—
we shall move to the context of revelation.  
 
7.3.2.2 The mediation of revelation    
7.3.2.2.1 Mediation “in, with and under” a sacramental universe 
In The Idea of Revelation, Baillie offers substantial thought on how truths, 
realities, and the universe mediate knowledge of God. Informative is the remark that  
 
 
 
I see or hear aright when my seeing or hearing is 
determined, in every particular, by what is there to be seen 
or heard.  The right answer to an arithmetical problem is 
the one which is wholly determined by the figures facing 
me.  I think validly when my thought is completely 
controlled by the facts before me . . . [T]hese laws of 
thought are not laws of the mind in the sense that so-called 
natural laws are laws of nature.  They do not tell us how the 
mind operates, but how it ought to operate. They are, 
therefore, laws for thought rather than of thought, laws to 
which mind (sic) is obliged to conform if it is to attain true 
knowledge . . . laws of the reality which mind is attempting 
to know.  They are not descriptive of mind but only 
normative for it; what they are descriptive of is the most 
                                                           
415 Ibid., p. 28. 
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general relations subsisting between the objects with which 
the mind is confronted.416 
 
 
 
Baillie, then, maintains that physical reality objectively exists apart from the knower, and 
the knower is able to have knowledge of it; that objectively-existing laws correspond to 
the physical reality known, informing as they do the “relations between the objects” of 
the physical world; that these laws govern “valid” thought, prescribing how the mind 
should think; that “true knowledge” necessarily presupposes the mind’s “conforming” to 
these objectively-existing laws.   
 
Observation: Baillie's critical realist epistemology in IRRT is no doubt anticipated the 
epistemological shift in OKG.  Accordingly, MI’s core content historically anticipates the 
core content of IRRT’s epistemology about the mediation of knowledge of God. MI: 
humans can and do have abstracted, indirect knowledge about (truths) as well as direct 
knowledge of realties; knowledge of these realities—the corporeal world, oneself, other 
humans, and God—mediates knowledge of the Really Real, God.  Indeed, IRRT’s 
epistemology presupposes the validity of MI’s core assertions on the mediation of 
revelation. The same applies to IRRT’s epistemology of the immediacy of revelation. As 
does MI’s epistemology417, IRRT’s conceives of knowledge of God as direct knowledge 
of the "Really Real".  From an anthropological perspective, it must be this way: humans 
suffer an imperfect “psychosomatic organization”—a byproduct of humans' finitude418—
and as such the human “receiving apparatus”419 is liable to faulty knowledge “about” 
objects or “of” subjects.420  
Consequently, human thought can neither totalize knowledge “of” the “extra 
mental world” of the Really Real (and other “minds”) nor provide an exhaust account of 
knowledge “about” the corporeal world.421   
                                                           
416Ibid.,  pp. 20-21. 
417 “This is what I have tried to express in the conception of mediated immediacy.  In Christ we know God 
not by argument but by personal acquaintance. In Christ God comes to us directly.” OKG, pp. 196-197. 
418 Ibid., p. 222. Cf. IRRT, p. 26.  
419 IRRT, p. 34. Cf. SPG, p. 6.  
420 Ibid., p. 26.  
421 IRRT, 25.  
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Each abstract noun I apply gives you a partly wrong 
impression of the man at the same time that it conducts you 
towards a right impression . . . in all this I am but 
narrowing the type to which he belongs, rather than 
offering you the individual. . . 
. . . . All of these considerations apply with greatly 
increased force to the revelation of God to the human soul.  
It is doubly impossible that we should give exhaustive 
account either of the ways by which we know God or of the 
God whom we know.  For God is not, like my friend, 
merely one being among others, but is the source of all 
being.422 
 
 
 
Although anthropological and epistemological constraints upon the human compromise 
humans' capacity to appropriate revelation, Baillie maintains, "There is nothing through 
which God cannot reveal Himself to me”.423  Nevertheless, IRRT’s epistemology rejects 
Temple’s claim that ‘all occurrences are in some degree revelation’.  How, then, should 
one conceive of the corporeal world's mediation of direct knowledge of God. One should 
conceive of the universe as being a sacrament. This sacramental language appears in 
Baillie's concurrence with Sir George Adam Smith's interpretation of Plato’s arguments: 
they, like the Eighth Psalm, ‘are not arguments—they are sacraments,’ that is pledges in 
outward and visible symbol of a personal communion already established”.  Hence, it is 
no all historical events, but only those divine-initiated events which are perceived as 
sacramental of the divine presence—revelation, again, is divine “action” (i.e., God's self-
disclosure) and human co-action (i.e., the appropriation of God’s self-disclosure)—which 
mediate knowledge of God.   
 
Observation: Baillie's introduction of sacramental language to describe the mediation of 
revelation, we have found, occurs in his description of knowledge of God as a MI.  MI, 
also like Baillie's idea of revelation, presupposes that divine action can come "in, with, 
                                                           
422 Ibid., p. 2.   
423 Ibid., p. 26.  Cf. p. 74. 
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and under" any medium424 in a “sacramental” universe; and that "in, with, and under" any 
medium, God can be, as God is, immediately known. I have also argued, that a modified 
version of Stearns’s sacramental modeling of MI’s logic would appear to best describe 
MI’s logic, given the forced option of modeling that logic along historical lines.   
7.3.2.2.2  Mediation by knowledge about history and knowledge of other minds  
In IRRT, Baillie emphasizes that revelation is a divine-human encounter always 
mediated by humans' “present” situation.  He also remarks that the divine-human 
encounter in humans' present situation entails history's being made, paradoxically, 
present in one's present situation.     
 
 
We may ask what then becomes of all they have said about 
revelation being given to us in the events of past history; 
but the answer is that through the past God reveals Himself 
to me in the present.  This could not be unless He had 
revealed Himself to others through the past while for them 
[the prophets] it was still present [emphasis mine].425  
 
 
This insistence on the necessity of history's being made present, we have found, also 
appears in the context of MI's first explicit introduction in Baillie's critical thought. 
Again:   
 
It is only in the conception of history as something that 
happens in the present that the apparent contradiction in 
our doctrine of mediated immediacy can be reasonably 
resolved.426  
 
 
Likewise, when in IRRT Baillie expounds upon history mediates revelation, he 
emphasizes, as does MI, the epistemological necessity of knowledge of “one’s fellows” 
for the appropriation of divine self-disclosure.    
 
                                                           
424 OKG, p. 222.  Cf. IRRT, p. 26.  
425 IRRT, p. 105.  
426OKG, p. 189. 
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The Christian revelation was not addressed to a number of 
disparate individuals, but to a community.  Only within the 
koinonia has it any reality . . . On the other hand, the 
revelation vouchsafed only to the fellowship is capable of 
authentication only so far as, through the fellowship, it 
reaches the individual; only so far as, when all are of one 
accord, the Holy Spirit speaks to each.427  
 
 
Revelation, then, is not only mediated by knowledge of the corporeal world; it is 
mediated also, and "only" when, one is in fellowship with others.   
 
Observation: MI contends: “No one of the four subjects of our knowledge—ourselves, 
our fellows, the corporeal world, and God—is ever presented to us except in conjunction 
with all three of the others.” Here is additional evidence that Baillie's idea of revelation in 
IRRT subscribes to MI’s epistemology, when it expounds the primary realities that 
mediate knowledge of God.    
 
As revelation is mediated by knowledge of ‘other selves’ in one's present 
community, and religion is “dependent on tradition”, it follows that the mediation of 
revelation would be mediated by knowledge about one's tradition, the minds of persons 
belonging to one's religious tradition, included.428 In IRRT, Baillie maintains that 
Christian knowledge of God is mediated by knowledge about certain persons indigenous 
to the Christian tradition's historical development.  
 
 
We know nothing of Christ except . . . through the Bible, 
all later communication of Christian knowledge being 
dependent upon this original record . . . There is no outside 
standard . . . [to] measure the adequacy of the Biblical 
communication . . . To persuade and assure us of its truth 
                                                           
427 IRRT, p. 108.  
428 In OKG, Baillie notes Brunner’s emphasis on the mediation of knowledge of God in one’s present via 
knowledge of others from the past, and cites Brunner with approval: 'Only in the bond which unites me to 
the historical fellowship of my fellow believers—to be more exact, in the fellowship of those who believed 
before me is my faith possible', Emil Brunner, God and Man, English Translation, p. 126f. Cited in OKG, 
p. 181. 
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we have ‘the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing 
witness by and with the word in our hearts,'’ but this 
witness is always ‘by and with,’ never independently of, 
the word.  As latter-day Christians we are therefore wholly 
dependent on the Bible for the light and truth by which we 
live [emphasis mine].429 
 
 
 
Christian knowledge about God, then, must be mediated by knowledge about Jesus 
Christ—i.e., knowledge about the Gospel. To have knowledge about the Gospel is to 
have knowledge about the Christian historiography of divine action—of the “mighty acts 
of God”.  For although the Gospel is not revelation but, not unlike John the Baptist, a   
“witness to the light,430 it can mediate, and by Baillie’s stipulations, must mediate 
revelation in order for humans to have a properly Christian knowledge of God. Inasmuch 
as they possess a "revelatory quality", both non-canonical "claims" to the witnessing of 
divine action, and “contemporary interpretations” of “God’s dealings with Israel”, can as 
well mediate revelation.431 Still, a work's revelatory quality must be assessed, as must 
Bible passages, according to its Christocentric emphasis: as Luther maintains, “the degree 
to which it ‘preaches Christ’ (Christum triebt).”  This criterion is to be applied not to the 
“degree of inspiration, but in the purpose for which it is given”.432   
 
Observation: MI, likewise, explicates the mediation of revelation with a Christocentric 
focus—a focus which would, as Fergusson notes, increasingly characterize Baillie's 
thought thereafter.433 Accordingly, when MI emphasizes knowledge about the Mediator 
for knowledge of God, it emphasizes the importance of knowledge about Christian 
tradition's history—this, again, as mediated by Christian fellowship—for knowledge of 
God.   
 
                                                           
429 IRRT, p. 117.   
430 Ibid., p. 25. 
431 Ibid., p. 105. 
432 Ibid., pp. 117-120, passim.  
433 Fergusson, "Orthodox Liberal”, pp. 140-143. 
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The Christian knowledge of God is not given to any man 
save in conjunction with the telling of an ‘old, old, story’. . 
.   
. . . .  ‘For there is one God, and one mediator between God 
and men, the man Jesus Christ; who gave himself a ransom 
for all, to be testified in due time." The service of others, 
the fellowship with others, and the historical tradition in 
which I stand are all media which lead me to the Mediator, 
and the Mediator leads me to God. 434 
. . . . And to this day all the history that has Presence in it 
for me, all the history that has anything to say to me, all of 
the past through which I am addressed in the present, is 
centered in the story of the Cross.435  
 
 
Observation: MI also permits the mediation of Christian knowledge of God by non-
canonical works; and does so inasmuch as they are centered in the story of the cross. 
This, in part, is because the concept has an autobiographical basis in Baillie's life and 
thought: as a boy, Baillie most profound awareness of God's presence was invariably 
mediated by those works which Christum triebt.    
 
7.3.2.3 The mode of revelation's apprehension: its immediacy      
When in IRRT Baillie contends that knowledge of God is an immediate 
knowledge, he emphasizes the Holy Spirit's action for faith's appropriation of divine 
action as revelation.  As concerning faith itself, Baillie states: 
 
Our contention has been that Christian faith (fides salvifica) 
consists essentially in reliance (fiducia) upon the revelation 
of God in Christ, that this reliance [fiducia] necessarily 
presupposes an acquaintance (notitia) with its object and 
also latently contains an assent (assensus) to certain 
affirmations that can be made about that object, but that 
there are many variations in the degree to which this latent 
assent becomes patent in men’s minds and these 
affirmations are explicitly drawn out.436 
 
                                                           
434  OKG, p. 180. 
435  Ibid., p. 186.  
436 IRRT,  p. 100.  
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The idea of faith propounded mirrors that advanced in OKG.437 However, as it also 
appears in Baillie's thought before OKG's publication, it cannot count as evidence for 
MI's influence on this facet of Baillie's idea of revelation. This is not the case, however, 
concerning Baillie's emphasis on the Holy Spirit's action for faith's appropriation of 
divine action as revelation.   
 
Observation:  With Baillie’s first (overt) emphasis on MI’s epistemology in OKG comes 
Baillie’s increased emphasis on the Holy Spirit's action for Christian knowledge of God 
This is more than a positive historical correlation; MI’s ideas of immediacy, such as the 
immediate apprehension, appropriation, and immediate confirmation of knowledge of 
God, are overtly and epistemologically tied to the Holy Spirit’s action in OKG (not the 
case in Baillie's earlier MT). This epistemological dynamic anticipates IRRT’s emphasis 
on the Holy Spirit's action for direct knowledge of God.  In IRRT, the Holy Spirit is said 
to encounter one in one's present situation so as both to “illuminate” the mind’s 
immediate apprehension of divine action and to "inspire" the appropriation of divine 
action as revelation. This illumination and inspiration includes, with regard specific to the 
Christian believer, an authentication of the Bible’s witness to God's might events in 
history. In this respect, the Holy Spirit's action in the mediation of divine revelation, is 
not unlike The Holy Spirit's action in and to the minds of the biblical writers themselves: 
for only by the Holy Spirit’s presence in and to their concrete situations, were the writers 
also able to apprehend “mighty acts” in history (past or future) as being God’s “mighty 
acts".438 This “illumination” and "inspiration" of the “minds” of the prophets “extended . . 
. to the thoughts of the writers . . . to the very words they employed in the expression of 
these thoughts.”439 According to IRRT’s epistemology of CRE, such illumination, 
apprehension and inspiration is a mediated (by knowledge about historical events and 
biblical language), though immediate knowledge of God.  
                                                           
437 See ibid., Chapter 2, "Ways of Believing". 
438 "The Biblical writers could not have written what they did, had the Holy Spirit of God not been with 
them and in them as they wrote,” IRRT, p. 34.  
439 Ibid., p. 115.   
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 We see, then, that Baillie epistemology in IRRT is one historically anticipated by 
MI. Evidence for this includes Baillie’s use of the language of mediation and immediacy, 
though more importantly Baillie’s reliance on MI’s core epistemology to describe divine 
action. This includes IRRT’s description of the now emphasized historical context that 
mediates God’s mighty acts: God’s action occurs “in, with and under” a sacramental 
universe whose many media (self, others, the world) mediate knowledge of God, and 
point to the logical center of history, Jesus Christ. All revelation, Christian or otherwise, 
is apprehended and appropriated as immediate knowledge of God. 
 
7.3.3. The Sense of the Presence of God (1962) 
We have found in the diachronic trace, with Newlands, that “Baillie’s concern 
throughout The Sense of the Presence of God is to chart the relationship between faith 
and reason, between philosophy and theology.”440 With regard to SPG, the trace has also 
produced substantial evidence that Baillie’s MT finishes his Christian apologetic agenda 
with a focus on MTPP and recourse to MI to defend his epistemological perspective.  
 
7.3.3.1 The sense of God's presence: mediated by three knowledges 
In SPG, Baillie maintains, as does he explicitly in OKG and his early MT, that 
reality is a gradated valuational field known from the revelation of divine perfection: 
 
It cannot indeed be too strongly emphasized that God’s 
revelation of Himself cannot be received by us save in the 
context of our knowledge of finite realities.  Only a being 
who is (a) self-conscious, (b) aware of other selves, and (c) 
aware of corporeal things can have knowledge of God.441  
 
 
Observation: This is a restatement of MI’s epistemology: 
 
I believe the view capable of defence that no one of the 
subjects of our knowledge—ourselves, our fellows, the 
                                                           
440 Newlands, “The Sense of the Presence of God”, p. 162. 
441 SPG, p. 117.  
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corporeal world, and God—is ever presented to us except 
in conjunction with all three of the others.442 
 
 
Accordingly, Baillie uses MI to argue that reality is a gradated valuational field—the very 
field denied by Russell's restrictions on what can knowledge by direct acquaintance. 
 
7.3.3.2 The sense of God's presence: underwritten by MI 
We have found that Baillie's criticism of Russell focuses upon Russell's concept 
of knowledge by acquaintance. Russell contends that knowledge about sensory data from 
the corporeal world (“created” reality or “proximate reality”) is the terminus of 
knowledge of ultimate reality.  Baillie argues that to deny knowledge by acquaintance of 
the “extra-mental world” of the “Really Real” (“uncreated reality” and “ultimate reality”) 
is (a) to depersonalize the “Really Real” as the source and possibility of empirical 
knowledge; (b) to depersonalize humans, through the demotion of each to a “half-man”—
as if humans “know nothing but analysis”;443 (c) to depersonalize the universe in which 
humans should “feel at home”;  (d) to undermine humans' “certitude” of the personal 
quality of reality—of relations between the self, other humans, and the corporeal world. 
This epistemology results in Russell’s ontological reduction of persons to “half-men”, 
according to Baillie.   “ 
 
Observation: MI’s epistemology maintains that “knowledge by acquaintance” is direct 
acquaintance with those realties denied by Russell’s epistemology ("knowledge by 
acquaintance"): God, ourselves, others and the universe. Baillie puts it this way in OKG: 
 
This is what I have tried to express in the conception of a 
mediated immediacy.  In Christ we know God not by 
argument but by personal acquaintance.  In Christ God 
comes to us directly .”444 
                                                           
442 OKG, p. 178. 
443 “‘Reverence, love and devout humility’ are qualities more necessary to wholeness of outlook than 
‘decisive scientific clearness’.  They engage us, and enable us to meet on a far deeper level.  At all events, 
it is with the half-men who know nothing but analysis, and leave us with nothing but the reductive 
naturalism in which it issues, that my present argument has been concerned . . . ” SPG, p. 254.  
444 OKG, pp. 196-197.  
 219 
 
Accordingly, Baillie maintains in SPG that it is better to conceive of the universe as one 
about which we have a mediated knowledge (empirical knowledge, included) that 
mediates immediate knowledge of the extra mental world of realities. Baillie expresses it 
this way, in his final work:   
 
 
Thought implies a ratiocinative process which makes use of 
the apparatus of inference.  But it must not be supposed that 
what is here called ‘immediate knowledge’ [of God] is 
merely sensation, the reception of the organism of sense-
data. It too is a product of intelligence, though not yet of 
reflection . . . the work of nous; but of the nous aisthetikos, 
not of the nous apodeiktikos (or, in the Latin equivalents . . 
. of the ratio intuitiva, not of the ratio discursiva).  When 
such knowledge is said to be immediate, what is meant is 
that it is not mediated by any process of inference.  It is  . . . 
a direct knowledge of the real, extra mental world.  It is 
indeed mediated by sense-data, but it is not one of logical 
entailment [emphasis mine].445 
 
 
Observation: MI’s epistemology contends for all of SPG’s epistemology crystallized in 
the above passage. 
When Baillie argues against Flew, he contends for such mediated-immediate 
knowledge. The language of a "sense" of God's presence, argues Baillie, is meaningful; 
and the knowledge apprehended with this sense—a direct (though, indirect) knowledge—
is, in Baillie's response to Flew's falsification challenge, presumed: faith's denial of God’s 
existence would occur only if this mode of apprehension—an immediate, “single 
illumination” and “sense of the presence of God”—failed. What would be a sign of its 
failure? It would be a situation in which "we were no longer able to discover any such 
meaning in any events but came to regard the whole of our experience and everything as 
that has ever happened as meaningful jumble."446 Essentially, then, faith's obliteration 
                                                           
445 SPG, pp. 51-52. This is Baillie’s interpretation of MacMurray’s concept of mediated immediacy—one 
with which he is in accord here.  
446 See ibid., pp. 72-73. 
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would require a perspective of the universe not unlike that for which Russell's empirical 
reductionism contends: a universe devoid of purposive value, personalities, and 
psychological certitude.  
Baillie’s explicit restatement of knowledge of God as MI in SPG evidences that 
Baillie still conceives of knowledge of God as MI. Baillie’s reliance on MI’s 
epistemology in his arguments against Russell's “knowledge by acquaintance” and Flew's 
falsification challenge in SPG evidences that MI remained important for Baillie’s latter 
MT, Baillie’s last major work included.  
 
7.4. CONCLUSIONS ON BAILLIE’S LATTER MEDIATING THEOLOGY   
My conclusion on Baillie’s thought is twofold: (1) the most important problem for 
Baillie’s latter MT is MTPP; (2) MI is important for Baillie’s latter MT’s position on 
MTPP. My support for these conclusions derives from the diachronic  and my 
observations of it. 
 
7.4.1. Baillie’s Latter MT: Its Apology’s Focus 
We have found evidence that (1) MTPP is the most important problem for 
Baillie’s latter MT, in Baillie’s arguments in his most important latter apologetic works. 
In OKG, Baillie argues that both neo-orthodox theology (i.e. Barth, Brunner) and the 
rationalist legacy (e.g. Aquinas, Anselm, Descartes) have failed to adequately account for 
God’s immanent Presence "in, with and under" creation. Baillie's point of attack: each 
position evidences a faulty conceptualization of the epistemological relationship between 
indirect (mediated) and direct (immediate) knowledge of God.  Barth “unduly [simplifies] 
the spiritual situation of the modern West” with his “denial that there is any implicit 
knowledge which could serve as a starting-point for argument.”447 However, the West 
knows the God whom it rejects, maintains Baillie, as all persons have immediate 
knowledge of God.  Baillie’s arguments against the rationalist theory of religion (Anselm, 
Aquinas, Descartes) also focuses upon the issue of the epistemological relationship 
between direct (immediate) and direct knowledge for knowledge of God. This theory 
makes knowledge “of” God excessively indirect—derived by discursive reasoning.  
                                                           
447 OKG, note #1, p. 15.  
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However, God’s existence cannot be established by invariably indirect knowledge; it is 
established only by direct knowledge of God.  Aquinas rightly insists that ours is 
sacramental universe, and that sensory data (contra Descartes and Anselm) mediate 
knowledge about God's effects; however, knowledge of God entails a personal encounter 
with God “in, with and under” the sacramental universe; that is, to know something of the 
nature of Personality.448 Aquinas rejects the possibility that nature mediates direct 
knowledge of Personality, in favor of direct knowledge of God's effects. This 
epistemology depersonalizes God, however, by making got an Inference. Moreover, it 
does not correspond with the experience of humankind: God is a direct knowledge of 
Personality as disclosed in and to moral consciousness, not an knowledge indirectly 
established by discursive reasoning—an inference.  Anselm's thought rightly recognizes 
the intuitive element for knowledge of God; however, it falls into the rationalist trap of 
thinking that knowledge of God can be logically demonstrated.  However,    
 
 
 
No proof of God’s existence can help us to understand our 
faith in Him, or can in the last resort do anything but hinder 
such understanding, if it be true that it is not by a process of 
inference that our faith has actually been reached . . . It is 
not as the result of an inference of any kind, whether 
explicit or implicit, whether laboriously excogitated or 
swiftly intuited, that the knowledge of God’s reality comes 
to us.  It comes rather through our direct [emphasis mine] 
personal encounter with Him in the Person of Jesus Christ 
His Son our Lord.449 
 
 
Both neo-orthodoxy and rationalism also advance problematic thought on the mediation 
of knowledge of God, in that each makes knowledge of God contingent upon discursive 
knowledge. Barth maintains that knowledge of God must be mediated by knowledge 
about Jesus Christ; Aquinas’s natural theology in effect makes knowledge of God 
mediated by knowledge about Aristotle.  Baillie agrees that knowledge of God is 
                                                           
448 “Not the communication of propositions but the communion of spirits is the last word about divine 
revelation.” John Baillie, The Place of Jesus Christ in Modern Christianity (Edinburgh, 1929), pp. 113-114.  
449 OKG, p. 143.  Baillie’s italicized emphasis.   
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mediated by indirect or second-order knowledge “about” God and other realities; 
however, God is immediately known “in, with and under” the entire range of human 
experience, whether one have knowledge about Jesus Christ or knowledge about 
metaphysical speculation.  Furthermore, each theory's doctrine of the knowledge of God 
presupposes a clear line between God’s grace and fallen human nature. However, no 
clear line of demarcation exists between these self-same facts of human experience. 
Better to contend, Baillie argues, that God’s grace is manifest in God's gracious provision 
of a direct knowledge of Personality to all persons.    
Baillie's arguments against Farrer and Temple in IRRT evidence his continued 
concern with the problem of the epistemological relationship between direct knowledge 
and indirect knowledge for knowledge of God.  When Farrer maintains that divine truth 
comes in the form of images, his is an “exaggeration of the distinctness” between 
imagination and the intellect. Baillie argues that there is inadequate reason to think 
"whereas all propositional knowledge’s apprehension of truth contains an element of 
possible error, the images are given directly by God and contain no such element.450" For 
example: “It is difficult to know why we should suppose that [images] are directly the 
medium of revelation in a sense in which [propositional truths] are not”. Moreover, the 
emphasis on direct images as the medium for knowledge of God, over direct knowledge 
of God, undermines the communal element of revelation. Temple's thought on the 
mediation of revelation—particularly that of an “impersonal” nature—also marginalizes 
the direct knowledge of Personality that is revelation. Temple correctly conceives of the 
material order as a testimony to God's self-disclosure; however, it is a Self who is directly 
disclosed "in, with and under" the medium of nature.     
When, in SPG, Baillie argues against Russell’s logical empiricism, the focus 
remains on the problem of the epistemological relationship between direct and indirect 
knowledge for knowledge of God.  The focus is on Russell's thought about what can be 
directly known. Russell limits knowledge of realities by acquaintance to knowledge of 
sense data, objects of memory, internal states, and ourselves.  Accordingly, he maintains 
that “apart from ‘universals’, knowledge by acquaintance is only with sense-data and not 
with real objects or with real subjects”.  To make the terminus of direct knowledge 
                                                           
450 IRRT, p. 38. 
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sensory data about the corporeal world (“created” reality or “proximate reality”) or a 
universal, and as such to deny immediate knowledge of the “extra-mental world” of the 
“Really Real” (“uncreated reality” and “ultimate reality”) is to incur difficulty—namely, 
to depersonalize human relations; to depersonalize the universe; and, to deny the ground, 
and hence, the possibility, of knowledge by direct acquaintance, be it empirical-scientific 
or otherwise:  God is the ground for direct knowledge “of” lesser “realties” (e.g., the 
material world, other humans, oneself) as well as for indirect knowledge “about” truths, 
including those abstracted by the logical empiricist. "The world we know is known by us 
as one world”451—this because humans have: a knowledge of God by acquaintance that is 
logically prior to all other knowledges (i.e., scientific knowledge); a knowledge which, 
given contemporaneously with knowledge of lesser realities, informs our knowledge of 
the universe: we are, Baillie contends, “self-conscious”, “aware of other selves”, and 
“aware of corporeal things”—this because of our knowledge of God by direct 
acquaintance.  To limit humans’ direct knowledge to knowledge about sense data is to 
turn the human into a “half-man”—one whom, having no direct knowledge of humans, 
God, and the moral basis of reality, can “know nothing but analysis”. 452 Such a half-man 
is, to the ordinary person, an alien—both as a reality and as a concept: the ordinary 
person has an abiding “sense of God’s presence” which pulsates with the “psychological 
certitude” of the existence of personalities, Personalities, and feels "at home in the 
universe".  Russell’s “knowledge by acquaintance” thus incorrectly confines direct 
knowledge of the Really Real to knowledge empirically verified through inferential 
abstraction upon immediately known sensory data. Rather, one should speak of humans 
as having knowledge of God by acquaintance through a sense of God's presence. 
Meaningful language, it also draws strength from ordinary experience, particularly the 
ordinary use of the language of sense.  That such direct knowledge of God is in theory 
falsifiable also counts against Flew's falsification challenge.   
Baillie’s apologetic focus, his criticism’s quality, and his response to that 
criticism in his latter MT evidence that MI is important for Baillie’s latter MT.  
                                                           
451 SPG, pp. 50-51.  
452 “‘Reverence, love and devout humility’ are qualities more necessary to wholeness of outlook than 
‘decisive scientific clearness’.  They engage us, and enable us to meet on a far deeper level.  At all events, 
it is with the half-men who know nothing but analysis, and leave us with nothing but the reductive 
naturalism in which it issues, that my present argument has been concerned . . . ”  Ibid., p. 254.  
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7.4.2.  Baillie’s Latter MT: MI’s Presence 
As ground for my second conclusion, (2) MI is important for Baillie’s latter MT’s 
apologetic position on MTPP, I offer those “observations” that I have made in this 
chapter’s revisitation of Baillie’s latter theology.       
. 
7.5. MI’S IMPORTANCE FOR BAILLIE’S EARLY LIFE AND FORMAL 
EDUCATION 
 As we near the final conclusion on the issue of MI’s importance for Baillie’s MT 
as a whole, I wish to return briefly to Baillie’s memory of his childhood and early-
adulthood experiences, as Baillie’s thought on the matter has implications for our 
evaluation of MI’s importance.    
 
7.5.1. The Mediation of Baillie’s Childhood Knowledge of God.  
Most central to MI’s epistemology is the claim “that no one of the subjects of our 
knowledge—ourselves, our fellows, the corporeal world, and God—is ever presented to 
us except in conjunction with all three of the others.”453 These knowledges can lead 
persons to knowledge of Jesus Christ (if mediated by knowledge about Jesus Christ) by 
direct acquaintance, The Mediator who mediates a deeper knowledge or awareness of 
God.  
When we compare Baillie’s autobiography of his early childhood, which 
describes Baillie’s childhood knowledge of God as a MI, with MI’s conceptual 
architecture, we find several conceptual parallels between the two. This, I shall maintain, 
too suggests that Baillie was formulating, if perhaps naively and somewhat crudely, a 
concept of MI well before the publication of OKG. 
 
7.5.1.1 Mediation by knowledge of others and knowledge about Jesus  
MI contends that knowledge of God is always mediated by human relations—by 
knowledge of other persons, as minds, by personal acquaintance.  Baillie, likewise, 
                                                           
453 OKG, p. 178. 
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relates that his childhood knowledge of God was one mediated by relationships—by the 
thought and deed of his parents, for instance.  As he puts it:  
 
 
I was born into a Christian home, and God’s earliest 
disclosure of His reality to my infant soul was mediated to 
me by the words and deeds of my parents.454     
 
 
Were those “ words” which “mediated” God’s Presence to Baillie’s infant soul, words 
about the Christian faith? Baillie has been found to suggest that they were: somewhat 
confused about the language of the Westminster Shorter Catechism, Baillie got the basic 
point of the lesson, nevertheless: for he states that he “grew up understanding and 
believing that only in the everlasting enjoyment of God’s presence could my life ever 
reach its proper and divinely appointed fulfillment.”  In the following excerpt, Baillie 
illuminates how his parents’ Bible and Bible-related language mediated to him his infant 
awareness of God’s Presence. He also identifies other factors involved in what he 
rembers to be the mediation of his knowledge of God.    
 
 
I cannot remember a time a time when I did not know that 
my parents and their household were part of a wider 
community which was under the same single authority 
[God]. Nor again, can I recall a time when I did not know 
that this authority was bound up with, and indeed seemed 
to emanate from, a certain story. As far back as I can 
remember anything, my parents and my nurses were 
already speaking to me of Abraham and Isaac and Jacob, of 
Moses and David, of God’s covenant with the Israelites and 
of their journey through the wilderness, of the culmination 
of the story in the coming of Jesus Christ, God’s only Son, 
whom he sent to earth to suffer and die for our salvation; 
and then of the apostles and martyrs and saints and “Scots 
Worthies” whose golden deeds brought the story down to 
very recent days. And I knew that the story somehow was 
the source of the authority with which I was confronted. I 
                                                           
454 Ibid., p. 5.  
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could not hear a Bible story read without being aware that 
in it I was somehow being confronted with a solemn 
presence that had in it both sweetness and rebuke. Nor do I 
remember a day when I did not already dimly know that 
this presence was God. 
 It was, then, through the media of my boyhood 
home, the Christian community of which it formed a part, 
and the “old, old, story” from which that community drew 
its life, that God first revealed himself to me. This is a 
simple matter of fact. But what I take to be a matter of fact 
in it is not only that God used these media but that in using 
them He actually did reveal Himself to my soul.  
For what I seemed to know was not merely that God 
had declared his will to my parents and that they in their 
turn had declared their will to me, but also through my 
parents God had declared his will to me... [W]hat gave the 
[Bible] story its power over my mind and imagination and 
conscience was the knowledge that ‘in, with and under’ this 
speaking to these others of long ago He was now speaking 
to myself.455  
 
 
 
Baillie relates that God’s revelation to his “soul” was mediated by his knowledge of his 
parents—by the “media” of his parents’ deeds and “in, with and under” their Bible-
centered language. Similarly, Baillie suggests that his knowledge of God was mediated 
by his knowledge about Church doctrine (e.g., the “strong evangelical note” which turned 
his mind often to “the necessity of regeneration”). Elsewhere, he discloses that certain 
non-biblical stories of his youth mediated the “same Presence as met [him] in the 
Bible”—inasmuch as its language was “somehow of a piece with the Bible stories.”456 
Baillie, similarly, relates how relationships were important in the mediation of knowledge 
of God—it was his fellowship with his “Church community” that God “first revealed 
himself to me”.  This emphasis on church relations for the mediation of knowledge of 
God is consistent with Baillie’s remark that it was his joint partaking of the Lord’s 
Supper which, in particular, mediated to him a profound awareness of God’s Presence.  
The media which mediated Baillie’s earliest awareness of God’s presence mirror 
MI’s conceptualization of the mediation of Christian knowledge of God; that knowledge 
                                                           
455 Ibid., pp. 183-184. 
456 Ibid., p. 186. 
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of God is always mediated by knowledge of others, knowledge about the history of the 
Christian tradition, and knowledge about the Gospel of Jesus Christ.  Baillie’s emphasis 
on what is presumed to be childhood relationships characterized by koinonia also reflect 
MI’s position that Christian knowledge of God is mediated by agapē.   
 
7.5.1.2 Mediation by knowledge of the universe 
Baillie’s autobiographical account of his childhood knowledge of God does not 
emphasis the universe's mediation of that knowledge.  Baillie does, however, use 
sacramental language—“in, with, and under”—to describe how his parents’ Bible-
centered language mediated to him knowledge of God: “What gave the [Bible] story its 
power over my mind and imagination and conscience was the knowledge that ‘in, with 
and under’ this speaking to these others of long ago He was now speaking to myself.”  
Presumably, it was not the language of “in, with and under” to which Baillie was 
routinely exposed as a child, given his Airlock church’s being Calvinistic theological in 
orientation; however, that he does use this particular sacramental language to describe his 
childhood knowledge of God does provide some support for my position that MI’s idea 
of mediation has a basis in Baillie’s thought about his childhood knowledge of God: MI 
describes knowledge of God as being mediated “in, with and under” our knowledge of a 
“sacramental universe”.   
 
7.5.1.3 Mediation by self-knowledge  
 
As little can I reach a day when I was conscious of myself 
but not of God as I can reach a day when I was conscious 
of myself but not of other human beings.457 
 
 
Here, Baillie restates that his knowledge of God was mediated by his parents' deeds. This 
remark reflects MI's position that knowledge of God is knowledge always mediated by 
knowledge of oneself and others.   
 
                                                           
457 Ibid., p.5.  
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7.5.2. The Immediacy of Baillie’s Childhood Knowledge of God  
MI’s logic presupposes that a knowledge of God is an immediate knowledge—a 
direct knowledge of God  “in, with and under” our “knowledge of others” in a 
“sacramental universe”—and that immediate knowledge of God is more directly present 
in and to our souls than our knowledge of other persons.458  
When Baillie describes his childhood awareness of God, he does not say that his 
knowledge of God was an “immediate” knowledge.  However, it is clear that he does not 
reduce this knowledge to an inferential, propositional, or discursive knowledge. Rather, 
he describes his childhood knowledge of God’s presence with the language of his being 
“somehow aware”—somehow having “a recognition, as vague and articulate as [one] 
will” of the “divine factor".  
 
 
My earliest memories have a definitely religious 
atmosphere.  They contain as part of their substance a 
recognition, as vague and articulate as you will, yet quite 
unmistakable for anything else, of what I have now learned 
to call the divine as a factor in my life.  I cannot remember 
a time when I did not already feel, in some dim way, that I 
was ‘not my own’ to do with as I pleased, but was claimed 
by a higher power not my own . . . For, as far back as I can 
remember anything, I was somehow aware that my parents 
lived under the same kind of authority as that which, 
through them, was communicated to me.  I can see that my 
parents too behaved as though they, even they, were not 
their own . . .459 
 
 
Similarly, the Gospel "somehow was the source of the authority with which [he] was 
confronted.”  When Baillie uses this somewhat vague language to describe his childhood 
“awareness” of God’s presence to his “soul”, he is referring to the immediacy of 
knowledge of God—the central tenant of MI for which Baillie contends throughout OKG.   
 Baillie’s reflection on his childhood knowledge of God suggests, then, that MI has 
a very strong autobiographical basis. 
                                                           
458 See ibid., pp. 238-239. 
459 Ibid., p. 5. 
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7.6. CONCLUSION ON MAJOR RESEARCH ISSUE #2: MI’S IMPORTANCE 
FOR BAILLIE’S MEDIATING THEOLOGY  
 
The prevalent position on MI’s importance for Baillie’s critical thought has been 
that MI is "an important feature”460of OKG—that MI is (1) but one important concept (2) 
for Baillie’s apologetic (3) at one phase in its development—in Baillie's OKG (1939).  As 
over against this position, I conclude that, inasmuch as Baillie’s MT is a Christian 
apologetic, MI is (1) the most important concept (2) for Baillie’s critical MT as a whole 
(3) throughout its development (1926-1960).   
 Ground for my conclusion derives largely from my diachronic trace of the 
development of Baillie’s MT (Chapters 3-5).  That trace reveals that Baillie’s MT is 
primarily concerned with this problem:  
 
The epistemological relationship between indirect (mediated) knowledge  
and direct (immediate) knowledge for knowledge of God. [MTPP]   
 
This is a more precise interpretation of the focus of Baillie’s MT than has been provided 
in previous Baillie research: it has observed that Baillie’s MT evidences a sustained 
interest was in the problems of knowledge of God and revelation, in general. As such, it 
stands as a plausible contribution to the research. 
My diachronic trace’s tracking of the development of Baillie’s apologetic focus 
on MTPP has thrown into a bolder relief MI’s importance for Baillie’s MT:  
 
MI is Baillie’s proposed solution to the problem upon which he focused 
throughout his roughly thirty-five-year academic career: MTPP. 
 
When I maintain that MI is Baillie’s proposed solution to the problem which occupied his 
academic career, I also rely on ground which, when translated, constitutes a major finding 
in the research on John Baillie’s thought:  
                                                           
460 James Brown, “John Baillie” (pp. 17-29), p. 23. In Theologians of our Time, A.W. Hastings and E. 
Hastings, eds., Edinburgh, T&T Clark, 1966. 
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In Baillie’s early MT, we see a nascent version of MI.   
 
As primary support for this novel interpretation, I have thoroughly documented a Baillie 
whose early apologetic repeatedly argues that knowledge of God is an indirectly direct 
knowledge—this as within the context of an exposition of Baillie's debate with several 
theological and philosophical positions on the issue of the indirectness and directness of 
knowledge of God. That Baillie's early thought would contend that knowledge of God is 
indirectly direct (mediated and immediate) is not entirely surprising, given that we have 
also found Baillie describing his childhood experience of God as a mediated immediacy:  
given Baillie's more words on the impact of his childhood experience, it seems 
reasonable to think that the mediating theologian would have entertained a concept 
similar to MI before his publication of OKG in 1939 at about the age of 53 years. 
Likewise, it is not unreasonable to think that Baillie would employ MI in works penned 
after OKG, as research has suggested:461 save that Baillie’s latter (and early) MT 
gravitates toward the problems with which MI’s epistemology is conceptually integrated, 
Baillie’s ideas of knowledge of God and revelation,462one should think Baillie not 
inclined to jettison possibly his "most original contribution" to the doctrine of the 
knowledge463 after the publication of OKG, but to exploit his contribution for apologetic 
gain. We have found that he does, if also not without difficulties. 
My ground for MI’s central importance for Baillie’s MT also rests in part on my 
contention that there is continuity in Baillie’s epistemology across its development—this 
despite, for example, the latter Baillie’s increased Christocentrism and, from about the 
mid 1930’s until Baillie’s death, the latter Baillie’s increased emphasis on God’s 
transcendence. Here too the previous research has suggested the feasibility of such 
ground. In particular, I have in mind a remark from Heron, who suggests that mediated 
immediacy both conceptually and diachronically connects Baillie’s early thought, whose 
emphasis is on the immediacy of God in general revelation, with Baillie’s latter thought, 
whose emphasis is on mediation of God in special revelation: 
                                                           
461 See Fergusson, “Orthodox Liberal”, p. 149 and Newlands, “The Sense of the Presence of God”, p.155.  
462 Klinefelter, “Our Knowledge of God”, p. 409.  
463 Fergusson, Selected Writings, p. 3. 
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In Our Knowledge of God (1939) he put a much stronger 
emphasis on the otherness and transcendence of God… 
Alongside the new emphasis, he still wished to preserve a 
general revelation of God in all religion, and a direct 
awareness of him in the human heart, even though it might 
not be a conscious or reasoned awareness. This immediate 
awareness he saw as brought out into the open by external 
mediation—through the world around us, through other 
people and most of all through the impact of Jesus himself. 
The result is what he liked to call a ‘mediated immediacy’ 
in our knowledge of God [emphasis mine].464  
 
 
As support for what one might call the epistemological organicity of Baillie’s mediating 
theological development, I have documented conceptual parallels between Baillie’s 
concept of universal revelation and mediated immediacy’s description of a specifically 
Christian revelation. For one, we have found that each maintains that revelation is a 
process always mediated-immediate knowledge. We have also found Baillie attempting 
to forge an epistemological connection between the immediacy of faith in Jesus Christ, 
and the immediacy of universal knowledge of God found in humans’ moral 
consciousness of value: from start to finish, Baillie’s MT maintains that revelation, be it 
universal, Christian or otherwise, is always mediated by our moral consciousness of 
value. Likewise, we have found that Baillie's MT contends that other-oriented love is the 
highest value of moral consciousness. Accordingly, we have found that when MI’s 
description of Christian revelation centers upon how the Mediator mediates the Christian 
faith’s more profound, immediate knowledge of God, it too emphasizes the importance of 
moral value—agapē—for the mediation of faith in Jesus Christ—and this despite, as 
Fergusson has rightly observed, the latter mediating theologian’s jettisoning, relatively 
speaking, of both a theology contextualized in largely Kantian terms and a method 
marked quasi-phenomenological in its approach to religious experience. 
                                                           
464 Alisdair I. C Heron.  A Century of Protestant Theology. Guildford: Lutterworth Press, 1980, p. 124. 
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 In passing, although I have maintained that revelation is always a mediated-
immediate knowledge of God in Baillie’s thought; and, by extension, have also employed 
this element of Baillie’s thought as additional ground for MI’s importance; I would not be 
interpreted as maintaining to that MI is a self-contained description of universal 
knowledge of God. For one, although Baillie's early MT is assuredly not as overtly 
Christocentric Baillie's latter MT, Baillie does tie his concept of “Christ” specifically to 
“Jesus Christ”,465 thereby denying that all humans have knowledge about God’s action in 
Jesus Christ. As such, I do not interpret Baillie, at any stage, as contending for a Christ 
known universally, which is to say, known by all persons. Likewise, MI contends for 
faith in Jesus Christ and not, for example, for something along the line of a universal 
Christ consciousness. Consequently, while Baillie does espouse a universalist concept of 
salvation that admits of varying degrees; and maintains that saving knowledge of God is, 
regardless of how one encounters God and lives a life of faith in God, invariably a 
mediated-immediate knowledge in Baillie’s thought; when MI describes knowledge of 
God as mediated specifically by the Mediator, Jesus Christ, its squarely Jesus-
Christocentrism effectively rules it out MI as a self-contained model of universal 
knowledge of God.  
That said, it is clear that MI is important for Baillie’s thought on divine action, 
revelation and religious experience (see Chapter 2); and that Baillie would have MI’s 
epistemology integrate his ideas of special and universal revelation. As such, MI is also 
essential to the epistemological undergirding that underwrites Baillie’s soft pluralist 
theology—one that advances a Universalist doctrine of the atonement. Although it 
remains to be seen if MI’s logic is successful at such integration, here is additional 
support for my claim that MI is the most important concept for Baillie’s MT.466 
 This leaves us with the third and final research issue, MI's importance for 
contemporary Christian thought.  
                                                           
465 See IOR, p. 467  
466 This is to say nothing about MI’s plausible importance for Baillie’s dialogue with other thinkers in the 
university setting: McIntyre notes Baillie's preoccupation with “theology’s compresence in the University 
with other disciplines” and ties it to Baillie's belief in the “mediated immediacy” of “God’s presence in, 
with, and under culture.” “New College Bulletin”, September 1983, 
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“Dr. Baillie is, indeed, a singularly 
independent thinker, and both those who 
read him now, and those who will be in the 
position someday to assess the value of his 
work as a Christian theologian, must not 
expect to follow his expositions as though he 
were taking them along familiar routes.”467  
 
8. MI: A CONTRIBUTION TO CONTEMPORARY CHRISTIAN THOUGHT 
We have found the scholarly criticism of MI to be overwhelmingly negative and 
to center primarily upon MI’s logic. Criticism which supports academic theology’s claim 
that MI is not a contribution to contemporary Christian thought, this negative criticism of 
MI, in turn, adds credence to historians’ and Baillie researchers’ also present claim that 
Baillie’s MT does have a concept with value for contemporary Christian thought. In this 
chapter, I will challenge those widely held claims, by arguing that one of MI’s four 
functions—MI’s description of CRE—is a promising contribution to contemporary 
Christian thought.  
 
8.1. EVALUATING MI’S LOGIC: METHODOLOGY CONSIDERATIONS 
We begin with the fundamental issue of the criteria required for MI’s evaluation. 
When evaluating MI, we must keep in mind the following.  
 
(1) The function of MI under examination.  This thesis indicates that MI has four 
functions, and not merely two functions (a description of revelation; an argument 
for knowledge of God), as prior research has often supposed. One of MI’s four 
functions is a normative epistemology—an argument for the reasonableness of the 
claim that humans can have knowledge of God. Three of MI’s functions are 
descriptive epistemologies—descriptions of the processes involved divine action, 
revelation and religious experience.  
  
                                                           
467 John Kenneth Mozley, Some Tendencies in British Theology  (London: S.P.C.K., 1951), p. 149. 
 234 
(2) MI’s ground. Although MI’s epistemology is ultimately grounded in 
divine revelation, when Baillie argues for MI he takes a typically empirical and 
somewhat multi-disciplinary approach in his attempt to substantiate each of MI’s 
four functions. Specifically, Baillie attempts to ground MI in: (a) social-scientific 
(psychology, sociology, history) interpretations of how humans, in general, come 
to know the world, the self, and each other; 468 (b) an autobiographical account of 
his own experience of God—“in, with and under” which he has found knowledge 
of God (revelation) to be a mediated immediacy (see Chapter 7).  Baillie, in turn, 
(c) often seeks to correlate (a-b), which amount to an empirical epistemological 
basis for the reasonableness of knowledge of god as MI, with a doctrine of the 
knowledge of God, the ultimately theological-epistemological basis of which is 
faith’s veridical immediate of God (i.e., revelation-as-MI). Baillie’s attempt to 
ground MI in a positive correlation—one between his theological epistemology of 
revelation and his social-scientific account of religious experience—reflects the 
correlative theological method feature by Baillie’s MT in general.  
 
(3) Theological dismissals of MI. We have found empirical, neo-Orthodox and 
Christian evangelical theologians criticizing MI, on the ground that MI fails to 
square with the theology of their respective Christian groups.   
 
Here, I wish to entertain (3) and to raise this question: Is MI’s seeming conflict with any 
one theological epistemology adequate ground for evaluating MI’s promise for 
contemporary Christian thought? I do not think so. For one, the leading Baillie research 
makes plain that an evaluation of Baillie’s MT will also consider the implications of 
philosophical perspectives. We recall, for example, Newlands’s observation that          
 
Debates between realists and anti-realists have reached 
levels of sophistication unknown to Baillie . . . No doubt 
Baillie would have been a keen observer of these debates 
and would have drawn the implications for his theology.469  
 
                                                           
468 Though it is the case that Baillie views the Bible as being a historical record of religious experience.     
469 Newlands, “The Sense of the Presence of God”, p. 161. 
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Baillie, of course, is not here to draw those implications; however, we are in the position 
to bring these and similar philosophical advances to bear on an evaluation on MI’s 
epistemology. Accordingly, Fergusson appeals to the philosophers Anscombe and 
MacIntyre as support for his claim that “any attempt [such as Baillie’s] to generate a 
system of belief from our deepest moral intuitions is fundamentally misguided.” Indeed, 
these philosophers’ perspectives are “deeply problematic for Baillie’s apologetic 
strategy.”470  Of course, they are not possibly problematic, if one does not think them 
relevant to a critique of Baillie’s thought, in the first place.  
Baillie’s thought does itself testify to the need to evaluate it from a philosophical 
perspective. For one, Baillie’s ambitious MT often engages, as we have found at several 
turns, philosophical thought.471Accordingly, Baillie specifically relates MI’s logic of 
immediate knowledge of God to a variety of sources, not all of which are strictly 
theological in orientation. This includes, for example, Baillie’s consideration of MI’s 
epistemology in light of: (1) doctrine derived from Baillie’s Protestant church heritage 
(e.g., Westminster Confession of Faith); (2) empirical data concerning “religious” and 
“non-religious” experience; (3) Christian and non-Christian religious traditions; (4) 
various fields and disciplines—psychology, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, 
ethics, philosophy of psychology, for instance; and, even, (5) the unconscious mind. 
Baillie’s overtly multi-disciplinary use of MI’s epistemology is in accordance with MI’s 
four primary functions, each of which weighs in on God’s presence “in, with and under” 
each of the above loci (1-5). It is thus clear that MI’s logic must be evaluated from 
multiple perspectives; and one need not consider, as additional support, Baillie’s 
employment of the nascent form of MI in his early MT’s engagement with manifold 
theological, philosophical and psychological theories.  
                                                           
470 “Orthodox Liberal”, p. 135. 
471 We recall, for instance, Klinefelter’s remark that “John Baillie both temperamentally and professionally 
served as a mediator and interpreter among competing Continental, British, and American theologies; 
between naturalism and supernaturalism; reason and revelation; science and history; empiricism and 
rationalism; theology and philosophy; morality and religion; orthodoxy and liberalism; liberalism and neo-
orthodoxy, neo-orthodoxy and Post-Barthian liberalism; and finally, between the several Christian and non-
Christian communions.” Donald S. Klinefelter, “The Theology of John Baillie”, p. 434. 
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This is not to say that MI should be immune to criticism from any one theology.  
There is, for instance, a place for confessionalist-theological rejections of theological and 
philosophical concepts, as Ward472 indicates. Moreover, when the claim to immediate 
knowledge of God is sheltered from theological criticism, such “protective strategies” 
invariably compromise our understanding of the epistemology of religious experience.473 
I would not have that. Neither am I suggesting that an evaluation of MI’s logic should 
place the onus on Baillie’s critics—that they should prove MI’s logic is self-
contradictory; clearly, that onus is on Baillie.474Nonetheless, I reject as wholly inadequate 
that tendency which we have witnessed in the research: to deride MI’s promise for 
Christian thought, on the ground that its logic fails to promote the dogma of any one 
Christian group. A theological-evaluatory method whose non-construct validity has 
repeatedly failed to address adequately, let alone to assess fully, MI’s multi-faceted 
complexity and conceptual richness; a method whose unduly narrow perspective has 
impeded our understanding of MI’s meaning—this, as evidence in its proponent’s shared 
eisegetical inclination to interpret, to evaluate and to dismiss MI’s logic, according to a 
rather truncated interpretation of MI's functionality (two functions, as opposed to four) —
here are the fruits of this approach.  It will not suffice for the judicious evaluation of MI’s 
logic, including that logic’s present promise for Christian thought.  
 
                                                           
472 Religion and Revelation, pp. 36-42.  
473 See Proudfoot, Religious Experience. 
474Indeed, let us go against much of our understanding of MI’s logic (Chapter 6), and presume that D.C. 
Macintosh rightly maintains that MI’s logic evidences that Baillie is being unduly dogmatic, whereas 
Macintosh’s empirical-theological hands, unlike Baillie’s “dualist hands”, have abated the perrenial issue 
of mind-body dualism. Let us also presume that D.W. Torrance rightly contends that MI evidences Baillie’s 
poor “theological understanding” when it allegedly “separates faith from knowledge”, whereas Torrance's 
Barthian tradition contrarily evidences a quite solid  “theological understanding” of the epistemological 
connection between “faith and knowledge” when, unlike MI’s epistemology, it epistemologically separates 
Christian faith in God from a knowledge of God denied to all humans, when it severs an ontological 
connection between unregenerate humans and God. Let us allow further still that Henry rightly maintains 
that Baillie’s epistemology of immediacy denies “epistemic access” to “objective reality” when it allegedly 
denies revelation’s “cognitive content”, where as Henry’s epistemology champions humankinds’ epistemic 
access to God, when it denies that all humans have knowledge of an objectively-existing God—it is 
certainly the case that said onus rests upon on Baillie’s thought, as: (1) MI is a relatively obscure concept in 
the literature; (2) MI’s logic is indeed, by inspection, seemingly self-contradictory; (3) MI’s critics, such as 
the aforementioned, can not be relied upon to provide insight into MI’s seemingly “paradoxical” logic (as 
Baillie puts it), as they often admit confusion about MI’s logic. 
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8.2. MI'S LOGIC OF KNOWLEDGE OF GOD:  ACCURATELY, ALBEIT 
DOGMATICALLY AND IMPRECISELY CRITICIZED 
I propose, therefore, that we take a different, if also somewhat unconventional, 
approach toward MI’s evaluation. Specifically, I propose a method which: (1) evaluates 
each of MI’s four functions and each of its two types of immediacy (normative-
epistemological, descriptive- epistemological); (2) evaluates MI’s epistemology on its 
own ground, including MI’s appeal to multi-disciplinary intellectual currents 
(philosophical, psychological and theological) for its ground; (3) subjects MI’s 
epistemology to more stringent and contemporary criticism, including insights from both 
philosophical-epistemological and empirical cognitive-psychological research concerned 
with CRE; (4) gathers up what survives the evaluation, and assesses MI’s promise for 
contemporary Christian thought. An approach that is essential for getting at the broader 
research issue, the extent to which Baillie’s MT affords contemporary Christian though a 
promising concept, it is one faithful to Baillie’ multi-disciplinary use of MI and 
warranted by the leading Baillie research’s insight into how Baillie would employ MI and 
evaluate MI, were he alive.  
 
8.2.1. MI's Normative-Epistemological Function: Its Logic of Immediacy Evaluated 
MI’s internal logical consistency has been the primary target of the scholarly 
criticism. As such, we begin with an evaluation of the logical consistency of MI’s first 
function, its normative-epistemological function. 
 
8.2.1.1 Normative-epistemological immediacy and the criterion of internal logical 
consistency: difficulties 
We recall Baillie’s claim that knowledge of God is analogous to knowledge of 
human minds, in that the logic of each involves: (1) a direct acquaintance with or 
immediate “knowledge of” minds (“realities”) that is (2) mediated by one’s indirect, 
abstract “knowledge about” (“truths”) the corporeal world, (3) “in, with and under” 
which these minds are immediately known.  This immediate knowledge of God and 
human minds is dependent upon (4) an immediate apprehension (“faith”, “a primary 
mode of apprehension” that transcends tactile-sensory perception); (5) an immediate 
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assent to belief (“faith”-as-“trust”) in the objective existence of each “reality” irreducible 
to the deliverances of discursive reasoning, including a highest inference; and (6) an 
immediate confirmation or verification (a “psychological certitude”) and not a logical 
certainty of the authenticity of the human’s encounter with another mind.  Knowledge of 
God and knowledge of humans are also analogous in that (7) direct, primary personal 
knowledge “of” these realities can epistemologically correspond to second-order truths 
“about” these realities. This “other-minds” analogy (as it has been called) is underwritten 
by a critical-realist epistemology that stipulates: humans can have and do have a 
mediated-immediate knowledge of an objectively existing God that is (partially) 
analogous to humans’ mediated-immediate knowledge of objectively existing human 
minds. Baillie’s ground for the analogy is ultimately theological: the God-human 
ontological and epistemological correspondences are ultimately known by faith (trust; 
i.e., divine revelation)—a response to faith’s apprehension of divine action. Faith’s 
apprehension and appropriation of divine disclosure in Jesus Christ is possible in part, 
because of its mediation by moral consciousness: all humans have, in their moral 
consciousness of value, immediate knowledge of knowledge of the ground of all being 
and knowing who is Value. God and knowledge of God provides the condition for the 
mediation and experience of immediate knowledge—not merely of seeming 
knowledge—of other realities (minds).  
The logic of the other-minds analogy, which underwrites MI’s normative-
epistemological function (to argue for the reasonableness of knowledge of God), 
presupposes, then, veridical immediate knowledge of God. Does Baillie logically 
contradict himself when he maintains that humans have both an epistemologically 
immediate (non-discursive) knowledge of God (and human minds), and a mediated 
(discursive) knowledge about God (and human minds)? We have found the scholarly 
criticism maintaining that mediated knowledge and immediate knowledge are strictly 
logically incompatible and/or logically incompatible, as they are psychologically 
incompatible. We recall that the main line of this often not fully developed argument is: 
discursive knowledge about someone (mediated knowledge) logically negates the 
possibility of non-discursive knowledge of (immediate knowledge) that someone, be that 
someone God, other humans, or oneself. The present concern, then, is not, for example, 
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whether the epistemic status of MI’s pre-reflective awareness can theoretically constitute 
justified true belief. Neither is the concern even with what might constitute justification-
conferring conditions for immediate knowledge.  The concern, rather, is whether it is 
logically possible to have immediate “knowledge of” someone’s mind—in the first place. 
 
8.2.1.2 Normative-epistemological immediacy and the problem of intentionality: 
logical difficutlies 
I shall argue that MI’s logic of immediacy suffers several difficulties, including 
its claim that humans have immediate knowledge. We begin with the problem of 
intentionality and its “implications” from MI’s (analogous minds-based) function as a 
normative epistemology. 
The problem of intentionality is the thought that consciousness of something (or 
someone) presupposes direction at and/or knowledge about that something (or someone). 
The argument, in brief, is that one must recognize object “X”—hence, know “that X” is 
being recognized—in order to have knowledge of X. However, if subject “S” has 
knowledge “that X”, then it would appear to follow logically that S has propositional 
knowledge “about X”. However, if S has propositional knowledge “about X”, then, the 
question arises: How is immediate knowledge “of X” logically possible? For immediate 
knowledge is, by definition, non-propositional knowledge.  
At first glance, this strikes me as a reasonable line of argument. Indeed, even 
when Baillie does maintain, on theological ground, that God provides practical 
knowledge in a direct encounter—that is, does not provide “knowledge that”, but 
“knowledge what” (we are to do) and/or “knowledge how” (we should live our lives)—it 
would appear that one must still have to know “that God” is being “immediately” known.  
Indeed, the problem of intentionality (hereafter, POI) must be brought to bear not only on 
Baillie’s enduring position that humans have immediate knowledge of God in their moral 
consciousness of value; it must be applied also to MI’s epistemology: MI’s epistemology, 
though concerned primarily with a specifically Christian knowledge of God, is dependent 
upon Baillie’s claim that humans have immediate knowledge of God in their moral 
consciousness of value: it is because humans have immediate knowledge of Goodness, 
that they are able, at least in part, to recognize Goodness—indeed, Godness in Jesus 
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Christ. Consequently, inasmuch as POI undermines the claim for moral consciousness’ 
immediate knowledge of God, POI’s logic, by extension, infects MI’s epistemology of 
Christian knowledge of God. Then, of course, there is still the issue of POI’s implications 
for MI’s epistemology per se.  
As we have seen, the criticism of MI has tended to be short on both the 
sophistication of its arguments and, with that, the substantiation of its claims. 
Consequently, we will have to strengthen those arguments by anticipating how the could 
plausibly be developed. For example, one could maintain, in defense of the logic of 
immediacy that underwrites MI’s other-minds analogy, that MI’s epistemology 
presupposes that S does not know at the (T1) initial time of the mind-encounter, be it a 
God-human or a human-human encounter, whom S is encountering—i.e., that it is only at 
(T2) a latter time that one comes to know “immediately” that one knows God (“that 
God”). The same line of reasoning could be applied to immediate knowledge of human 
minds. This seems a plausible line of defense for MI’s epistemology, as MI’s 
epistemology does allow that humans have something like subconscious pre-reflective 
knowledge of God (cf. T1). We have also found (Chapter 2) that, accordingly, the 
Christian apologist should aim to bring to the fore of humans’ consciousness (cf. T2) 
such latent, non-discursive knowledge of God (cf. Baillie’s advocacy of Cook Wilson’s 
epistemology in OKG).  
This line of defense against POI would incur at least two difficulties, however.  
For one, it is seemingly logically non-reconcilable will Baillie’s final position on the 
logic of a mediated-immediate knowledge of God. In SPG Baillie maintains, as does he 
relentlessly through his career, that immediate knowledge of other minds is always 
mediated by propositional knowledge, though never established by logical entailment nor 
verified by logical certainty. Accordingly, he maintains that immediate or non-
propositional knowledge of God derives from a “primary mode of apprehension”, faith, 
and that “psychological certitude” is that which verifies as veridical knowledge of God. 
To contend that psychological certitude validates a direct apprehension “that God” is 
being immediately known, however, is merely to reassert that one can have an immediate 
knowledge of God devoid of logical certainty. While this move may cohere with Baillie’s 
theological epistemology—namely, a priori knowledge of God is mediated by ordinary 
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human experience—to counter POI with the logic that S, at (T1), knew, though did not 
know consciously that S knew, that S was directly encountering Mind; but that S did 
come, at (T2), to know consciously (albeit still immediately or non-propositionally) the 
Mind hitherto encountered directly; is, I think, to explain away the very issue: the 
possibility of non-contradictory immediate knowledge of God (and human minds) in the 
first place (and at the first time). Secondly, this tack would plausibly introduce logical-
coherence difficulties for MI’s logic: it would suppose that S engaged in additional 
discursive reasoning and abstraction (mediated thought) between (T1) the time of S’s 
direct encounter with a subconsciously known God and (T2) the time that S comes to the 
conscious realization that S has had knowledge of God—a knowledge which at (T2) is 
now disclosed to S by the “primary mode of apprehension” and verified by a 
“psychological certitude” as being thus: S has subconsciously, latently and immediately 
had immediate knowledge of God all along—i.e., since (T1). This strikes me as a 
plausibly escapist strategy—were it even admitted as coherent reasoning. In short, if 
indeed it is problematic enough to contend persuasively that a mediated-immediate 
knowledge of God could (somehow) bypass propositional knowledge “that God” at T1; 
this scenario demands that yet more discursive language and cognitive operations 
mediate (i.e., provide more propositional “knowledge that’s” to bear upon) one’s now 
consciously immediate knowledge of one’s hitherto subconsciously immediate (i.e., non-
propositional) “knowledge of” God (or another mind). While such additional 
ratiocination may facilitate the sensory mediation of (seemingly) immediate or intuitive 
knowledge of (seemingly) non-corporeal abstract phenomena (e.g., intuitive knowledge 
of mathematics and cognitive insight into physics-oriented theorizing475); Baillie 
ostensibly maintains the contrary: there is a negative correlation between propositional 
knowledge about non-corporeal realities and immediate knowledge of those realities. 
Indeed, language's logic can confound humans’ apprehension of the very ground of Being 
                                                           
475For an instructive account of the popularity of mathematical platonism amongst mathematicians, see: 
Grygiel, Wojciech. "Mathematicians on Mathematical Platonism: An Interesting Discussion (Matematycy o 
platonizmie matematycznym. Zapis ciekawej dyskusji)", in Logos i Ethos (Logos and Ethos), 2, 2010, pp. 
7-26. For a classic approach to mathematical platonism, see: Gottlob Frege's 1884 publication Die 
Grundlagen der Arithmetik, eine logisch mathematische Untersuchung über den Begriff der Zahl. Breslau: 
W. Koebner. Transl. as The Foundations of Arithmetic: A Logico-Mathematical Enquiry into the Concept 
of Number by J. L. Austin. 1953. Oxford: Blackwell. Second edn. 
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and Knowledge—i.e., obfuscate knowledge of the Personality who makes immediate 
knowledge logically possible.476If, then, S has more propositional knowledge at (T2) then 
at (T1), it is not entirely clear how an increasingly language-laden S at (T2) would be 
better equipped epistemically for immediate knowledge of Mind. In keeping with 
Baillie's logic, better that S should come to Jesus with the so-called mind of a child—
particularly if the mediation of immediate knowledge of Mind entails a noetic structure 
bereft of discursive knowledge of Mind. Regardless, this line does not persuade as a 
rebuttal of POI.  
We can push it a bit further, however: given the logical difficulties that attend to 
Baillie’s claim—discursive reasoning (i.e., mediated knowledge) can obscure a Theo-
logic (as-known) that verifies S's immediate knowledge of God—defenders of MI could 
plausibly counter POI’s challenge with the modified position that immediate knowledge 
of other minds, be it conscious or subconscious knowledge, is initially (T1) not mediated 
by discursive knowledge at all: S’s knowledge of God at (T1) is chronologically 
antecedent to any mediated knowledge; discursive reasoning only subsequently operates 
upon, if at times does falsify, immediate knowledge of God (and other minds). There is 
indeed room here, as MI’s logic of knowledge of God maintains mediated-immediate 
knowledge of God is logically prior to mediated-immediate knowledge of other realties. 
Nonetheless, it also maintains that these paradoxically immediate knowledges of God and 
other minds are co-terminously given to each human by God and that each is consciously 
known by each human at that same time.  Put differently, MI’s epistemology presupposes 
the logical priority of immediate knowledge of God, though maintains immediate 
knowledge of God is not chronologically prior to knowledge of the other realities that 
mediate knowledge of God at (T1): oneself, other minds, and the world. Moreover, were 
MI’s proponents to appeal to an ontological monism of sorts, maintain that these 
manifold reality-knowledges are grounded, from S’s perspective, in a pre-reflective 
awareness of realities; and assert that there is no apparent logical conflict between 
“knowledge of X” and “knowledge that X”, as there is effectively no mediation by 
                                                           
476 “The infinite riches of the divine Personality who is revealed to us in Christ cannot be exhaustively 
enclosed in any number of abstract nouns. In every such abstraction, in every such conceptualizing, we are 
also to some extent falsifying by regarding one aspect of the living whole in temporary isolation; and not 
all possible abstractions added together can make up the living whole itself.” IRRT, p. 27 
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discursive reasoning; this move would not defeat POI, because it would yet remain that 
MI’s epistemology of immediacy is dependent on (mediated by) what Baillie maintains is 
disclosed in and to moral consciousness: immediate knowledge “about what” God is and 
wants us to do (i.e., discursive knowledge).   
We find, then, that MI’s other-minds analogy is ultimately grounded in Baillie’s 
theological epistemology of revelatory religious experience: it is to his theology of 
revelation, and not, for example, to the proper basicality of belief in other minds, that 
Baillie ultimately appeals as ground for the reasonableness of his other-minds analogy. 
Consequently, its force (or lack thereof) derives from Baillie’s theology of revelation 
itself—a problematic one, as we shall soon discover. Within this theological-
epistemological framework, Baillie uses MI’s normative-epistemological function to 
contend for the reasonableness of knowledge of God. Employing a theological method 
with which he attempts to correlation theological presuppositions about immediate 
knowledge of God in particular with empirical philosophical interpretations and 
epistemologies about knowledge of other-minds knowledge in general, the mediating 
theologian aims to reconcile the logic of mediated-immediate knowledge about persons 
with mediated-immediate knowledge of God. Baillie’s own thought effectively negates 
the logical possibility of such reconciliation, however.  Indeed, were the philosopher of 
religion inclined to admit as reasonable Baillie’s claim that ordinary human experience 
testifies to humans having a supra-propositional knowledge of human personalities and 
God—one that transcends or bypasses the categories of language and thought—such 
knowledge sinvariably demands at least some propositional knowledge about the identity 
of the personalities (God, other minds) believed to be known non-discursively. MI’s logic 
denies that this is possible, however, as it maintains, in both OKG and in SPG, that 
knowledge of other minds is essentially immediate. An aspect of MI’s logic that does not 
afford a plausible solution to POI, it compromises the force of the theological 
epistemology which, underwriting MI’s description of knowledge of realties, does as 
such underwrite Baillie's other-minds analogy. This descriptive-epistemological deficit, 
in turn, undermines MI’s normative-epistemological function—an argument for the 
reasonableness of Christian immediate knowledge of God. MI’s normative-
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epistemological difficulty with POI counts against the promise of this function of MI as a 
contribution to contemporary Christian thought. 
 
8.2.1.3 Normative-epistemological immediacy as a “primary mode of 
apprehension”: logical difficulties 
Baillie’s conceptualization of immediate knowledge as “a primary mode of 
apprehension” also compromises the staying power of MI’s function as a normative 
epistemology. Evidence for this shortcoming derives from the diachronic trace provided 
in the thesis. We recall, for example, that when Baillie couches MI’s logic of immediacy 
in the language of faith—again, now identified as a “primary mode of apprehension”—he 
relies squarely on MI’s normative-epistemological logic in his effort to counter Flew's 
falsification challenge, in particular. 
In “A Religious Way of Knowing,”477 C.B Martin engages Baillie’s thought in 
OKG and criticizes Baillie’s logic of faith qua “primary mode of apprehension”. En 
route, Martin notes that Baillie conceives of knowledge of God and knowledge of other 
minds as analogous in at least three ways: (1) each is mediated by other knowledges; (2) 
each is an immediate knowledge; (3) each is self-authenticating and describable only in 
terms of itself.  He also notes that the various analogies developed in OKG are not, 
according to Baillie, perfect: (4) God-knowledge and human-knowledge are only 
partially analogous to each other; (5) God-knowledge and human-knowledge are each 
only partially analogous to humans’ knowledge of tridimensional space: for 
tridimensional space is also conceived by Baillie as a self-authenticating, mediated-
immediate knowledge.  
We see, then, that MI’s logic is not only the logical foundation for Baillie’s other-
minds analogy; it is a hermeneutic or interpretative model which Baillie uses to 
conceptualize humans’ knowledge of tridimensional space—a reality, the mediated-
immediate knowledge of which does itself mediated humans’ other mediated-immediate 
knowledge (e.g., immediate self-knowledge mediated by knowledge about bodily states). 
How does Baillie aim to show that there are multiple mediated and immediate 
                                                           
477 In New Essays in Philosophical Theology, Antony Flew and Alasdair MacIntyre, eds. (London: SCM 
Press, 1955), pp. 80-95. 
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knowledges? Martin wryly summarizes Baillie’s thought (and that of H.H. Farmer) on the 
matter of immediate knowledge of God: “You do not know what the experience of God is 
until you have had it.” He then focuses his attack on the mode by which humans 
allegedly apprehend minds and other realties directly and know them immediately, 
Baillie’s “primary mode of apprehension”. “What Professor Baillie does not see is that 
according to his criteria anything can qualify as a primary mode of knowledge.” Indeed, 
one might as easily vie for a primary mode of apprehension for a direct encounter with, 
immediate knowledge of, and immediate verification of Italy: “You must go to Naples 
and not just to Venice.  A postcard is no substitute.”  Martin concludes:    
 
 
 
All that this [direct experience] proves is that a description 
of one group of sensations A in terms of another set of 
sensations B is never sufficient for knowing group A . . . 
This helps in no way at all to prove that such experience is 
direct apprehension of God and helps in no way to support 
the existential claim ‘God exists’.478  
 
 
Martin’s position, then, is that MI’s logic, which underwrites Baillie’s other-minds 
analogy and Baillie’s conceptualization of tridimensional space, is one effectively 
negated by Baillie’s apparent willingness to permit direct knowledge of any reality: 
anything can be claimed to be known immediately by a primary mode of apprehension. 
Thus, MI’s logic adds no support to the claim “God exists”.  
Martin’s criticism of what I have identified as MI’s normative-epistemological 
function appears reasonable as is. It gains force when one considers that, whereas MI’s 
normative logic in OKG (1939) posits immediate knowledge of only four loci in general 
(God, other minds, self, world), and likens these mediated-immediate knowledges to a 
mediated-immediate knowledge of tridimensional space; MI’s normative logic in SPG, 
published seven years after Martin’s criticism (1955), now underwrites a substantially 
more elaborate attempt by Baillie to elucidate how mediate-immediate knowledge of the 
“world” (in particular) is partially analogous to mediated-immediate knowledge of God.  
                                                           
478 Martin, “A Religious Way of Knowing”, pp. 81-82.  
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For example, when in SPG Baillie attempts to strengthen his claim that subject-
knowledge (God, other minds, self) is partially analogous to object-knowledge, he now 
maintains that each of the mediated-immediate knowledges (God, others, self, world) 
requires “a primary apprehension”. Accordingly, Baillie expands MI’s epistemological 
scope and asks its logic to bear a much heavier epistemological burden: for now humans’ 
mediated-immediate sense of God’s presence is claimed to be analogous to our (so-
called) “senses” of other things—such as such our senses of proportion, literary style, 
duty, and the holy.  
Specifically, these new senses are analogous in that: (1) each sense provides 
corresponding knowledge of their realities; (2) each sense’s knowledge of these realities 
is a mediated knowledge—each “presuppose for their possibility the experience gained 
through the bodily senses”; (3) each sense avails immediate knowledge of reality: each 
mode of apprehension does “enable us to perceive something not otherwise perceptible; 
to perceive it ... not merely to conceive it.”  In addition, (4) each of these “senses” (modes 
of apprehension) is employed on a regular basis in our ordinary language, Baillie 
contends. Consequently, argues Baillie, (5) each mode of apprehension or “awareness" 
should be recognized as so far analogous to the corporeal senses as to enable us to 
perceive something not otherwise perceptible.” Maintaining that that these analogous 
senses enable humans to apprehend “an aspect of reality” “beyond the bodily senses” 
whereby one can have immediate knowledge of these realities—and not merely “a truth 
or proposition” about the corporeal world479—Baillie argues that immediate knowledge 
of God is, by analogy, a reasonable position: faith also constitutes “a mode of 
apprehension which perceives something more [God] than the total reality with which we 
are confronted than is manifest, or is expected to be manifest, to the senses”.480 
Consequently, maintains Baillie, faith should be considered a legitimate mode of 
apprehension, and “sense of the presence of God” should be admitted as meaningful 
language. In SPG, then, we find Baillie using MI to provide a fuller account of the media 
which can mediated immediate knowledges, including immediate knowledge of God. We 
also find Baillie using MI to reconcile the now greater contextual emphasis that his put 
                                                           
479 SPG, pp. 50-59, passim. 
480Ibid., p. 126.  
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on divine action with an emphasis on religious experience not unlike Baillie’s early 
thought. Here surely is evidence for MI’s importance for Baillie’s latter MT.481  
There are, however, difficulties with Martin’s analysis. For one, he incorrectly 
interprets Baillie as contending that anything can be a mode of apprehension. Baillie does 
not. For example, Baillie does not posit a primary mode for the apprehension of God's 
non-existence; that there is a “sense” of atheism, Baillie's position being rather that all 
persons belief in God in the “bottom of there hearts”, if also, to varying degrees, reject 
God with “the top of their minds.” Moreover, Baillie spells out the criteria for what can 
count as a mode of direct apprehension. For example, Baillie makes it clear—in the OKG 
perused by Martin—that “faith” alone is the primary mode of apprehending Reality, God.  
When, for instance, Baillie maintains that a “sense of duty” is a mode of direct 
apprehension of Duty, he distinguishes this mode of direct apprehension from a direct 
apprehension of God. Indeed, he makes it plain that a direct apprehension of duty is not 
entirely analogous to the primary mode of apprehension that is faith in God. That Baillie 
does reject such a rigid analogy can be found, for instance, in Baillie’s distancing of his 
thought from a Kantian thought which wrongly grants epistemic authority to direct 
apprehension of duty over direct apprehension of God.   
 
 
We, on the other hand, have argued that the Source of the 
obligation is Himself directly revealed to us and that it is in 
this vision of His glory and His holiness that our sense of 
obligation is born . . . [I]t is no mere law that is revealed to 
us, but a living Person, and what we call the moral law is 
but an abstraction which our limited and limiting minds 
make from the concreteness of the living Glory that is 
revealed.482  
 
 
                                                           
481 We are also reminded of McIntyre’s observation that mediated immediacy enabled Baillie to regard the 
university as a community whose various fields and disciplines of inquiry mediated knowledge of God: 
clearly Baillie is using MI’s epistemology in SPG to enage increasingly multiple disciplines. John 
McIntyre, "Theology and the University: John Baillie”, New College Bulletin, no. 14, September, 1983. 
Cited in A.C. Cheyne, Studies in Scottish Church History. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999, pp. 219-20. 
482 OKG, p. 162. 
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Furthermore, there is Baillie’s thought on the meaningfulness of the language about the 
so-called modes of apprehension.  Here, again, Baillie does not contend that the modes of 
apprehension are co-equal in terms of the quality of knowledge that they provide, as 
Martin would suggest. Rather, Baillie is quite clear about what constitutes a sense of 
apprehension in the more general sense. For one, the senses of must be “senses” which 
conform to ordinary language usage (e.g., “sense of duty”).  Secondly, these require a 
measure of philosophical support (e.g., Heims's tridimensional space).  Thirdly, the 
modes of apprehension and their respective mediated-immediate knowledges of their 
realties must appear to be connected epistemologically to faith’s primary apprehension of 
God. It is within the context of his elucidation of the modes’ criteria, similarities and 
subtleties of difference, that Baillie, yet furthermore, underscores that faith’s direct 
apprehension of God is quintessentially unlike any other direct apprehension: faith is an 
apprehension of the ground of being Whom, being also the ground of knowing, makes 
possible the modes of awareness of all lesser realities—knowledge of tri-dimensional 
space included: “We reach the unconditional only in an unconditional imperative that 
reaches us.”483  This is not only a statement that God is known in one’s values; it is a 
claim to humans having a priori knowledge of God’s attributes—a knowledge mediated 
by sensory experience. In this respect, Baillie endorses Kant's position that direct 
knowledge of God does not legitimate “‘a theory of supersensible realities” as do the 
‘pretended practitioners of natural theology’.” Baillie also endorses Kant’s position that 
"in the obligation that is revealed to us some element of knowledge must be implicitly 
contained”—a practical knowledge to which it is right to submit (though, Baillie insists 
that God's demand is to accept the gift—not a law—of Christ’s salvation).  That said, 
Baillie would yet have faith's primary apprehension of Reality conceived as knowledge 
mediated by other knowledges, albeit it yet paradoxically a direct apprehension and 
immediate knowledge of both God and God’s ideals. 
 
 
While there is no temporal priority of one knowledge over 
the other, the logical priority lies with our knowledge of 
God ... [O]ur knowledge of all ideals is a priori; not 
chronologically prior to our knowledge of the actual, but a 
                                                           
483 OKG, p. 157 
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necessary condition of our ability to ascribe to the actual 
such characters as good and bad, just and unjust, wise and 
foolish.484  
 
 
Baillie elsewhere adds:   
 
 
The Westminster Shorter Catechism is . . . using directly 
applicable and non-symbolic language when it answers the 
question ‘What is God?’ by saying ‘God is a Spirit, infinite, 
eternal and unchangeable, in his being, wisdom, power, 
holiness, justice, goodness, and truth.’ 485 
 
 
Baillie’s position, then, is that whatever “truths” are immediately known by other modes 
of apprehension (literary style, tridimensional space, the holy, etc.), they are truths known 
ultimately, because one has a primary apprehension of God and God alone.   
Baillie, then, hardly allows anything to be a mode of immediate apprehension of 
reality. Although there is assuredly much to be experienced in a direct experience of 
“Naples” (or “poverty” or a  “blue sky”—Martin’s other examples as possible modes of 
apprehension), passing familiarity with the logic of MI’s epistemology indicates that it 
roundly rejects these as legitimate modes of apprehension. Martin, quite simply, is wrong 
on this important epistemology-related point; and his red herring-like critique does not 
persuade that Baillie’s use of “sense of the presence of God” is non-meaningful language.  
Nonetheless, Martin rightly concludes that Baillie’s argument for the 
meaningfulness of “sense of the presence of God”—namely, Baillie’s appeal to multiple 
modes of knowledge and “senses” (e.g., Heims's tridimensional space)—fails to buttress 
Baillie’s claim that God-knowledge and other minds-knowledge are both mediated and 
immediate. Again, this is not because Martin offers much of an argument, let alone a 
persuasive one; rather, it is because my own analysis shows that Baillie's own criteria for 
a direct knowledge of God’s Presence negates the logical possibility that Baillie could 
garner support for his analogy via appeal to this newly introduced “primary mode of 
apprehension”. After all, such a “sense of the presence of God”, Baillie contends, is 
                                                           
484 SPG, pp. 117-118. 
485 Ibid., p. 119.  
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“something that cannot be imagined by one who does not already possess it, since it 
cannot be described to him in terms of anything else than itself [emphasis mine].”486 This, 
however, is exactly what the mediating theologian qua apologist attempts, when, 
employing MI’s normative-epistemological logic, he attempts to forge a logical 
connection between God-knowledge, human mind-knowledge, and tri-dimensional 
space-knowledge.  One might attempt to rebut with the claim that Baillie does 
differentiate these mediated-modes of apprehension, however—that Baillie does not liken 
mediated immediate knowledge of tridimensional space to mediated-immediate 
knowledge of Personality. Nonetheless, were one thus inclined to permit these types of 
knowledge as each entirely sui generis, it remains that Baillie grounds each knowledge in 
faith's primary apprehension of God: save that Baillie overtly presupposes both an 
ontological basis for humans’ knowledge of tridimensional space (tridimensional space is 
the manifestation of its ground, Being) and an epistemological connection between 
knowledge of tridimensional space and knowledge of God (the ground of all 
Knowledge); his very apologetic strategy tacitly presuppose such an epistemological 
connection (hence his attempt to forge the partial analogy qua mediating theologian)—all 
of this is in keeping with MI the core logic of whose normative epistemology asserts that 
immediate knowledge of God is mediated “in, with and under” both tridimensional space 
and humans’ knowledge thereof.  As I have shown, the logic of MI’s normative 
epistemology does not clearly integrate, however, the various senses of apprehension in a 
logically consistent way.   
Baillie, then, does identify what qualifies a mode as a mode of direct 
apprehension (i.e., immediate knowledge), contrarily to Martin's claim. However, in 
keeping with the thrust and tenor of Martin’s critique, I conclude that the logic of MI’s 
other-minds analogy is, as it stands in our analysis, problematic—an apparently muddled 
logic; a tautology at best. 
Does MI's normative-epistemological logic even possess the coherence to grant it 
tautological status, however? 
 
                                                           
486 OKG, p. 217. 
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8.2.1.4 Normative-epistemological immediacy and knowledge of the mind of Jesus 
Christ: logical difficulties 
In addition to the POI, and Baillie’s thought on immediate knowledge as “a 
primary mode of apprehension”, Baillie’s thought on the mediation of knowledge of the 
mind of Jesus Christ also compromises MI’s normative-epistemological logic.  
MI’s logic presupposes that immediate knowledge of God requires one to be in 
the presence of one’s fellows. As Baillie puts it, “only when I am in fellowship with my 
fellow men does knowledge of God come to me individually.”487 Such “fellowship,” for 
Baillie, requires that the individual be in a relationship characterized by agapē with at 
least one person. Can a subject “S” have knowledge of God when S is not in the presence 
of others?  Baillie surely thought so; he often isolated himself in his study to pray to 
God.488 He was undoubtedly also aware that Jesus himself is thought to have sought 
God's will by the physical withdrawal of himself from other bodies (e.g., Jesus’ 
wandering in the wilderness for forty days).  
Accordingly, MI’s logic presupposes that S can have knowledge of God, when S 
is not in the physical presence of another human being. However, this raises the question: 
How can MI’s logic self-consistently maintain that S’s immediate knowledge of God 
must be mediated by S’s fellowship with others, without S being in the physical presence 
of those others? There would appear to be at least two options: (1) the mediation of 
knowledge of God requires that S be in fellowship with other human minds whose bodies 
were once perceived, though are no longer being perceived in “fellowship”;  (2) the 
mediation of knowledge of God is not contingent upon S’s having ever perceived the 
bodies of those with whom S is in fellowship.  
To tease out some tacit assumptions of option (1), one could contend that MI’s 
normative-epistemological logic presupposes that S can fellowship with other minds, 
while not perceiving those minds’ bodies—that is, that S can apprehend another mind’s 
ideas in S’s present situation and fellowship with that mind whose body is not perceived. 
For example, on this reading S can fellowship with the mind of the Apostle John, while 
not perceiving John’s body—via the mediation of the ideas attributed to John in, say, 
                                                           
487 Ibid., p. 179 Baillie's italicized emphasis.  
488 Thomas F. Torrance, "A living Sacrifice:  In Memoriam, John Baillie, 1886-1960”, Religion in Life, 
Vol. 30, No. 3 (summer, 1961), pp. 329-333. 
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John 3:16.  To translate this option into the language of MI: S is having immediate 
knowledge of the mind of John, as mediated “in, with and under” S’s discursive 
knowledge about what S thinks is John’s thought.  
Save issues of translation, hermeneutics and exegesis, this line of reasoning 
proves difficult for MI’s logic.  For one, it is difficult to conceive how S can be said to be 
in “fellowship” with another mind—viz., in a fellowship characterized by agapē that 
involves “service” to the “need(s)” of another mind. How does S meet the need of S’s 
brother in this situation? Baillie does not provide an answer. MI’s criteria for the 
mediation of immediate knowledge is also problematic for option (1): MI’s logic appears 
to maintain that immediate knowledge of human minds is contingent upon (mediated by) 
S’s perceptions of—that is, discursive knowledge about—the body or bodies with which 
S is fellowshipping.  Baillie elaborates:    
 
It must be allowed, or rather insisted upon, that the 
recognition of other minds, though it is not built up from 
the perception of the bodies associated with these minds 
but is itself an apprehension of a direct and primary kind, is 
nevertheless never given save in conjunction with such a 
perception [emphasis mine].489  
 
 
Baillie attaches a footnote to the above quote—one which contends that even if telepathy 
is possible, it does not instance a counterfactual, when squared with MI’s above-indicated 
criteria for knowledge of other minds. This is because telepathy would provide, on 
Baillie's reading, an inferential knowledge about ideas of another mind—never 
immediate knowledge of that mind.   
Yet, is it not something like a telepathic process that MI’s logic presupposes, 
when it maintains that knowledge of the Christian gospel is epistemically necessary for 
Christian knowledge of God? For even if it is the case that S heard of the gospel message 
while fellowshipping in agapē with a mind (M1) whose body was empirically perceived; 
and, more so, that M1 had that message mediated to it by another mind (M2) whose body 
had been, at that time, empirically perceived—and so forth (i.e., as toward an infinite 
                                                           
489 OKG, p. 214 ('59).  
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past-historical regression); it seems rather unlikely that such historical mediation of the 
gospel involved all persons having empirically perceived all the bodies of those person(s) 
who mediated the gospel message.  
From a logical perspective, then, if MI’s logic contends for (1), it would 
apparently self-defeat its internal logic, as Baillie is not clear about how these minds and 
bodies interact with each other across history. Baillie’s less-than-precise elucidation 
about history’s mediation of knowledge of other minds anticipates difficulties that pertain 
to MI’s descriptive epistemological functions (divine action, revelation, religious 
experience). Those difficulties will be discussed latter in this chapter. Here, we observe 
that position (1) does not adequately counter the widely held claim that MI’s logic is self-
contradictory: its logic fails to explain clearly the mediation of immediate knowledge of 
Jesus Christ by S’s agapē-oriented fellowship with other minds (e.g., Gospel writers)—
“in, with and under” history.   
If MI’s logic is to avoid seeming self-contradiction, it must maintain (2): S’s 
previous fellowship with human minds (i.e., perceptions of their bodies) enables S to 
come to knowledge of God; and this fellowship, in turn, enables S to recognize the mind 
of God in Jesus Christ—even when absent from the human bodies with whose minds one 
has had fellowship. That this is likely the more faithful interpretation of MI’s normative 
epistemology is evidenced by Baillie’s use of MI-related language: knowledge of God as 
MI, a unique experience of the truth, is mediated only through persons historically 
antecedent to oneself.490 How, then, does MI’s logic explain how immediate knowledge 
of God is mediated to S by other minds when S is not in the presence of those minds’ 
bodies?  
 
 
Our knowledge of other minds is not merely a derivative 
from our knowledge of other minds or of our own minds or 
of both together, but is itself a primary and original mode 
of consciousness of equal right with these others and 
having like them a character sui generis.  Expressing it in 
Kantian language, we may say that the conception of 
society is not an a posteriori but an a priori conception.491   
                                                           
490 OKG, p. 185 ('59). 
491 Ibid., p. 213 ('59). 
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Baillie, then, is persuaded that a logically a priori conception of society—a primary and 
original mode of consciousness—helps mediate humans’ knowledge of other minds.  
This mode of consciousness, he adds, arises from our encounter with human bodies in 
general:  
 
 
We cannot possess the conception of otherness prior to our 
first encounter with another, yet that conception is not 
inductively derived from the encounter, but is called into 
being on occasion of it and contributes to it the very 
character which would be required as the basis of such an 
induction [emphasis mine]...492  
 
 
Elsewhere, Baillie remarks that this primary mode of apprehension arises from our 
experience, governs all of our social interactions with human minds, including our 
abstractions of truths from immediate knowledge of these minds; and mediates our 
knowledge about those minds’ bodies:       
 
 
 
This non-inferential element which lies at the root of our 
social experience and was present at its birth, must be 
allowed to be present throughout the whole subsequent 
course of it, playing at every part a necessary and 
constitutive part.  It is thus, indeed, that the intuitive and 
discursive elements in experience always intermingle.  The 
discursive element is at every point present, at no point 
fundamental.  It is essentially of the nature of a 
construction, grounded upon one intuition, and forming a 
bridge to another [emphasis mine].493   
 
 
 
                                                           
492 Ibid., p. 214.  
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MI’s logic, then, apparently presupposes this: an immediate knowledge of others requires 
[mediating] knowledge about their bodies—this via a “primary mode of consciousness” 
which, “called into being” (somehow), enables humans subsequently to have knowledge 
of other humans.   
Baillie’s reasoning raises issues for the logical consistency of MI’s normative 
epistemology. For one, “called into being” fails to elucidate the process of this so-called 
mediation. Secondly, Baillie’s “primary mode of consciousness” fails to make clear how 
knowledge of God’s being in Jesus Christ can possibly come to S in S’s concrete 
circumstance. Indeed, regardless of whether this mode of apprehension cogently conjoins 
one’s intuitive knowledge of realities with one’s discursive knowledge about those 
realities (i.e., it exists), MI's logic negates the possibility of immediate knowledge of a 
human mind when one does not have a perception of the human body to which that mind 
corresponds.    
The problem that I have isolated with MI’s logic might appear a trivial point of 
contention. After all, MI’s logic does at least contend that immediate knowledge of a 
human mind is contingent upon sensory perception of that human's body. Furthermore, 
Baillie does at least propose a mode of apprehension for S to have (somehow) increased 
knowledge of God in the absence of fellowship with a human mind. It could also be 
noted that (2) is also open to at least one alternative modification: S has had at least one 
agapē-like fellowship in S’s past with a mind whose body was perceived; and that 
fellowship continues to mediate the higher knowledge of God which S finds, by faith, in 
Jesus Christ, though that body is no longer perceived. Nonetheless, regardless of how one 
interprets (2)—in its naked form: previous fellowship makes it possible for S to have a 
knowledge of God’s being in Jesus Christ—a glaring difficulty persists: How can one 
have knowledge of the mind of Jesus Christ, even when mediated by knowledge about the 
Gospel? MI’s logic, again, stipulates that a perception of a mind's body is 
epistemologically necessary for immediate knowledge of that body's mind. However, 
even if fellowshipping with a football stadium of Bible-reading fellows in a koinonia of 
agapē, it remains, or so it would seem, that such fellowship will not give rise to a sensory 
perception of Jesus Christ’s human body. However, it must, I have maintained, if MI’s 
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normative epistemology is not to violate its own logic about the mediation of Christian 
knowledge of God.  
 The logic of MI’s normative epistemology, then, appears494 to negate the 
possibility of immediate knowledge of God in Jesus Christ in the absence of sensory-
perceptual mediation of Jesus Christ’s body.  This would appear to compromise the 
logical coherence of MI’s normative-epistemological function. Furthermore, MI’s logic 
about such mediation compromises MI's other-mind’s analogy—an analogy that 
presupposes a partially analogous epistemological correspondence between knowledge of 
God in Jesus Christ and knowledge of the other human minds who mediate that 
knowledge.495  
 
8.2.1.5 Normative-epsistemological immediacy: logically self-contradictory 
Based on the unresolved tensions indicated in the previous section—those 
pertaining to POI, Baillie’s thought on the immediacy of the primary mode of 
apprehension, and his thought on the mediation of knowledge of Christ—I conclude that 
MI’s normative epistemology is logically inconsistent.  
 
                                                           
494 I suppose that Baillie could take a Berkeleian approach to resolve this tension. However, we have found 
Baillie rejecting Berkeley’s epistemology in IOR. 
495 MI’s internal logical difficulties, and that logic’s implications for Baillie’s Christology (and vice versa), 
have not received much attention in the literature, though they have been anticipated by Fergusson, who 
contends, as I have been fond of quoting, that the “outstanding weakness” in Baillie’s theology is its failure 
to identify which is the primary source for knowledge of God —a universal awareness of God’s presence or 
the Christian church’s Gospel proclamation? They are anticipated in this manner: MI’s function as a 
normative epistemology (i.e., its other-minds analogy) is underwritten by Baillie’s idea of revelation: it is 
the theological basis for Baillie’s claim to knowledge of God; it is the concept that Baillie the apologist 
uses to respond to secular currents—this by correlating his idea of revelation with, to borrow from Tillich, 
humans’ existential concerns. Consequently, if Fergusson's criticism is valid, then MI’s logic must identify 
the primary locus of the mediation of revelation—knowledge of Jesus Christ or a universal knowledge of 
God. The two are surely related in Baillie's thought—at least in theory: MI’s logic straightforwardly 
maintains that the Mediator is the supreme incarnation of God, as well as the logical center around and “in, 
with and under” whom a divine purposive-regulated history mediates God's grace and knowledge—
universally. But this seems a rather difficult position to maintain cogently: for the seemingly self-
conflicting logic that is MI’s function as a normative epistemology, left unclarified, renders as logically 
impossible humans’ realization of the telos for which Baillie's idea of revelation contends—a universal 
faith in Jesus Christ: it is logically impossible that all persons have had the sensory perception of Jesus' 
body necessary for the mediation of that knowledge.  A logically coherent explanation of how this occurs 
within Baillie’s theological epistemology of revelation is necessary for Baillie's thought to overcome 
plausibly its most outstanding theological weakness. 
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8.2.1.6 Normative-epistemological immediacy and external correspondence 
criterion: an infinite regress  
 Additional difficulties attend to the logic of MI’s normative-epistemological 
function. These arise not so much from a straightforward rationalism which asks, “Is it 
logically possible to have an immediate though propositionally-mediated knowledge of 
another mind?”  Rather, they derive from Baillie’s attempt to reconcile MI with empirical 
observation. The question here is: “Does empirical observation suggest that so-called 
immediate knowledge of an object is not conceptualized by discursive knowledge about 
the object?” The correspondence question is a fair one to ask, as MI’s other-minds 
analogy’s representational realism presupposes epistemological correspondence between 
its own logic and empirically-based knowledge about matter, including minds’ bodies. 
It has been argued, on empirical ground, that an accurate description of religious 
experience must reject the logical possibility of immediate knowledge. Katz, who is well 
known for this type of argument, insists in his “Language, Epistemology and 
Mysticism":496 “There are NO pure (i.e., unmediated) experiences.” He grounds his 
argument in empirical research on mystical experiences and humans’ interpretations of 
those experiences. This research indicates that both ordinary and religious human 
experiences are influenced by our cognition. Emphasizing the socio-cultural and 
linguistic mediation of mystic experiences in particular, and how Zaehner and Stace have 
failed to recognize the logical implications which flow from discursive reasoning’s 
mediation of mystical-experiential interpretations, Katz argues that these theorists, and 
those of a similar persuasion, falsely interpret the nature of the epistemological 
relationship between antecedent discursive knowledge brought to bear on an experience 
and the knowledge derived from a supposedly pure, core mystical experience; for when it 
comes to interpretation, “the symmetry is always one-directional: from ‘experience’ to 
‘beliefs’”.   Katz, however, maintains: “Beliefs shape experience, just as experience 
shapes belief”. A better interpretation, as it is a more balanced interpretation, argues 
Katz, empirical evidence for its truer correspondence to experience is found alike in 
Jewish, Hindu, and Christian interpretations of mystical experiences: each brings 
                                                           
496 Steven T. Katz, "Language, Epistemology and Philosophical Analysis", in Mysticism and Philosophical 
Analysis, edited Steven T. Katz (London:  Sheldon Press, 1978), pp. 22-74. 
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culturally tied concepts and symbols to bear on the interpretation of religious 
experiences.497  
A substantial body of empirical psychological research supports Katz's thesis. For 
example, research indicates that humans are often convinced that they have implicit  
(intuitive, pre-reflective) knowledge of an object, when, in fact, that knowledge has been 
influenced by propositional knowledge. One such line of research explores how our 
mental “sets” affect our processing and evaluation of experiences. The research shows 
that inferential reasoning-based interpretations of object perception can take place so 
rapidly, that the processing takes place outside of our self-conscious awareness.  
 
 
If you say that you have had a vision, the meaning of that 
vision of can make sense only within the context of the 
schema that was activated when the vision occurred.  
Schemas are said to be activated within milliseconds, 
automatically (Fiske and Taylor, 1991). Thus, when a 
vision occurs, your mind immediately activates the mental 
structure most relevant to your making sense of it, and it is 
given meaning within that.  In this way, a general sense of 
awe is assigned a God-related meaning by someone with a 
devout Christian or Jewish schema but is given some other 
meaning by someone who does not have any particular 
religious schema. . . . . Because the influence of schemas is 
virtually automatic, it could be said that their function is to 
help you decipher the immediate experience.498 
 
 
There is considerable theorizing in the above passage, as well as a hint of explanatory 
psychological reductionism.  However, the point is well made that humans often interpret 
an “immediate experience” as one devoid of non-discursive reasoning, when that 
experience is actually mediated by virtually automatic inferential reasoning. The 
prevalence of this rapid discursive mediation, and of the cognitive bias that often comes 
                                                           
497 See Katz, ibid., pp. 22-46, for his argument. 
498 Raymond F. Paloutzian, Invitation to the Psychology of Religion, 2nd ed., Needham Heights, MA: Allyn 
& Bacon, 1996, p. 190. 
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with it, has been verified by a number of studies.499 Collectively, these studies challenge 
the empirical basis for MI’s analogy: namely, that ordinary experience testifies that 
humans immediately know other minds, despite mediated discursive knowledge about 
those minds’ and their corresponding bodies. This empirical research counts against 
empirical ground for non-inferential knowledge, and undercuts MI’s external 
correspondence with ordinary experience; for it evidences that are at least some times 
when humans claim pre-reflective immediate knowledge of objects, when in fact they are 
truths derived from inferential (non-immediate) knowledge about other information.  
MI’s normative epistemology also presupposes that immediate knowledge of God 
and immediate knowledge of humans are, according to an empirical examination of 
human experience, equally credible. As over against this, Franks Davis maintains that the 
analogy rightly contends that humans universally appear to take prima facie the 
veridicality of immediate knowledge of other minds, though falsely contends that humans 
universally appear to take prima facie the veridicality of immediate knowledge of a 
personal God. This lack of external correspondence, maintains Franks Davis, undermines 
the analogy to the extent that it shows it to be a disanalogy.500 To translate Franks Davis’s 
position into the language of MI: empirical research indicates that human minds tend to 
believe that knowledge of other minds is a MI, though tend not to believe that knowledge 
of a personal God is a MI.    
In MI’s defense, MI’s proponents could point out that, yes, MI’s logic does 
suppose that humans take prima facie the veridicality of immediate knowledge of a 
personal God—in the “bottom of their heart;” however, it also maintains that many 
persons live, with the "top of their minds", in a state of conscious “denial”, banishing 
immediate knowledge of God to their subconscious through repression. One could then 
develop the argument that, as such, one would expect there to be empirical support for 
Frank’s Davis’s claim that many persons do not believe in a personal God immediately 
known; and that, consequently, Franks Davis line of attack does not undermine MI’s 
                                                           
499 E.g., Stanley Schacter and Jerome Singer, “Cognitive, Social and Physiological Determinants of 
Emotional State”, Psychological Review, 69, 1962, 379-399. Alan Tormey, The Concept of Expression. 
Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1971. Leon Festinger and J.M. Carlsmith, “Cognitive Consequences 
of Forced Compliance”, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 58, 203-210.  Mark Cook, Perceiving 
Others. London: Methuen, 1979, Ch. 5.   
500 Caroline Franks Davis, The Evidential Force of Religious Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1989), p. 82.  
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logic. However, I do not think that such an appeal—humans are immediately aware of 
God, though not consciously aware of their being immediately aware of God—would 
persuade. For one, when Baillie’s epistemology appeals to the subconscious, it proves 
generally problematic for Baillie's apologetic strategy, as Macquarrie has noted.501A 
more recent examination502 of Baillie's idea of immediacy supports Macquarrie’s 
position, as does an earlier and more-extensive analysis503of ideas of immediacy, 
Baillie’s included.   
I add that this type of rebuttal could conceivably lead as well to an infinite 
regress—to an appeal to any number of strata of consciousness “in, with and under” 
which, a personal knowledge of God resides. For example, proponents of MI’s normative 
epistemology might attempt to rebut Franks Davis with the claim that, technically, it is 
not “in” the corporeal world, but rather it is “in” the “in, with, and under” of the corporeal 
world, that one directly encounters, direct apprehends, and immediately knows God and 
other minds: it is this stratum of Reality (as experienced) that enables one to know prima 
facie that one does know these minds.504 Put differently, one could maintain that 
immediate knowledge of minds is mediated by multiple planes of reality (this time, 
however, as objectively existing "outside" the mind) which mediate a multiplicity of 
logics; one of these logics is known pre-reflectively; hence, the fact that humans do not 
universally appear to take prima facie the veridicality of a personal God. Save that this 
externalistic appeal to the subconscious would effectively explain away the ground for 
MI’s logic of divine action and revelation, it could plausibly lead to an infinite ontic (and 
epistemic) regress—to the posting of worlds “in, with and under” worlds “in, with and 
under” worlds… ad infinitum.   
One could also take an internalistic approach, appeal to any number of strata—
now ontologically localized and grounded in the human psyche—and attempt a rebut to 
the effect that it is “in, with and under” the individual’s human consciousness that 
personal knowledge of God resides. However, this move would suppose, amongst other 
                                                           
501  E.g., H.D. Lewis, Philosophy of Religion (London:  English University Press, 1965), pp. 113-122; John 
Macquarrie, In Search of Deity (London:  SCM, 1984), p. 44. 
502 Michael Sudduth, The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology, Farnham, UK and Burlington, VT:  
Ashgate, 2009. See esp. Ch. 5. 
503 Robert Hoyler, "Unconscious Belief and Natural Theology", Heythrop Journal, 25, 1984, pp. 423-41. 
504 Stearns comes close to suggesting this maneuver, when he speculates about "in, with and under" as a 
model of Incarnation. See Stearns, “Mediated Immediacy: A Search for Some Models.”    
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things, MI’s advocacy of a phenomenalistic idealism—that reality is ultimately limited to 
the mind’s operations on sensory impression. MI’s normative epistemology, for all of its 
subjectivity, is not so solipsistic, however. Consequently, if one would reconcile its logic 
of the mediation of Reality—one that clearly maintains that knowledge of God is 
mediated by sensory impressions derived from the corporeal world—the only seemingly 
possible way to do so would be to deny what MI’s critical realism presupposes—namely, 
the objectively existence of realties (e.g., "minds"), veridical knowledge of those realities, 
and veridical knowledge about truths epistemologically connected to them—and to re-
conceive of the content mediated to the mind by matter as being merely sense 
impressions. Certainly, this would be an exercise in futility,505 despite Baillie’s seeming 
penchant for epistemological skepticism.506 
 
8.2.1.7 Conclusion: MI’s normative epistemology: not a contribution  
            to contemporary Christian thought 
I conclude that MI’s function as a normative epistemology is not a contribution to 
contemporary Christian thought, as it: (1) does not adequately demonstrate how the logic 
of a mediated-immediate knowledge of God is internally coherent; (2) does not 
adequately explain how propositional “knowledge about” truths (mediated knowledge) 
and non-proposition “knowledge of” (immediate knowledge) are epistemologically 
connected; (3) does not explain with logical consistency how humans can have an 
immediate knowledge of other minds.    
                                                           
505 Indeed, in keeping with MI’s appeal to empirical phenomena as partial (coherentist) ground for the 
mediation of knowledge of God, MI’s normative epistemologyl would still have to validate its logic’s 
correspondence with empirically-based evidence of a certain sort—viz., that humans generally know (or 
generally think that they know), prima facie, that they have an unconscious, immediate knowledge of God 
and other minds—“in, with and under” the “in, with and under” of their human experience. Accordingly, 
such an externalist tact would demand of MI’s logic empirical that remotely suggests that humans possess: 
infinite, second-order, mediated “in, with and under” truths whose infinite discursive “knowledges about” 
derive from infinite, first-order, “in, with and under” immediate realities, whose infinite “knowledges of” 
are mediated by human’s immediate knowledge of Reality—as mediated, “in, with and under”, human 
experience. 
506 Cf. Professor Newland's remark: “There are [in Baillie’s thought] indeed certainties, in the natural 
sciences, in moral and especially in our religious conviction. A distinction is drawn between knowledge of 
truth and knowledge of reality. Our knowledge of the realities is primary, and our knowledge of truths 
concerning them secondary. This is a neat way of affirming apposition which I have described elsewhere as 
a combination of ontological realism and epistemological skepticism.” Newlands, “The Sense of the 
Presence of God”, p. 156. Perhaps, however, this argument could be reconciled somewhat with string 
theory?  
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My conclusion corroborates the widely held, and now strongly substantiated, 
position that MI’s normative epistemology, its other-minds analogy in particular, is 
logically defeated by MI's seemingly self-contradictory logic.  
 
8.2.2. MI’s Descriptive-Epistemological Functions: their Logic of Immediacy 
Evaluated  
We are now in a position to evaluate MI’s three descriptive-epistemological 
functions: (2) MI’s description of divine action, (3) MI’s description of revelation, (4) 
and MI’s description of CRE. In light of the previous analysis of MI’s normative 
epistemology, functions (2) and (3) can be evaluated immediately and succinctly, 
  
8.2.2.1 Conclusion: MI’s descriptive epistemologies of divine action and revelation: 
            not contributions to contemporary Christian thought  
MI’s epistemology describes (2) God's divine action “in, with, and under” the 
corporeal world, and describes (3) how humans come to a knowledge of God (i.e., 
revelation) “in, with and under" the corporeal world.  Neither function describes religious 
experience per se; rather, each primarily describes the divine action which is 
epistemologically necessary for veridical “knowledge of” Jesus Christ: without divine 
action, there is no faith; without faith, there is no Christian revelation; without Christian 
revelation, there is no CRE. Accordingly, MI’s logic underwrites Baillie’s descriptions of 
divine action and revelation: each description presupposes that humans have an 
immediate knowledge of God that is mediated by various media and can be described 
cogently. As Klinefelter has rightly maintained, "Mediated immediacy is the cornerstone 
of Baillie’s epistemology of religion and it is crucial for his doctrine of revelation".507  
We have just found MI’s normative epistemology to be logically inconsistent in at 
least two respects: (1) MI’s internal logic of mediation and immediacy is not logically 
self-consistent (cf. POI, mode of apprehension); (2) MI’s description of the human 
mind’s immediate knowledge of objects and persons external to the human mind is 
problematic, particularly description of the mediation of divine action and revelation (i.e., 
knowledge of God) across history (e.g., by knowledge of other minds, including Jesus).  
                                                           
507 Klinefelter, "Our Knowledge of God”, p. 409. 
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On the strength of that analysis, I conclude that two of MI’s descriptive 
functions—a description of divine action; a description of revelation—are not promising 
contributions to contemporary Christian thought. This research supports Fergusson's 
claim that Baillie's "theological weakness" is Baillie’s ambiguity about the mediation of 
divine revelation. It also instances Fergusson’s contention that Baillie offers somewhat 
"disjointed" arguments in OKG.  
 This leaves us with MI's final function, its description of CRE.  
 
8.3. MI’S PROMISE FOR CONTEMPORARY CHRISTIAN THOUGHT: 
UNDERESTIMATED 
Although MI’s critics have rightly considered MI’s first three functions as being 
of little-to-no relevance for contemporary Christian thought, they have falsely maintained 
that MI is not a promising contribution to contemporary Christian thought.  In so doing, 
they have also overlooked MI’s function as a description of CRE.  In this final section of 
the thesis, I will argue that MI’s descriptive epistemology of CRE is a promising 
contribution to contemporary Christian thought.  
 
8.3.1. Evaluating MI’s Description of CRE: Preliminary Considerations 
8.3.1.1 Consideration #1: MI’s epistemology is theoretically not revelation-based   
When MI functions as a description of a specifically CRE, it is describing an 
experience in which one is putting one’s faith (trust) in Jesus Christ. Such an experience 
includes the moment when, in an act of faith, one initially “comes to Christ”. It also 
includes subsequent seemingly moments in which one, believing to have revelation from 
God, places additional faith in Jesus Christ. MI’s epistemology describes such moments 
as ones mediated by epistemologically necessary discursive knowledge—namely, 
knowledge about Jesus Christ. This mediating knowledge is epistemologically necessary, 
because Christian knowledge of God requires, according to MI’s epistemology, 
immediate knowledge of God in Jesus Christ.  
Although CRE is mediated by discursive knowledge about Jesus, that knowledge 
is not adequate for a moment(s) to qualify as CRE. That such mediating knowledge is not 
an end in itself, comes out in Baillie’s remark that the Christian’s immediate knowledge 
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of God entails a "placing [of] our complete reliance on God—Father, Son and Holy 
Spirit, commiting ourselves wholly to his care, nowise doubting that he will betray our 
committment.”508 Religious experience, then, requires faith, which is “essentially 
trust”,509 in God whom one knows personally; and, in the instance, of a specifically 
Christian knowledge of God, trust in the Mediator, Jesus Christ, whom one knows, with 
the help of the Holy Spirit, immediately.  In sum, 
 
 
CRE is a personal knowledge of, and trust in, Jesus Christ, 
occasioned by mediated (propositional) and immediate 
(supra-propositional) knowledge, and authenticated by an 
immediate (non-logically demonstrable) "psychological 
certitude".510 
 
 
MI’s descriptive epistemology of CRE presupposes that humans do have veridical 
knowledge of God, including knowledge of God’s being in Jesus Christ. This is because 
MI’s epistemology is a critical-realist epistemology ultimately underwritten by Baillie’s 
critical-realist theological-epistemology of revelation. Accordingly, we have found that 
MI’s function as a descriptive epistemology of revelation does presuppose that humans 
do have immediate knowledge of God: faith in God (i.e., religious experience511) is 
mediated by immediate veridical knowledge of "ourselves, our fellows, the corporeal 
world, and God".512 Such mediated-immediate knowledge of Reality extends to universal 
knowledge about God (moral consciousness of value), the possibility of universal 
knowledge of God (universal trust in God—i.e., a universal religious experience—i.e., 
universal religious consciousness), and to a universal Christian faith in God (i.e., 
universal Christian religious consciousness—i.e., universal CRE—i.e., CRE). Summa 
Summarum: all knowledge “of” God is mediated by experience, though immediate, 
according to Baillie’s theological-epistemology of religion.  
                                                           
508 SPG, p. 258. 
509 Ibid. 
510 SPG, pp. 64-66, passim. 
511 “The proper name of religious experience is faith.” Ibid., p. 64. 
512  OKG, p. 178. 
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Accordingly, my definition of CRE (above) reflects Baillie’s conceptual overlap 
between his theology of revelation and his idea of religious experience. My definition of 
CRE is, furthermore, consistent with Baillie’s thought on MI’s complementary 
epistemological functions: one is concerned primarily with the logical necessity of 
revelation’s theological ground for religious belief; the other is concerned primarily with 
the causal necessity of religious experience’s psychological processes with religious 
belief: In addition, my definition reflects Baillie’s general position, as witnessed in our 
trace of Baillie’s MT, that divine action (i.e., MI’s function as a description of Baillie’s 
theology of divine action) and human co-action (i.e., MI’s function as a description of 
Baillie’s empirically oriented quasi-phenomenology of religious experience) are, 
epistemologically speaking, complementary513 (i.e., MI’s description of revelation), 
because of the work of the Holy Spirit (i.e., faith).  Previous research has not spelled out 
these conceptual parallels, to my knowledge; however, we have observed them as-is. 
Moreover, we have observed that this very epistemology is presupposed by (1) Baillie’s 
mediating-theological method; (2) Baillie’s apologetic strategy; (3) Baillie’s use of MT to 
correlate positively, at all stages of its development, a theology of revelation with a 
largely empirically-based description of religious experience.514 MI is important for 
Baillie’s MT. 
 However, we must be reminded that, for all of its critical realism, MI’s function 
as a description of CRE per se does not presuppose that humans have veridical 
knowledge of God. Rather, when this function, one grounded primarily in Baillie’s 
empirically-oriented reading of human experience (e.g., his own sense of God’s presence, 
included) describes the cognitive phenomena (belief content) of a subject’s experience of 
Jesus Christ, it describes those cognitive processes entailed what is, for the subject, a 
seeming Christian knowledge of God (i.e., a seeming Christian revelation)—according to 
                                                           
513 “What we have learned, then, is that human discovery and divine revelation, instead of dividing the field 
of religious knowledge between them, hold the field of it in common and are but complementary sides of 
the self-same act of experience. . . .What is here being asserted is that every human discovery of God or of 
religious truth mat be regarded under the correlative aspect of divine revelation.” IOR, p. 458. Accordingly, 
we have found Baillie employing MI, in an effort to correlate his theology of revelation positively with 
what he thinks valid from philosophical and psychological inquiries into human experience.  
514 What I am claiming here to be my own collection of insights, adds further force to what I have also 
claimed to be a research contribution: that Baillie’s latter MT evidences a stronger doctrine of the Holy 
Spirit than is apparent in his early MT. See Chapter 5.  
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the subject (e.g., as, per Baillie’s memory, how knowledge of God seemed to come to 
him).  
8.3.1.2 Consideration #2: MI’s promise: two leading questions 
MI's function as a descriptive epistemology of CRE is more precisely expressed 
when situated in my Proudfoot-indebted515 definition of descriptive epistemology:    
 
Descriptive-epistemological immediacy refers to how an 
emotion or experience seems to the subjects as an account 
of what must be assumed in order to have such an 
experience.  
 
 
Into this framework, we can insert MI’s function as a description of CRE, 
 
 
MI's description of epistemological immediacy refers to 
how an emotion or experience [the experience of faith in 
Jesus Christ] seems to the subjects as an account of what 
must be assumed [divine revelation] in order to have such 
an experience,  
 
 
and arrive at our definition:  
 
 
MI's description of epistemological immediacy refers to 
how the experience of faith in Jesus Christ seems to the 
subjects to be revelatory.  
 
                                                           
515 My distinction between MI’s descriptive-epistemological function and MI’s normative-epistemological 
function is not unlike Proudfoot’s distinction between two types of immediacy pertaining to religious 
experience. “Phenomenological” immediacy (what I call descriptive-epistemological immediacy) describes 
“how an emotion or experience seems [emphasis mine] to the subjects as an account of what must be 
assumed in order to have such an experience.” “Theoretical” immediacy (what I call normative-
epistemological immediacy) refers to how an emotion or experience is  [emphasis mine] an account of what 
must be assumed in order to have such a religious experience. I have avoided “phenomenological 
immediacy”, as it suggests Baillie’s epistemology is a phenomenalistic epistemology. I have also rejected 
this language, as it suggests that Baillie uses a phenomenological method. I have avoided “theoretical 
immediacy”, as it suggests that theorizing is only involved in metaphysical speculation and/or arguments 
for God’s existence. However, theorizing is presupposed by attempts to describe religious experience (e.g., 
as concerning the method best able to describe religious experience). Quotations from Wayne Proudfoot, 
Religious Experience. Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press, 1985, p. 19. Cf. p. 3. 
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From this line of reasoning, we can derive at least two leading questions for the 
evaluation of the logic of MI's descriptive epistemology of CRE:   
(1) Does MI’s logic describe how faith in Jesus Christ "seems" to be experienced as 
revelation? 
 
(2) If (1), what value does that description of CRE have for contemporary Christian 
thought? 
 
8.3.1.3 Consideration #3: MI’s core substance for evaluation 
Baillie’s theology of revelation presupposes the objective existence of realties, as 
well as human capacity for knowledges both “about” and “of” them: (a) self-knowledge, 
(b) other-knowledge, (c) God-knowledge, (d) world-knowledge, and (e) Gospel-
knowledge —all mediate (f) God-in-Jesus knowledge, a personal knowledge of Jesus. 
Without any one of these knowledges, there cannot be, according to Baillie’s theology of 
revelation, Christian knowledge of God through "faith"—a “trust” in Jesus Christ, in 
whom God dwelt, as verified by a self-authenticating psychological certitude.  
When we frame these knowledges, according to Baillie’s thought on religious 
experience in general (on knowledge of God, in general), we find that Baillie’s thought 
on religious experience (in general) maintains that religious experience: (1) describes 
realities (minds) known immediately by revelation; (2) involves abstracted "truths" about 
those realities (including the world) that can epistemologically correspond to the realities 
(minds, matter) that mediate knowledge of God; (3) entails both immediate knowledge of 
(non-discursive) and mediated knowledge about (discursive) realities (God, others, self, 
the world) the veridicality of whom (or which) can not be demonstrated with 100% 
logical certainty. Without knowledge capacities (1-3) and their individual interactions 
with each knowledge dimension (a-d), there cannot be, if Baillie’s thought is consistent, 
universal knowledge of God (UKG).   
When we frame these knowledges, according to Baillie’s description of a 
specifically CRE, we find that UKG is, as is the case for religious experience in general, 
epistemologically necessary for a specifically CRE (i.e., requires the interaction of 1-3 x 
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a-d). However, CRE also requires that knowledge capacities (1-3) interact with 
knowledge dimension (d), for personal knowledge of Jesus (f)—the “logical center” in 
history to whom all the media (e) “point” (in Baillie’s words). Dimensions and 
interactions that mirror Baillie’s belief that reality is a gradated valuational field, MI’s 
normative epistemology (i.e., theology of revelation) presupposes that they are veridical; 
MI’s descriptive epistemology of CRE presupposes that they are, to the subject, 
seemingly veridical.  
When we translate Baillie’s epistemology of religious experience (in general) into 
the language of MI; and frame it according to MI’s particularized description of CRE; we 
find MI maintaining, in keeping with Chapter 2’s elucidation of its logic, that this is an 
accurate description of CRE: “it seems to cognition” that a personal, knowledge of God-
in-Jesus knowledge is characterized by the following. 
 
   MI’s Descriptive Epistemology: Core Beliefs about CRE 
 
 
(1) Mediated by propositional knowledge about Jesus Christ's live, death,  
     and resurrection (the "old, old, story");  
(2) An immediate (non-discursive) knowledge of God;  
(3) An immediate knowledge of Jesus Christ;  
(4) An immediate knowledge of God's being in Jesus Christ;  
(5) A trust in, and volitional commitment to follow, Jesus Christ (“faith”).  
(6) A self-authenticating “psychological certitude” that God is in Christ 
(7) An event (1-6) mediated by self-knowledge, other-knowledge, world- 
knowledge and God-knowledge 
 
 
Plainly put, this constitutes the core of the cognitive content of a person who is having a 
religious experience of Jesus Christ. This conceptually crystallized account (1-7) amounts 
to the core substance for my evaluation of MI’s promise as a contribution for 
contemporary Christian thought. 
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8.3.2. MI's Descriptive Epistemology of CRE Evaluated 
There are three aspects of MI whose collective ground make it a contribution to 
contemporary Christian thought: (1) MI corresponds to empirical data concerning the 
cognitive psychology of CRE; (2) MI corresponds to Christian theology about CRE; (3) 
MI holds promise as a concept for engaging an intellectual current. 
 
8.3.2.1 MI is superior to other models of CRE 
In assessing the degree of MI’s correspondence with empirical accounts of CRE, 
it is helpful to situate MI within the context of options for describing CRE from an 
empirical perspective.  Here is but one way that I can conceive of patterning the data:   
  
 
 
 
  
(Please see next page)
 270 
     “Models of Descriptive Epistemologies of CRE” 
 
 
                
                Humans’ Epistemological Ground of Faith 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
      
 Mediated  
 Knowledge  
 (propositional        
 knowledge    
“about”) 
      
 Immediate    
 Knowledge 
 (non-propositional  
  knowledge “of”) 
 
 
 
Mediated-Immediate 
 Knowledge 
(propositional knowledge 
“about” and non-proposi-
tional knowledge “of”  
 
Mediation 
(Bodies 
only) 
 
 
Jesus experience:   
an inference from 
knowledge about 
bodies only 
 
 
Jesus experience:  
a non-inference from 
knowledge of  
bodies only 
 
Jesus experience:  
a non-inference with  
knowledge about and of 
bodies only 
 
Mediation 
(Bodies and 
Minds) 
 
Jesus experience:  
an inference from 
knowledge about 
bodies and minds 
 
Jesus experience:  
a non-inference from  
knowledge of  
bodies and minds 
 
 
Jesus experience:  
a non-inference with  
knowledge about and  
of bodies and minds  
(Baillie’s Concept of MI) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Divine  
Action 
 
 
 
Immediate 
(No bodies; 
minds only) 
 
Jesus experience:  
an inference from 
knowledge about 
minds only 
 
Jesus experience: a 
non-inference from 
knowledge of  
Minds only 
 
Jesus experience:  
a non-inference with  
knowledge about and of 
minds only 
 
 271 
Column 1: Its models considered  
The models depicted in column one, what I am calling “mediated-mediacy” 
models, describe assent to CRE as being mediated by propositional knowledge about 
Jesus and CRE as being authenticated by propositional knowledge about Jesus. Does 
empirical research evidence that assent to faith in Jesus Christ seems to subjects, as a 
whole, to be occasioned by a logical demonstration of Jesus' being the object of faith? It 
is plausible that some persons have been confronted with the Gospel message, processed 
the information, worked out a seemingly logical demonstration of Jesus' being the object 
of Christian faith, and Jesus’ credibility having thus been established by and grounded in 
a seemingly logical entailment, assented to belief in Jesus. However, surely such an 
assent to CRE would be an anomaly. For example, William James's thorough description 
and analysis of religious experience516suggests that religious conversion experiences are 
not grounded in logical demonstrations; rather, subjects as a whole describe religious 
experience as being grounded in what is a seemingly immediate knowledge of the 
numinous.  
This tendency of persons to regard Christian conversion experiences as logically 
non-demonstrative experiences of God has been evidenced in the more recent research of 
Glock and Stark.517 Examining the religious experiences of person’s from the West Coast 
of the United States, they found that the “confirming experience” which substantiated a 
religious experience's authenticity was for subjects, as a whole, “a sudden feeling, 
knowing, or intuition that the beliefs that one holds are true.” Specifically, subjects’ 
descriptions for the verification of their religious experience tended along two lines: a 
“generalized sense of sacredness” and a “specific awareness of the presence of divinity.”  
Their research indicates that over 40 percent of their sample interpreted their religious 
experiences as involving “a feeling that [they] were somehow in the presence of God.”518 
The findings of Glock et al. suggest, then, that a more subjective experience, and not a 
logical demonstration, is the primary factor for the triggering of religious experience.  
                                                           
516 See Varieties, Lectures IX-X.  
517 C.Y Glock and R. Stark, Religion and Society in Tension, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964. In Margaret 
M. Poloma, "The Sociological Context of Religious Experience”, p. 169, as cited in Hood, Handbook of 
Religious Experience, pp. 161-182.  
518 Glock and Stark, ibid. 
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The research of Glock et al. corroborate research data which indicates that 
cognition tends to be marginalized, in favor of emotion, in instances of religious 
conversion. An excellent example is Hood's analysis of language's effects on religious 
experience. Acknowledging the importance of discursive reasoning for the mediation of 
religious experience, Christian and otherwise, Hood also makes the point that religious 
experience nonetheless seems to many to be irreducible to language.  
 
 
 
1) It [language] can facilitate awareness of foundational 
realities, including being a factor in the phenomenological 
description of the experience; 2) it can provide the 
necessary mediation by which experience becomes 
reflexively conscious; 3) it can facilitate the report of 
experiences within what Wittgenstein would call a 
particular language game; 4) it can lead one to reject 
experiences as legitimate religious ones.  In each of these 
ways, language plays a crucial role in religious experience, 
but not one that can carry the weight of constituting the 
experience.519 
 
 
Accordingly, Lee’s examination of Christian and non-Christian forms of religious 
experience lead to the conclusion that:   
 
 
In the final analysis, God in his many manifestations is 
primarily to be experienced, rather than to be defined.  
Indeed, all major religions ranging from Hinduism to 
Catholicism regard the mystic as the pinnacle of religious 
achievement—and the mystic is the one who has the most 
frequent and intense religious experiences [emphasis 
mine].520   
 
 
Empirical psychological research, then, evidences, that subjects tend to think that 
immediate knowledge substantiates the veridicality of CRE. Consequently, the models 
                                                           
519Ralph W. Hood Jr., "The Facilitation of Religious Experience”, p. 577.  In Hood, Handbook of Religious 
Experience, pp. 568-599.  
520James Michael Lee, "Religious Instruction and Religious Experience", ibid. p. 547.  
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under column one are ruled out as accurate descriptions of the experience of faith in Jesus 
Christ. 
 
Column 2: Its Models Considered 
The models depicted in column two, which I am calling “immediate-immediacy” 
models, describe assent to CRE as being mediated by only immediate of Jesus and CRE 
as being authenticated by or grounded in immediate knowledge of Jesus.  
Unlike those models depicted in column one, column two's models describe CRE 
as an event grounded in immediate knowledge: knowledge of Jesus is knowledge 
authenticated not by discursive reasoning, but established rather by faith's immediate 
knowledge of Jesus. Specifically, it describes persons' assent to CRE as one mediated 
only by immediate knowledge, be that immediate knowledge of minds or bodies or both.  
It seems reasonable to think that when persons place faith (fiducia) in Jesus, while most 
believe that the veridicality of knowledge of Jesus Christ is ultimately an immediate 
knowledge, the same yet generally presuppose that CRE is mediated by at least some 
propositional knowledge about Jesus Christ—that Jesus existed, that knowledge of Jesus 
is tied to one's salvation, for example. If so, then models of this type must be rejected on 
empirical ground as accurate descriptions of CRE.  
 
Column 3: Its Models Considered 
The models depicted in column one, mediated-immediacy models, describe assent 
to CRE as mediated by propositional knowledge about Jesus and CRE as authenticated 
by immediate knowledge about Jesus. These are mediated-immediacy models. 
The first particular model under the mediated-immediate column describes assent 
to faith in Jesus as mediated by both knowledge about (propositional), and mediated by 
immediate knowledge of (non-propositional), bodies only. While this model correctly 
describes CRE as being grounded in immediate knowledge; that its description of the 
cognition of CRE makes the body the terminus of subjects’ immediate knowledge—
assent to CRE is mediated by, and the veridicality of CRE, established by, mediated 
knowledge about and immediate knowledge of bodies only—squarely contradicts the 
empirical data pertaining to descriptions of the immediacy of CRE: on the whole, 
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subjects describe CRE as being mediated by immediate knowledge of the mind of Christ; 
and as being grounded ultimately in what also seems to be an immediate knowledge of 
God. 
The third particular model under the mediated-immediate column describes assent 
to faith in Jesus as mediated by both knowledge about (propositional), and mediated by 
immediate knowledge of (non-propositional), minds only.  While this model does also 
rightly describes CRE as being grounded in immediately knowledge; when it limits 
subjects’ knowledge to knowledge of the mind—assent to CRE is mediated by, and the 
veridicality of CRE, established by, mediated knowledge about and immediate 
knowledge of minds only—it too advances a model of CRE whose description of 
persons’ cognitive state during CRE fails to correspond with research pertaining to CRE: 
the psychology of CRE indicates that subjects generally believe that veridical knowledge 
about bodies have mediated and continue to mediate their concrete experiences of Jesus 
Christ, their religious conversion experience included.521  
 
Column 3: Baillie’s Model of Mediated Immediacy Briefly Reconsidered 
MI’s description of the immediacy of CRE   
MI, when functioning as a descriptive epistemology of CRE, clearly describes the 
cognition involved in assent to faith in Jesus Christ—i.e., CRE—as being not being a 
matter of logical demonstration. Likewise, it grounds CRE in what subjects perceive to 
be an immediate subjective verification of knowledge of God in Jesus. In this regard, it 
rightly describes the immediacy involved in CRE. It is as such superior to the other 
models of mediated immediacy discussed. 
MI’s description of the mediation of such supposedly immediate knowledge is, 
however, plausibly problematic, based on what has been found to be a seemingly 
muddled description of the epistemological correlate of religious experience: the divine 
                                                           
521 See, for example, William P. Alston, Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience. 
Cornell University Press, 1991. Alston’s general theory of doxastic practices  argues that religious beliefs 
are formed in a belief forming framework or context in which there are interlocking sources of authority. 
This framework, not unlike those that influences other claims based on sensory perception (for instance, 
empirical science’s claims, includes back ground assumptions, belief forming mechanisms, and the not 
always logically demonstrable criteria that we routinely presume to justify believed truths about the world 
and others. 
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action which, engaging the subject, gives rise to CRE—this when subjects apprehend it 
and, by faith (immediate knowledge), appropriate it. As MI’s function as a description of 
divine action is muddled, it seems prudent to flesh out briefly what that functions 
suggests—though preferably would have described more lucidly and cogently—about the 
cognitive psychology involved in assent to CRE, subjects’ beliefs about the knowledge’s 
which mediate CRE, in particular.  This will enable us to understand better and to 
evaluate more judiciously MI’s thus far otherwise accurate rendering of the cognitive 
psychology of CRE.   
 
MI’s description of the mediation involved in CRE 
If, then, MI describes well the immediacy of CRE, in that its description 
corresponds in general with empirical data pertaining to the immediacy and subjectivity 
of CRE, does it also describe faithfully the thoughts and feelings that tend to mediate 
persons’ believed experiences of Jesus? More specifically, would its problematic logic 
appear to suggest, if also fail to persuade, that CRE is mediated by cognition that 
involves logical demonstration(s), illogical reasoning, or, perhaps, reasoning that leads to 
paradox?  
If MI describes CRE as being mediated by a (seemingly) logical demonstration of 
Jesus Christ's being the subject of Christian faith, then it would describe faith’s 
immediate knowledge of Jesus (CRE) as entailing no logical paradox. MI obviously 
rejects logical demonstration as the modus operandi for the mediation of CRE, while yet 
describing assent to CRE as mediated by what subjects believe are truths about Jesus. 
Consequently, if subjects’ knowledge about gospel truths are said to mediate CRE, 
though do not provide immediate knowledge of Jesus (faith); then, inasmuch as Christian 
faith (CRE) is a decision-based act—one precipitated by (i.e., mediated by) discursive 
reasoning—one can infer that MI describes the immediate knowledge of (faith in) Jesus 
Christ that marks the transition to CRE proper as being mediated by discursive reasoning 
that is either: (1) illogical or (2) paradoxical.  Possible also is that it describes the moment 
of assent to faith in Jesus CRE as one (3) devoid of any apparent ratiocination at all (e.g., 
a subconscious assent). I have already argued against the tenability of this third option in 
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this chapter context. This leaves options (1-2) as explanations for MI’s description of the 
cognition involved in the mediation of CRE.    
Option (1)—MI describes assent to CRE as being mediated by persons’ 
contemplation of the illogical—is ruled out on the ground that nowhere in Baillie’s 
thought does he maintain that assent to Christian faith is essentially assent to the 
Logically Self-Contradictory. Accordingly, not one of Baillie’s critics has interpreted 
Baillie as contending for that, even when, as we have found, his critics have maintained 
that MI proves itself to be, upon scrutiny, logically self-contradictory.  This leaves open 
option (2)—MI describes CRE as being mediated by knowledge about (mediated or 
propositional knowledge) and knowledge of (immediate or non-propositional knowledge) 
a paradox.  
Although the logic of Baillie’s theological epistemological of revelation fails to 
persuade—viz., as concerning the epistemological linkage between general revelation 
and special revelation—and, accordingly, MI’s function as a description of revelation 
fails to persuade, if only for its seemingly self-contradictory Theo-logic; it is my position 
that MI’s function as a descriptive epistemology of CRE is not, by extension, necessarily 
logically contradictory. Indeed, while MI’s other functions suffer a seeming inability to 
convey coherently those processes by which various loci mediate divine action and 
revelation, when MI describes CRE, it describes CRE in narrower and more mentalistic 
terms, and then describes the epistemological junction between faith and reason as being 
paradoxical. This is to say that MI’s description of CRE is a description of what appears 
to be, from the subject’s perspective, a knowledge (faith) the apprehension and 
appropriation of which is mediated by both propositional knowledge about (“truths”, in 
Baillie’s language) and immediate knowledge of God’s being in Jesus (“realities”, in 
Baillie’s language)—knowledges whose logics are believed not to contradict each other, 
but believed, by faith, rather to compliment each other.  
 "Jesus Christ is the Paradox to whom I shall give my intellectual assent; in whom 
I shall trust; to whom I shall give my life and fullest allegiance"—that perhaps is what 
Baillie would have MI describe plainly, had the mediating theologian, perennially given 
as he was to intellectual currents psychological, explicated in detail the psychology of 
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humans’ encounter with the Mediator—a psychology which he attempted to correlate 
with his theology of revelation.  
Regardless, I think it apparent that MI’s description of CRE approximates 
something like a philosophy of the cognitive psychology of what is thought to be the 
paradoxical quality of Christian faith—this when, relatively speaking, it is stripped from 
its theological suppositions, in keeping with Baillie’s effort to correlate his theology with 
a more empirically-based description of how humans appear to encounter Jesus in human 
experience. Indeed, save Baillie’s description of the mediation of knowledge of God’s 
being in Jesus, when Baillie speaks explicitly of the “paradox” that is MI’s logic this too 
evidences Baillie’s affinity for paradox as a description of MI’s logic. Additionally, 
Baillie’s speaks of an affinity for the treatment of Christian faith provided by the 
“genius” Kierkegaard. While Kierkegaard’s language about assent to CRE would likely 
strike Baillie as a bit extreme for its seeming emphasis on logical contradiction—
Christian faith in Jesus is an assent to the Christian Absurd—Baillie would have no 
difficulty with Kierkegaard’s epistemological position that faith is neither an assent nor 
an allegiance to an entirely Logically Self-contradictory whose grace and salvific effects 
are verified by illogic. Rather, Baillie would concur with Kierkegaard that faith in the 
Absolute Paradox, while subjective, is nonetheless not grounded ultimately in logical 
contradiction.522  
There is, then, already reason to think that Baillie’s model of MI is superior to the 
competing models or CRE, in that it correctly describes CRE as being occasioned by and 
grounded in what seems to subjects to be immediate knowledge. I have also advanced the 
position that Baillie’s model of MI describes CRE as being paradoxical. What remains to 
                                                           
522 For a lucid analysis of Kierkegarrd's thought on this issue, see Steven M. Emannuel, Kierkegaard and 
the Concept of Revelation, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996, esp. Chap. 3 ("Reason, 
Faith, and Revelation"), pp. 39-60. Cf. Stephen C. Evans, "Is Kierkegaard an Irrationalist? Reason, 
Paradox, and Faith", Religious Studies, 25, 1989, pp. 347-62. In addition, while I do not rest my 
interpretation of MI upon correlations between Baillie’s psychology of the paradoxical nature of CRE and 
Kierkegaard’s theology of paradox; and I am certainly not maintaining that Baillie’s MT is an existential 
theology—promising as that research line may be; it is interesting to note that, when viewed from the 
perspective of the Incarnation, the idea of faith in the Paradox has been maintained by John Baillie’s 
brother, Donald. See D. M. Baillie, God Was in Christ: The historical Jesus and the message of Christ 
woven into the doctrines of the Incarnation and Atonement, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1948. See 
also George B. Hall, “D.M. Baillie: A Theology of Paradox”, pp. 65-86, in Fergusson’s Christ, Church and 
Society for an informative elucidation of types of theological paradox, and his application of them to his 
interpretation of the logic of Donald Baillie’s Christology.  
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be seen is the extent to which Baillie’s model of MI is a contribution to contemporary 
Christian thought. This assessment requires that MI meet at least three criteria: (1) that it 
generally corresponds to the empirical psychology of CRE; (2) that it affirms chief 
Christian tenants about CRE; (3) that it has utility for contemporary Christian thought.  
 
8.3.2.2 MI corresponds to the cognitive psychology of CRE 
As the above chart indicates, MI describes the experience of Jesus (CRE) as being 
assent to a non-inference accompanied by knowledge about, and of, bodies and minds. 
Put differently, MI asserts that persons who have a CRE believe that they have 
propositional knowledge about, and personal knowledge of minds and bodies, believing 
that such knowledge mediates assent to faith in Jesus Christ. These aspects of mediation 
of personal knowledge of Jesus refer to points (1) and (7) from the list of the core beliefs 
espoused by MI’s descriptive epistemology of CRE.  
          
          “MI’s Descriptive Epistemology of CRE: Core Assertions” 
           (1) Mediated by propositional knowledge about Jesus Christ's live, death,  
      and resurrection (the "old, old, story");  
(2) An immediate (non-discursive) knowledge of God;  
(3) An immediate knowledge of Jesus Christ;  
(4) An immediate knowledge of God being in Jesus Christ;  
(5) A trust in, and volitional commitment to follow, Jesus Christ (“faith”).  
(6) A self-authenticating “psychological certitude” that God is in Christ 
(7) An event (1-6) mediated by self-knowledge, other-knowledge, world-
knowledge and God-knowledge; 
 
In addition, MI’s descriptive epistemology presupposes that subject S thinks S’s CRE 
neither logically demonstrable, nor paradoxical, nor contingent upon seeing Jesus’ 
body.523 Does the research describe assent to faith in Jesus as mediated by (1) and (7)?  
                                                           
523 Although, see, e.g., Lecture III of William James, The Varieties of  Religious Experience.  New York : 
Longmans, Green & Co., 1902. 
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8.3.2.3 MI endorses a revelation-based Christian theology of CRE 
MI’s description of CRE mirrors Baillie’s theology of revelation in that it 
describes CRE as a seemingly mediated and immediate knowledge. Inasmuch as a 
Christian theology of revelation should conceive of knowledge of God as being both a 
mediated and immediate knowledge of Personality, then MI’s description of CRE is a 
contribution to contemporary Christian thought, in that it safeguards against those models 
of CRE which would, perhaps in service to an argument for God’s existence, endorse a 
God either excessively immanent or excessively transcendent in terms of God’s 
relationship to humankind. 
Should Christian theology conceive of a God who is immediately known in a 
manner that bypasses all human cognition (i.e., mediated knowledge)? While Baillie’s 
theology of revelation remains open to the charge of minimizing the cognitive content 
involved in the mediation of divine revelation—MI’s normative epistemology has been 
shown to suffer a seeming breakdown in its logic in this regard—MI’s description of 
CRE, like MI’s descriptions of divine action and revelation, contends that knowledge of 
God, be it actual or seeming, is always mediated by human cognition: by knowledge 
about the world, oneself, others, what one knows about Jesus, and historical events. This 
seems to me the right course of action for Christian thought. 
Nowhere in the New Testament will one find an idea of CRE whose epistemology 
amounts to faith in a God the seeming knowledge of Whom bypasses all human 
cognition. One does find, however, multiple examples of persons placing faith in a Jesus 
Christ who meets them in them in their concrete situations, either in body and/or in spirit, 
to deepen their walk with God. In these instances, one does not find a Jesus effectively 
asking persons to surrender their cognitive faculties. To the contrary, Jesus, engaging 
such persons in their concrete circumstance, speaks to persons in a language that they can 
understand and, in so doing, engages their background knowledge and, as the 
psychologists would say, cognitive schemas, in the personal encounter. Such persons 
include the one who would become the greatest of the Christian missionaries, Saul of 
Tarsus.  When, for instance, Saul, soon-to-be Paul, encounters Jesus on the road to 
Damascus, Jesus, according to what we take to be Paul’s description of Paul’s CRE, 
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speaks to Paul and appeals to Paul’s thought.524 The same goes with Jesus’ discussion 
with Simon Peter on the coasts of Caesarea Philippi: an occasion which assuredly 
strengthened a person’s faith in Jesus,525 it was precipitated by Jesus’ inquiry also into a 
concrete situation—namely, what the religious community was saying about the identity 
of Jesus. Accordingly, when Jesus utters parables, albeit parables whose deep truths526 
are not meant to be understood by all persons,527Jesus uses concrete examples which 
appeal to listeners’ cognitive set—cloth, wine, a fig tree, a mustard seed, a pearl, a fishing 
net, sheep, goats, for example—to mediate deep secrets of God. While these isolated 
parable-telling instances may not have given rise to a religious experience along the lines 
of say a religious conversion, that Jesus gave them with the hope that these stories would 
deepen his followers’ faith in and walk with God seems apparent.  
One danger of a model of CRE whose epistemology bypasses the mediation of 
knowledge of God by knowledge about objects is it can promote an unduly immanentist 
account of God’s presence—one that, for emphasis on the epistemic accessibility of an 
always immediately known God, blurs the Creator-creature distinction fundamental to the 
Christian tradition’s ontology.  MI’s description of CRE militates against this move 
toward pantheism: it mains that CRE is never a direct knowledge of God, but one that is 
always mediated by (comes “in, with, and under”) the material order and human 
knowledge about it.  
                                                           
524 “And as he journeyed, he came near Damascus: and suddenly there shined round about him a light from 
heaven: And he fell to the earth, and heard a voice saying unto him, Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me? 
And he said, Who art thou, Lord? And the Lord said, I am Jesus whom thou persecutest: it is hard for thee 
to kick against the pricks. And he trembling and astonished said, Lord, what wilt thou have me to do? And 
the Lord said unto him, Arise, and go into the city, and it shall be told thee what thou must do. And the men 
which journeyed with him stood speechless, hearing a voice, but seeing no man. And Saul arose from the 
earth; and when his eyes were opened, he saw no man: but they led him by the hand, and brought him into 
Damascus. And he was three days without sight, and neither did eat nor drink.” Acts 9: 3-9, KJV. 
525 13 “When Jesus came into the coasts of Caesarea Philippi, he asked his disciples, saying, Whom do men 
say that I the Son of man am? And they said, Some say that thou art John the Baptist: some, Elias; and 
others, Jeremias, or one of the prophets. He saith unto them, But whom say ye that I am? And Simon Peter 
answered and said, Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God. And Jesus answered and said unto him, 
Blessed art thou, Simon Barjona: for flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Father which is 
in heaven.” Matt.16:13, KJV. 
526 “All these things spake Jesus unto the multitude in parables; and without a parable spake he not unto 
them: That it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophet, saying, I will open my mouth in parables; 
I will utter things which have been kept secret from the foundation of the world.” Matt13:34–35, 
referencing Psalm 78:2, KJV. 
527  “And the disciples came, and said unto him, Why speakest thou unto them in parables? He answered and 
said unto them, Because it is given unto you to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven, but to them it 
is not given.” Matt. 13:10-11. 
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When MI describes CRE as mediated by knowledge about the material world, it 
also safeguards a major teaching for a Christian theology of revelation, inasmuch as that 
theology of revelation is to be at least consistent with Bible stories: that there is no direct 
knowledge of God. Nowhere in either the Old Testament or the New Testament is there 
mention of a revelatory event in which God is seen directly. There are however, multiple 
accounts of divine disclosure being mediated by media—by things, beings and/or human 
cognition about things and beings—by human bodies, angels, visions, bushes, thunder, 
lightening, pillars of cloud and fire. Accordingly, MI’s epistemology affirms the orthodox 
Judeo-Christian teaching that no human can see God in God’s full glory.528 As such, MI’s 
descriptive epistemology of CRE militates against what amounts to idolatry for the 
Christian tradition: pantheism. 
 
8.3.2.4 MI has apologetic value for enaging non-supernaturalist accounts of 
religious experience 
Postmodern thought continues to be one of the most pressing challenges for 
Christian theism.  Although its proponents and teachings are diverse, the postmodernism 
that underwrites the contemporary culture and ethos that is postmodernity is one that 
gravitates toward certain core beliefs. Grenz expounds these beliefs in “A Primer on 
Postmodernism.”529 His exposition can be summarized as follows. 
 
 
The Postmodern Ethos: A Rejection of the Following Modernist Beliefs (Grenz, 1996) 
 
(1) Belief in objectivism, in favor of relativism; 
(2) Belief that truth is what is rational, in favor of subjective experience and pragmatism; 
(3) Belief that the scientific method discovers truth, in favor of a more holistic and   
      experiential approach to knowledge;  
(4) Belief that knowledge can be totalized, in favor of knowledge being non-totalizable;  
(5) Belief that truth can come from epistemological individualism, in favor of truth as     
      the byproduct of communal relations and consensus;  
(6) Belief in a logocentric emphasis for knowing, in favor of multiple ways of knowing;  
                                                           
528 Exodus 33:20. 
529 Stanley J. Grenz, A Primer on Postmodernism. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1996.  
 282 
(7) Belief that knowledge is best attained from personal disinterest, in favor of a  
      participatory model for knowing; 
(8) Belief in modernist Euro-American centrism, in favor of a multi-cultural approach   
      toward knowledge and values; 
(9) Belief in the inherent goodness of knowledge, in favor of the moral neutrality of  
      knowledge.530 
 
Each of the above-indicated beliefs reflects postmodernism’s rejection of the “meta-
narrative” (all-encompassing explanation of reality), epistemic foundationalism (there are 
self-justifying basic beliefs), and the representationalist theory of language (that language 
objectively mirrors objectively known objects). 
Postmodern thought, then, is not inclined to endorse some trans-historical, 
objective Truth the veridicality of which (or Whom) is guaranteed by revelation (e.g., 
theology) or logical demonstration (e.g., science, philosophy). Accordingly, it rejects, in 
principal, an Absolute Value that should apply categorically to all individuals. 
Undergirding this ethical relativism is the logic that worldviews are, mediated by the 
“textuality” of, to borrow from Perry,531our ego-centric predicament. This includes, 
though hardly exhausts, the impact of information provided by our personal histories, 
cultures and language constructs on our worldviews. The thought is that mediation 
logically negates the immediacy required for such a pure experience. As Vanhoozer 
remarks, 
 
 
To assert ‘there is nothing outside textuality’ is to deny the 
possibility of ever achieving immediacy, philosophy’s 
longed-for encounter with pure ‘presence’ uncontaminated 
by difference, an unmediated, nonlinguistic encounter with 
what lies outside language.532  
 
                                                           
530Ibid. See esp. Ch’s 2 & 3, pp. 11-56. 
531Ralph Barton Perry. "The ego-centric predicament." The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and 
Scientific Methods, 1910, pp. 5-14. 
532 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, “Scripture and Tradition”, p. 157. In The Cambridge Companion to Postmodern 
Theology, Kevin J. Vanhoozer, ed., Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 149-69. 
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Accordingly, the postmodern tendency is to look to culture-specific truths and to assess 
their credibility. This evaluation typically includes an assessment to which beliefs 
correspond with the shared subjective empirical experience of the localized community 
as a whole. It also typically includes an assessment of the utility value of those beliefs for 
the community.  
This raises, for Grenz, the question of how the Christian tradition might 
effectively share the Gospel with postmodernity. Grenz, following his analysis of 
postmodern thought and culture, provides four guidelines or prescriptions for how he 
thinks the Gospel can speak effectively to the “postmodern situation”. 
 
Four Characteristics of a “Postmodern Gospel” (Grenz, 1996) 
(1) Post-Individualistic.  “We must affirm with postmodern thinkers that knowledge—
including knowledge of God—is not merely objective, not simply discovered by the 
neutral knowing self…. Here we can learn from the contemporary communitarian 
scholars [who]…. affirm that the community is essential in the process of knowing. 
Individuals come to knowledge only by way of a cognitive framework mediated by the 
community in which they participate… The community mediates to its members a 
transcendent story that includes traditions of virtue, common good and ultimate meaning 
[emphasis mine].”533 [cf. Baillie’s autobiographical basis for MI; cf. MI’s emphasis on 
the four knowledge’s interrelatedness in knowing.] 
 
(2) Post-rationalistic. “We must make room for the concept of ‘mystery’—not as an 
irrational complement to the rational but as a reminder that the fundamental reality of 
God transcends human rationality [cf. MI as immediate knowledge]…. At the heart of 
being a Christian is a personal encounter with God in Christ that shapes and molds us… 
It is in the context of making sense out of life by means of recounting the story of a 
transformative religious experience [cf. MI as CRE] that doctrinal propositions find their 
importance…. Propositions can thus be said to have second-order importance. [cf. MI’s 
presuppositions on knowledge of first-order realities vs. knowledge about second-order 
                                                           
533Primer on Postmodernism, p. 168. 
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truths] They both serve conversion experience [i.e., mediate it] and arise out of our new 
status as believers…. A postmodern articulation of the gospel… no longer focuses as on 
propositions [but rather experience] as the central content of Christian faith.”534 
[emphases mine] 
 
(3) Post-dualistic. “The next generation is increasingly interested in the human person as 
a unified whole. The gospel we proclaim must speak to human beings in their entirety… 
It involves integrating the emotional-affective, as well as the bodily-sensual, within one 
human person…. [It] must also put the human person back into the social and 
environment context that forms and nourishes us…. Our anthropology must take 
seriously that our identity includes being in a relationship with nature [cf. MI as world-
knowledge] , being in a relationship with others [cf. MI as other-knowledge], being in a 
relationship with God [cf. MI as God-knowledge] , and, as a consequence being in a true 
relationship with ourselves [cf. MI as self-knowledge]. All the emphases are evident in 
the ministry of our Lord [emphasis mine]…”535  
 
(4) Post-Noeticentric Gospel. “Our gospel must affirm that the goal of our existence 
encompasses more than just the accumulation of knowledge. We must declare that the 
purpose of correct doctrine is to serve the attainment of wisdom…..Knowledge is good 
only when it facilitates a good result—specifically, when it fosters wisdom (or 
spirituality) in a knower….To this end, a post-noeticentric gospel fosters a proper 
ordering of activism and quietism…  The postmodern ethos correctly understands that 
activism must arise from inner resources. The postmodern gospel will remind us that we 
will be able to sustain right action only when it flows from the resources of the Holy 
Spirit…. As Christians, then, we should be concerned to gain knowledge and to hold 
correct doctrine in order that we might attain wisdom for living so that we might please 
God with our lives.”536  
 
                                                           
534 Ibid., p. 171. 
535 Ibid., pp. 171-72. 
536 Ibid., pp. 172-73. 
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Grenz’s theological emphasis is on how to share the Gospel message in the postmodern 
situation, and his method is confessionalist in orientation. Although that theological 
approach is not the primary concern of this thesis, Grenz does avail important points of 
contact with postmodernity for the academic theologian who would engage postmodern 
thought on the issue of, to use Grenz’s language, “transformative religious experience”. 
Indeed, it is the profound religious experience, and not so much religious doctrine, that 
this now not-so “new generation” seeks. Postmodernity’s experience-seeking inclination 
reflects postmodernity’s typically anti-objectivist ontology, typically anti-logocentric 
epistemology, and, accordingly, the tendency to enthrone subjective experience as the 
means and verification of knowing. It also reflects the postmodern preference for shared 
subjective experiences of community as normative for spiritual growth.  
Does MI’s description of CRE, then, overlap with beliefs central to the 
postmodern ethos? When we compare MI’s core beliefs with postmodernity’s core 
beliefs, we observe the following points of agreement. 
 
Shared Emphases between MI’s description of CRE and the Postmodern Ethos  
(1)  A rejection of logic as the final arbiter of truth 
(2)  There are multiple ways of knowing 
(3)  The authority and subjective certitude of life-transforming experiences 
(4)  The necessity of personal communal relations for the mediation of knowledge of   
      supreme value 
(5) A rejection of the belief that knowledge can be totalized by any human enterprise 
(6) A rejection of the belief that all knowledge is inherently good  
(7) A rejection of the belief that knowledge attainment is the proper end for humans 
 
MI’s and postmodernity’s mutual affirmation of these beliefs is discussed in detail in the 
following section.    
 
Does MI’s description of CRE emphasize what Grenz’s four criteria for postmodern 
gospel emphasize? It does, in each instance. I have just noted these shared emphases and 
conceptual overlaps (via bracketed insertion and underlined emphasis), in passages that 
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outline the four criteria. The concepts noted are central to MI, have been discussed 
throughout the thesis, and need not be repeated here. 
 The only criterion in need of consideration, then, is the fourth or “post-noetic” 
criterion, including the extent to which MI meets it. Grenz’s position on this criterion is 
that Christian theology should reject knowledge as the telos of knowledge acquisition, 
and contend rather that knowledge should facilitate “spirituality” (equated with 
“wisdom”)—a spirituality characterized by wisdom, governed by the Holy Spirit, and one 
which aims to “please God”.  
Grenz’s prescription for Christian thought’s engagement with postmodernity is 
not without difficulties. For one, Grenz is ambiguous about what he means by 
“spirituality” and “wisdom”. Secondly, I would also reject what he appears to be 
contending about the telos of knowledge acquisition.537 Nevertheless, when he rightly 
maintains that Christian theology’s engagement with postmodernity should emphasize 
that “spirituality” and “wisdom” derive from the Holy Spirit, he espouses, if again 
somewhat vaguely, an epistemology with which MI’s epistemology is all too familiar.  
For we have found, for example, that MI’s epistemology maintains that the Holy Spirit 
mediates assent to CRE (cf., postmodern “spirituality”), by providing a “paradoxically” 
logical connection (cf., postmodern subjectivity) between our knowledge about second-
order truths about God’s divine action, and our immediate knowledge of God; and that 
this epistemological connection is evidenced by the Holy Spirit’s illumination of the 
human mind with at least three types of immediacy: (1) an immediate perception (cf. a 
“sense” of God’s presence; faith as a “mode of apprehension”) of God’s having been 
directly present in Jesus Christ—this despite God’s self-disclosure being indirect—
mediated by a veiled form (flesh); (2) an immediate trust in God, as Self-disclosed in 
Jesus Christ: “faith” the veridicality of whose evidence is ultimately irreducible to 
sensory perception (that which is seen); and, (3) an immediate confirmation—a 
                                                           
537 Grenz appears to advocate a theological method that would emphasize that the telos of the Christian 
walk is “to please God”.  What are the problems with this position? For one, it suggests that God is not 
pleased with God’s creation. Secondly, it suggests that good works might steer God around on the matter. 
Thirdly, it suggests that God would somehow be incomplete, were God not pleased by the actions of God’s 
creation—that God’s aseity is not enough for God—that God’s Self-actualization is contingent upon human 
action. I would prefer to emphasize God’s love for creation and to conceive of the telos of knoweldge 
aquistion as loving, and not aiming ultimately to please, God and one’s neighbor. 
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“psychological certitude” by (direct acquaintance), of knowledge of God and of Jesus’ as 
the Subject of Christian faith (contra confirmation by indirect knowledge—namely, 
knowledge about God from a “highest inference”).538 Inasmuch as postmodernity 
emphasizes “spirituality” as a way of knowing, existing, and finding value and direction 
in life, MI’s description of CRE is a promising means for Christian thought’s dialogue 
with postmodernity: MI’s epistemology emphasizes spirituality—a Holy Spirituality. 
MI’s description of CRE also emphasizes, with postmodernity, that religious 
experience, like human experience in general, does not end with one particularly 
profound transformational moment; rather, religious experience is an ongoing 
transformative experience. Accordingly, MI’s epistemology does not conceive of a 
spiritual experience as one characterized by a moment of dispassionate thought; rather, 
MI description of CRE conceives of what is a seemingly “revelatory” moment(s)—one(s) 
that initiates a worldview shift initially, but which demands ongoing reflection, 
existential commitment (i.e., praxis), and spirituality characterized by openness (faith) to 
further (seeming) revelation. Here too is a point of contact with postmodernism. For 
although postmodern epistemology does reject the meta-narrative, its epistemology tends 
to suppose, if also to prescribe, a story for everyone: our individual actions should mimic 
our noetic structures. Be our beliefs conceived as a loosely knit, non-hierarchically 
intertwined amalgamation of unchallenged tacit assumptions—or as free-floating, 
hermeneutical spiral-driven, Escher-like imprisoned, dueling textualities—or as ever-
shifting connectionist nodes of multiple reciprocities (and so forth, ad nauseum)—our 
actions, axiology, and intellect should inform each other an operate in accordance with 
each other. Likewise, MI’s epistemology maintains that value judgments must give rise to 
action—namely, to a Holy Spirit-inspired walk with Christ (for the Christian). CRE is not 
merely a static moment, if indeed some moments of CRE are more spiritually profound 
(“revelatory”) for the Christian and for the Christian community as a whole.  
Accordingly, when Baillie speaks of the Christian “frame of reference” in his 
final work (SPG), he identifies as the paradigmatic experience the Holy Spirit’s Presence 
at Pentecost: here is a general guide for interpreting human experience, including other 
post-Pentecost religious CRE’s (e.g., revelatory moments; moments of deepening one's 
                                                           
538 See Ch. 5, passim, esp. conclusion. 
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faith in Jesus) that one might encounter in one’s walk with Christ.  How does MI’s 
descriptive epistemology of CRE relate to what has been identified as Baillie’s increased 
communitarian emphasis in his latter thought? When Baillie describes the communitarian 
“triangular relationship” as one “mediated” the Holy Spirit’s Presence at Pentecost, 
identifies its koinonia of agapē as the paradigm for Christian communal relations, and 
maintains that the Holy Spirit should guide the Christian community’s collective walk 
with God today; he squarely relies on MI’s descriptive epistemology of CRE to describe 
how the Holy Spirit provides, as Grenz would have, the cultivation of wisdom and 
spiritual growth 
It is clear, then, that MI’s description of CRE contends, with postmodernism, that 
spirituality is a communitarian enterprise characterized by good will and the cultivation 
of individual’s personal capacity to realize existentially, in thought and deed, his or her 
values.  
Ian Barbour observes that  
 
If inherited religious symbols are for many people today 
almost totally detached from human experience, a return to 
the experiential basis of religion is important for its 
renewed vitality in practice, as well as for a sound 
epistemology in theory.539  
 
 
I submit that the situation facing theology today is not unlike the situation that was facing 
theology when Baillie penned IOR in 1926: for the ordinary persons, the inherited 
religious symbols are almost totally detached from human experience.  
Accordingly, the past two decades (in particular) have witnessed several 
prominent theologians, such as Barbour, engaging contemporary culture over the issue of 
Christian theology’s reconcilability with empirical science. Itself something of a 
mediating theological enterprise, much of it has endeavored to square theology with 
theoretical physics, in particular. As important as that work surely is, I do think that there 
                                                           
539 Ian G. Barbour, Myths, models, and paradigms: A comparative study in science and religion. New 
York: Harpercollins College Div, 1974, p. 8. 
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is an air of unreality to it for much of postmodern culture. For one, the ordinary 
postmodern person tends to reject both science and theology as higher-order knowledges 
whose meta-narratives provide the best understanding of Reality. Secondly, the ordinary 
person is likely unable to comprehend both systematic theology and quantum theory. 
Thirdly, I suspect that the ordinary person does not think knowledge about physics 
essential to spirituality, though no doubt many postmodern persons find ethical liberation 
and spirituality in quantum physics. Fourthly, even those thinkers concerned primarily 
with theology’s relationship with physics, such as Polkinghorne, have come to realize 
that contemporary theology must explore “the most important part of the frontier between 
science and religion,” the social sciences, including psychology.540  
Today’s ordinary person is, largely, a postmodern person—one who can and does 
relate existentially to something called “spirituality”.541 Inasmuch as today’s mediating 
theologian would engage postmodernity on the issue of religious experience, MI’s 
description of CRE provides a promising model for such dialogue: MI’s core 
epistemological beliefs overlap substantially with those of the ordinary person, as 
evidenced in MI’s correspondence with much of the postmodern ethos. MI’s description 
of CRE also holds potential for the conceptual modeling of revelatory religious 
experience, as evidenced in its correspondence with research from the psychology of 
religious experience. Here is an additional strength. Furthermore, while I would neither 
have MI’s descriptive epistemology of CRE reduced to a scientific (or otherwise) 
naturalism—even if, for example, the felt immediacy of religious experience seems to be 
mediated by the dorsomedial frontal cortex542—nor its epistemic potential appraised 
according to its value as some instrumentalist epistemology; MI’s description of CRE 
                                                           
540 Having expressed his hopes for theology in the third millennium, Polkinghorne finishes his lecture for 
the British Royal Academy with this statement: “The most neglected part of the frontier between science 
and religion, is the most important part of the frontier between science and religion, which is the human 
sciences, neuropsychology, psychology and so on. Working is going on there, but not enough, and I hope 
much more work will be in the future.” John Polkinghorne, “Gifford Lectures Revisited: Reflections of 
Seven Templeton Laureates, Part. 2”, Gifford Lectures video, 27.42 – 52.51, June 1, 2012, 
http://www.giffordlectures.org/videos. 
541 In his quite recent Gresham Lecture, one titled “Experience and the Spiritual Dimension,” Keith Ward 
indicates: “I have chosen that phrase ‘the spiritual dimension’ because… one of the most common things 
people say in Britain is ‘I am spiritual, but not religious’.” (.57 - 1.09). Keith Ward. “Experience and the 
Spiritual Dimension”, Gresham Lectures video, 50.56, January 27, 2015, 
http://www.gresham.ac.uk/lectures-and-events/experience-and-the-spiritual-dimension.  
542 Nina P. Azari, et al. "Neural correlates of religious experience." European Journal of Neuroscience, 
13.8, 2001, pp. 1649-1652. 
 290 
indicates, nevertheless, that MI has promising utility value for Contemporary Christian 
thought, as its logic does affirm no shortage of contemporary postmodern-cultural and 
contemporary empirical-psychological epistemology of religious experience. In 
particular, MI holds potential for Christian thought open, as I think it should be, to 
theological construction via multi-disciplinary dialogue. Consider, for example, MI's 
potential for Polkinghorne's frontier between science and religion: one might plausibly 
employ MI's descriptive epistemology in fruitful service to a theological method engaged 
in (at least) a four-way multi-disciplinary dialogue between: philosophical theology 
(descriptive models of religious experience—i.e., divine action, revelation), philosophy 
of religion (e.g., the phenomenology of religious experience), empirical psychology 
(models of the cognitive processes of religious experience) and postmodernism 
(including popular cultural perspectives on spiritual experience). The tenability of such 
an approach's promising is warranted by (for example): MI’s epistemological strengths; 
empirical psychology’s recent call for multi-disciplinary methods and multi-dialogical 
approaches for understanding religious experience; empirical psychology’s recent 
conceptualization of multi-level models of religious experience;543 and recent efforts in 
religious studies to engage the psychology of religion.544 An emerging, multi-disciplinary 
research milieu, whose methods and models of CRE have been anticipated by thinkers 
such as Barbour, Ramsey, Bowker and Proudfoot (for example), it is but one area in 
which MI evidences plausible and immediate promise as a contribution to contemporary 
Christian thought of a certain bent.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
543 Raymond F. Paloutzian and Crystal L. Park. "Recent Progress and Core Issues in the Science of the 
Psychology of Religion and Spirituality”, in Handbook of the Psychology of Religion and Spirituality, eds. 
Raymond F. Paloutzion and Crystal L. Park, pp. 1-22. See esp. p. 15 ff. New York: Guildford Press, 2013. 
544 Taves, Ann. Religious experience reconsidered: A building-block approach to the study of religion and 
other special things. Princeton University Press, 2011. “In preparation: Revelatory Events: Extra-Ordinary 
Experiences and New Visionary Movements. This research project looks at the role that unusual 
experiences play in the earliest stages of three well-documented new spiritual paths (Mormonism, 
Alcoholics Anonymous, and A Course in Miracles).”http://www.religion.ucsb.edu/people/faculty/ann-taves 
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8.4. CONCLUSION ON MAJOR RESEARCH ISSUE #3: MI’S DECRIPTIVE 
EPISTEMOLOGY OF CRE: A PROMISING CONTRIBUTION TO 
CONTEMPORARY CHRISTIAN THOUGHT  
 
J.K Mozley reminds us in the chapter’s opening passage that John Baillie was “a 
singularly independent thinker”.  An observation not unlike that of H.R. Mackintosh, who 
found Baillie to be “the most creative mind” 545 of his thousands of students, Mozley’s 
observation issues a warning to those who would “one day” assess the value of Baillie’s 
thought: Baillie’s thought often takes the reader down unfamiliar intellectual routes. 
Accordingly, Baillie’s thought must be engaged carefully, creatively, critically and 
unconventionally, if one is to do justice to both its complexity and subtlety. I have 
endeavored to do that in this chapter, as have I throughout this thesis.  
On the ground that MI’s descriptive epistemology agrees in general with the 
cognitive psychology of religious experience; that MI coheres with, as well as promotes, 
the Christian theological tradition’s emphasis on both the transcendence and immanence 
of God; that MI holds plausible promise as cognitive model of CRE per se; that MI also 
holds promise for contemporary Christian thought’s engagement with today’s ordinary 
person; I conclude that MI’s function as a descriptive epistemology of CRE is John 
Baillie’s promising contribution to contemporary Christian thought.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
545 The program for Baillie’s installation as lecturer at Auburn Seminary on Tuesday 26 October 1919 
quotes Mackintosh: “He [Baillie] has the most creative mind I have known among my students.” In 
Newlands, Transatlantic Theology, p. 65. 
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9. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS 
This research began with much speculation about the meaning of MI in the 
literature, as evidenced in competing interpretations about MI. Does MI’s logic reduce to 
an historical or sacramental model? Is MI a metaphysical structure or argument?  Does 
MI describe the mediation of knowledge of God as being a dyadic or a triadic 
relationship? Does MI separate faith from knowledge, or does it contend for an organic 
epistemological connection between faith and knowledge? Does MI evidence that Baillie 
was logically agnostic? Does MI’s idea of immediacy fail to express a “theologically 
understanding” of Christian knowledge of God, or does MI’s logic convey the very “logic 
of faith” itself?  Does MI de-personalize Christian faith in Jesus Christ? These competing 
interpretations about MI’s meaning beckoned an elucidation of MI’s logic. This thesis 
has provided insight into MI’s meaning in at least three respects: (1) it has provided a 
conceptual understanding of MI’s meaning, by modeling its logic (Chapter 2); it has 
provided a contextual understanding of MI’s meaning, by tracking MI’s development as 
within the dynamic context of Baillie’s MT’s development (Chapters 3-5); (3) it has 
provided a corrected understanding of MI’s logic, by engaging each of the above 
competing interpretations (Chapter 6). In short, the thesis has provided a clearer 
understanding of MI’s meaning than will be found in the prior research. En route to this 
major research contribution, the thesis has delivered two additional research advances: 
(1) the modeling of MI’s logic, which had not been previously modeled (Chapter 2); (2) 
research which indicates that Baillie’s latter MT evidences a stronger doctrine of the 
Holy Spirit than that found in Baillie's early apologetic works (Chapter 5).  
This thesis has also shown that MI’s importance for Baillie’s MT has been 
underestimated. Prior research has acknowledged MI’s central importance for OKG, and 
has somewhat noted MI’s residual effect on Baillie's latter works, particularly those 
concerned chiefly with knowledge of God. However, it has not maintained that MI is 
Baillie’s most important concept for his latter MT. This thesis has demonstrated that it is. 
Invariably, previous research has failed to detect MI’s seminal presence in 
Baillie’s early MT. This too has contributed to the underestimation of MI’s importance 
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for Baillie’s MT as a whole. This thesis has shown that a nascent version of MI exists in 
Baillie’s MT—as early as 1926—however: MI appears in Baillie’s idea of knowledge of 
God as being indirectly direct (ID). Evidence for MI’s nascent presence in Baillie’s early 
MT has been provided by the thesis’s diachronic trace of Baillie’s early (pre-1939) major 
works, those concerned with Baillie’s ideas of revelation, knowledge of God, and 
religious experience, in particular. Specifically, that trace’s elucidation of the apologist’s 
arguments with manifold philosophies and theologies divulged a mediating theologian 
repeatedly maintaining that manifold religious and philosophical epistemologies make 
knowledge of God either too direct or too indirect (too mediated or too immediate). 
Accordingly, Baillie has been found to contend repeatedly that knowledge of God as ID 
is the better epistemological alternative, as its logic corresponds with what Baillie takes 
to be an accurate reading of the belief content of ordinary persons’ religious 
consciousness. This discovery of MI’s nascent presence in Baillie early MT constitutes a 
substantial research contribution.  
This thesis has also provided a substantially more precise understanding of 
Baillie’s MT’s focus. Previous research has maintained that Baillie’s critical thought 
gravitates toward the problems of revelation and knowledge of God; this thesis shows 
that Baillie’s MT squarely focuses on the problem of the epistemological relationship 
between direct knowledge and indirect knowledge for knowledge of God (MTPP)—as 
across almost a 35-year span of theological development. 
The ordering of John Baillie’s non-systematic thought was found to be an ongoing 
challenge for John Baillie research. This thesis tackled that challenge with its diachronic 
trace. In the process, it discovered MTPP’s presence in Baillie’s first (ROR, IOR), middle 
(OKG), nearly last (IRRT), and very last (SPG), major epistemological works. As such, 
the thesis has provided John Baillie research a concept with which to chronologically and 
conceptually order Baillie’s thought: MTTP.  
Furthermore, the thesis has demonstrated that MI’s epistemology is a promising 
contribution to contemporary Christian thought. Here is a first for John Baillie research, 
to my knowledge. Inasmuch as MI's promise is wrranted, it constitutes a research 
contribution to John Baillie research, if also a minor contribution to contemporary 
Christian thought.  
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Lastly, we have raised the question about the field’s present estimation of John 
Baillie’s theological legacy. How should research arrive at a deeper understanding and 
fuller appreciation of it? Newlands provides the lead: 
 
 
“My own suggestion for developing part of the legacy of 
John Baillie would be along these lines. Faith in God 
means trust in God for all things. It is from religious 
experience, as part of our experience of all life, that faith is 
formed and sustained. This is experience, we claim, not 
simply of experience but of God. It is based on reflection 
on experience, ours and that of others throughout history, 
and it includes other components as well. Faith means trust 
in one who is in important respects mysterious to us.”546  
 
 
I have followed that lead; and this thesis instances what contributions can be made to 
John Baillie research, when Newlands’s insight is heeded. For this thesis has shown that 
MI’s epistemology does: situate CRE within the broader context of our life experience, 
when it emphasizes that faith in God is mediated by our shared knowledge of ourselves, 
others, the world, and God, including God’s Self-disclosure in and to our and moral 
consciousness; emphasizes that faith’s trust in God is mediated both by experience of 
God and by reflection upon that experience; and emphasizes that others, situated 
throughout history, mediate, sustain and deepen immediate knowledge of, and faith in, 
the One. In so doing, this thesis has afforded substantial insight into what is surely part of 
John Baillie’s theological legacy, his concept of mediated immediacy. 
The past two decades have witnessed a resurgence of research on John Baillie’s 
life and thought, due in large to the research of Newlands and Fergusson. My hope is that 
this thesis, the definitive work on mediated immediacy, has helped to nudge it along 
further still—with a measure of freshness, creativity and originality, à la John Baillie.                                                                       
87, 827 words 
                                                           
546 Newlands, “The Sense of the Presence of God”, p. 167.  
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10.2.4. Appendix A: Theological Language’s Limitations and The Apologist’s 
Mediation of Knowledge of God  
 
According to Baillie, Christian theology is the science of the God-human 
relationship in the human soul. It operates on critical-realist assumptions that religious 
consciousness (Christian, or otherwise), revelation, and theological language can be 
epistemologically connected to God’s thought. Ground for this epistemological 
connection comes from Baillie’s interrogation and description of the belief content of the 
religious consciousness of humankind. All humans appear to evidence an immediate 
knowledge of God in their (gradated) moral consciousness of value; to believe that 
second-order truths (language) can participate in the logical structure of God, the ground 
of all being and knowing; to believe that knowledge of God is self-authenticating; to 
believe that there is an ontological connection between the human spirit and the Spirit of 
God—to believe, that is, that there is a divine-human relationship in the human soul. 
Baillie’s thought on the scope, limitations, and purpose of apologetic language mirrors at 
least three other long-standing positions in Baillie’s thought: Baillie’s distinctions 
between second-order truths and first-order realties; faith’s immediate knowledge of God 
and other realties by direct acquaintance; and theological language’s reflexive action 
upon, and discursive (mediated) knowledge about, God. Baillie maintains that these types 
of knowledges are also epistemologically connected; that doctrine can correspond to the 
beliefs inherent in religious experience, be its reference to the general experience of 
humankind (faith in God) or to Christian religious experience (faith in God’s being in 
Jesus Christ). The Christian theologian recognizes that “[t]he proper name of religious 
experience is faith”,547 recognizing also that faith, Christian or otherwise, is not a 
passionate commitment to second-order truths about God (i.e., never a trust in theological 
language); rather, it is a commitment to God with all of one’s being. Accordingly, the 
Christian apologist recognizes that theological language cannot “exhibit” the God 
immediately-known, regardless of how many true propositions can be marshaled as 
support for God’s existence. Nonetheless, theological language can be used effectively in 
service to God: for while religious consciousness does believe knowledge of God to be an 
                                                           
547 SPG, p. 64. 
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immediate knowledge, an interrogation of the religious consciousness of humankind 
suggests that all humans have a basic knowledge about God (moral consciousness) that 
interrogation also shows that, while faith in God (religious consciousness) admits of 
varying degrees, faith is universally regarded as “a moral trust in the ultimate Source of 
power, a confident reference of our values to the real order of things”.548  The religious 
apologist’s use of theological language should be informed by these and other key 
observations about religious consciousness’s beliefs, including the beliefs that: faith 
comes from immediate knowledge of God; knowledge of God is grounded in, and 
mediated by, humans’ moral consciousness of value. The apologist will also be reminded 
that knowledge of God is often repressed (Freud) to the extent that some persons (e.g., 
the intellectual atheist) are not self-consciously consciously aware of their faith in God. 
The specifically Christian apologist’s attempt to use language to exhibit the belief content 
of the God-human relationship, as interpreted by religious consciousness, is one informed 
furthermore by the epistemological distinction between knowledge about Jesus Christ 
(doctrine) and faith’s immediate knowledge of God’s being in Jesus Christ (CRE). The 
apologist’s incorporation of these insights helps the apologist to make way for the 
coming of faith’s immediate knowledge of Christ (Christian religious consciousness), as 
language mediates divine action and, by God’s grace as well, divine revelation.  
 
                                                           
548 IOR, p. 340.  
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10.2.5. Appendix B: Detailed Schematic of Thesis Architecture 
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